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1.1  Background to the indigenous peoples of Taiwan 
Taiwan is an area that hosted many colonial regimes for many centuries. The most 
significant political authorities in Taiwan can be divided into six distinct periods: 
the Dutch East India Company Period (1624-1661); the Koxinga Period (1661-
1683); the Qing Dynasty or Manchu Period (1683-1895); the Japanese Colonial 
Period (1895-1945); the Chinese Na-
tionalist Period (1949-1996); and the 
current Independent or Democratic 
period (1996-present). Indigenous 
people have experienced many cultur-
al, social, legal and economic encoun-
ters. ‘Indigeniety’ has been contexted 
and contested under a range of differ-
ent regimes of governance. 
 In the early 17th century, Taiwan’s 
indigenous communities were divid-
ed into the pingpu of the plains and 
the mountain aborigines. Gradually, 
most pingpu peoples encountered 
Han Chinese customs and religious 
beliefs and, consequently, their na-
tive languages died out (Yang, Yan-
jie 2000). As a result of this cultural 
assimilation, it is now hard to deter-
mine how many pingpu tribes actu-
ally settled on the plains of the island. 
In the Japanese period, the indige-
nous peoples in the mountains were 
generally divided into nine major 
tribes, although many of these people 
lived on the coastal plains and other 
islands (Miyamoto 1985; Mori 1900, 
Map 1.1
Government-recognized Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan 
(2010) 
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1985 2000; Ogawa et al. 1935). The Amis populated the two sides of the Coastal 
Mountain Range in eastern Taiwan; the Puyuma lived on the Taitung plain and 
the Yami settled on Orchid Island. The Atayal, Saisiyat, Bunun, Tsou, Rukai and 
Paiwan made a living in the mountains. 
 The traditional nine tribe classification system, which was used throughout 
most of the 20th century, is now considered inadequate for the classification 
of the rich variety of Taiwan’s indigenous cultures (Chiu 1994; Rudolph 2003a, 
2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). Today, fourteen  tribes are recognized as distinct 
subgroups. In 2001, the Thao Tribe was classified as a dependent of the Tsou; 
in 2002 the Kavalan was classifed as a dependent of the Amis; in 2005 both the 
Truku and the Sediq were officially declared as dependents of the Atayal people; 
and in 2008 the Sakiraya were classified as dependents of the Amis. The Pingpu 
are also pursuing official recognition of their status as indigenous peoples. Eth-
nic movements on ethnic labels indicate the need for recognition of both iden-
tity and methods of survival. In addition to ethnic labels, Taiwan’s indigenous 
peoples have initiated many social movements of diverse persuasion. What they 
all have in common, however, is an emphasis on the land rights issue. Certainly, 
throughout the 1980s and 90s, many indigenous people brought many waves of 
‘Returning my Land’ social movements to national attention. 
 In fact, indigenous ways of subsistence have demonstrated the peoples’ rela-
tionships with the land, no matter whether the lands in question are the places 
where they live now, or whether they are the lands where they lived in the past. 
These relationships are the basis for their feelings of injustice regarding their 
social status. Slash-and-burn mountain cultivation, hunting, fishing and gath-
ering were the main occupations of indigenous peoples, and millet, corn and 
dry rice were the staple crops (Wallis-Nokan 2002). Plains-dwelling aborigines, 
including the Pingpu, Puyuma and Amis, primarily engage in farming, fishing 
and hunting. Fishing on the sea is a key occupation for coastal people such as the 
Yami (Tao Tribe) on Orchid Island. These ways of life were challenged or abol-
ished by outsiders starting from the Qing Dynasty. Indeed, the Qing Dynasty’s 
strategies for mountain indigenous peoples oscillated between two ‘adversative 
policies’: defensive segregation and development by pacification. Under the de-
fensive segregation policy, there appeared to be a line of demarcation between 
Taiwan’s plains and mountains that prevented the Han people from encroach-
ing on the indigenous peoples’ territory. However, this policy of segregation was 
gradually defeated by the Han’s pursuit of lands. Indigenous ways of subsistence 
have been forced to change in a very short space of time. The taking over of Tai-
wan by the Japanese in 1895 accelerated the changes and, in fact, the Japanese 
state went on to remove almost all indigenous land rights. Though some reserva-
tion land rights were preserved for indigenous survival, their subsistence meth-
ods proved to be no match for so many changes. 
 The Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) government adopted almost identical 
land policies to those designed by the colonial Japanese government. In 1999, a 
White Paper on Indigenous Policy was introduced by the then Presidential can-
didate Chen Shui-Bian, of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This paper 
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announced that as of the 10th of September 1999 the legal term ‘natural rights’ 
would be used to recognize that the indigenous peoples were the original owners 
of Taiwan (see appendix 3) (Simon 2005, 2007, 2011; Rudolph 2006). The docu-
ment suggested that indigenous land rights and sovereignty should be acknowl-
edged and upheld. Subsequently, many policies concerning indigenous rights 
have been reviewed and redesigned. Certainly, this White Paper was the positive 
result of many decades of effort by indigenous social movements. During Presi-
dent Chen’s second term in 2005, the Indigenous Basic Law, which comprises 
much of the spirit of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2007) was promulgated. 
 In the Indigenous Basic Law, land rights are largely respected and redesigned 
to support the indigenous people in such a way that they can revitalize their 
livelihoods – whether it be through co-management or autonomy – and their 
relationship with the natural resources. However, what the law does not seem 
to be able to deliver is tangible land rights for indigenous people. There are still 
many problems at the legal and governmental levels and numerous land claims 
are still being filed by indigenous communities. A case in point is the Smangus 
tribe, which advocated a not guilty plea in response to the Windfall Beech Tak-
ing Event on the 2nd of September 2005, just a few months after the passing of 
the Indigenous Basic Law (IBL):
 
「Rhiyal myan, hmwsa qeriq son sami！」Kmayal qu mrhuw Icyeh,「Iyayt 
nbah mstkung、msqara qu sinnusan inlungan！Nyux qu mshiyu mtasaw 
na Gaga Tayal, khanay ta nya Utux Kayal, prraw、slokah、phngyang qu 
Smangus！ Mhway simu kwara！」(Atayal version)
“It is OUR land! Why call us thieves?” said Icyeh the chief, “And to the end will 
we fight with perseverance and with no fear. We firmly believe that all of our 
efforts will bring forth the realization of justice and truth. We pray that God 
will bless for this time, and I hope that the friends of Smangus will help us with 
your great strength. Thanks you very much!”1
To return to the issues that will be the focus of my research, I would say that 
this event illustrates the dialectic of accessing indigenous land rights through 
claims. Issues relating to what exactly indigenous land rights are and, moreover, 
how any kind of meaningful ‘rights’ for indigenous peoples can be achieved are 
repeatedly raised in Taiwan. There is also the need to balance the needs of this 
group, which makes up only about two per cent of the small Taiwan Island, with 
those of the wider population of about 25 million, who occupy a crowded area of 
36,000 square kilometres. It is not enough to simply address this issue from a le-
gal point of view; there also needs to be a reconceptualization of the land-human 
relationships inside and outside of indigenous cultures and societies. Among the 
1 http://smangus.blogspot.com/search/label/The%20Petition%20Statement%20of%20Smangus 
(last accessed 2008/2/28).
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crucial issues to be discussed and resolved are: What is a ‘right’? What are the 
characteristics of land and resources that need new consideration? Who has the 
right to ‘own’, and to what extent and under what conditions? 
 The Smangus Windfall Beech Taking Event is only one case among the 400-
600 tribes (amounting to a population of circa 500,000 in 2010) of Taiwan. These 
groups are suffering, and debating with society about who has rights over what 
and under what conditions. These land issues actually relate to a reconceptual-
ization of politics in terms of who can legitimate a base for governance between 
so many different human units on issues of justice and the appropriation of land 
and natural resources. 
Nowadays, land claims have to relate to a reconceptualization and practice be-
tween ‘human units’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’ and ‘rights’. These four vague, and not 
necessarily exclusive, categories now form indigenous peoples’ emic2 challenges. 
Here, the term ‘institution’ is broadly construed as pertaining to ‘the rules of 
the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction’, as defined by North (1990). The notion is not used in 
a narrower sense referring to institutional arrangements embodied in promul-
gated policies, formal laws and customary rules, and the state administration 
(Ho 2005). Rights include not only legal rights, but also illegal or customary 
accesses that are practiced in daily lives. Thus, ‘human unit’ denotes not only 
legal ‘personhood’, but also subjectivities that local people can play roles in any 
possible arrangements between institutions and power concerning the manage-
ment of any land and natural resources. In this thesis, I present the Taroko area 
of Eastern Taiwan in order to discuss the process of encounters that have taken 
place over the course of more than a century, from 1895 to 2010. Taroko is an 
2 An emic view is the view from within, the etic view is the view from outside. Emic is what a person 
in the culture studied would have, and an anthropologist would take an outsider's view.
Emic concepts and practices
of the relationships between
‘people’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’
and ‘rights’
Etic concepts and practices
of the relationships between
‘people’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’
and ‘rights’




Encounters of emic and etic concepts in human-land relationships 
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example that provides us with an opportunity to explain and interpret the chang-
ing scenarios of land related issues. I will begin with the historical roots of land 
problems and examine the process, quality and characteristics of rights, and the 
conceptualization and practice of the politics between ‘human units’, ‘land’, ‘in-
stitutions’ and ‘rights’ in an attempt to shed light on the future of indigenous 
rights in Taiwan. Thus, my research questions are as follows:
 
1 What are the characteristics of land rights that indigenous people feel are 
misunderstood, ignored, distorted or intruded on by the others they have 
encountered in the Taroko area during the past century and until now?
2 What evidence, proofs or discourses have indigenous people offered to legiti-
mate their claims over land rights in different historical, economic, political 
and legal situations?
3 How do indigenous people in the Taroko area initiate, mobilize, organize and 
act to express their claims?
4 How does society and the state respond to such claims in the Taroko area?
5 What kind of rights – and to what extent – have indigenous people in the 
Taroko area accessed, or extinguished, distorted or created in relation to vari-
ous claims made during the different historical, ideological and institutional 
contexts and given the ethnographical framework.
Thus, the research process began with collecting as many kinds of claims as pos-
sible. For my purposes – and in terms of ethnographic curiosity – these claims 
could take the form of: murmurings, complaints, explanations, requests dis-
courses, acts of resistance, expressions and representations of feelings, guess-
es, pleas, petitions, law suits, accusations, charges or assertions, or even joking 
about and indirect criticism of land rights or resource appropriations. Land 
claims occur at the point where encounters take place between two or more re-
gimes, i.e. encounters between ‘human units’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’ and ‘rights’. As 
figure 1.1 illustrates, I have set an operational definition for the claims that are 
the focus of my investigation. Land claims are expressions that occur between 
etic (from outside) and emic (indigenous) concepts and the practice of human-
land relationships. 
1.2 Scientific background: property paradigm
1.2.1 Anthropology and other disciplines’ exploration of human-land 
 relationships
Land claims tell us a great deal about human-land relationships. Claims inter-
pret evidence or discourses about who is right and who is wrong in relation to 
land resources. Firstly, however, claims need to be analyzed by both sides of the 
encounter. Anthropologists are keen to be involved in such encounters in order 
to see both the etic and emic dialectics of claims. As Hann says, ‘at any one time 
Accessing indigenous land rights through claims in Taroko Area, Eastern Taiwan
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within each culture concepts of ownership and possession, control and disposal, 
are likely to vary greatly for different categories of object’ (Hann 1998:3). Many 
studies have adopted the approach of ‘property’ theory in order to shed light on 
how people conceive the relationship between land and people, especially in en-
counter scenarios. In an article on the land claims of the Canadian First Nation 
people, Nadasdy argues that ‘the land claim process—because it forces aborigi-
nal people to think and speak in the language of property—tends to undermine 
the very beliefs and practices that a land claim agreement is meant to preserve 
(Nadasdy 2003: 1).’ He warns that ‘Western concepts of property on land and 
many natural and human resources […] are incompatible with many indigenous 
people’s views about proper human-animal/land relations (Ibid).’ 
 Issues of incompatibility are of particular concern to anthropological meth-
odology. A brief history of anthropological investigations on human-land or 
property issues, by scholars such as Lowie (1928) and Harrison (1992), illustrates 
the problem of compatible or incompatible issues:
[…] for example, each exploded the term “thing” by showing how aboriginal 
and other non-European societies had well-defined ideas about the ownership 
of incorporeal ‘things” such as songs, magic, and ritual. Other anthropologists, 
such as Anderson (1998), de Coppet (1985) and Scott (1988, 1998), to name 
but a few, have examined non-European ways of relating to the land which 
Western jurists would not recognize as constituting relations of “ownership” 
at all and have argued that we must recognize that these relationships, like 
“private property,” grant those engaged in them certain rights to the land on 
which they live (Nadasdy 2003). 
Strathern (1984, 1985 and 1998) argued that European notions about property 
are contingent on a Western distinction between ‘subject’ (the owner) and ‘ob-
ject’ (the owned). It is, therefore, inappropriate to apply this concept to cultural 
contexts where such a distinction does not apply. She suggests taking into ac-
count the radically different ways in which humans construct notions of per-
sonhood in an attempt to theorize about property. She argues that we need to 
expand our notion of ‘person’ before we can understand how ‘property’ works 
cross-culturally. Anthropology will always bring us back to the basic question, 
what is property? 
 Many disciplines have explored this question: legal and economic theories 
tend to focus on property as a well-defined ‘bundle’ of rights. Political philoso-
phers legitimate property through labour (like John Locke; see Tully (1993); An-
ghie (1999); Cronon (1983)), or time (like Kant; see Huang 2005), even through 
competition between the two. Economists focus on efficiency (like Demsetz; 
see Ryan 1991) and anthropologists on kinship (N. Peluso) or artefacts (Zerner 
2003: 5). Anthropologists are also keen to highlight ‘the cultural production of 
nature as idea and ideal and the politics of representing relationships to nature, 
resources and territory (Zerner 2003: 1-5; Weiner 2002; Small 2006: 276)’, and so 
their focus turns to religion, songs, verses, trances, memories of performances, 
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poetics and the like. Common property theory differentiates between continu-
ums from private to communal, to state owned and open access property re-
gimes (Ostrom, Agrawal, Persoon, Roy and Peluso). I have reviewed these disci-
plinary explorations and I have found that they are more convergent than diver-
gent in terms of the focus of the relationships of humans-land with distribution 
and appropriation in different contingencies. As Hann (1998) thinks: 
[…] to approach property as a key category in cross-cultural analysis with a 
view to restoring it to its 19th century role as a fundamental concept in an-
thropology and suggest that property can serve to integrate the separate disci-
plinary traditions in Western scholarship, and also to expose the deepest prob-
lems posed by forms of social organization rooted in misleading ideas about 
separability (Ibid: 9).
These discussions have so far pro-
vided a number of perspectives 
with which to analyze how differ-
ent systems of properties encoun-
ter each other and result in incom-
patibilities between the clear or 
vague ‘bundle’ of rights; between 
labour or time , private or commu-
nal, ownership or usufruct, and so 
on, to name but a few. As Hann de-
fines, ‘Property, in other words, is 
not a thing, but a network of social 
relations that governs the conduct 
of people with respect to the use 
and disposition of things’ (1998: 4). 
However, I would caution that with all these points of view, and with my field-
work and on-going analysis, I am aware of ‘the casual use of that term “property” 
in ethnographic investigations that creates a severe risk of superimposing on 
other cultures the shadowy fragments of a contemporary Western weltanschau-
ung (cosmology)’(Bell 1995:609). I would, ‘rather than gloss over a wide range of 
phenomena under the mantle of property and property rights’, as Bell mentions, 
‘ […] effectively deconstruct property into the essential elements that distinguish 
specific forms of rights in relation to resources’ (ibid). In this thesis, I consider 
‘property’ to be a constitution of the relationship between human units, land, 
natural resources, rights and governance institutions. It is the governance by hu-
man subjects over land resource objects. Indigenous people have much to say 
regarding the adjustments of the relationship between human subjects and land 
resource objects that constitute the notion of property. Indeed, the claims they 
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A study of the relationships between ‘human units’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’ and 
‘rights’ regimes is quite a political science and, like politics, it focuses on power 
or the interchangeability of interests and appropriations (Thelen 1999; von Ben-
da-Beckmann 2003). How power and interest structures relate to the concepts 
of institutions of governance at the indigenous local level with its referencing 
scales is central to my study. The ideas and forms of state institutions or custom-
ary institutions and administrations at different times are primarily a process of 
legal system constructions taking place between different agents of colonialism 
and bodies of power and indigenous encounters. Consequently, my initial inves-
tigations range from customary property laws or private laws to public laws and 
some regimes of international laws that model the constructions. 
 With regard to indigenous ideas about the relationship between human units, 
land, institutions and rights, a comparative perspective between the formal laws 
and customary laws promises to penetrate the anthropological and ethnographi-
cal explorations of the encounters of different systems. But, even in anthropo-
logical explorations, we still need to be aware that human-land relations cannot 
be simply categorized as economic or political or kinship, but rather they require 
scrutiny of each culture’s context and contingencies. As Hann stresses: 
the concern with cultural differences and the rigorous questioning of Western 
models as complementing, and not invalidating, the efforts of other anthro-
pologists to prioritize issues of distribution and political economy, and thereby 
to sustain traditional concerns with sharing and exclusion, equality and hier-
archy, power and social justice. Whatever the languages used to express them, 
these are the universal concerns of property and they are shared by the people 
we study (Hann 1998: 44).
Tim Ingold (1986) tried to take a holistic point of view on the investigation of 
tenure. He said:
Now tenure, as I have shown, is an aspect of social (that is, intersubjective) rela-
tions. Such relationships, like the persons that they constitute, are processes in 
time. To find out about tenure, an anthropologist has to ask of his informants: 
‘who owns, or has what rights over, this land or what’? The answer comes: a 
certain person, or maybe several persons with multiple, nesting or overlap-
ping claims. To pursue his inquiry, Luckmann had to discover who the people 
involved are, and for this he can be satisfied with nothing less than a complete 
biography of each individual and their mutual relations (Luckmann 1979: 67). 
Every person is his past, a continuous, experiential trajectory described by the 
temporal unfolding of a total system of social relations of which he is but a 
particular point of emergence. In short, to understand people, social relations 
and, hence, tenure, we must adopt a perspective that is holistic and proces-
sual rather than atomistic and static, as adopted in the analysis of territorial 
interaction. Tenures are about the ways in which a resource locale is worked 
or bound into the biography of the subject or into the developmental trajec-
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tory of those groups, domestic and otherwise, of which he is a member. For it 
is only by virtue of his belonging to the community that a person acquires a 
relation to a determinate portion of natural space, furnishing those material 
conditions of his social being ‘which constitute, as it were, a prolongation of 
his body(Marx 1964: 87-89)’. Through tenure, the locale stands to its holder in 
a relation of metonymy. Every claim is part of a continuous process, expressing 
an intention or promise for the future through the fulfilment of past obliga-
tion’ (Ingold 1986: 137).
1.2.2 Encounters are dialectic rather than separations between different 
 property paradigms
In my opinion, encounters are not primarily about clear definitions of the 
boundaries of different legal regimes, but rather they are concerned with what 
happens during these encounters. Thus, an emic approach to property relations,
 
‘requires investigations into the total distribution of rights and entitlements 
within society, of material things and of knowledge and symbols. It requires 
examination of practical outcomes as well as ideals and moral discourses, and 
an appreciation of historical process, both short-term and long-term’ (Hann 
1998: 35). 
Recent studies in Taiwan on the issues surrounding indigenous people and land 
have followed the above mentioned debate on what defines (or not) property in 
the Western legal sense. In a study of the Bunun people from central Taiwan, 
Huang (2004) expresses how the Bunun use the concept Hanitu (spirit) to differ-
entiate between natural and artificial things, and he then explores the relations 
natural and artificial things have with human agents. He agrees with Strathern 
(1988) that the interactions between things and humans are like a bundle of in-
puts and outputs in different moments and situations. This results in fluid and 
complicated, but hardly absolute and exclusive, relations. In order to escape the 
Western perspective of a fixed property regime, the Taiwanese law scholar, C-T 
Huang (2005) departs from Y-G Huang’s (2004) and Cronon’s ‘ecology property’ 
and invites us to think of an ‘ecological (checks and balances)’ scenario when 
considering the agents and characteristics of resources and how the relations be-
tween them synchronically and diachronically interact with one another. There 
is a need for greater attention to the above reflections on indigenous people-land 
relationships from legal and anthropological perspectives in Taiwan if there is 
be a reconceptualization of the encounters between laws, governance and rights. 
In terms of the ethnographical aspect of the Taroko area, I will provide more 
evidence that such interactive systems in a modern Taiwanese Indigenous sce-
nario ‘cannot be understood except in the wider context of cultural beliefs and 
practices that give them meanings’ (Malinowski 1935: 320). Indigenous peoples 
are not only immersed in, but also imposed upon by a barbarianism that, over 
centuries, has taken its ideas from social Darwinism, orientalism, post-coloni-
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alism, environmentalism, multiculturalism, regimes of ‘international societies’ 
(especially 19th century international law, see Anghie 1999), globalization, Com-
mon Property theory, and so on, all of which have an impact on how people 
claim, conceive of and practice the relationships between ‘human units’, ‘land’, 
‘institutions’ and ‘rights’. It is certainly hard to deal with so many perspectives 
and ideologies, but I suggest that starting with the claims from a particular area 
can provide an ethnographical understanding of some perspectives and ideolo-
gies, from the local to much wider levels, to see what precisely the dialectics are, 
and what the possible faces of ‘human units’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’ and ‘rights’ have 
been in the past and will be in future.
 
1.3 Choice of field area: the Taroko now and then
The place name Taroko originated in the Qing Dynasty to indicate the location 
where the tattooed people lived in the Karenko area (what today forms Hualien 
County). Later, from 1895, Qing rule of Taroko was gradually replaced by Japa-
nese colonial control and administration. 
Map 1.2
Shoulin Township in Hualien County 
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Subsequent Japanese colonial governments came to understand that the Taroko 
area was inhabited by the Tekdaya, the Toda and the Truku people who spoke 
different dialects of the Sedeq language and had their own internal conflicts (fig-
ure 1.3). They were lumped together as the Sedeq people, a sub-ethnic group 
belonging to the Atayal tribe, by Japanese anthropologists at that time, and they 
were singled out as a special area for occupation. Consequently, these three in-
digenous groups share similar experiences of being ruled by Japanese govern-
ments. Indeed, since the Japanese colonial period they began to show up in his-
tory more vividly.
 Following the colonial invasion, these three peoples in the Taroko area (here-
after I will use ‘Taroko people’ to indicate the people from here, no matter which 
of the three tribes they belong to) found themselves embroiled in continuous 
claims and conflicts over land with the Japanese during the period 1896 to 1945 
(Yang, Sheng-tu 2004). Even after Japanese rule from 1945 until today, they have 
been involved in many clashes with the Forestry or National Park administra-
tions of the Nationalist government. During the 1980s and 90s, for example, they 
held many demonstrations about the unfairness of cement industry investments 
on their lands (Simon 2007; Chen, Zhu-shang 2000). Since 2000, they have run 
campaigns to promote the correct use of ethnic names (Yu, Guang-hong 1980, 
1982; Ma 1998) and advocating autonomy at the village or ethnic level. In the 
last decade, they have been providing a combination of environmental protec-
tion and eco-tourism and development projects that are similar to the common 
property co-management of natural resources. Community mapping activities 
are also taking place at different geographical levels in this area.
 Since 2003, I have had the opportunity to be involved in some of the afore-
mentioned activities. I believe that, gradually, these actions, discourses and prac-
tices could encourage a reconceptualization of the relationships between ‘human 
units’, ‘land’, ‘institutions’ and ‘rights’. Thus, I began to search for materials from 
the past century to use in my study, examining how indigenous people are ac-
cessing land rights through claims. 
 
1.4  Specific objectives of the thesis
 
Through the five research questions raised above, and as a result of being ac-
quainted with Taroko contexts, I began to investigate and answer the following:
1 How do indigenous peoples conceive or construct discourses as evidence and 
proof to support their land rights claims? As Appell suggests, ‘we should be-
gin with a single productive resource and work back to the individual(s) who 
have interests of various kinds in that resource’. I will ‘discriminate among the 
types of interest held by an individual in any single piece of claim I encounter 
in the field, and among the kinds of social relationships obtaining between 
individual and any referencing scales of members’ (Appell 1976). 
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Figure 1.3
Major ethnic groups and subgroups in Formosa (Taiwan Govenor Bureau of Aboriginal 1911: 1)
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2 The next step is to ascertain whether or not such interests are recognized as 
emic categories by the wider social group, and only protected through mutual 
recognitions or codification in rules and laws (rights) that may intercom-
municate with the etic ones (Appell 1976, 1984; Wiber 1991: 471-472). I will 
examine dispassionately, yet critically, the claims made for land rights in the 
ideologies and practices of different agents at different times and in different 
political situations. 
3 I am particularly concerned with the transfer of ideas between different 
groups and contexts that occurs when claims are made in the Taroko area. 
Claims are useful for expressing ideas in particular contexts, but seek to go 
beyond such demonstrations and statements of the obvious in order to ask 
how they come into play in the accessing of land rights and ideological and 
political discourse more generally. 
4 The examination of institutions – formal, tangible organizations, legislation 
and regulations, and the unwritten social and cultural norms – will enable a 
more thorough understanding of exactly where and why conflicts, claims and 
perverse outcomes occur; and, more positively, how programs and policies 
can be developed based on seeking out and creating compatibilities between 
sets of rules (Gerritsen and Straton 2006: 181). 
5 This, in turn, may further enable all participants to restructure their sets of 
rules to better serve their shared purposes (Ostrom 2005). Taiwan is also 
‘poised within a problematic moment in the charting of global and regional, 
legal and developmental policy pertaining to land environmental resource 
management, governance, and the rights of indigenous peoples’ (Roseman 
2003: 138). Thus, the country is in need of such an area analysis in order to 
shed light on future policy implementation. Moreover, an ethnography of the 
human-land relationships in the Taroko area is needed in order to under-
stand the reasons why conflicts are happening now and also for future policy 
suggestions supported by the Indigenous Basic Law (2005) and further law 
constructions that indicate the importance of ‘respecting and recognition of 
indigenous ways of conceptualizing and management of properties’ (Indig-
enous Basic Law 2005: Article 20; Yang, Chih-wei 2005). 
1.5 Notes and queries on field methodology and ethical issues
Land issues and claims happen not only between outside regimes, but also with-
in indigenous communities. Clearly, there are some issues that are too sensitive 
for a researcher from outside to gain access to. Land issues are sensitive because 
people involved always have contradictory ideas and propositions. Consequent-
ly, entering a field and trying to find a suitable approach to claimants was the 
hardest part of conducting the field research in the beginning. 
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I found that what subjects would reveal about land issues to me depended on 
how they perceived me. Over the years, I have participated in many research 
projects sponsored by the government, National Park headquarters, local NGOs 
and universities or local indigenous associations and played a number of differ-
ent characters in the field. Thus, I have spent a lot of time (almost 28 months3) 
and effort taking part in all kinds of activities, both local and outer, in order to 
make contacts and to get a sense of, and a feel for, issues concerning land claims 
in recent years in the Taroko area. During the first few years of my research, I 
continued participating in the Indigenous Traditional Territorial and Land Sur-
vey (ITTLS) sponsored by the Council of Indigenous Peoples in central govern-
ment. Through my role as a project manager, I was able to observe and partici-
pate in the mapping practices in the Taroko area. Later, I was also invited by the 
local indigenous people to participate in four projects: (1) Oral Life Histories of 
Truku Elders Documentation Project; (2) Traditional Territories Mapping With 
Methodology of Public Participatory Geographical Systems (PPGIS) (Lo, Y-C 
2006, 2007; Tsai, B-W et al. 2005); (3) Skadang Tribe Mapping Project (Liu, D-K 
2008); and (4) Petition for Compensation from the Asia Cement Company Ac-
tion Project. I believe that as a result of being invited by local claimants to work 
with them, and being given the opportunity to get to know these people in a 
‘natural’ way, I was able to proceed to the second stage of fieldwork, a stage I 
would describe as observation by participation. This is what Geertz (1973) called 
an opening of ‘thick’ description. It is only at this stage that I believe I am more 
or less capable of managing the ethical issues of research. There is an important 
lesson here on how to be a ‘person’ in an ‘other’ culture. Now, after 28 months of 
preliminary field life, I would say I have made important contacts, friends even, 
with whom I will be able to work on future investigations. Furthermore, I have 
also come to better understand the boundaries between people and to recognize 
sensitive issues. Once I felt more accepted by the people in the area, and more 
engaged and involved in the many claims scenarios I was interested in (follow-
ing a process outlined below), I was more confident about reacting to different 
situations and able to make decisions about how to interact with the informants. 
 During the initial fieldwork phase, I tried to access different sources of ar-
chives and administrative documents with a view to discovering – and really 
getting to know – as many claimants as possible. Among these resources were 
the Archives of Shoulin Township Council of Mediation, Documents of Shoulin 
Township Representatives Council, Hualien County Representatives Councils, 
Taiwan Province Representatives Council of Senates and many Japanese docu-
ments. I have collected, traced and carried out interviews in relation to about 400 
cases of land claims in the Taroko area spanning more than one hundred years. 
These cases were fought at diverse levels of government and at different stages of 
the court system. Analysis of these archives of land claims, followed by in-depth 
3 My first two stages of fieldwork lasted a total of 28 months ranging from Jul-Dec 2003 (6 months), 




interviews with concerned informants is my major methodology. It is a special 
methodology that makes use of conversations between histories and informants 
in the ethnographical moment I am presenting here. In other words, the docu-
ments or ‘histories’ are able to interact with the ethnographical ‘now’ in my in-
vestigations. 
1.6 Brief summary of the chapters of the thesis
The thesis consists of ten chapters, including an introduction to the theories and 
methodologies (chapter 1) and a conclusion (chapter 10). The main body of the 
thesis consists of five parts, comprising chapters 2 through 9:
 In chapter 2, I describe the formation of the area of Taroko and the state law 
frames introduced in the indigenous areas. The way in which the Japanese au-
thorities viewed the indigenous people’s ways of lives, personalities or characters 
can be encompassed by what I call perspectives of ‘state of nature’. The term ‘state 
of nature’ has been used by Western political philosophers to describe the con-
ditions or characters of those ‘others’ that are situated in pre-state conditions. I 
have adopted this term to discuss how the Japanese authorities started from this 
premise in order to develop policies on the rule of indigenous peoples and natu-
ral resources with the aim of accomplishing a ‘state of the nature’ that translated 
into control of these people and resources. 
 As for land tenures, most of the lands in Taiwan were owned by Japanese 
authorities (see Chart 1). In respect of the indigenous area, I have adopted the 
frame used by a Japanese officer, Iwaki Kamehiko, who was in charge of indig-
enous land management during the final years of Japanese rule. In 1934, he sepa-
rated indigenous lands into three categories,: (1) some 51% of the total indig-
enous population (84,000) lived in indigenous villages and were allowed to re-
main at this original location; (2) some 24% of the indigenous population would 
be ‘mixed up’ and recombined into new living groups; and (3) some 25% would 
be moved to new areas. In other words, generally speaking, at least half of the in-
digenous areas of Taiwan would experience some level of migration. In my field 
area in Taroko, almost all the indigenous people have experience of these poli-
cies. Based on historical analyses, I focus on how the Taroko people claim land 
rights through mapping activities in different contexts.
 My explorations in chapters 3 and 4 echo Iwaki Kamehiko’s categories and 
find that indigenous people in Taroko have diverse experiences of migration that 
can be differentiated into a further three categories: (1) diaspora: people almost 
entirely removed from their relations with their original lands almost because of 
forced or semi-forced migration; (2) hybrid: mixed communities formed from 
people of different origins, from different tribes or villages with different cus-
toms or gaya (customary rules); and (3) in situ communities: people still living 
on their original lands but subject to control by new political regimes.
 Recent mapping activities related to the Taroko people reflect these three 
contexts of land and people relations. Above, I introduced some of the mapping 
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projects and processes that I have participated in or observed both inside and 
around the Taroko area. These mapping projects take place at different levels and 
have various sponsors, initiators and practitioners. The largest mapping project I 
participated in was the Indigenous Traditional Territorial and Land Survey (IT-
TLS) sponsored by the Council of Indigenous Peoples in central government. 
This project dealt with all the mapping initiatives and implementations in all of 
the 55 indigenous townships in Taiwan over a period of five years (2001-2006). 
The Taroko area hosts three townships: Shoulin (秀林鄉), Wanlong (萬榮鄉) and 
Choushi (卓溪鄉) and is also involved in this national mapping project. Over the 
decades, I have observed that indigenous people have always viewed (and there-
fore participate in) mappings as a tool for expressing their land claims. These 
mapping activities are mainly conducted in collective actions that express a high 
plea for collective purposes like autonomy or common property management. 
Based on these mapping actions as land claims, I differentiate collectivilization 
by collective actions on collective purposes from individualization that focuses 
on claims to legal titles of reservation lands among indigenous individuals. 
 In chapter 5, I discuss some of the legal or legislative processes undertaken by 
legislators and officers or indigenous activists in order to see how they concep-
tualize lands or territories, something that is necessary for the revitalization of 
indigenous rights. I will illustrate some processes both before and after a break-
through regarding the stipulation of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (IPBL 
2005) with a view to understanding how activists use ideas about lands and ter-
ritories as legal devices to help in their claims to indigenous land rights. I will 
present a case study from the Taroko area to show how the Truku people are 
advocating and acting to achieve autonomy and to illustrate trends in the legal 
sphere, in discourse and in indigenous movements. I specifically focus on how 
the Truku build on the matrix between lands, sovereignty, people and rights in 
order to bring an image of autonomy that they think would avoid many of the 
problems that they are suffering now (and have suffered in the past). I conclude 
that legislating is another way of mapping an ideal Utopia of lands and territo-
ries. 
 Aside from these mappings of the Utopia of indigenous territory, many land 
claims also occur in the legal and institutional spheres. Indeed, reservation lands 
are a common and frequent arena for claims. Reservation lands mean lands pre-
viously reserved for indigenous future use and titling.
 Indigenous peoples in Taiwan have been titled or granted limited reservation 
land rights since Japanese colonial rule. However, this land tenure still conflicts 
with indigenous ideas and practices in a number of ways. In chapter 6, I ex-
plore some of the major types of conflicts and land claims that result from the 
encounters between etic state substantive laws and the customary laws or gaya 
(indigenous term for customary rules). Based on approximately 400 land claims 
cases, collected from different levels of legal and governmental institutions, from 
interviews and interaction with local indigenous claimants in the Taroko area, 
I reveal that state laws, such as the Indigenous Reservation Land Management 
Procedure (IRLMP) (原住民保留地管理辦法), which processes indigenous 
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reservation land titling using four fundamental procedures, are the major bat-
tlefields for land conflicts. My research suggests that, as a result of these four 
procedures, which proceed from: (1) land measurement and survey; (2) registra-
tion of superficies (3) duration of actual usufructs; to (4) the granting of titles, 
ever stronger individualistic ideas are being suggested and built among indig-
enous individuals and communities. Gradually emerging from these procedures 
is the possibility of a person who is supported by individualistic ideas based on a 
Roman-Japan-Chinese civil law system. Emerging from these four procedures is 
a law-individualism that moves towards what McPherson (1962) defines as ‘pos-
sessive individualism’, which equips people to be ‘[…] the sole proprietor of his 
or her skills and owes nothing to society for them.’ From this perspective, this 
chapter uses case studies to show how reservation land is increasingly linked by 
this law-individualism to capitalism, which is not well embedded in indigenous 
communities in the Taroko area.
 Many studies have detailed analyses of the political and economic processes 
involved in the setting up of cement and power plant industrial districts, but they 
lack an ethnographic perspective on the processes of indigenous movements and 
on the processes of being embedded in cement industrial districts and other spe-
cial national projects such as hydropower plants and national parks. In chapter 
7, I illustrate how indigenous people have played a role (from minor to major) 
in all these processes. This is necessary to understand all of these ‘development’ 
scenarios. Among these scenarios I have found a neo-liberalism hegemony in 
the Taroko area that constructed itself through what Davey Harvey described as 
‘accumulation by dispossession’. I will focus on the metaphor of ‘money’ in in-
digenous communities in order to discuss the encroaching of this hegemony on 
development scenarios. Through this chapter, I express the conflict between the 
property regimes of individualization and collective appeal of land rights from 
the indigenous communities.
 In chapters 8 and 9, I will describe how the indigenous locals and some gov-
ernment institutions constructed new governances on ‘ambiguous commons’ 
through ‘uncertain co-managements’ of river protection in three communities 
inside the Tarako area: Skadang, Pratan and Meqreq in the period 2000-2010. I 
found indigenous locals were expecting to achieve co-management regimes that 
would support livelihoods, ecology and cultural identity. However, the govern-
ments concerned could only devote limited efforts because of the constraints of 
insufficient law infrastructure. 
 Contingency is a term I use to describe results coming from unknown or 
unpredictable causes and effects in the process of co-management implementa-
tions of river protection. I use the methodology advocated by Vyada et al. (1999) 
– ‘evenemental or event ecology’ – to express the visible line of causes and effects 
that threads through my observations. For those results that did not trace any 
clear evenemental lines, I try to contextualize the situation with other indirect 
information, such as rumours, gossip or my own experiences. Though it may 
seem that I use the term ‘contingency’ to express frustration about the failures 
of the three cases presented, possible lines of cause and effect are still illustrated 
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in order to make some suggestions about further implementation of co-manage-
ment of river protection. Ambiguity about properties, local management capac-
ity, legal infrastructure and the interpretation and implementation of laws, along 
with ideas of self-determination are the main issues that are contextualized in 
order to reach the conclusion that indigenous locals are claiming land rights 
through these collective actions. These collectivilization of the use or rights of 
nationalized natural resources are efforts that indigenous people bring to make 
collective good for indigenous communities. Local ideas on ‘sovereignty’ will 
illustrate these land claims, which are initiating a new contextualization of the 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From ‘State of Nature’ to ‘State of 
the Nature’: The Taroko Area in 
 Japanese Colonial Times
2.1 Debates on whether the indigenous people were citizens or 
 barbarians 
When the Japanese colonists came to rule the mountain areas, there were many 
conflicting ideas about how to deal with the indigenous peoples using national 
rules and laws. The mountain people were recognized as special and different to 
others; they lived in areas where they were hard to access or control compared 
to the Han or other civilized barbarians on the plains. The term ‘barbarian’ (蕃
人), first used in the Qing Dynasty and later adopted by the Japanese, was used to 
indicate these indigenous groups. The question regarding how differently should 
they be treated was debated in different contexts. In 1906, the Governor of Tai-
wan, who already appeared to have his own ideas about how to deal with the 
barbarians, raised a theoretical debate on this issue. Four authors put forward 
their ideas during this debate, (Li, Wen-lian 2001). Among these ideas was a 
suggestion by Okano Saitaro that barbarians should be seen as Japanese citi-
zens, with the same (and equal) rights and duties as ‘regular’ Japanese citizens 
(Okano 1992). Okano Saitaro states that, according to article 5 of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki4 signed with the Qing Dynasty in 1895, ‘people in the territories to 
be ceded to Japan may, at will, sell their real estate and move out of the area with-
in two years. After two years, people remaining in Taiwan and other ceded areas 
are seen as Japanese citizens’ (Ibid.). This idea was challenged by Fujii Kensuke 
(Kensuke 1992), who thought that barbarians were not Japanese citizens, but 
simply human beings. He thought the issue of whether barbarians were Japanese 
citizens or not depended on location, i.e. the barbarians were not living in the 
4 The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japanese:下関条約, ‘Shimonoseki Jōyaku’), known as the Treaty of 
Maguan (simplified Chinese: 马关条约;  traditional Chinese: 馬關條約; pinyin: M guān tiáoyuē) 
in China, was signed at the Shunpanrō Hall on 17 April 1895 between the Empire of Japan and the 
Qing Empire of China, ending the First Sino-Japanese War. The peace conference took place from 
20 March to 17 April 1895. In this treaty, China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty of 
the Penghu group, Taiwan and the eastern portion of the bay of Liaodong Peninsula together with 
all fortifications, arsenals and public property.
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Qing sovereign area, so they were not Qing citizens. Later, when these areas were 
ceded to Japan, but were not yet governed by Japanese rules, these people were 
not considered Japanese citizens either. As article 5 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
states, only those who obey Japanese rules can be seen as citizens. Thus, at this 
time, the mountain people of Taiwan were viewed as people without nationality 
or citizen status, but their existence could not be denied (Fujii 1992). Respond-
ing to this idea of an individual without nationality, Yasui Katsuji, president of 
a local court, took the view that, legally, barbarians had the equivalent status of 
animals (Katsuji 1993). That is to say, barbarians had no status under Japanese 
law. Katsuji emphasized that though the Qing Dynasty had paid compensation 
to Japan for the Mutan Village Incident (牡丹社事件)5 he did not believe that 
this compensation could be seen as proof that barbarian areas came under the 
sovereignty of the Qing Dynasty. He also pointed to articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, which say that ‘territories including Taiwan ceded to Japan and 
the inhabitants included referred only to Han and cooked barbarians but not raw 
barbarians’. Whether raw barbarians were to be seen as citizens or not depended 
on the ideas of the Japanese government regarding barbarians obeying Japanese 
rules. The extent to which Japanese rules were obeyed would determine whether 
barbarians were treated as human beings or like animals. 
 Through the ideas expressed in this policy debate, we can see that the Japa-
nese authorities were searching for legal reasons to support their treatment of 
raw barbarians. These ideas also concerned how they conceptualized individuals 
who were different from Japanese citizens, people they saw as being grounded 
in a civilization based on state laws and rules. This can be seen as a sort of social 
Darwinism that supports the idea of the evolution of humans. The fourth idea 
raised during the debate on the status of barbarians was firmly rooted in social 
Darwinism and suggested that ‘barbarians had a simple society, they couldn’t 
understand the idea of ‘state’, so they were not suitable for ‘legal’ lives because 
the barbarians were still practicing head-hunting that the Japanese government 
thought as priority to be abolished’. Barbarians were thought of as animals be-
cause they did not know the meaning of Japanese laws, therefore it was futile to 
establish any laws in the indigenous areas. The idea of seeing barbarians as ani-
mals was reflected in the treatment meted out to indigenous people in response 
to their actions, which were considered crimes. In particular, the state hoped to 
take control and put a stop to head-hunting, a practice that it saw as criminal, 
but which the barbarians viewed as traditional and customary. The debate about 
establishing a criminal law to control indigenous peoples was a hot issue during 
the initial encounters between the Japanese state and the barbarians. 
5 In 1874, 66 seamen from Miyako Island (宮谷島) in the Ryukyu Archipelago, or Okinawa, were 
shipwrecked at Payao Bay (八瑤灣) near the southern tip of Taiwan. Fifty-four of them were subse-
quently killed by local aborigines after stumbling into Mutan Village (牡丹社).
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2.2 Debates on criminal law for raw barbarians: ‘state of nature’ 
 
Barbarians were notorious for acts such as head-hunting and robbery and in 
1906 the Japanese government planned to implement criminal laws to bring 
them under control. The course of action chosen was to consider the barbar-
ians as citizens who should be disciplined under national laws. The idea was 
soon challenged and, in fact, halted by, among others, Nagano Yoshitora (長野
義虎) who seemed to have great influence over the decision to enact (or not) 
the Criminal Act on Raw Barbarians (生蕃刑罰令). He believed that ‘the raw 
barbarians were strongly united in units, such as a tribe composed of only one 
family’. ‘They were so low in the evolutionary scale that they were proud of cru-
elty and they grew stronger and closer, uniting to protect themselves in small 
units’ (Yoshitora 2004[1897]). If one of their members did something ‘outlawed’, 
the group would rally round and hide him from the Japanese policemen. There 
was no hope of the criminals being handed over by the chief of the small tribe. 
Nagano Yoshitora illustrated this theory with evidence from cases in the Taroko 
area where, in December 1896, the tribes of Mukua (木瓜蕃) and Chijaochun (
七角川蕃) battled with each other following a misfiring incident during hunt-
ing. The government wanted to punish one of the initiators of the conflict, but 
failed to do so because the tribes closed ranks and refused to obey the govern-
ment. Nagano Yoshitora (長野義虎) had a long list of examples to illustrate how 
the barbarians were only interested in feuding amongst themselves and would 
not let either the Qing government, or later the Japanese government, negotiate 
peace with the help of state laws. On occasions where there was feuding between 
barbarians and Han or Japanese people, the only way to calm the situation was 
to bring in the army. The Shin-Chen Incident (新城事件) in the Taroko area in 
1896 was also discussed by Nagano Yoshitora (長野義虎) and put forward as 
evidence that the barbarians were too cruel to know the meaning of criminal law, 
which was intended to make people act rationally. Nagano Yoshitora suggested 
that the deeds of barbarians were best expressed through the ‘animal theory’, 
i.e. that these people were indeed barbarians and civilized ways could not help 
them. Since wars were always the way barbarians resolved their conflicts, there 
was no need to establish a criminal law to encourage them to find a rational and 
civilized way to stop their feuding and cruelty. In other words, barbarians were 
not capable of taking legal responsibility for their deeds. Some argued, however, 
that barbarians differed in their levels of cruelty or evolution. Another consul-
tant, Takekoshi Yosaburo, who suggested a policy based on the theory of evolu-
tion, had a great influence on later policymaking and practices. He divided the 
barbarians into three categories in order to assess their level of assimilation into 
Han or Japanese civilization (Takekoshi 1996). As Tavares concluded: 
The indigenous people consisted of three groups, based roughly on their ac-
culturation to the settlers’ culture and their relationship to the state. The 
‘cooked savages’(shoufan/jukuban) or plains aborigines (pingpuzu/beibozoku), 
who practice settled agriculture, pay taxes in kind, and perform military duties 
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for the state. The ‘transformed savages’ (huafan/kaban) were an ephemeral, 
transitional category applied to indigenes people who were in the process of 
being ‘cooked.’ The ‘raw savages’ (shengfan/seiban), or mountain aborigines 
(gaoshanzu/kauzanzoku), lived on or beyond the savage border and had mini-
mal contact with the settler society or the imperial state. While the two cat-
egories of cooked and raw savages came to form the larger subdivisions of an 
ossified ethnological classification during the Japanese colonial period, such 
categories during Qing rule were cultural-political and quite permeable (Ta-
vares 2005:364).
The raw barbarian did not obey the authorities or assimilate at any level. In 1902, 
Takekoshi Yosaburo stated that since the raw barbarians were not obeying the 
government, then the authorities had the right to fight against them; further-
more, they had the right to kill them at will because they had no legal status at 
all. Laws were of no use when dealing with barbarians. Consequently, when all 
the ‘rational’ and ‘civilized’ options had failed, the Japanese felt they had to resort 
to treating barbarians the way the barbarians had treated them. The formation of 
special areas such as Taroko can be viewed as the dialectic between negotiations 
and battles or wars between barbarians and colonial governments – cruelty for 
cruelty and rationality for rationality and sometimes a mix of the two. Here we 
can see that the way to treat raw barbarians was differentiated by the responses 
from the raw barbarians. Takekoshi Yosaburo believed that there were three di-
mensions or levels to dealing with the problems of raw barbarians. He thought 
‘the problem of barbarians at that time was not related to human rights issues 
because they were actually animals’ (Taiwan Zongdufu 1998 [1932]).
It was not land problems either, because there was no legal status for indig-
enous people so there were no rights to claim lands. So there were no legal 
questions. But it is easy to treat them as a social problem in which we could 
see that bad humans would be replaced by good humans in an evolutionary 
scale. All we have to do is to get rid of murders and explore the mountains to 
find resources. Then we could solve the mountain problems (ibid; Fu 1997). 
According to Takekoshi Yosaburo’s theory, barbarians would, over time, evolve 
to different levels of civilization; so there was a possibility for raw barbarians to 
become cooked. In the interim, however, those who were cruel could only be 
treated as non-humans. This special theory for the acts of raw barbarians is de-
scribed as ‘state of nature’. If we adopt the term ‘state of nature’ to describe the 
hypothetical condition of humanity before the state’s foundation, then we can 
see that the Japanese government was using a ‘state of nature’ theory not only to 
describe, but also to respond to and deal with Taiwan’s indigenous people before 
Japanese law was established in the indigenous areas. In this context, ‘state of 
nature’ becomes synonymous with anarchy. 
 This ‘state of nature’ theory was not implemented by the authorities ruling 
different colonial contexts or areas. In practice, the differentiation between citi-
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zen and barbarian was the result of a fuzzy process in which barbarians and au-
thorities were applying policy on a trial and error basis, especially in relation to 
land rights. Later, I will illustrate these processes of trial and error undertaken by 
both the barbarians and the Japanese authorities in order to see how the ‘state of 
nature’ of the barbarians was conceptualized and implemented by the Japanese 
authorities who used methods of both ‘cruelty’ and ‘civilization’ in their dealings 
with the area of Taroko. 
Photo 2.1
The abolition of head-hunting
The abolition of the practice of head-hunting was a priority for the Japanese authorities. This 
photo shows a ceremony to bury all the skulls in a village in the Taroko area following its con-
quer in the 1914 war by the Japanese authorities. (National Taiwan University Library)
2.3 The Formation of the Taroko Area: From a criminal to a civil law 
area?
2.3.1 Dialectics between sincerity and cruelty: the Shin-Cheng Incident 
 1896 
The formation of the area of Taroko was contingent with the historic events 
that occurred from the late Qing Dynasty to the rule by the Japanese authori-
ties based on the aforementioned different theories of ‘state of nature’ (Pan 1999; 
2008; Mona 1984, 1997; Qiu 2004: 23-24). Taroko was a place name that indi-
cated an area of raw barbarians who were hard to access. Lo Da-Chu, a military 
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general sent by the Qing Dynasty to control the east of Taiwan, used the term 
Taroko to indicate the area of ‘special treatment’ between the Da-Chou-Suei Riv-
er and the village of Pratan (Lo, Da-chun 1997: 47). The Taroko area was per-
ceived as a bad area of ‘savage pests’ (番害), a term that suggested the need for 
‘pesticides’. The indigenous people living in the Taroko area, who had previously 
been under Qing rule, were categorized as raw barbarians by the Japanese. They 
were infamous for their head-hunting and disobedience. When the Japanese ar-
rived to the east of their territory, they worried that they would face many dif-
ficulties and they hoped to find convenient ways to access the area and negotiate 
with the indigenous people. 
 The Japanese authorities believed that the best method was to call for submis-
sion from the indigenous tribes (Ino 1918: 648). This was a customary strategy 
that the Japanese used to adopt as a first step, inviting the people in the Taroko 
area to have a peaceful relationship with them and to submit to rule by the Japa-
nese authorities. Indeed, the Japanese found it could be useful to negotiate with 
the barbarians, mostly through mediation with a renowned leader in the Taroko 
area, Li A-Long (李阿隆). In fact, Li A-Long was a Han migrant who had moved 
to the Taroko area. He was a trader and a broker between multi-ethnic groups in 
the Taroko area and, as a tongshih (通事), he was a semi officer, an agent of the 
Qing State brought in to negotiate between the state and the indigenous people. 
Li A-Long married a Taroko woman and had many relationships with this group 
of indigenous people. He spoke their language and, in many respects, was trust-
ed by the Taroko. In the late Qing period, around 1880, ten years before the Japa-
nese arrived, Li A-Long was chosen (as a Han) to act as a representative, along 
with some twelve other Taroko, people to welcome the Qing governor and Gen-
eral Lo Da-Chun (羅大春), who came to build roads and maintain the peaceful 
relationship between Qing authorities and indigenous peoples. The Japanese re-
alized that Li A-Long could perhaps be the key to accessing the Taroko area. Top 
Japanese officers in the eastern colonial districts came to see Li many times to ask 
him to negotiate on their behalf. At first, Li seemed to be playing games, agreeing 
to provide safe passage into Taroko for the Japanese authorities. Li even carried 
out a population census and provided a list of tribes and village names in the 
Taroko area to the Japanese. But later, Li refused to help the Japanese authorities 
any further. He disappeared, and rumors suggested that he had been murdered 
or that he had escaped. In fact, the Japanese had become frustrated when they 
learned that Li was Han and not a real representative of the Taroko people, a bar-
barian group that was still head-hunting, robbing and carrying out many cruel 
deeds towards other people, including the Japanese and the plains people on the 
east coast. 
 One incident in particular upset the Japanese authorities very much. It hap-
pened in 1896, the second year following their arrival in the east of Taiwan. What 
has become known as the Shin-Chen incident (新城事件) centered around a 
group of soldiers who were killed by the Taroko people. The group of soldiers 
was trading weapons and daily necessities with the indigenous people in order 
to encourage good relationships with the tribes, just as Li had done. The incident 
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was triggered when a number of Taroko people believed that some Japanese sol-
diers had humiliated a Taroko woman by using sexual language; there were even 
rumors that she had been raped. The Japanese authorities were shocked that the 
top officer in this district appeared to have shifted from a policy of insisting on 
peaceful negotiation (Wang, Xue-xin 1998). To control the incident, the Japanese 
authorities sent in troops made up of other indigenous people and the Japanese 
army in order to attack the tribes and villages involved. They even summoned 
battle ships to bombard the area from the sea. Even this show of force did not 
result in the surrender of any Truku tribes. In fact, the Japanese troops suffered 
a heavy defeat and the Taroko indigenous people lost all respect for them. The 
weapons the indigenous people were using were better than the ones the Japa-
nese had (Ibid.). 
 The Japanese authorities were frustrated by the fact that they had thought it 
possible to employ a broker like Li to deal with the administration of the barbari-
an area and to implement a peaceful transfer of sovereignty through submission. 
The Japanese authorities trusted the policy of submission, and Li, too much and 
they forgot the fact that the indigenous communities in the Taroko area were a 
homogeneous group that did not obey a single authority, despite appearing to be 
from one ethnic group. The Japanese thought they could enter the Taroko area 
by following Li’s example and that they could develop peaceful relations with the 
Taroko people through trading and by making friends. A report by Takekoshi 
at the time stated that ‘the Japanese had established somewhat precarious trade 
relations with most of the Formosan tribes, whose ‘mental condition’ has under-
gone a remarkable transformation’ (Takekoshi 1907: 221). 
 This idea of fostering peaceful relations through civilized deeds was actu-
ally an important principle among Japanese governors. It was seen as part of 
their colonial skills. A good example is the first governor to Taiwan, Kabayama 
Sukenori (樺山資紀), who gained insight and experience through his relations 
with a tribe in Nanou (南澳), a neighboring area north of the Taroko settlement. 
In early 1872 (so prior to the Japanese taking over Taiwan in 1895), Kabayama 
Sukenori had been on an expedition to observe the situation in the indigenous 
areas. This fact-finding mission had the aim of assessing which indigenous areas 
were suitable for Japanese occupation. He entered the area and gained access to 
the indigenous people in a sincere way, in order to earn their trust. Furthermore, 
he believed that if you treat indigenous people with sincerity (for example, shak-
ing hands or exchanging gifts, as discussed by Barclay 2005), then they will treat 
you with the same respect and will not kill you without good reason (Fujisaki 
1926: 676). ‘Sincerity is for sincerity’ was an important premise embedded in 
many Japanese administrative rules6 later on. Sincerity meant treating the indig-
enous people as human beings. Later, however, the practice of this principle did 
6  In 1931, the Bureau of Barbarian Management stipulated a Handbook for the Standard of Busi-
ness for Policemen in Barbarian Areas, which stressed (in article 3) the need for a ‘soft’ approach 
to the indigenous people. In article 6, the need to be sincere and honest with the barbarians was 
emphasised, and in fact, ‘sincere’ indigenous people were encouraged to work as policemen in the 
barbarian areas.
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not always result in this much sought after sincerity in the relations with indig-
enous people and the Japanese authorities were often confronted with cruelty by 
the barbarians. As a number of later documents reveal, the decision to trade or 
to cooperate with the Japanese varied between indigenous tribes or communi-
ties. Different tribes or communities had different strategies used to strength-
en some groups and weaken others. There were intense struggles and competi-
tion amongst indigenous people, even though they belonged to the same ethnic 
group (Toyota 1896). A decision to access (or not) Japanese resources depend-
ed largely on whether the indigenous people thought the Japanese were strong 
enough to rely on in relation to their own internal struggles. This was at a time 
when the Taroko were powerful because of their weapons, which they exchanged 
with and imported from foreign areas through brokers such as the infamous Li. 
The Shin-Cheng incident occurred following the humiliation on Taroko women 
by Japanese soldiers. The traditional way of avenging an insulted woman was to 
hunt human heads, and many Japanese soldiers’ heads were hunted by Taroko 
people and subsequently taken to various tribal villages. These acts were humili-
ating for the Japanese who, until then, had felt that they were treating the indig-
enous people sincerely. 
 From these histories, it is clear that the Japanese were seeking convenient 
methods to access the Taroko area and the indigenous people who lived there. In 
the eyes of the Japanese authorities, their logic of treating people sincerely and in 
‘civilized’ ways was soon challenged by the ‘uncivilized’ ways of the indigenous 
peoples. As a report from the Japanese government said: 
During the year 1899, a punitive expedition was undertaken against this Taro-
ko tribe, but it ended in failure. Since then several efforts have been made to 
subjugate them by peaceful methods, but such attempts also turned out to be 
futile. By degrees their rapacity and barbarity reached extreme limits, creating 
increased fear in the border districts (Formosa Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs 
1910).
 
Consequently, another theory began to gain ground. It was based on evolution 
theory and the idea that the indigenous people were too ‘raw’ to communicate. A 
method of ‘cruelty for cruelty’ was implemented and involved the use of technol-
ogy such as electric guard lines and setting up boundaries to mark out the area 
of special treatment for Taiwan’s barbarians. 
2.3.2 Administration behind the electric guard lines: the Wili Incident of 
 1906 
The reasons why problems like head-hunting and robbery occurred frequently 
were, on the one hand, because indigenous people in the Taroko area were eager 
to conquer the plains area and to fight with neighboring ethnic groups. On the 
other hand, the Japanese hoped to develop the neighboring areas where many 
valuable natural resources, like gold, camphor trees and many minerals, were to 
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be found. Inevitably, this resulted in conflicts between the Japanese government 
and the Taroko people or neighboring ethnic groups. In the first few years of oc-
cupation, the Japanese were not familiar with this terra incognita (Mori 1900), 
and they hoped that the eastern part of the country, where there were no seri-
ous influences from the Han people, would be easier in terms of establishing a 
colonial area for future Japanese immigration. After a number of defeats at the 
hands of the Taroko people, the Japanese considered the situation to be a nation-
al problem. They needed a solid plan to suppress the conflict. The then Taiwan 
Governor wrote a ‘Report on the Control of the Aborigines in Formosa (Bureau 
of Aboriginal Affairs 1911)’ in which he expressed a serious need to deal with the 
problems of the Taroko barbarians. The report stated that: 
The savages in Formosa may roughly be divided into two tribes whose districts 
may be shown by drawing a line across the central mountain ranges from Hori-
sha in the west to Karenko (Hualien) in the east. Those in the northern part 
are termed the ‘northern tribe’ and those in the southern part of the island the 
‘southern tribe’. Now the term ‘northern tribe’ is adopted as another name of 
the Atayal group (Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs 1910:3). 
From this section of the report, we see that the Japanese authorities were defin-
ing the Atayal groups as ‘more uncivilized than any of the others’ (Takekoshi 
1907: 219; Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs 1911; Ino et al. 1918: 648). As the south 
of the country calmed down and the north had almost been cleared, the Atayal, 
and in particular the Taroko people, remained fierce and still ‘outside of the law’ 
(Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs 1910: 3). 
 Consequently, the new technology of electric guard lines and landmines 
were used to define a control area. ‘In the year of 1907, a new guard line was es-
tablished in the district of Karenko on the east coast, against the strongest and 
most powerful tribe of Taroko. This line was subsequently extended. The Taroko 
tribes, the most powerful savages among the Atayals, occupy an extensive terri-
tory in the mountain districts of the Karenko Prefecture on the East Coast’ (ibid: 
15). 
 We can see that in order to deal with the Taroko, the Japanese were using 
national resources to prepare for the ‘taming of the raw barbarians’. This project 
was initiated by Governor Sakuma, a man with military experience, and went 
under the name of the Five Year Taming Project. The operation involved brib-
ing local indigenous people or sending officers or merchants to investigate the 
manpower and weapons in the area. It was a common tactic to bribe indigenous 
people within the communities to work as spies and to incite disharmony. On 
the surface it appeared that Sakuma and his men were sending exploration teams 
to record the natural resources, landscapes and physical environments in order 
to make maps for future use. In fact, the Japanese were doing their best to build 
electric guard lines, not only in the east but also on the north and west sides of 
the Taroko area, in order to prevent other ethnic groups from joining or helping 
the Taroko. Clearly, the aim was to isolate the Taroko and to cut them off from 
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the supplies of daily life and information. A map drawn by the Japanese govern-
ment in 1906 already shows the Taroko area blocked off and awaiting occupa-
tion. Certainly, the Japanese used every opportunity to surround the inaccessible 
area where the Truku people lived (The Geographical Society of China located in 
Taipei 2003).
As the 1906 map shows, those areas outside the guard lines were beyond Japa-
nese rule. As a report by Yosaburo Takekoshi, a member of the Japanese Diet, il-
lustrates, this was a big issue for Japan and one they felt needed to be progressed: 
‘the Chinese policy toward Formosan indigenous peoples had been to “govern 
them by leaving them strictly alone”’ (Takekoshi 1907: 212; Michio 1998; Yoshi-
michi et al. 1996). Takekoshi suggests, 
The entire area of Formosa is estimated at about 14,000 square miles, of which 
nearly half is still in the hands of the savages, outside the reach of our Govern-
ment. [Land] above 1,500 and below 3,500 feet is swathed in dense forests 
teeming with large and valuable trees, and in particular camphor trees. This 
timber belt covers about 5,230,000 acres. It is also supposed to be rich in de-
posits of gold, iron and kerosene oil. But, at present, it is occupied only by the 
savages, and only the agricultural resources of the coast plans are exploited. In 
my opinion, the golden key to the infinite wealth of the island will only be ob-
tained by opening up the savage districts (Takekoshi 1907: 212). 
The policy of opening up the savage districts seemed to be practiced by the appli-
cation of the electric guard line system. The Japanese developed this policy from 
a method adopted by the Qing dynasty, which had intended to separate the Chi-
nese settlers of the plains from the savages of the mountains. The Japanese used 
other indigenous ethnic people to act as guards in order to maintain the line and 
keep the area inside safe for the exploration of natural resources and land. They 
also tried to push ever deeper inside the barbarian territories. 
As the Japanese subsequently pushed their way into indigenous territories, the 
native peoples fought back. By 1903, Japan had already seen 1,900 Japanese 
killed in 1,132 incidents initiated by the indigenous people of the island (Take-
koshi 1907: 229). One typical incident resulting from this policy was the incident 
at Wili in 1906 in which the Taroko people felt that they were not receiving fair 
returns or the promised benefits from leasing Wili tribal lands to a Japanese 
company engaged in producing camphor (Ruan 2001; Jin, Qing-shan 2010; Ino-
suke 1935). 
 The Taroko people made a sudden attack in July 1906 and killed the police 
chief of the Karenko District along with thirty camphor workers. Subsequently, 
plans for a punitive campaign were carefully mapped out. However, the territory 
in question was so steep and precipitous that it was impossible to conduct a cam-
paign from the plains. Accordingly, it was decided to blockade the indigenous 
territory by installing yet another guard line, which extended 7.5 miles (see map 
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Map 2.2
Taroko Area surrounded by electrical guard lines and dynamite until 1911 (Mochiji 1912) 
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2-1). This boundary fence was constructed in May 1907. At the same time, a 
bombardment of the villages from the sea was executed.
 Until this period, the affairs between the Taroko people and the Japanese au-
thorities had centered not only on establishing an area of criminal control, but 
also on the competition for natural resources and territory. Some indigenous 
scholars believe that following this incident in 1906, the Japanese did admit, to 
some extent, the rights of indigenous people to claim rent or lease fees for the 
territories that they had occupied and that had been leased to the Japanese cam-
phor company. This policy, to admit that the Taroko people had certain land 
rights, was an exception to the general rule that the entire island of Taiwan, in-
cluding the barbarian area, was terra nullius and therefore no land rights could 
be granted to raw indigenous people. So far I have not found any documents to 
prove that the Taroko in the Wili area were granted any degree of land rights. 
But one opinion expressed in a document written by Luo, stated that the inci-
dent happened because the indigenous people were not paid a reasonable wage 
in their jobs making camphor products (Luo 1953). There was also a suggestion 
that the Japanese company had paid an indigenous tribe that actually had no 
right to claim what they did not deserve. Clearly, if the dispute had centered on 
salary rather than rent, then there would have been no reason to believe that the 
incident resulted from a land rights conflict. However, the fact that the village of 
Wili was outside the guard line meant that the Japanese were encroaching inside 
the indigenous area, step by step, in a drive to incorporate more land and natural 
resources.
 Constructing borders or guard lines was not the ultimate plan for the Japa-
nese in terms of dealing with the barbarian problems. What attracted the Japa-
nese most were the natural resources inside the barbarian areas, especially in the 
Taroko area. General Sakuma, who was later nominated to be the fourth Gover-
nor of Taiwan, attempted to settle the barbarian problems using martial meth-
ods. In considering the Taroko problems he said, ‘the east coast is full of gold and 
minerals, so it’s said, around the area of the Tatsukire River in the Taroko area, 
which is inside the Taroko territory. The gold in the Taroko area should be valu-
able enough to be able to balance all of our national debts’. Governor Sakuma 
later drew up a national plan to seek support from the Japanese Parliament for 
a five-year long savage management policy. He hoped to invest a great deal of 
national resources to, firstly, support the pacifying of all the barbarian territory; 
secondly, to make the barbarian territory a free area, where anyone could enter; 
and thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, to bring safety and economic devel-
opment to the entire island (Komori 1933: 526-531). 
 Before we discuss how the Japanese authorities implemented land and prop-
erty law, I will describe some of the claims and complaints made by indigenous 
people from the Taroko area. This will demonstrate how, in the first decade of 
Japanese rule, indigenous people felt about the administration that was shifting 
between different ideas about the nature and characteristics of barbarian socie-
ties. 
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One precious historical document expresses the barbarian’s views of life inside 
the North Barbarians Area. The author, Iijima Motoi (飯島幹), appears to have 
been a Japanese clerk working as a surveyor or reporter, liaising between the 
Japanese authorities and indigenous villages. In the next section, I will discuss 
the issues he reported in order to analyze the gaps between policy and practice 
in relation to the authorities and the indigenous people. 
2.4 Iijima Motoi’s reports of complaints
Iijima Motoi quoted, almost in full, what an anonymous Atayal man had told 
him:
We don’t know why we are surrounded by the electric fences of guard lines 
and we are bombarded with big bombs and small guns? Are the fences pro-
tecting us or the Han people? The fences were extended every year and the 
lands behind the fences were granted to the Han to cultivate. Is this the way 
that the Japanese meant to protect us from the start? The Japanese said that 
they wanted to protect us. But, why did they invade our territory? The bam-
boos and the trees on our land actually belong to us. However the Japanese 
didn’t think so. They sold or leased our lands to the Chinese at will. This is quite 
a despotic ruling. It is tyranny to sell what we had to others without our con-
sent! For example, we use camphor as fire wood, but the Han think camphor 
is a treasure that is hard to find any more in indigenous villages; so the Han 
people beg us to exchange our camphor. This way of exchange is a common 
practice that we have known for a long time. But the Japanese broke our cus-
tom of selling or making contracts with the Han and only make large profits for 
themselves. We consider these deeds as unreasonable, what we call ‘yumigato’ 
or ‘mayuule’ (ユミガト or マユーレ), which means highly dishonourable. If 
you take other people’s property without their consent, that is a criminal deed, 
something that we indigenous societies do not allow. Are the Japanese doing 
this intentionally; or, are they just ignorant? Or, is this just the way the Japanese 
do things? If this is the way the Japanese behave, then, I will tell the Japanese 
that if they do this intentionally, it is unreasonable and we will find chances to 
teach them a lesson. The so-called ‘protection’ should be offering help to us. 
Orders that are unreasonable render our life unprotected (Motoi 1906:1-17).  
 
 This section of a petition was recorded in an academic journal, ‘Reports on Tai-
wan Customs’ (台灣慣習記事), with the support of the Japanese authorities, in 
order to depict indigenous customs and aid the management of savages. Later, 
some scholars described the majority of the reports in this journal as being too 
academic for policy application (Chiang 2002: 205). It is interesting that in this 
petition, we see a mirroring of complaints; this time it is the indigenous peo-
ple accusing the Japanese of being irrational or ‘uncivilized’ (ユミガト). Fur-
thermore, the indigenous people claim that there are actually rules and customs 
48
Part I ■ History
for property relations inside their indigenous territories. The indigenous people 
thought the Japanese authorities were being cruel to them. The idea of ‘cruelty 
for cruelty’ appears to be emerging as a result of feeling repeatedly cheated by 
the Japanese. As Iijima Motoi later quoted, ‘Concerning the ordinances from 
the Japanese authorities, are the Japanese authorities qualified to order us indig-
enous peoples? Ordinances are intended to make us obey what the Japanese or-
dered, but should we do this? We couldn’t find any reasons to do so.’ In this para-
graph, it is clear that indigenous people believe that they should be independent 
and free of interference from outside. Indeed, this kind of independence is often 
mentioned as a particular social characteristic of the Atayal society, where peo-
ple were independent and united in very small groups of families or extended 
families who occupied a particular area (Wang, S. H 1986; Wang S. S 2001; Wei, 
1963; Li, et al. 1964). Iijima Motoi (飯島幹) emphasizes this: ‘In our indigenous 
societies, orders or ordinances only happened between fathers and sons or hus-
bands and wives; we don’t accept any orders from other ethnic groups, and there 
are no reasons to obey other’s orders’. This idea of family or tribal sovereignty 
supports the indigenous peoples’ belief that they should be outside of Japanese 
rules. It is also a reason why the Japanese encountered so much resistance from 
the Taroko. 
 As far as the Japanese were concerned, indigenous people should be incor-
porated in, and therefore could be ‘protected’ by, the state and be subject to state 
laws based on civilization, not barbarian cruelty. The only way the indigenous 
people would submit to the protection of the Japanese state, was if the rights to 
their lands and territories remained intact. However, the Japanese authorities 
appear to have broken the implicit and explicit contracts of their protective role. 
Thus, the indigenous people felt that it was reasonable to ‘find chances to teach a 
lesson to the Japanese’.
 The ideas expressed in this petition are critical of the policy practiced in the 
indigenous areas, such as illegitimate orders, intrusive guard lines, the failure 
of protection, and the irrational taking of property. In fact, these were the ma-
jor factors behind incidents and the resistance to Japanese rules. Property tak-
ing was perhaps the most critical issue, the one indigenous people cared about 
most, and an issue that meant they could challenge the legitimacy and rule of the 
Japanese authorities. The Japanese legitimacy of rule came from their promise to 
‘protect’ indigenous property from the encroaching Han people. This legitimacy 
came from an idea similar to the theory of a ‘social contract’ between citizens 
and the state. That is to say, that the state gains its legitimacy from the trust of 
citizens who need their property protected. The indigenous people appear to 
have understood that there could be a channel between the Japanese state and 
the indigenous people, a way to find consent and establish mutual relations that 
meet the needs of both sides. 
 However, the petition is a rebuttal from the indigenous people and accuses 
the Japanese authorities of practicing cruelty at the same time as the Japanese 
were complaining that the indigenous people were too cruel to know the mean-
ing of law or civilization. The indigenous people could also adopt a theory of 
49
2 ■ From ‘State of Nature’ to ‘State of the Nature’: the Taroko Area in Japanese Colonial Times
‘state of nature’ in relation to the Japanese authorities, whom they saw as barbar-
ians who disobeyed their gaya or rules. It is certainly possible that the Japanese 
intended to ignore the customs or rules that were practiced inside indigenous 
areas. Indeed, later policies and developments appear to support such a hypoth-
esis.
2.5 Debates and policies on indigenous land and property: 
 ‘State of the Nature’
The debates about whether indigenous people were civilians or animals would 
influence the policy concerning their rights as people (human rights), as well as 
their rights over things (property). In order to find a suitable policy concerning 
land and property, many consultants working for the Japanese government car-
ried out research on possible theories for the management of land and natural 
resources. One pressing issue relating to the land and natural resources in in-
digenous areas, which had not arisen under Qing rule, was whether the Japa-
nese could have ownership rights in indigenous areas even though the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki had ceded the whole island to Japan. In his paper ‘Is aboriginal 
Formosa a Part of the Chinese Empire?’ (LeGendre 1874a), the former Ameri-
can ambassador to China, LeGendre suggested that aboriginal Formosa was not 
actually part of the Chinese Empire or, in fact, part of any other country. He re-
ferred to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that he, as an American rep-
resentative, had signed with the tribes of the south of Taiwan. This MOU agreed 
that boat crews and fishermen who drifted into indigenous territory from nearby 
oceans would not be attacked (LeGendre 1874b). LeGendre suggested that this 
was a question of international customs and laws at a time when the indigenous 
areas of Taiwan were deemed terra nullius and not belonging to any country, 
not even the Qing Empire. In fact, this idea provided impetus for the Japanese 
to invade the southeast coast of Taiwan in 1874, in the hope that they would be 
the first to occupy the terra nullius. The Japanese appeared to have viewed the 
areas occupied by indigenous people not as territories owned by individuals, but 
rather as terra nullius that belonged to no one. As a new colonizing country, it 
is no surprise that the Japanese government chose a theory that was compatible 
and convenient for ruling the area (Uemura 2003). 
 Keal (2003), refers to what Lindley wrote in 1926 in a book called ‘The Acqui-
sition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law’, which states 
that in the realm of international law during colonial time, colonial countries 
expressed three different attitudes to the rights of people in non-European areas: 
acknowledgement, limited acknowledgement and denial (Keal 2003: 86-107). 
 Different from the Qing Dynasty, which actually, ‘fully acknowledged cus-
tomary practices that gave indigenous people a large degree of autonomy over 
the forests that they inhabited (Ibid: 370)’, the Japanese adopted the principle 
of denying the land rights of the indigenous peoples in Taiwan. Based on the 
logic that considered indigenous people as barbarian or as animals, rules were 
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derived to treat indigenous property in a way that was consistent with the theory 
of social Darwinism. The Japanese laws issued by the Foreign Affairs office of the 
Japanese Imperial Government stated that indigenous peoples were outside of 
regular Japanese laws and, as a result of their different conditions, required spe-
cial treatment: 
Those barbarians living in barbarian areas are leading uncivilized lives that 
know nothing of the meaning of social lives. They lack the idea of state, thus 
they are not aware of legal institutions. Now general laws are not setting these 
barbarian areas as exceptions that are not applicable with these laws; there-
fore, it seems we still have to consider these areas as permeable applicable by 
these laws. In other words, these barbarian areas should be ruled according 
to our laws. But under this premise, we will encounter many problems when 
implementing these laws in barbarian areas. As is mentioned, the barbarians 
are not civilized to know what is society, what is state and they are not capable 
of taking actions and taking responsibilities. Thus, whether the barbarians are 
capable of taking actions (in legal terms) will still be problematic. Concerning 
this, we should deal with every case on its context. In other words, whether 
they are capable of taking legal responsibilities or whether they are subjects in 
civil laws and then whether their legal actions should be deemed as effective in 
law consequences should be considered case by case (Laws and Procedures of 
the Bureau of Treaties in Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1964: 53-55) (Nokan 2004).
Indigenous people were basically considered to be people of incompetence, dis-
ability and incapacity. How to deal with indigenous behavior depended on each 
individual or specific context. As for issues of land and natural resources, the Jap-
anese authorities actually made a decision soon after they took over Taiwan. On 
31 October 1895, the colonial state issued the Regulations for the Management of 
Government Forests and the Camphor Industry ‘Kan’yu rin’ya oyobi shono seizo-
gyo torishimari kisoku (官有林野及樟腦製造業取締規則)’. ‘The first clause of 
the regulations deemed all mountain forests and wastelands as state property if 
those occupying the lands could not provide a certificate or other documents is-
sued by the Qing Dynasty verifying ownership rights (shoyuken)’(Tavares 2005: 
72). In reality, this regulation resulted in the Japanese taking control of almost 
all forest land as indigenous people could not offer any certificates proving own-
ership from the Qing Dynasty era. In February 1900, the Japanese government 
issued Law No. Seven: Provisions of Occupying Aboriginal Lands (蕃地占有ニ
關スル律令), which also officially declared and affirmed that aboriginal lands 
were state-owned. Both of these laws denied aboriginal rights to tribal lands; 
furthermore, they also prevented non-indigenous people, i.e. the Han, from ob-
taining indigenous lands. 
 For the Japanese government in Taiwan, in search of support for its colonial 
investments, how to make good use of the indigenous lands became quite a prio-
rity. The Japanese government thought indigenous people did not make use of 
the land in an efficient and economic way, largely because they were ignorant 
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of land management and did not possess a land ‘law’ like the Han or Japanese 
people did. This is also the reason why, shortly after the Japanese arrived on 
Formosa, the administration was quick to adopt a suggestion by the American 
consultant J.W. Davidson, who had formulated the reservation land policy in 
US-Indian relations (Fu 1997: 151). As previously mentioned, initially the Japa-
nese government borrowed the idea of terra nullius, that the land was unoccu-
pied if not used productively, and that the ‘civilized’ colonizers had the right to 
pacify ‘savages’ and develop such land (Fu 1997 : 281). The principal idea was 
that the lands in indigenous areas were ownerless and therefore the state could 
own the lands. In December 1902, the Counselor Mochiji Rokusaburou (持地六
三郎) proposed his ‘Comment on the Savages Policy’ to the Governor-General 
Kodama Kentarou, ‘We only talk about savage lands here. The Empire sees sav-
age lands, but no savage peoples. Savage lands must be regarded from an eco-
nomic point of view and managed with financial strategies’ (Mochiji 1902).
 The theories of rendering indigenous people as people with no rights and 
taking mountain lands for the colonial state seemed to be a most convenient de-
vice for achieving colonial success.
 These ideas were actually legal and authoritative constructions for colonial 
authorities to rule the area and to support their colonial investments. If land was 
not inhabited it was not owned. If lands were not used for economic benefit, they 
would not result in any land tenure, because indigenous people were ignorant of 
property management. 
 In fact, as Iijima Motoi (飯島幹) noted, and as many Japanese scholars and 
officials also found, the indigenous people did have methods for managing land 
tenure and property. For example, Saitou Takehiko (齋藤武彥), an official in 
charge of a survey in the district of the Atayal area on indigenous land use in 
1916, reported that:
 
Generally speaking, we think indigenous people do not have clear concepts 
about land tenures. Land is cultivated at will and this results in many conflicts. 
But actually, in our view, we found they have well organized land tenures. They 
make lines and borders to differentiate land pieces for cultivation. Land rights 
are held according to two customs inherited from their ancestors. One is by 
way of natural occupation and usually relates to those who first occupied and 
cultivate lands around the village. The second way is by claiming a share of the 
communal land. You may claim a share of land by offering the leader some-
thing in return. The first way was the most common way to obtain land rights’ 
(Taiwan Zongdufu 1998: 144-147).
 
Later research conducted by Japanese scholars also demonstrated that the indig-
enous people did have their own system of tenure (Matsuo 1941; Yan, Jun-xiong 
1997: 13-15; Narasaki 1914; Academica Sinica 1996; Awano and Ino 1900). Such 
studies proved that lands were actually inhabited and used by indigenous people. 
They highlighted a gap in the theory of terra nullius and provided an explanation 
for why we see so many conflicts over the practice of taking the mountain lands. 
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The following incidents and claims from the indigenous people will illustrate 
this gap between theory and reality.
2.6 The Nan-zhuang Incident 
The policy of taking all indigenous land as state-owned land created problems 
all over Taiwan where there were different indigenous situations and conditions. 
In 1896, the second year of Japanese rule in Taiwan, a district governor wrote to 
the chief of the Civil Administration stating that, ‘the savages in Nan-zhuang (
南庄) had capitulated to the Qing Dynasty and assimilated into Han customs. 
They had been offered deeds to cultivation to support their land rights. So these 
Nan-Zhuang barbarians could be seen as cooked barbarians and deserved pri-
vate ownerships of lands’ (Lin, Xiu-che 2004; Iban 2004). This request for land 
ownership was not approved in full by the Civil Administration Chief, but it was 
acknowledged that the savages in question owned the trees (民木) but not the 
lands. Thus, even the cooked indigenous people were not granted land rights 
during the first few years of rule. This ruling is different from the Qing Dynas-
ty’s operation in which the Nan-zhuang cooked indigenous leaders also thought 
that: 
Through the operation of customary forest rights, indigenous tribes who “ca-
pitulated” to the Qing State held enormous control over the forests, and they 
were able to profit from Han settlements and engage directly in the system 
of camphor production. In return for gaining access to the camphor forests, 
camphor producers paid the tribes 1.5 to 3 yen (Japanese dollars) per stove, 
per month (Lin, Xiu-che 2004). 
It is recognition of the land rights of the cooked indigenous people that they 
could make profits through leases or rents of the rights to non-indigenous people 
for the cultivation or use of natural resources like trees. These were rights based 
on land rights already recognized during the Qing period. So the leaders of the 
Nan-zhuang tribe also believed that the lease contracts they had signed with the 
Japanese capitalists to produce camphor were simply that – only the rights to 
make camphor – and not the rights to cultivate the land. In 1902, the indigenous 
headman Ri A-guai was adamant that his land should not be invaded, and he 
was very concerned that the marking of land borders by the Japanese camphor 
companies would result in the confiscation of his lands. He was so angry that he 
planned to attack the Japanese authorities (Ibid). This incident became known 
as the Nan-zhuang incident, and it showed that the Japanese authorities’ inten-
tion to gain yet more control over the indigenous lands that were full of natural 
resources. Tavares’ observation has showed a similar tendency in the late Qing 
imperial state, which was also interested in regulating and controlling the cam-
phor trade, to the extent that it imposed taxes to pay for frontier defense and 
maintaining security of the savage territory. In addition to these concerns, the 
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Japanese colonial state was also interested in protecting its monopoly of profits 
by managing the output of camphor by individual producers, and by controlling 
the total output of the island in order to maintain steady high prices on the world 
market (Tavares 2004: 373). The Nan-zhuang incident taught the Japanese au-
thorities that the theory of terra nullius would be challenged by the people who 
were actually living inside the area and who would claim their rights to the land. 
The recognition of indigenous status was a way to prevent further confronta-
tion and avoid further conflicts. Mochiji Rokusaburou, a policy consultant to the 
Japanese authorities on Taiwan governance, was put in charge of investigating 
the incident. He suggested that, ‘these indigenous people were so sinicized that 
they could speak the Han language. They owned lands and leased lands to Han 
people as land lords. They are cooked indigenous people who deserve land rights 
to the standard of ownership’ (Lin, Xiu-Che 2004: 157-166; Sun et al. 1997). The 
theory of terra nullius was challenged by the existence of the cooked indigenous 
people who demonstrated that they were qualified enough to own land and for-
est (Taiwan Zongdufu 1997). In order to quell the resistance, the Japanese au-
thority was looking for convenient ways to meet the needs of both sides. The 
theory of the evolution of indigenous people from ‘raw’ to ‘cooked’ helped the 
authority to acknowledge the citizen status of cooked indigenous people, on the 
condition that the area the cooked indigenous people owned would be treated as 
a normal administrative area where citizens were expected to obey laws and pay 
taxes. Later, the Japanese authority decided to have a clear policy on the separa-
Photo 2.2
The surrender of the Kalabau tribe in the Taroko area in 1914 (National Taiwan University 
Library)
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tion of indigenous areas and ‘normal’ areas, in order to distinguish the status of 
the people in these areas and their rights to property. If the raw barbarians were 
not willing to move to a higher level of evolution, and to submit to Japanese rule, 
then their rights as human beings, and their rights to things, would be outside of 
the eyes of the administration and the law. 
 Taroko area was outside the electric guard lines, the terra incognita inhab-
ited by raw barbarians who were not willing to submit to Japanese rule. The raw 
barbarians did not qualify as citizens so they did not have any human rights, no 
matter which theory of evolution administration was at play. As a result of the 
cruelty the barbarians had displayed towards the Japanese, the Japanese were 
convinced that the raw barbarians would never submit to their rule. In addition, 
and based on their previous experience of defeat at the hands of the raw barbar-
ians, the Japanese prepared to conquer the indigenous lands in the Taroko area 
in a national war during 1914.
2.7 The land and people after conquest
Those people who did not submit to Japanese rule or who refused to obey ad-
ministrative orders were considered to be rebels by the Japanese authority. In the 
eyes of the Japanese, it was their right to conquer these rebels (Taiwan Zongdufu 
1997: 153; Fu 2001). The people in the Taroko area were finally conquered by 
Photo 2.3
The ceremony of taking the order from the Japanese Emperor to progress the war against 
the indigenous people in the Taroko area (National Taiwan University Library)
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the Japanese army in 1914. The act of conquest strengthened the theory of terra 
nullius because the Japanese authorities were the conquerors who demonstrated 
total sovereignty over the land and territory. No private rights existed in Taroko 
after conquest. The view was that people in the Taroko area deserved no land 
rights in an occupied area. The Japanese authorities appeared to feel that they 
could appropriate the lands for any purpose. Any property rights that existed 
were those granted by the state. 
 The Japanese authorities were busy managing ‘state-owned’ lands. In 1910, 
the Rules on the Survey of Taiwan Forest (台灣林野調查事業規則) were prom-
ulgated and a survey of land owned by the state and land owned by citizens was 
conducted from 1910 to 1914. Generally, these rules were used all over Taiwan. 
However, in the Taroko area, there were no lands belonging to the Truku people 
because they were not citizens. Although surveys took place in indigenous areas 
outside of Taroko, they actually served to declare that the lands or forest inside 
the Taroko area still belonged to the Japanese state. When the Taroko area was 
conquered by the Japanese, the authorities prolonged the survey and extended it 
into the Taroko area. Through these rules and surveys, indigenous lands with no 
prior registrations were taken as state-owned lands and forest. From 1915-1925, 
the ‘Act of the Management of State-Owned Forest’ (官有林野整理事業) dif-
ferentiated state-owned forest into two categories: preservation forest land (要
存置林野) and non-preservation forest land (不要存置林野). The former was 
considered as land for natural preservation and the latter as land for develop-
ment (Fu, Qi-yi 2001). Non-preservation forest lands began to be opened up 
for capitalistic developments aimed at exploiting the natural resources in the 
mountains. This policy prescribed that lands that were considered as useful and 
profitable in terms of natural resources could be appropriated at will by Japanese 
authorities. The people who inhabited the forest areas were not considered a pri-
ority, and certainly not in terms of granting any land rights. Until this time, the 
Japanese authorities had designated the entire island of Taiwan, including the 
Taroko area, as belonging to a ‘state of the nature’ and, moreover, any barbarians 
found to be living in a ‘state of nature’ were deprived of any rights. The Japanese 
authorities used two theories to accomplish this: One is the theory of ‘state of 
nature’, which considered barbarians to be animals who were not rational, civi-
lized people. The second is the theory of ‘state of the nature’; the notion that a 
transformation by the state or government could make the nature useful. 
 The Japanese authorities hoped to control the land and change the living 
practices of the indigenous people, who had been practicing slash and burn since 
time immemorial. This habit was considered to be bad and the cause of environ-
mental damage and economic inefficiencies. In simple terms, under these rules, 
the indigenous people would not have any legal land to live on, but the fact that 
there were indigenous people living in these areas of terra nullius could not be 
ignored. In response to these rules, indigenous people resisted the rulings by the 
Japanese authorities. Indeed, a lot of resistance occurred during this period, de-
spite the fact that the Japanese military forces were strong. Their legal provisions, 
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however, were not so strong and so, in 1928, the Japanese government began to 
consider the idea of lands reserved for indigenous people. 
 The numerous confrontations with indigenous people suggested that indig-
enous people were aware of land tenure and rules that were beyond the scope of 
the theory of terra nullius, and also beyond the theory of ‘state of nature’, which 
does not recognize land tenure at all. My research shows that the Japanese policy 
of land appropriation in mountain areas was designed not to look at indigenous 
land tenure, but rather to see the natural resources. The implementation of colo-
nial policies aimed at economic growth and the integration of Taiwan’s economy 
into the Japanese Empire was another priority of the Japanese rulers. Thus, later 
it was decided to limit the areas of land registrations for the indigenous people 
in the design of the reservation land tenure system. Consequently, a reserva-
tion land system was designed to grant three hectares of land to each individual 
indigenous person, to help indigenous people live in permanent areas with resi-
dential cultivation systems. These cultivation systems were quite different from 
indigenous people’s ways of practicing subsistence agriculture. Generally, each 
individual indigenous person was promised 0.2 hectares of land for housing, 1.8 
hectares of cultivation lands, 0.5 hectares as common land for gathering wood 
and another 0.5 hectares for husbandry or land to accommodate refugees from 
disasters (Taiwan Zongdufu 1944: 35). On the face of it, this system of reserva-
tion tenure seemed to consider the needs of the indigenous people, but it still 
encountered much resistance.
 What the indigenous people complained about most was that the lands indig-
enous people had left fallow for some time were considered by the Japanese gov-
ernment to be waste lands that belonged to no one but the Japanese state. Thus, 
we can see many land claims by indigenous people during this time when indig-
enous people still fought to use the land they left fallow or where they used the 
method of shifting cultivation but which the Japanese had taken as state owned. 
Some top officers in the indigenous management department were highly aware 
of this issue, as is clear from an essay written by Iwaki Kamehiko (Kamehiko 
1936:23; Taiwan Zongdufu 1944) entitled ‘The conflicts between indigenous res-
ervation lands and cultivation lands’: 
The reservation land system was designed and appropriated by the population 
of an indigenous area. For example, a place with a population of 1000 people 
will be appropriated with 3000 hectares of land as reservation land. This appro-
priation should satisfy what the indigenous people actually need; there should 
be no complaints from the indigenous people. But actually if we look into the 
way the lands were appropriated, we could find most of the lands appropriat-
ed were bad for cultivation. Indigenous people would rather cultivate outside 
indigenous reservation land, because the appropriations the Japanese survey-
ors had done just disregarded the land indigenous people had been using, or 
they just made a crude line to differentiate lands for the indigenous people 
or lands for the state, when there were still lands actually used by indigenous 
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people who had sweet potatoes fields, dry rice or millet fields or even house 
constructions (Kamehiko 1936).
Iwaki Kamehiko worried that resistance would come from the indigenous peo-
ple if the appropriations of reservation lands were too crude. This officer sug-
gested a number of ways to prevent possible conflicts, including the idea to in-
troduce settled cultivation methods, such as paddy fields with irrigation systems 
and fertilizer to bring more production than dry field cultivation. His sugges-
tions were adopted and implemented alongside a policy of migrating the indig-
enous people to the plains, which were more suitable for settled cultivation and 
control. This officer thought that the government could help conserve the forest, 
store water and safeguard the indigenous lives, ‘but what helps more is to prevent 
the cruelty of the barbarians’ (Iwaki 1936b: 326). In the Taroko area, reservation 
land systems were not implemented in the mountains, but rather only on the 
plains where all the Taroko indigenous people were moved to, with the excep-
tion of two mountain villages, Skadang and Hohos, where farms for high altitude 
vegetables were planned. But the implementation of the policy to bring people 
down from the mountains did not go smoothly. Many indigenous people in the 
Taroko area refused to move down. The first major reason they did not want to 
leave the mountains was that they believed their home area was still full of virgin 
forest, which was enough for them to cultivate food. The second reason was that 
there were still plenty of animals for them to hunt for food. The third reason was 
that they found people who had been moved down to the plains were struggling 
to make a living. And the fourth reason was that the new concentrated com-
munities would be managed by a policy that would result in them losing their 
own, free way of life (Iwaki 1936b). What they worried about most was that they 
would lose the lands their ancestors had explored for hunting and shifting culti-
vation (Yamakuchi 1999). 
 The collective migrations of the Truku people between 1919 to 1937 can be 
characterized in two phases: In phase one, from 1918-1930, the Japanese au-
thorities implemented migration using softer methods such as suggestion or ad-
vocating to help indigenous people to move voluntarily. However, in cases where 
people would not move, the Japanese authorities would concentrate or combine 
the indigenous villages in the area for easier control. The second phase began in 
1930, when the Wushe Incident happened, and continued until 1937, when the 
war between Japan and China started. During this period, all the villages in the 
mountain areas, like the inner Taroko area and the Tausai area, where the Toda 
people lived, were moved to the plains (Liao 1977).
 Subsequent to the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the Japanese adopted differ-
ent policies to educate indigenous people, especially the young, as subjects of 
the Japanese Emperor, who would fight for Japan’s holy war against China. With 
regards to land tenures at this time, we can see from the table below that most of 
the lands in Taiwan were owned by Japanese authorities. In relation to the indig-
enous area, I would adopt the framework used by the Japanese officer Iwaki Ka-
mehiko, who was in charge of indigenous land management, and who described 
58
Part I ■ History
indigenous lands in terms of three categories: (1) in 1934, some 51% of the total 
indigenous population of 84,000 lived in indigenous villages, which could re-
main on the original spot; (2) some 24% would be combined in larger settle-
ments; and (3) some 25% would be moved to new areas (Kamehiko 1936). In 
other words, at least half of the indigenous area would experience migrations to 
some extent. In my field area in Taroko, almost all of the inhabitants experienced 
this kind of mobility. Their different experiences of migration can be described 
in three categories: (1) diaspora, in which people were unplugged from their re-
lations with their original lands almost entirely, because of forced or semi-forced 
migrations; (2) hybrid, in which communities were mixed up with people of dif-
ferent origins, tribes or villages, which all had different customs or gaya; (3) in 
situ communities, where people still lived on the original spot, but where they 
were controlled by new political regimes. 
 Through these policies, Japanese authorities finally achieved a ‘state of the 
nature’ that brought every piece of land under colonial control and governed by 
new tenure systems. The table below indicates that indigenous reservation lands 
occupied 6.7% of the total area of Taiwan Island. Most of the other categories of 
lands belong to the state, including the forest land where the indigenous people 
inhabited and which had been terra nullius. 
(hectare, %)
Item area % of Mountain 
area
% in total Taiwan 
area
National forest 1,615,000 64.2 44.9
National forest for experiment 108,000 4.3 3.0
Indigenous reservation lands 240,300 9.6 6.7
National waste lands 174,000 6.9 4.8
National properties and national 
bank lands 42,000 1.7 1.2
Public lands 26,700 1.1 0.7
Company lands 80,000 3.2 2.2
Private lands 230,000 9.1 6.4
Area of mountains 2,516,000 100 70.0
Area of plains 1,080,000 30.0
Total area of the island 3,596,000 100.0
Figure 2.1
Land tenure in Taiwan from the Japanese regime to the Nationalist government (Bureau of Agriculture 
and Forestry Taiwan Province 1965: 5)
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2.8 Indigenous concepts of peace and war
The war started by the Japanese army in 1914 meant defeat for the people in the 
Taroko area, and the subsequent introduction of a full Japanese legal regime in 
the territory. However, many indigenous people in Taroko did not agree with 
the result of the war. Many argued that the way the Japanese authorities dealt 
with the war (and the peace) were quite different to the indigenous ways. Even 
today, the view is expressed that Taroko people have their own customs or rules 
for conquering other people(s) or to obtain lands and territories, and that this 
had been the case for a few hundred years, ever since they began to migrate to 
the east. 
 Some indigenous informants told me that they have specific strategies for 
conquering other territories. Many indigenous people think the Japanese army 
was at odds with the rules that their ‘gaya’ permits. One reason why they do not 
view the battles waged in 1914 by the Japanese as regular wars is because indig-
enous cultures assume that declarations of war should be made through public 
announcements and preparations. They believe that the battles started by the 
Japanese were like the indigenous acts of head-hunting that usually happen se-
cretly. Furthermore, they did not accept that they had lost all the rights to their 
territories in the Taroko War of 1914, because during fighting against the Japa-
nese army, the Taroko warriors shot the head man of the Japanese army, the then 
Governor of Taiwan, General Sakuma, who died later of his wounds.7 For some 
of the Truku indigenous people, Sakuma’s death, and the temple built in his hon-
or in the Taroko area, is a sign that the indigenous people did not lose the war. 
Indeed, some Truku people explain it in terms of their gaya or customs, and say 
that it is like going head-hunting; if you succeed in getting heads but any person 
in your team is wounded or killed, then the heads you have cannot be a positive 
sign. Indeed, it means you have failed. The head man of the Japanese army or the 
government, General Sakuma, died in the war. Thus, in the eyes of the Truku, 
the Japanese did not win the war and deserved no winners’ status. Furthermore, 
according to indigenous gaya, they will suffer from bad luck as a result of the 
death of General Sakuma. My research suggests that such ideas still exist even 
now. There are rules specific to head-hunting or wars that necessitate a different 
treatment of the rights of both sides, no matter who are the conquerors and who 
are the conquered (in the war scenario), and no matter who are the head-hunters 
and who are the hunted. Though the scale of the 1914 battles was large, the indig-
enous people consider them to be non-public acts, like head-hunting, and unlike 
a war, which requires public processes.
One Japanese law scholar, in charge of the project of the ‘Reports on Barbarian 
Customs and Habits’, found that there should be a differentiation between the ac-
tions of ‘head-hunting’, ‘war’ and ‘crimes of killing people’ (Okamatsu 339-354). 
He thought that head-hunting in indigenous culture was not a crime of killing 
7 It was reported that General Sakuma died in Japan a few months after the war. But even today, 
many Truku people believe that he actually died on the battle field. 
60
Part I ■ History
someone, even though you have to kill to obtain the head (Ibid). According to 
my informants, head-hunting was an exchange of substance, of spirits or ener-
gies, or forces and powers. I agree with Okamatsu that it is important to differ-
entiate this deed from a criminal act, because in indigenous customs, especially 
in Truku cultures, if one of your group loses a head, it is not necessary to take 
revenge on the head-hunter responsible. That is to say, indigenous people do not 
believe it is a crime, unlike the Japanese whose criminal laws would require pun-
ishment or revenge. Okamatsu also thought that ‘wars’ happened in indigenous 
cultures and the specific targets were enemies with whom they had bad relations 
as a result of spoiled gaya or customs. So wars happened inter groups or with 
other ethnic groups. In Okamatsu’s interpretation, ‘wars’ had their reasons and 
their purpose was to return the balance of justice. Okamatsu believed that the 
indigenous people always prepared wars in public and fought with public meth-
ods. At the same time, he found that indigenous people always practiced head-
hunting in secret, and that head-hunting could not be seen as a crime because 
the indigenous people believed it to be a custom (Okamatsu 1919). 
 I do not see that that there is a clear cut difference between the three cat-
egories of crimes, head-hunting and wars, especially when these deeds were 
practiced in different contexts. The Japanese authorities lumped all these deeds 
into the category of barbarian cruelties conditioned by a ‘state of nature’. They 
certainly seemed to ignore what Prof. Okamatsu had found (McGovern 1922; 
Masuda 1994). As a matter of fact, based on Okamatsu’s findings, I think the 
Truku have their own ways of dealing with neighboring friends or enemies. De-
spite having migrated from the western mountains to the eastern mountain ar-
eas, they practiced the same gaya and believed that such customs would provide 
them with reasons and purposes to act as they always had but in a different situ-
ation. 
 A Japanese scholar, Mabuchi (1941), discovered the principle of respecting 
the first cultivators of land in other Austronesian tribes in Taiwan. Likewise, I 
found that the Taroko people also keep their gaya in order to show respect for the 
first occupiers or initiators and to gain legitimacy in terms of controlling land 
use and jurisdiction of territory, if we take a ‘minimal definition of the territory 
‘as any defended area’ (Ingold 1986). A territory dominated by initiators was a 
typical and satisfactory situation. Where there was a situation of adverse occupa-
tion, the rights of the initiators were not neglected. In reality, it would never be 
the case that anybody within the indigenous community would occupy lands be-
longing to initiators without negotiation or gaining consent. As one of my infor-
mants told me, ‘Even now we are not living in the homelands in the mountain; 
we don’t go to other’s places to hunt’. If that happened in the past, there would be 
punishment. This doctrine of first occupiers as legal owners facilitated the peace-
ful migration of the Truku, the Tgdaya and the Toda people into the vacant areas 
in the eastern mountains, what is now called the Taroko area. 
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Photo 2.4
Land cultivation in Taroko area (photo courtesy of National Taiwan University) 
Photo 2.5
Similar land cultivation in Skadang Tribe, Taroko
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However, it was not entirely peaceful. Indeed, things changed when tribes came 
closer to the edge of the vacant lands in the very east of the island. Competition 
and conflict occurred often. For this reason, the first settlements in the east were 
mainly those established by descendants of the first cultivators or pioneers (Say-
ama 1923; Huang, Zhang-Xing 2000; 2001:13-14; Xiu-lin Township 2006). And 
on the very eastern edges of this territory, there are more hybrid communities. In 
Pei’s study, he found that every second generation migrated in order to find new 
territories for hunting and cultivation. In other words, the first generation would 
leave the place where they were living and move jointly to new territories. And 
when the third generation achieved prosperity in the new land, the first gen-
eration would return to the original lands to cultivate them again (Yu 1980; Pei 
2002: 7). This is seen as an ideal type of settlement that was originally maintained 
by the same initiators and their descendants. The land that was cultivated by the 
first settlers was usually owned by them, even when it had been left fallow. As the 
study of the history of settlement movements by Truku scholars has shown, the 
initial founding families were the main occupiers who used the land for cultiva-
tion and hunting. It was an ideal to have one family on a territory, as Kaji said, 
‘In traditional times, a family is with a territory’ (Kaji 2003). 
 This acknowledgement of the lasting impacts of the original or first explorers 
is an important gaya (customary ) practice. For example, even today, people will 
always take a sip of wine for the ancestors or first explorers. Gaya such as this is 
particularly important in relation to cultivation when exploring a new territory. 
As many Taroko people have described, in the ceremony that takes place before 
crops are sown, a tree branch or a straw cross is planted in the soil and then the 
people return home to wait for dreams in which utux (ancestors spirits) will tell 
them whether the land is suitable for cultivation (Wang, M.H. 2006:95). These 
dreams are interpreted by family elders (Chien 2011). If the dream is interpreted 
as ‘clean’, then you can cultivate the land. The straw cross or the tree branch in the 
soil is interpreted as a sign of first occupation. However, indigenous people also 
believe that there are limitations to using gaya to explore new lands. So they also 
choose their lands by asking elders or neighbors, who know more about the his-
tory of an area, which are the ‘clean’ lands. This is a more ‘empirical’ way to make 
sure that you are not occupying land belonging to others. There is a supplemen-
tary way to indicate whether a new land is free for exploration. That is to set fire 
to the vegetation and to let the smoke rise into the sky to show and inform other 
people that you are demanding the land. In addition to these empirical ways, 
there are important gaya rules that have a religious function and remind people 
not to invade a place where there are ghosts (utux). It is gaya that allows new 
cultivation or first occupation. You may occupy a land that is empirically and 
religiously ‘clean’, or you may renew a first occupation by informing the ghosts 
there that you plan to occupy the land. As previously mentioned, first occupiers 
are respected by the people who come after them. In Truku, the doctrine of first 
occupation is called ‘oetelinay’ and it indicates one of the most important gaya. 
It has magico-religious-economic connotations as well as a political meaning in 
terms of the relationships between humans and lands (Liao 1998:189). 
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When there are no vacant lands to migrate to, then what I will term the ‘scar-
city scenario’ comes into play. Faced with such a scenario, rather than extending 
their territory through war, the Truku people would join other’s territories in 
order to survive. This was practiced in different ways and can be differentiated 
using different terms. For example, the term ‘tumumun’ means to join another 
settlement, but it can be differentiated further as ‘tbalah’, which means to be im-
mersed or assimilated into the host community, or ‘buliuh’, which means to ex-
change one part of your land with the host in order to make space for your own 
survival. In addition, you may practice ‘temai’, which means to curse a land dur-
ing a conflict. This would mean that people had to leave the land or subsequent 
generations would face living on cursed lands and suff from bad luck. Clearly, 
the people in Taroko adopted more peaceful ways to solve the problem of the 
scarcity of lands.
 The rules of first occupation and the sharing of community lands were the 
ideal practices used by the indigenous peoples in order to migrate within the 
Taroko area peacefully. Of course, the key word here is ‘ideal’. In reality, there is 
evidence of considerable internal fighting or competition among the Truku, the 
Tgdaya and the Toda. When the ideal methods failed, then wars would be fought 
to conquer enemies, whether they belonged to the same ethnic groups or not. 
Here we find that the Truku people have their ideal ways of being conquerors, 
conquered, and also ways of keeping peace. However, the Japanese authorities 
deemed such processes ‘state of nature’ and viewed them purely as barbarian 
irrationalities. The Japanese believed that such problems and barbarian irra-
tionalities and cruelties could only be responded to with cruelty and aggression. 
But those indigenous people I spoke to who had experienced the war with the 
Japanese said that there should have been a more nuanced and differentiated ap-
proach to the conditions that resulted in the involvement of different communi-
ties in the war of 1914. Those who considered the conflicts with the Japanese as 
war in the indigenous sense believe that the rules of war and peace meant that 
land and property could be confiscated. Those who considered these battles to 
be the equivalent of head-hunting saw the conflict as an exchange of spiritual 
powers and so land and property should be preserved. Those who considered 
indigenous involvement in the wars as purely pessimistic should be treated as 
victims who need compensation. Thus, we see that indigenous people have very 
different perspectives on the 1914 war and the results of war and peace.
2.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the formation of the area of Taroko and the 
framework of state laws introduced into the indigenous territories. We have seen 
that the Japanese authorities believed that the indigenous people’s ways of living, 
their personalities and characteristics could be lumped together into what I call 
a ‘state of nature’ perspective. I use this term to describe the methods and ideolo-
gies that the Japanese authorities adopted to view and deal with the indigenous 
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people. The term ‘state of nature’ had previously been used by Western political 
philosophers to describe the conditions or characters of those ‘others’ that were 
situated in pre-state conditions (Wolff 2002). Different philosophers had differ-
ent premises to conceptualize these characters. Indigenous people were barbar-
ians, uncivilized, wild or noble savages with different levels of rational ability. 
Here, I have demonstrated how the Japanese colonialists introduced a theory of 
‘state of nature’ to accomplish their ideas and ambitions in terms of incorporat-
ing indigenous areas and peoples into a state (of the nature). 
 To sum up, the ‘state of nature’ of the indigenous people can be character-
ized in terms of human beings that belong to a spectrum of different rational 
capabilities. The spectrum starts from animals that have no rational capabilities, 
moves to semi-rational human beings with their own limited rational capabili-
ties, i.e. people with personality but without civilization, and then at the other 
end of the spectrum we find fully rational and civilized Japanese citizens who are 
afforded the full rights that a state can grant. Thus, we see that the Japanese au-
thorities adopted evolutionary concepts and differentiated the indigenous peo-
ple into three categories: the raw (uncooked), the semi-cooked, and the cooked. 
The raw people like those in the Taroko area were considered to be animals that 
knew nothing of rationality and, thus, were only worthy of aggression and being 
conquered. The semi-cooked or the cooked were treated as Japanese citizens and 
afforded land rights.
 My research on the encounters between the ‘raw’ indigenous peoples in the 
Taroko area (in particular the Atayal) and the Japanese, shows that the cruelties 
were enormous on both sides. What is clear, however, is that the raw Taroko 
people were given no chance to be promoted to semi-cooked or cooked before 
the war was started by the Japanese authorities in 1914. We see that the Japanese 
operated from the premise that the lands in these ‘raw’ areas were terra nullius. 
This made the Japanese authorities blind to the indigenous people and their own 
methods of land tenure and management. Consequently, many of the Japanese 
consultants, like Takekoshi Yosaburo (持地六三郎), focused policy priorities on 
lands that could be used by the state and they deemed indigenous people to be 
a problem. At a time when many colonial states were competing for the land, 
the Japanese adopted the theory of terra nullius as a strategy for obtaining the 
lands and people of the indigenous areas of Taiwan. My research has uncovered 
evidence that Japanese colonialism involved cruel methods and was blind and 
unwilling towards the indigenous people, their lands and way of life. ‘State of na-
ture’ was a fictive version adopted by the Japanese colonial authorities to neglect 
all the rights that human beings deserve. 
 In this period, we see many other ‘colonial powers have treated these mini-
nations in different ways. When the English went to Canada and New Zealand, 
they recognized that the indigenous peoples in those territories were nations. 
They thus signed international treaties with them. Those treaties became the ba-
sis for later legal claims’ (Yen and Yang 2004: 241). The ‘raw’ indigenous people 
of Taiwan were not treated like those in other colonial situations. As Yen and 
Yang found, ‘the Japanese, however, did not recognize that Taiwan’s indigenous 
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peoples were nations. They did not sign treaties with them. They treated them as 
if they were animals’ (Yen and Yang 2004: 241; Vickers 2008). The view taken was 
that if the animals were cruel to the Japanese authorities then only cruelty could 
be considered an appropriate answer. The indigenous people in Taroko, then, 
were animals that needed to be conquered.
 There were many different indigenous perspectives on the ideals of peace and 
war, and on the subsequent taking of land and property by the Japanese army 
and authorities. The indigenous logic of conquering, to be conquered or to ex-
change under certain conditions, allows for the ‘legal’ processing of land rights 
based on indigenous customs. These should be differentiated from the encoun-
ters among the indigenous people and the Japanese authorities. In terms of the 
process of war, indigenous people could be conquered if the war was started for 
convincing reasons (as outlined above). If this was the case, then the war could 
result in submission without conditions. However, if the war was started with-
out just cause, the indigenous people would consider it as an invasion and they 
would only submit to the army under specific conditions. These ideas for the 
foundations for indigenous people to bring claims for their rights, and in par-






Administration in the Taroko Area under the Japanese rule
Map 3.2
Mapping results on Google Earth of Skadang and Xoxos communities
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From Terra Nullius to Terra Cognita: 
Mappings as Land Rights Claims
3.1 Mapping discourses in representational politics 
So far we have learned about the relationships between indigenous peoples and 
lands or territories in Taiwan’s historical and geographical contexts. I have con-
cluded that there are basically three ideal types of relationships, which I would 
describe as: in situ, hybrid and diaspora. As is the case in the Taroko area, very 
few people still live on the territories in the mountains that they claim as their 
traditional territories. Rather, most now live on lands on the plains designated 
by the Japanese or the Nationalist government as areas of collective or forced 
migration. The majority of the Taroko8 people who used to live in the mountains 
were moved to the plains to live with people from other tribes forming hybrid 
communities. Thus, from about 1920 onwards, most Taroko people have experi-
ences of diaspora or hybridity, which more or less disconnected them from their 
original homes and lands. Among the one hundred other tribal communities in 
the Taroko mountain area, almost all of them were moved down to the plains 
during the Japanese time (Iwaki 1936a; Yamamoto 1929; Yamakuchi 1999). Two 
communities were exempted from the initial plans to move indigenous people 
down to the plains – the Skadang and the Hohos. Both these tribes maintained 
direct connections with their homelands until the setting up of the Taroko Na-
tional Park in 1986 when they too were moved down to the plains. However, 
both the Skadang and the Hohos still have reservation lands in the mountain 
area, (about a three hour hike from where they now live on the plains), which 
they are legally entitled to live on. 
 Relatively speaking, the Skadang and Hohos people have more in situ rela-
tions with their lands than other Taroko people, who have very few legalized 
lands in the mountain areas. But the Alang (settlement or tribe) Skadang and 
Hohos villages are also special because they are the only indigenous areas that 
are included inside Taroko National Park, which is subject to restrictions and 
different laws and rules than regular indigenous areas. 
8 The term ‘Taroko people’ means peoples living in the Taroko area and includes the Truku, Toda 
and Tgdaya people.
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Since the establishment of the Taroko National Park in 1986, the Taroko area 
has been famous for the conflicts that have occurred between the National 
Park headquarters and the indigenous people (not only those living inside the 
park, but also those in the neighboring areas). These disputes concern a series 
of land and natural resources issues. Indeed, land rights and land use conflicts 
have been the major dramas played out in the Taroko area in the past two de-
cades (Zhang, Zhi-sheng 1998; Yang, Lin-hue 1996; Zheng 1996; Chen, Zhu-
shang 2000; Chang, Dai-pin 2000; Song 1999; 2001). The responses from the 
National Park headquarters and other concerned authorities reflect the efforts 
they have made to dissolve the tensions and to foster more mutual understand-
ing and cooperation. Mapping is a typical device used by the park headquarters 
to bring third parties on board to help build forums on the land-resources-hu-
man-resources issue. There have been at least three waves of mapping activities 
in these two small communities. However, I have found that these mapping ef-
forts can be contentious. Mapping raises a number of issues, such as who in these 
two communities has what authority to report to a third party (which, in turn, 
would report to the National Park headquarters) about the human-land relations 
in the area? And what results of the mapping exercise should be revealed, and 
to whom? Why mapping exercises should be sponsored by any party and what 
are their purposes? I call these issues the ‘representational politics’ of mapping. 
These issues relate to the subjectivity of information providers and the objectifi-
cation of the information that many studies on indigenous mapping have shown 
in Taiwan and all over the world (Guo 2003; Kuan 2008; Fox 1998; 2002; Escoba 
1997; Chapin and Threlkeld et al. 2001).
3.1.1 Public Participatory Geographic Information System Mapping 
 (PPGIS)
Generally speaking, the mapping projects in the Skadang and Hohos commu-
nities revealed, and were entangled with, a wide range of power relations in a 
historical and political context. Both critics and proponents of the mapping 
processes and their results formed discourses and plans to work with different 
purposes or interests among different stakeholders inside and outside the com-
munities. We can see that the five-year-long national Indigenous Traditional Ter-
ritorial and Land Survey (ITTLS), which I worked on as project manager, also 
adjusted its methodologies and focus in the light of these discourses (Chang et 
al. 2004). In the scoping and implementation of the national mapping project, 
it was suggested that territorial information be recorded using GIS technology. 
This national cadastre paradigm is rather unsuitable or incommensurable to the 
indigenous ways of looking at land use and territories, in particular in situations 
where indigenous people are making claims on the land and there are disputes 
about boundaries and ownership. In addition, given what I have differentiated 
broadly as in situ, diaspora and hybrid contexts, past tenure could be interrupted 
without taking the emic perspective into consideration; indeed, it may be partly 
forgotten or mixed with different regimes. 
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The initiation and implementation of a more bottom up approach, which takes 
into account local visions, was encouraged in local communities (Chang, C.Y. 
et al. 2004). Thus, it was suggested that a Public Participatory GIS mapping ap-
proach (hereafter PPGIS) should be adopted, i.e. a series of methodologies that 
included ethnography and focus group discussions in order to evaluate the ex-
tent of any mirroring between social structure, land and environment. This ap-
proach insisted on paying more attention to the process, rather than an inscrip-
tive model that could be accused of seeing indigenous ‘landscape as a pictorial 
way of representing or symbolizing surroundings as the materialization of mem-
ory’ (Guo 2003). A quick appeal to use the cadastre method or land registra-
tion system would possibly distort the indigenous contexts. The reason why this 
system is seen as ‘pictorial or inscriptive’ is because the initial mapping project 
results only showed places names and did not detail the many stories or local 
processes that could provide rationale or evidence to support land claims. Worse 
still, we do not have clear ideas to help us determine the extent to which some 
rationales or evidence are strong enough to support land claims, especially in 
terms of legal process. In spite of this, the implementation of a national mapping 
project was still encouraged among indigenous participants as a way of evidenc-
ing and proving their land rights (Chang, C.Y. et al. 2004). The desire for a stron-
ger emic perspective to the project, however, appears to have been overshadowed 
by the etic focus of the cadastre system employed. This means that local partici-
pation in the project was very limited or even manipulated by local elites. There-
fore, it appears that such mapping efforts do not encourage the empowerment of 
indigenous people (Wang 2003). 
 PPGIS methodology is advocated in order to deliver a more bottom-up strat-
egy, which would encourage locals to undertake mapping based on their social, 
epistemological and political processes, and which would tell the stories or the 
processes of land and human relations. Such stories would provide an opportu-
nity to reconsider the human-land relations and the documenting of human-
land relations would be based more on local knowledge. This local knowledge 
would provide evidence for indigenous land claims. PPGIS also encourages the 
establishment of an equal forum for local people to discuss human-land rela-
tionships and to bring more consensus in terms of ideas about tenures. As Pa-
suya Poiconu, the former deputy minister of the Indigenous Council said:
Indigenous Traditional Territorial and Land Survey (ITTLS) is the first step to 
establishing self-government. Maybe people will ask me why the government 
does not set up laws directly to make it happen as soon as possible. It is be-
cause, first, we (indigenous people) have to persuade mainstream society and 
to produce consensus in each indigenous group (Poiconu 2004).
The ITTLS has been conducting a survey to try to establish what land there is 
and who owns it, and also to empower indigenous people to coordinate their ac-
tions on land rights claims, and to pursue the possibility of future autonomy or 
co-management of indigenous land and natural resources. The ITTLS is more 
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than an ambition to encourage indigenous movements initiated and sponsored 
by the central government; it is also a survey that can provide a legal foundation 
for the resolution of all kinds of land or natural resource conflicts. The ITTLS is 
trying to encourage indigenous people to achieve an internal consensus on land 
claims and to persuade the mainstream society of their legal status. 
3.1.2 Logistic problems and more
As mentioned above, progress is being blocked by political obstacles. These gov-
ernment initiated mapping projects are often filtered by local politicians who 
invite certain participants and silence certain opinions. In order to know more 
about local processes in terms of the mapping actions and beyond, the ITTLS 
academic team focused on land claims and tried to form close relations and long 
term cooperation with certain local teams. We lobbied the Indigenous Council 
for support for these local teams in order to deliver more promising results that 
would generate some good models and examples for the mapping projects. This 
is a clear effort to cooperate with the locals and to get them more involved in 
mapping at the local level. The then Minister of the Indigenous Council prom-
ised to support this action and adopt the idea of empowering local teams, pro-
viding them with funds and skills. Each scholar in the team committed to long 
term cooperation with the local team he had been working with. Eventually, with 
some help, each team produced a proposal for the implementation and funding 
of PPGIS mappings in a local context. Despite the promises from the minister 
and the commitment from the teams to make progress, there were problems 
with the administration staff at the Indigenous Council who could not provide 
expenses for traveling and meals for the workshops. This funding failure result-
ed in less local teams than expected being established (Wang, Ming-hui 2004). 
There appeared to be a lack of trust between the mappers and the sponsors. 
 During my research over the past few decades, I discovered that major in-
digenous movements have been focusing on land issues. Indeed, to date there 
have been at least three big waves on a national scale of ‘return my lands move-
ments’ initiated by indigenous people. If central government support for map-
ping was welcomed by indigenous peoples, and much of the existing energy on 
land claims diverted into a national mapping project, it could bring a fourth 
wave of ‘return my lands’ movements. However, so far, this has never been real-
ized. 
 Despite the funding problems at the Indigenous Council, we still tried to 
cooperate with local indigenous teams to bring more bottom-up, participatory 
mapping. Time and budget constraints meant that from 2005 onwards, the max-
imum support available was for ten candidate ‘communities’ every year for the 
national mapping project. Announcements about which communities had been 
recruited to join the PPGIS project were published by the central government 
through local indigenous institutions and NGOs. Communities who hoped to 
map their traditional territories, based on their own interests and scopes and 
with the help of academic skills and methodologies, were invited to apply. Suc-
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cessful candidates were provided with training and support and the promise of 
at least one year of partnership with a group of scholars. 
 Alang Skadang and Hohos were among the candidates that applied to join the 
national PPGIS mapping project. Some criticized the way indigenous tribes were 
invited to join the project, the method for announcing successful candidates and 
the involvement of geography or anthropology scholars as being top-down. But 
the ethnographical methodology was also an attempt to encourage and imple-
ment an approach with more local vision and subjectivity. Two anthropology 
PhD students (including me) and a geography master’s student joined the pro-
ject to undertake ethnographical fieldwork and to observe the local context, pay-
ing more attention to the ‘politics or contexts’ behind mapping activities. These 
activities followed PPGIS procedure in order to integrate more local concepts 
and ideas on the relationships between people and land. In addition, a group 
of four professors and students joined local people on the mapping activities 
every couple of months to observe and aid the processes of mapping in an in 
situ scenario where indigenous people have increased relationships and inter-
actions with the land (Tsai et al. 2006). From 2005-2006, the PPGIS projects 
among the Skadang and the Hohos were implemented as experiments to see how 
mapping could empower indigenous people to meet their needs through map-
ping based on their own endeavors and visions. The needs that motivate local 
indigenous people to struggle against repressive politics and to provide evidence 
or discourses to bring to the forum devised by PPGIS will be discussed later in 
relation to the mapping processes in Skadang and Hohos.
3.2 In situ: examples from Skadang and Hohos
3.2.1 Sensitive local topographies
After eighteen months of implementing the PPGIS project in Alang Skadang and 
Hohos, indigenous participants from these two tribes had described and marked 
286 place names on Google Earth. The academic team has promised to keep this 
information for these two communities and not to reveal the results and some 
sensitive information to outsiders. Consequently, I cannot reveal all the infor-
mation here in this academic report. Instead, I can present a less detailed map 
that indicates the diversity of information and adopt Liu’s (the master’s student 
appointed in the field) preliminary analysis to show some basic categories of the 
mapping results related to these 286 place names (Liu, D-K 2008). The categories 
include:
Topologies: 9 gorge names, 10 valley names, and 19 other topologies
Natural resources areas: like tree or bamboo or animal habitats (12) 
Water: 16 river names, 3 lakes
Public properties: 21
Place names with related stories, histories or events: 12
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Tribe names: 6
Path and border names: 8 
Hunting areas: 11
Private Properties: 40 private land names, 13 hunting lodges, 106 house land 
plots 
These mappings took place in the context of a number of sensitive issues, such as 
the construction of cable cars, border lines and reservation land appropriations. 
This analysis helped us to understand the 286 place names, and stories behind 
them, and also to assess what it is that helps people to either remember or forget 
information that contributes to the mapping processes and results. The past is 
reconstructed on the basis of the present.
 A plan to decommission cable cars will be problematic for local people as 
this is currently the only method of transportation for moving large quantities 
of goods from the mountains to the plains. Thus, as part of the project, land 
that could be used as a base for cable cars, and a number of alternative cable car 
routes were marked on the map, in a bid to suggest to the National Park head-
quarters that they rebuild a transport system for indigenous people. Conflicts 
over the rights to the land occupied by the owner of the cable car system were 
also monitored in the mapping process. 
 Traditionally, border lines differentiating Skadang and Hohos alang were im-
plicit and there is mutual recognition by the two communities regarding future 
access to lands that have not yet been appropriated as reservation lands. In fu-
ture, lands between border lands will be granted to the locals by the township 
government. Thus, maintaining clear borders helps to maintain rights and space 
for future access within each tribe. 
 The results of the PPGIS mapping have raised reservation land issues con-
cerning approximately 109 place names. Some of the conflicts regarding reser-
vation lands were due to the National Park headquarters’ attempt to buy or take 
indigenous reservation lands located inside the National Park. There was a ten-
dency by the National Park administration to define boundaries in a way that 
secured land and property in their favour. In fact, the lands in these two alang 
are primarily areas of indigenous reservation land that have already been de-
marcated by the national reservation land registration system. During the PP-
GIS mapping process, we found that local people often showed us cadastre maps 
to support their claims. Participants often referred to specific land numbers to 
indicate where they live. This is the first and second generation to be ruled by 
this cadastre system, which was introduced by the Japanese authorities and later 
strictly implemented by the nationalist authorities. Most of the participants were 
familiar with this system and used it as evidence to identify land ownership and 
land use. Indeed, every family seems to have a map of the total area of the two 
alang and not just the area they own. 
 Many local participants gave the example of a famous and successful land 
claim case, specifically, a request for the National Park headquarters to return 
pieces of land #109 and #216 to indigenous owners. The claimants asked for land 
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use rights to be granted on these two pieces of land that had been bought by the 
National Park from Shoulin Township without the consent of tribal people. The 
lands in question had not been registered or appropriated by any individuals; 
however they had been registered as being owned by the township office, which 
had acknowledged the fact that some local indigenous people were using the 
lands without full registration. When the indigenous people discovered that the 
lands in question had been transferred to the National Park they protested and 
said that they had a stronger prior claim to the land rights than the National 
Park. During the protests, local indigenous people used the cadastre to provide 
documentary evidence that they had been ‘recognized’ as ‘illegal cultivators’ (
濫墾戶). This is a customary rule that indicates candidates for the next wave 
of appropriations of reservation land. As is well known among indigenous citi-
zens, having your name on the cadastre is crucial to claiming rights. Even so, the 
township government was determined to deny the fact that the lands in question 
had already been in use by local indigenous people. ‘The township just hoped to 
sell lands to the National Parks for money as a way of making up the shortfall 
in township finance’, participants in the project told us. ‘Thus the cadastre is no 
guarantee, and this is why we want to map in our language, to show the National 
Park and the township and tourists, to let them know the lands in our territory 
belong to indigenous communities’, as a community leader told me when he in-
vited me to join their mapping projects. 
 In terms of the 106 plot names, Sapah Someone indicates a house that is cur-
rently inhabited. Nniqan Someone indicates a house where someone used to live 
but which is currently empty. Pnspahan Someone indicates a plot of land where 
activities used to take place, like housing, working or planting. Using these 
markings, local participants were able to add more local meanings to the land 
that previously had just been numbered in the cadastre system. These labels dif-
ferentiate whether places are currently in use or not. They respect places that 
were used by someone else, even if they do not know exactly who had used the 
lands previously. There are even cases where someone’s name is used as place 
name in order to indicate ownership of a piece of land. As Liu (2008) has high-
lighted, there is a plot of land in alang Snlingan that is named Pnspahan AKaw, 
which indicates that a Mr. Akaw was the individual who used to live in that place. 
In alang Hohos, there are neighboring plots of land with the place names marked 
as Tnlangan Danga Akaw, Tnlangan Tumun Akaw, and Pnspahan Telung Akaw. 
This indicates that the Akaw family had migrated from Snlingan to alang Hohos. 
Through these place names, we found that Truku people are able to trace migra-
tion histories that affirm the human relations among alang.
 Among the places indicated were thirteen hunting lodges or hubs that indig-
enous mappers indicated to be biyi, a term that is used to mark the places and 
houses which were used to farm mushrooms or to rest during hunting activities. 
Biyi are controversial in terms of law because most of the mushroom houses or 
hunting areas were located inside National Forest lands that indigenous people 
still accessed for gathering and hunting ‘illegally’. The Forest Administration 
considers biyi illegal. Today, biyi are not used as mushroom farms because the 
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price for the crop is no longer good. However, local participants marked these 
places to indicate that they still cared about the places where they had spent a lot 
of time and effort, even though they were located at quite a distance from their 
houses. Thus, the locations of these biyi became one of the sensitive categories 
that the participants hoped not to reveal to officials. 
 Among the 40 private properties named in the mapping project, we found 
that the term Dxgal denotes a Truku idea indicating lands awaiting further use 
by someone who has a claim to the user rights or ownership of the plot. For ex-
ample, the place name dxgal Udaw indicates that the person Udaw has a prior-
ity right to the land in question. The Truku term Qmpahan is used to indicate 
land that is currently being planted or that had been planted in the past. Thus, 
the place named Qmpahan Watan indicates that a Mr. Watan is using the land 
now and everybody living in the alang knows this. If Mr. Watan died, the place 
name would probably change to Pnspahan Watan if nobody took over the land. 
However, such a transfer of land is unlikely to happen quickly since recent gen-
erations of local people still remember Mr. Watan and his ownership of the plot. 
However, if the land is inherited by his descendants or sold to other people, then 
the place name would change to the name of the new rights holder. Our research 
showed that place name markers used to indicate land-human relationships in 
Truku cultural topographies can and did change. Place names carry meanings 
explicit among local people and are used as points of reference.
3.3 Places of daily life: Private or public place names in situ 
3.3.1 Narrations on topogeny and genealogy
One of the outcomes of these PPGIS processes was the accusation that mapping 
is responsible for the reification of place names that could, in fact, change at 
some point in the future. I certainly found some evidence of this in my research. 
When maps are just records of the status quo, it is also possible to mark some 
places that are not yet named by the public but are implicitly used by a few local 
private individuals. A number of local participants in the project indicated some 
places that had names only known by a few private users; places names that de-
noted the close relations of the individual with the land (Basso 1996; Roy et al. 
2000). Aunt Ikong’s mapping below illustrates some of these private places.
Sapah Yuyung (Yuyung’s home)
Sapah Yuyung is my sister-in-law’s home. We lived with my mother and my 
brother. My father was from Snlingan. I have not lived there for over 40 years. 
When I was 20, I left to come down to the place where I live now in the plains. I 
remember that we used to shout to the place called ayug, to call my brother and 
my mother to come back home to have lunch. I also had to work at ayug until 
10am, and then come back to make lunch for my brother and his wife who were 
still working up there. It took about 15 minutes to walk back home from ayug. 
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We lunched until 1 pm and then went back to work again. In summer we used 
to work until 6 pm. My brother was very hard-working and treated me strictly. 
My father died when I was 2, and my mother died when I was 17. I learned how 
to work from my mother. I remember that my mother and I walked to the plains 
carrying oranges and vegetables on our back to sell to the Han people. This made 
money for tuition fees. We used to start at 3 or 4 am with a torch and arrive at 6 
am so we could avoid the burning sun.
Honat (cliff)
Honat is the place where our cultivation land is located. The land is much lower 
than our home, so sometimes we would sleep at a biyi (temporary house) there. 
We used to sing all the way when going there. We sang the songs from church. I 
liked to sing alone and I could hear the echoes from the opposite mountain. The 
louder you sang, the louder the echoes.
Dkiya (mountain)
The mountain is the place where my brother would take me to see the traps for 
mountain rats and birds. We had to start very early, especially when the win-
ter was very cold and the dawn came very late. But when we saw many qowlit 
(mountain rats) in our traps, we were happy and did not feel tired. We still had 
to come back home before 7 am, because we still had to work in other places.
Map 3.3
Aunt Ikong’s mapping of her home base
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Ayug (gully)
In Ayug we had cultivation plots where my brother would drive our cow and 
plough the ground to plant dry rice (emhuna pyai), wet rice (oryza sativa 
Linn) and peanuts (emhuna trabus). That was also where we herded our cow. 
Ayug Truma (the bottom of the gully)
Ayug Truma is the place where I worked with my mother. After she died, I used 
to work there alone. One day, white balls dropped from the sky there. I did not 
understand what it was. Actually it was hail. I was thinking that it was the end of 
the world, because the church always said that the time will come for the end of 
the world. At that moment I didn’t know what to do, so I just prayed and prayed 
to God to ask, ‘What is this, is this end of the world?’ Later, when I went back 
home, everybody felt astonished and strange. We planted peanuts and sweet po-
tatoes and we used to grow cucumbers that were so sweet that my mother and 
brother liked to eat them fresh with salt. That was so delicious! 
The terms or place names Aunt Ikong used, such as onat (cliff), dkiya (moun-
tain), ayug (gully), and ayug truma (the bottom of the gully), are actually Truku 
terms to indicate physical topographies. Thus, while these terms can be used 
generally, we find here that they are used by Aunt Ikong as private place names, 
indicating her very personal experiences with the lands. Even people in the same 
alang, unless perhaps they were close neighbors, would possibly not know which 
places she was referring to. The four places she indicated as personal place names 
surround the house where she used to live. She centered the relations of these 
four places in the sapah (house) belonging to her sister-in-law, called sapah Yu-
yung. Aunt Ikong specified the house as Yuyung’s sapah to further indicate that 
the house carried the lineage of her brother’s father-in-law, who had built the 
house. Though it is mainly Ikong’s family that lives in Yuyung’s sapah (house), 
they still respect that the original owner of the house was someone else. A sapah 
could usually carry a genealogy of a few generations. Ikong recited the geneal-
ogy of her brother’s wife’s family. She said that when her brother married into 
Yuyung’s family she got the right to use the land from her brother’s father-in-law. 
She was expressing that they had use rights but not ownership rights; that the 
land was on loan from the family they married in to when their family left an-
other tribe that did not have enough land to live on. Ikong’s cousin Ici articulated 
his family’s lineage by indicating that the land actually belongs to him. Among 
the lands Ici owned, most of the lands were obtained through purchase, only one 
third of his lands were inherited from his father, Ikong’s brother. Ici explained 
that he bought lands in Alang Hohos because their ancestors moved from an-
other alang named Snlingan to Hohos where previous owners that had left some 
land for Ici’s ancestors to occupy and use. Ici and Ikong both recited their lineage 
from alang Snlingan as follows: (in Box 3.1 below): Ici Dadaw → Dadaw Yadu → 
Yadu in a sequence from the current generation to previous generations. Our re-
search showed that informants usually remember three generations before them. 
Yadu’s father was not remembered by Ikong and Ici, but they knew their ances-
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tor Yadu was born in their original alang Snlingan. Their Uncle Loking Yadu and 
father Dadaw Yadu moved to alang Hohos where they live now. They came with 
the approval of prior cultivators.
 Migration is also a common issue mentioned in the mapping process. Most 
of the people in the Taroko area have experiences of migration, irrespective of 
the processes of nation building. In Ikong’s narrative, she mentioned that her 
father moved from Snlingan to Skadang, and that she moved from Sdadang to 
the plains. A narration of the sequence of place comes via the genealogy and 
produces a topogeny, as Fox described for other Austronesian peoples (Fox et al. 
1997). When they recite the genealogy, they also indicate the relationships with 
the land. 
← Tumu (Hohos)  ← Ibai
Yadu (Snlingan) ← Lokin (Hohos)  ← Yalu
← Dadaw (Hohos) ← Ici
← Ikong (ego from Hohos now lives in plain)
Chart 3.1
Topogeny of Ikong’s family
(← : means the direction they recite the genealogy)
3.3.2 Topogeny is/with genealogy
Topogeny with genealogy was a common model of narration among many par-
ticipants. Migrations indicated in topogeny and genealogies are recalled in many 
people’s memory to mark the land in sequence and at the same time to bring the 
memory of landscape as a background for personal or family histories. Each 
family sent just one delegate to implement the narration model of genealogy and 
topogeny to indicate information on where, when and who should be inscribed 
on Google Earth in order to create a territory map. 
 Participants were eager to represent their vivid lives on the land they are fa-
miliar with. Ikong, for example, said that she wanted to describe her memories 
of the place before she was twenty years old, to create a reflection of her life. By 
contrast, she did not have much to say about Snlingan, the previous alang where 
her father lived, because she had very few ideas about the place. This certainly 
explains why she expressed her genealogy using a backward model, in sequence, 
from herself to her father and to her grandfather. As a result of the way she de-
scribed their daily lives in the place where she used to live and that were so fa-
miliar to her, she provided us with a basis for further interpretations on human-
land relationships. She told us about the happiness of hunting mountain rats or 
birds with her brother, and the sadness connected to the land where she worked 
with her mother. One participant interpreted Aunt Ikong’s narration: ‘From the 
perspective of land claiming, we could see that Aunt Ikong was describing the 
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land where they could do hunting, cultivating and gathering, which made up the 
typical daily lives in mountain communities.’ Aunt Ikong was telling us about 
more than just land rights and property, she was describing place with which 
she had connections and held great affection for. A community leader concluded 
that a place for daily lives is also a place that provides foundations for different 
narrations. This interpretation seems to be recognized among the participants. 
Following on from Aunt Ikong’s narrations, another family said that, ‘we also 
hunted in the area that Ikong calls Dkiya, which was first explored by our ances-
tors. We gave permission for Ikong’s family to hunt there.’ Pastor Xue also recited 
generations of genealogy and topogeny, telling us that his family had originated 
in Snlingan before moving to Hohos.
 Aunt Ikong’s descriptions of daily life were more powerful than any alien-
ated discourses for claiming land rights. Indeed, nobody’s story about this plot 
of land was more legitimate than hers. Through her narrations we obtain a much 
clearer idea of the landscape and the place called Ayug, which was within shout-
ing distance of her home on the plains. It was a place for cultivation that needed 
daily care and hard work. We learned too that Honat (cliff) and dkiya (moun-
tain), where the family did their hunting and gathering, is also at a convenient 
distance from their home on the plains. 
3.3.3 From micro world to contextual world: scaling up of the PPGIS
So far we have found that the mode of narration used by participants – articu-
lating both genealogy and topogeny – provided a structure and order for space, 
based on the rule of priority status for families of first cultivators and permission 
for newcomers, granted by families of prior cultivators and explorers. With these 
simple rules, local participants were able to differentiate other land relations that 
resulted from inheritance, buying, selling, granting or lending and borrowing. 
Thus, later we see that what Aunt Ikong describes within five place names that 
make up a micro world, were actually embedded in more complex contexts. 
These contexts were mentioned by other participants who also narrated their 
own personal micro worlds. The church location mentioned by Ikong was also 
mentioned by another family, who had donated the land to the church. These 
church donors were in a position to reveal the meaning of the place names. The 
only neighbor Ikong mentioned was sapah Lihan. This house is later mentioned 
and marked as a result of the narrations of the Lihan family genealogy, which 
demonstrated the family’s long residence and occupation of land in alang Hohos. 
When a place name is indicated as a result of PPGIS processes, we also find that 
a genealogy is recognized by the participants who were able to check and verify 
these labels on the map. There is also an implicit recognition among locals for 
the need for a suitable representative who can describe their places not only with 
names, but also using genealogies. Not surprisingly, participants tended to rep-
resent places where they had legitimate or direct connections. Thus, they did not 
tend to express meanings over places when there was someone else with more 
legitimate relations to that land. It is a process that starts with the private and 
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then extends to the public, and is subsequently checked and verified using ge-
nealogies and topographies, all of which combine to provide the best and most 
legitimate position for articulating land-human relationships. This process starts 
with ‘hearing the other side when it comes what touches all should be agreed to 
by all thus to make up an awareness that anyone couldn’t replace the other per-
son and speak for him or her (Tully 1995:35)’. (Author’s italics). 
 Through the representatives of the families that were able to articulate their 
places, a map indicating family land property in situ is processed. Those families 
that did not have representatives were also respected and invited to put a mark 
on the map to indicate the existence of a family who had rights to the land.
3.3.4 Village borderlines
The place names of land properties, and in particular reservation lands, indi-
cated on the cadastre, actually had very clear cut borders. However, borderlines 
in alang Hohos and Skadang were not shown on the cadastre. One participant 
explained that this was because the Japanese policemen in each alang had di-
vided up the territory to make space for reservation lands to be appropriated by 
individuals. Thus, the borderline was a way of marking the future appropriation 
of reservation land inside each alang. The township, however, did not recognize 
these borderlines and would often grant reservation land to other people belong-
Photo 3.1
Pubic Participatory Geographical Information System (PPGIS) workshop on Traditonal 
Territory in Skadang and Hohos Tribe 
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ing to different alangs. Consequently, clear and undisputed borderlines were a 
sign of an original oral contract on land appropriation inside an alang. Certainly, 
to claim a borderline in an alang was to claim sovereignty.
 An alang is not only made up of houses and cultivation lands that are allowed 
under the reservation land registration system, but also includes hunting and 
gathering areas that had largely been taken by the state as national lands, state 
forest lands or national parks (Yan, Jun-xiong 1997). Participants in the project 
were also eager to mark and indicate where they hunted and gathered, to provide 
a complete picture of their alang where they lived their lives. 
 They expressed many places names for hunting paths and areas, and tem-
porary houses that the National Park or Forest Bureau would consider as illegal 
and priority targets for elimination. Though some participants were worried that 
these markings on maps would leave them vulnerable, some were still eager to 
mark them in order to document a personal story, one that detailed the topolo-
gies they had experienced, including mountain names, gorge and valley names, 
lakes and hunting paths or old trails or shortcuts. These places were indicated 
sometimes using private place names and sometimes using public place names; 
the result was a coordinated system that structured the relations inside each 
alang. In this mapping process, these participants are coordinated to make new 
mental maps that combine personal experiences with the experiences of others, 
thereby giving personal place names like Ikong a new public status. For example, 
the tiny island in the middle of the Skadang River was named by Mrs. Yaya as 
Taiwan Island, because of its shape like the Taiwan Island. Participants adopted 
this name, thus giving public recognition to private naming.
3.3.5 The co-management of river landscape among different 
 communities
Besides hunting and gathering places (biyi) which the participants claimed ac-
cess to through their traditional customary rights, river landscapes were also 
demonstrated during the PPGIS process. Some participants told me that the 
Skadang and Hohos alangs were proposing a co-management project with the 
Taroko National Park headquarters for the protection and conservation of the 
Skadang river basin. Through the project, we discovered that the administration 
authority maps of the Skadang River were actually very different from the map 
made by the locals, which had different names for different sections of the main 
river from the upper stream to the downstream, as indicated on the map from 
A to H:
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Through the mapping of the river landscape we find that the principle of first 
occupation was still adopted to manage access to river resources. River sections 
were organized by clear boundaries and borders. However, these sections also 
combined to form a system of co-management among the stakeholders in dif-
ferent areas, especially in areas where fishing with the roots of a poisonous plant 
called tuba (Derris trifoliata, Jewelvine) was employed. This method makes the 
fish faint and flow from the upstream sections to the downstream where various 
stakeholders could harvest them at different points. The fact that co-manage-
ment systems exist for different river sections was clearly a rebuttal of ideas that 
the river also belongs to those alangs located on the opposite side of the river, 
such as Sdgan and Rocing. As one participant said, the opposite side of the river 
is actually highly vertical, with steep gorges, making it difficult for the people to 
get access to the river bank. The narrations and disputes on the ownership of the 
river came to a climax when the National Park decided to accept the proposal for 
co-management from the Skadang and Hohos group.
A-B Yayung (river) Snlingan includes the 
place beginning from Gglag (water-
fall) to Tapaq Tasil (big rock) man-
aged by the family of Snlingan, which 
comprises the lineage from a dama 
(father) belonging Ikong’s ancestors .
C Yayung Kruh: begins from Tapaq Ta-
sil to Gbiyuk (big gorge), which was 
managed by the family of Kruh, who 
were dominated by the family of Mr. 
Maji’s lineage that is recited as fol-
lows: Abu (Kruh) → Yakaw (moved to 
Skadang) → Asin → Maji (ego)
D Yayung Wilang Lawkay that belongs 
to alang Skadang and Hohos: begins 
from Gbiyuk to Tasil Qsiya where 
Wilang Lawkay’s family had the right 
to access the river resources.
E Yayung Wumin Sudu owned from 
Tasil Qsiya to Kiyuh. 
F Yayung Wilang Taymu owned the sec-
tion from Kiyuh to the river mouth 
where his grandson still lives now.
Map 3.4
Traditional River section management of Skadang 
River (Xu and Huang 2001) 
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3.3.6 Historicity and place
There are some place names carrying or indicating historical events or personal 
names. Take the place name Dxgal Skuring for example; it is the place that Ho-
hos participants identified as the spot where the Dutch left their gold mining 
equipment. It is still debated whether the Skuring originate from the Dutch or 
another Austronesian tribe who used to live on the mountain slopes and on the 
plains area around the river mouth (Kang. P 1999). Hohos participants consider 
the place as evidence of outsiders who occupied the land prior to the Hohos 
people. They still leave the mining equipment intact, as an ethno-archaeological 
site, so that Hohos and Skadang people are reminded that there were previous 
explorers in this place. In this case, I would say that historicity is demonstrated 
and confirmed by the rule to respect the first and prior occupation of this land. 
The place name of alang Skadang means the jaw of a human being in Truku 
terms (s = old, used to be; kadang = jaw). A historical event to dump equipment, 
no matter whether it was by the Dutch or people from the coast, is inscribed on 
the landscape and remembered by the current occupants, even though they have 
not lived through the event personally. 
 Historicity is also demonstrated by many place names that indicate vivid his-
torical or past events that people have encountered personally. Bangah indicates 
the place where they used to make charcoal. Amerika indicates a spot where an 
American was drowned. Sapah Knsat indicates where the Japanese police station 
was located. Lhngaw Qbulit indicates a place where some skulls that were hunted 
by tribal heroes were hidden. These place names carry stories that local partici-
pants recall to remember certain events.
3.3.7 Natural Sovereignty
Through the mapping processes we find participants using place names and sto-
ries to coordinate the alang communities, using the principle of respecting first 
occupation. From local private micro narrations, participants can coordinate 
with different families over a territory and make rules about access to the land 
and natural resources. These rules were set up by their ancestors who came to 
explore the lands that they have inherited. This is the reason why local people 
insist that they should obey the gaya of ancestors. To refer to ancestors is to refer 
to the principle of first or earlier prior occupation. Newcomers could join, pro-
viding they had approval from families of the first comers. One elder concluded 
that, ‘on the processes of migration, what is of most importance is that each 
family on the river bank of the Skadang river has a clear boundary.’ Each family, 
with the help of gaya, has to cooperate and negotiate on borders and rules to sur-
vive. Those who did not obey the gaya were killed (Yu, Guang-hong 1980; 1982; 
Yamaji 1987). Gaya contains genealogies and topogenies to demonstrate the rule 
of first occupation and, later, to structure a system to coordinate daily lives and 
activities like planting, housing, gathering, hunting and so on. These gaya actu-
ally form borderlines, zoning, access and rights to natural resources and even 
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determine punishment when necessary. As Pastor Xue and Elder Huang said, 
‘these gaya still worked until at least 1960s when the state forced us to stop prac-
ticing our gaya by bringing in outsiders and state agents to fish with electricity 
and logging’. ‘We could do nothing now because the state is stronger and more 
powerful than us; otherwise, we would be able to kill or defend any one intrud-
ing inside our land without our permission in the past. The right to defense was 
our natural sovereignty’.
3.4 Conclusion 
In an in situ scenario, place names are basic devices for producing a coordina-
tion and reference system for locals to indicate publicly recognized meanings of 
place and, thus, to be able to zoom into micro scale landscapes based on gaya 
rules. The gaya respects the place where prior occupations and historicity are 
articulated through vivid personal experiences. Thus, the gaya structured the 
land tenures and social relations in terms of genealogy and topogeny, which, in 
turn, ordered human-land relationships. These genealogies and topogenies cre-
ated borders between alangs that keeps rights intact and prevent conflict over 
‘sovereignty’. This subjectivity is demonstrated through all the PPGIS processes 
and results.
 The PPGIS mapping project lasted about one and a half years. It experienced 
some obstacles in terms of funding and prioritization, but this is not surpris-
ing as the local people involved were busy with their livelihoods and various 
organizations (including an indigenous NGO), in the hope of finding work and 
improving their lives. The PPGIS results can certainly play a role in providing 
complementary information to existing maps. As was anticipated, the mapping 
coordinated and initiated by the Geography Association of Taiwan (our team), 
which was commissioned by the Indigenous Council, provided evidence for land 
claims. Participants understood, however, that there was a limit to how much 
these results could facilitate their aims. They know that it also takes further leg-
islation and legal action to protect or bring back the rights they have lost. They 
realized, too, that the cable car or road building issues would not be solved by 
mapping alone. They also acknowledge that micro conflicts about reservation 
lands cannot be solved or analyzed by Google Earth’s low resolution images. 
 We hope the multimedia mapping results will provide fruitful information. 
Most of the local leaders felt it would be difficult to continue the mapping efforts 
since they did not bring any solutions to urgent issues. They did believe, how-
ever, that mapping had a role to play in ecotourism or as material for their chil-
dren to learn about their ‘roots’ in the mountains. Indeed, we invited children 
to attend the meeting where we disseminated the information about the project, 
even though we knew that the mapping had resulted in some controversial as-
sessments and had the potential to cause tension between the two alang that had 
been moved down from the mountains together to form a hybrid community, 
and that hoped to co-manage the lands above them where their homelands were 
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located. PPGIS mapping has the ability to scale up and down, to provide visual-
ized topologies of the place in situ and, it has the real possibility to reveal micro 
issues or conflicts among locals living in situ. PPGIS is also controversial because 
it has the potential to raise conflicts but not provide resolutions. In conclusion, 
it is hard to determine whether PPGIS mapping processes or results are func-
tioning in terms of meeting the purposes and aims of locals in the short- or long 
term. However, what it does provide is a new forum for participants to detail real 
and visualized topologies and to show their own relations with the lands in ques-
tion. It should be noted, however, that even though Google Earth is becoming 
more accessible and the techniques and skills required to handle monitors are 
becoming easier, locals are not used to using this equipment. 
 We found locals living in situ with their lands have a need for such a forum 
when dealing with their many conflicts over land with the National Park. The 
PPGIS mapping methodology makes the public articulation of experiences of 
topologies and land-human relationships a priority, and is an example of a ‘delib-
erate democracy’, even though is still the cause of some controversy in this socie-
ty. If one of the principles of democracy is based on Audi alteram partem (a Latin 
phrase that means, literally, hear the other side) (Tully 1995:35), Quod omnes 
tangit ab omnibus comprobetetur (q.o.t) (what touches all should be agreed to 
by all). It is also true that the diversity awareness one comes to acquire in dia-
logues does not consist of being able to replace the other person and speak for 
him or her (ibid: 133). We found the participants in alang Skadang and Hohos 
had more opportunity to follow these principles because they are still living in 
situ on their traditional territories. These territories have authentic places names 
and lively spatial reference systems. Through PPGIS, these geo references have 
been inscribed and processed, whether it is by land owners or tribal sovereignty 
protectors, while most of the other Truku people are not living in situ on their 
original home lands and are caught up in complex local hybrid or diaspora situa-
tions. People in hybrid or diaspora situation thus have different scenarios on the 




Free-sketch Mapping Workshop on Traditonal Territory in Skadang and Hohos Tribe
Map 4.1
Mapping through Google Earth on Alang Btakan by the Shoulin Township Team on Tradi-
tional Territory Mapping
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4
Mapping Taroko Traditional  
Territories in Diaspora and 
 Hybridity Scenarios
4.1 Zero-or-Sum places: Mapping diaspora and hybridity scenarios
An in situ scenario, lends itself to a more empirically based methodology of 
mapping human-land relationships, since people are living where they are still 
practicing and structuring land uses and tenures (Basso 1996). An empirical 
method allows for the checking of the ideas on human-land relationships that 
emerge among stakeholders. However, in cases where land is not inhabited, but 
there are still many stakeholders dispersed in many different places, each with 
different discourses and claims to land rights, it is hard to find suitable mapping 
methodologies. It is hard to define, quantitatively and qualitatively, or even to 
find enough representatives or stakeholders for mapping purposes when there 
are only descendants without strong connections to the traditional territories. 
There is no doubt that mapping empirically and ethnographically takes time and 
money and, on the whole, requires governmental efforts and initiative. Thus, we 
see in the national Indigenous Traditional Territorial and Land Survey (ITTLS) 
project, different townships implement the project either by adopting a way of 
cooperating with local people or indigenous NGOs who have been undertaking 
similar mappings, or by carrying out literature reviews and general interviews as 
a way of searching for surviving elders or representatives with a view to achiev-
ing a township scale mapping and finding clues to places and fading memories 
(Chang et al. 2004). Collaboration with local people has always involved a pro-
cess of mapping on a micro local scale, rather on a larger, township level. In my 
role as general secretary to the ITTLS project, I have observed that the imple-
mentation of local mapping processes adopted methods that meet the needs of 
different local contexts or politics. This observation requires further analysis, but 
at this point, I will examine the Taroko area in order to illustrate how the social 
movements of mapping traditional territories initiated by central government 
were interpreted and implemented in local contexts. 
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4.1.1 A doctrine for traditional territory mapping: witnessing 
As part of a national indigenous mapping plan sponsored by the Indigenous 
Council, the Shoulin Township adopted a method that, despite a limited budget 
in terms of time and money, aimed for the mapping of territory on a township 
scale. Even though Shoulin is the largest township in Taiwan, it was only granted 
the same budget for mapping as other smaller townships. Inevitably, it was dif-
ficult to conduct a detailed investigation with so few resources. The person hired 
to take charge of the mapping was a Truku intellectual, who had devoted a lot 
of time to exploring ancestral territories with other Truku people, and who had 
hunted and traveled a great deal within the ancestral areas. 
 In fact, the leaders of the Shoulin project took the definition and boundary of 
the Taroko territory to be those defined by the Japanese, who had already mapped 
and demarcated the Taroko territory prior to their invasion of the area in 1914 
(Yang 1996; Zhang, zhi-sheng 1998; Chen 1999; Chang, Dai-Pin 2000). They be-
lieved they knew the territory belonging to Taroko people, but that was now un-
der the control of the Forestry Bureau and Taroko National Park headquarters, 
well. Following recent social movements to promote their ethnic identity as an 
independent tribe, rather than as a sub-tribe of the Atayal, they invited a group of 
people who had fought for the independence of the Truku tribe from the Atayal 
ethnic identity to discuss and participate in the mapping project. It is clear, then, 
that mapping was scoped at an ethnic level. The project leaders collected Japa-
nese maps that supported the legitimacy of a mapping of Truku territory. How-
ever, most of the lands they called traditional territories are no longer inhabited by 
Taroko people. Indeed, the people were actually disconnected from those areas to 
a great extent. The investigators on this project had no direct experience with the 
land they were mapping. In the first few years, the primary methodology used was 
to find hunters who still accessed the hunting area to provide information and to 
use tribal place names indicated by elders or marked on Japanese maps. The inves-
tigators used these hunters to gain access to the land. This method of ‘witnessing 
the traditional territories’, resulted in a data bank, indicating traditional territories 
in units of small tribes with some basic information provided by limited sources 
of informants. Box 4.1 illustrates an item from the project’s 2008 report regarding 
tribe No. 176, the Alang Btakan. It gives an example of the information provided 
for analyses used in their mapping processes.
4.2 Frames of historicity and legitimacy between men and land 
4.2.1 Time-embedded landscape in diaspora scenarios
The box relating to the Btakan is a typical illustration of the mapping reports on 
each tribe visited by the project. It shows a typical style of narration. The reports 
are always structured in four sections: (1) names of the first comers and the time 
period they stayed after first arrival; (2) later migrations by the founding families 
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in different time periods; (3) the conditions around the time before 1895 when 
the Japanese came and later migrations and conditions of these families after the 
Japanese had implemented their polices relating to indigenous people; (4) the fi-
nal section introduces some details relating to the correspondents who provided 
the information and led the visit to the tribe. 
 In the report relating to the Alang Btakan, I sense that the map makers were 
structuring the time frame with a specific model that indicates major events in 
the history of the Taroko people. The Japanese army actually came to the Taroko 
area around 1914, whereas the year of 1895 (when the Japanese took over Tai-
wan) is a temporal land mark used to define the dramatic differences in the rela-
tionships between certain families and the territory. The mappers described their 
territories before the Japanese came as places where gaya was used to manage in-
ternal negotiations in terms of which land and natural resources they could oc-
cupy and have access to. However, after the Japanese and the Nationalists came, 
they were forced to leave their homelands, which now belong to the ‘state of the 
nature’.
 In my opinion, the mapping results and processes were stressed in terms of 
counter mapping, which views colonialism as a major factor of change (Chapin 
2001; 2005; Kuan 2008; Lu 2009; Tsai, et al. 2006; Wang 2004). A further device 
used by the mappers to illustrate the contrast between colonial and pre-colonial 
rule is the construction of the time period after the first families of each tribe 
Box 4.1 ■ Alang Btakan
1 About 250 years ago, Padu Umaw’s decendants, Apu Uda’s brothers, moved 
their families out of Skadang, by way of Iyax Paru, to the south bank of the 
Heran River where they established a settlement in Btakan.
2 Later, they found vacant slope lands in the south east, which were good for cul-
tivation, so some family members set up another tribe, the Apu, who were still 
ruled by the Btakan.
3 Before 1895, the villages on the south bank of Heran River were overpopulated 
and the threat of invasion by the Smiyawan from the south was getting fierce. 
In order to prevent the invasion, they built a satellite settlement on higher 
ground called Bngaran, which means a settlement for protection. When the 
Japanese came, around 1895, there were more than 30 families. After the war in 
1914, the settlements were forced to move down to the plains, but they were 
still allowed to cultivate the original tribal lands,  until 1946, when the National-
ists came, and we were all forced to leave our forest and land.
4 The guide, Wilang Yudaw, aged 62, whose ancestors came from the Skuy tribe 
on the Liwu River, now lives in Hoping village as a village head. From his youth, 
he went with elders to hunt all over the Nan-hu Mountain. His ancestors lived 
along the Da-Chou-Suei River. He participated in many construction projects 
in this area, including the building of cement factories and power plants. He 
knows these areas quite well.
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arrived on the land in question. I have found three specific time periods used 
regularly by these mappers to indicate the histories of certain families: as long 
as 250 years; 200 years; and 150 years. This can be seen in the sentence in Box 1: 
‘About 250 years ago, Padu Umaw’s descendants, Apu Uda brothers, moved their 
families out of Skadang by way of Iyax Paru’. I asked the question, how did the 
investigators know that the timeframe was 250, 200 or 150 years ago? One infor-
mant answered that there are Japanese documents that mention genealogies that 
list at least ten generations (Utsurikawa 1935). ‘If one can calculate one genera-
tion as 25 years, then the ten generations [recorded] suggest that this specific 
tribe endures at least 250 years’. ‘At least the Japanese did something good for us 
by recording the genealogies in the book ‘Studies of the Systems of Taiwanese 
Mountain Peoples (Utsurikawa 1935)’. However, Japanese scholars had not re-
corded all the genealogies, so ‘we could still have a basis to count the time period 
in terms of the memories of migrations and external marriages’. One indigenous 
participant told me that, ‘we don’t need an accurate time, but we need a rela-
tively reasonable timeframe to structure the first comers and later comers, which 
would be enough to keep the gaya of human-land relationships in histories’. I 
asked why he could only remember three to five generations back and, more 
importantly, given this, how it was then possible to connect to the first comers. 
Could there be a missing link? ‘Of course, there are missing links, but we always 
remember our first ancestors who came to the place’, he replied. Another infor-
mant answered that the reason why it is not important to have an accurate time 
period is because it is the time before the Japanese came; a time when ancestors 
lived their lives in a similar way to the founding families, who lived naturally and 
happily on the land. ‘The past was a much easier and a happier time than now, 
when we are not able to live on our homelands’. Here, again, is a sense of counter 
mapping as a device to help explain the timeframe. ‘Thus we don’t care about the 
missing links between the first comers and the last families who ever lived here 
before the Japanese came’. I notice that this narration of a time period is a miss-
ing link that, though it escapes the actual connections in terms of genealogy, it 
is actually legitimating the connections between the first comers and the then 
residents in the Japanese era with certain lands and territories. 
 Here, I have differentiated various narrations on the use of genealogies in 
Truku scenarios: one is a reverse genealogy that is used in scenarios such as the 
PPGIS mapping of the Skadang and Hohos tribes, where they live in situ and are 
able to recall three to five generations back. This reverse method always begins 
from the person involved and recounts just enough previous generations to le-
gitimate and demonstrate land tenure structures in combination with the narra-
tion of apical genealogy: from the original ancestors and a few later generations 
(Fox 1998, 2002). I have found that apical genealogy always offers only a few gen-
erations, starting from the first generation ancestors and later few generations 
but missing the generations between the top and the present ones, which result 
in a third type of genealogy that I call a missing genealogy. This missing gene-
alogy is a vague frame that defines time in periods of 150, 200 or 250 years, as 
illustrated in the previous example relating to the Btakan people (see Box 1). 
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Time is a metaphor that replaces the missing links of genealogies between the 
apical first comers and those generations ruled by the Japanese. People would say 
things like ‘we just knew our first ancestors who moved here’. ‘We knew because 
our parents told us.’ ‘We knew the ancestors’ names that are often used in our 
families’. However, what I have found is that these families only have about fifty 
commonly used names, and that these names are used for both patrilineal and 
matrilineal lines. Consequently, it is hard to tell which names belonged to which 
families. This is the reason why there are social groups or units that could be 
described as families, which are only traced back a few generations. It is highly 
possible that in the past, before genealogies were written down, families had only 
limited knowledge about a limited number of generations. Thus, it is argued that 
there are no clan systems or lineage systems that can be accurately traced, as ac-
curate lineages are traced from a common ancestor, or from clans whose descen-
dants can put an ancestor’s name into naming systems using surnames or lineage 
names. The Truku or the Pan-Atayal people do not have systems of surnames or 
lineage names. Instead, they simply employ the term ‘txhal tama’ (same father) 
when considering social units and categories. Some informants said that they 
have different ways of determining their familial connections, for example, by 
using the myths and stories circulated within families, or by looking to marriage 
connections. Both of these examples assist in determining accurate genealogical 
relations. Some Truku people admitted to me that it was possible that someone 
could claim a connection with an apical ancestor, even though there were no 
genuine consanguinity connections. This could be because he or his ancestors 
just joined a group or lived with the local first comers forming a temporary co-
operative group that is sustained with gifts and sharing relationships. Genealo-
gies are not absolute evidence for proving legitimate rights to a piece of land. In 
the mapping scenario, a period of time such as ‘250 years’ is used as a metaphor 
to demonstrate the way that gaya is conceptualized as ideal, and was a ‘normal’ 
and ‘ordinary’ part of people’s lives before the Japanese came. Thus, a time period 
became a space for imagination or a platform where ancestors’ ways of life con-
tinued, resulting in the image of time as a ‘time-embedded landscape’. This land-
scape animates the mappers’ imagination and the notion that within this time 
and space there were ancestors living a life free of interference from the Japanese 
and the Nationalist Kuomintang regimes, who did not allow them to hunt or cul-
tivate the land using the slash and burn methods of their ancestors and guided 
by their traditional morals and gaya. I would define this perspective of time as a 
‘time-embedded landscape’ and use it to describe a mapping scenario found usu-
ally in a diaspora scenario. Time-embedded landscape becomes a metaphor to 
connect people and landscape. Time is an embedded concept that is loaded with 
imaginations of ancestor’s ways of ideal lives and rules of gaya.
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4.3 Does the present come from histories of continuity or 
 contingency?
As an example of an in situ scenario, it is useful to interpret the mapping results 
from the surveys of Skadang and Hohos. This allows us to construct a landscape 
using a mode of narration of everyday life or the history of continuity, where 
people recall vivid experiences about the events and conditions that lead to the 
present. The status quo is basically a confirmation of the impact of an event or 
conditions from the past. This is not to say that people living in situ on their land 
possess all the answers or clues to explain the situation now and then. As demon-
strated by the mapping results of Skadang and Hohos – the only two villages with 
strong connections and continuities with their ‘homelands’ – the origins and cir-
cumstances surrounding a number of place names are still unknown. However, 
compared to a diaspora scenario, people in situ are more likely to construct their 
genealogies based on existing family connections with the land. 
 In an in situ scenario, Truku people tend to think of the past as a history of 
continuity that traces a path from their ancestors. The Japanese colonial impact 
on their lives cannot be denied. There are direct and empirical experiences that 
demonstrate a continuity of history and from which they construct the narra-
tives of change, especially those changes brought by the Japanese and the Chi-
nese. 
 In a diaspora scenario, histories are made up of contingency insofar as the 
Truku map makers imagined the time after the first comers and ancestors, de-
fined by their gaya ways of living, as being (relatively) better than the situation of 
change brought about by the Japanese. Certainly, ‘old’ ways are not always ideal, 
but previous bad periods in the time of the ancestors are not revealed as much. 
People also constructed a more ideal and idyllic past in the hope of regaining a 
mode of life according to ancestral gaya. A mode of life that mappers, intellectu-
als and activists considered to be the rules for the much anticipated autonomy 
and that was even encouraged by the then President Chen. Here we see people 
are constructing the past according to the will of the future (Persoon 2009: 12). 
Thus, the past is made up of contingency in which events and conditions are not 
acknowledged or explained by local people. However, people still try to come up 
with empirical clues in order to bring a continuity of history that can be traced 
by well-known events or conditions, in particular those that occurred under Jap-
anese rule. 
 Thus, the mapping reports reveal that people grab evidence or any clues to 
prove a connection to the places where one of their ancestors or a member of 
their ethnic group had lived. Using this methodology, they tried to access almost 
168 ancestral sites or tribes that had been named by ancestors. Key to the investi-
gation the team visited the location in question in person. In their reports to the 
township and the Indigenous Council, they described in great detail their jour-
ney and the processes involved in reaching an ancestral site, where they com-
monly found remnants of stoves or evidence of house construction that nobody 
could identify or had relations with. The journey also led them to the time-em-
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bedded landscape where their ancestors were living. The reports provide many 
narrations and videos illustrating the dangers and difficulties they faced during 
the journey. The reports also emphasized the conditions involved, the remote-
ness of a place and the wilderness their ancestral tribes had inhabited, which 
they were now encountering once more after many decades of absence. Some of 
the participants of the mapping team insisted on blaming the Japanese for the 
major changes to their territories and for the miserable conditions their ances-
tors endured. They took pictures and video recordings of their ancestral tribe 
and together with the investigators they were able to provide evidence to show 
that they had discovered their ancestral people. This doctrine of ‘seeing is believ-
ing’ precedes the project of traditional territories mapping. Apparently, since the 
areas the team visited were Taroko territories, there was less of a priority to pro-
vide evidence of direct relations to stakeholders. Years later, when these reports 
were revealed, there were accusations that the information about land tenure 
and ownership received too little attention and that the facts about boundaries, 
owners, and inhabitants’ of the land appeared to have been biased in favor of the 
Truku point of view. 
 In the initial years of the mapping project, the township clerk hired academ-
ics who had knowledge of historical documents and the skills to type and record 
interviews with these ancestral tribes. The journey guides who led the investiga-
tors to the ancestral lands were not necessarily the people who had ‘legitimate’ 
relationships with the land. The results of the mapping show indigenous territo-
ries with some ‘points on maps’ to indicate the tribes the team visited. No tribal 
boundaries were indicated. The leader of the project explained that there are two 
reasons for this. One is because they did not have the resources to find people 
with direct and legitimate relations to a specific tribe to describe the territory 
of each tribe with a degree of consensus. The second reason is that those people 
who do have legitimate relations, as either the descendants or the last inhabit-
ants of the land, were dispersed among many different plains tribes or commu-
nities, who had few clear memories about what the boundaries were. In order to 
overcome this missing element, the mapping project was designed to map at the 
Truku tribe level, i.e. mapping the territory belonging to the entire Truku ethnic 
group, rather than mapping at the more detailed, community level. This meth-
odology was criticized by some local participants and Truku people, especially 
those claiming land rights in the national property area, who said that the map-
ping results did not express the detailed land tenure or ownership structures of 
each tribe. 
 In fact, I found that in a diaspora scenario, people did not care that much 
about the ‘spatial accuracy’ of mapping their homelands. Indeed, space is not 
talked about in an accurate context, but rather in terms of a relative relation-
ship between descendants of different families from different communities. The 
leader of the mapping project was aware of this problem but he believed that 
adopting a schema to remember the space through the family group ‘txhal tama’ 
(same father) system was the most efficient. He noted that people do not have 
many memories of spatial arrangements because of their absence from the lo-
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cation and the fact that they were very young when they left. As the leader of 
the mapping project pointed out, given the constraints of the project, the family 
group ‘txhal tama’ system is good enough:
Now we are presenting a mapping of the entire Truku territory, rather than at 
a smaller scale, with details of every tribe. We only have a limited budget and 
human resources. We need to carry out ethnic tribal scale mapping primar-
ily with a view to our future autonomy. When we achieve autonomy, we may 
have internal discussions within each tribe to determine authentic stakehold-
ers and to draw maps with a cadastre that will define our homelands and solve 
the problems of legitimacy that the maps we are currently working with raise 
(personal contact with elder C.H. Huang July, 24 2006). 
4.3.1 Appeals for mapping with legitimacy
Maps compromised by so many limitations inevitably invite criticism from in-
side the Truku communities. The mapping that was carried out at the Truku eth-
nicity level is mainly criticized for its top-down approach and there is an accu-
sation that the process was open to manipulation by some intellectuals who did 
not pay much attention to the local details of each traditional community. Thus, 
Photo 4.2
Finding the Roots to the Ancestral Traditional Territory and Claiming land Sovereignty. Photos cour-
tesy of Huang, C.H. (黃長興先生提供)
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there was a concerted effort in the follow-up mapping project to employ guides 
who had closer relations to the land and to take investigators to visit the spots in 
order to document and trace the land tenure in as much detail as possible.
 In addition, a number of local indigenous people who identify themselves as 
Toda or Tkdaya were critical of the results of the mapping of traditional territo-
ries. They complained that the exercise was biased towards a Truku point of view 
and only based on the views of elites and intellectuals. There was an issue regard-
ing the extent of participation and also the legitimacy of information. In dealing 
with these issues, I found that, in fact, many alternative mappings – some spon-
sored by the Township Office, some not – started to emerge during the process. 
Below, I will focus on those mapping activities practiced by people who have, 
what I term, hybrid relationships with their traditional territories.
4.4 Hybridity
I define a hybrid scenario as a relationship between human (in this case, map-
pers) and land where the humans do not have as direct relations with their lands 
as, say, those involved in an in situ scenario. At the same time, in a hybrid sce-
nario, the human has more direct memories of the land than someone in a di-
aspora scenario, where almost all direct memories are lost. A hybrid scenario 
occurs when, for example, the elders of a tribe spent very little time during their 
childhood or youth in the land where they were born. These elders were moved 
down to the plains far away from their original lands and, after the migration, 
which happened at least six or seven decades ago, they had very few opportuni-
ties to return. They kept some memories of the land but experienced diaspora 
traumas that blurred their memories. Where they are able to recall memories of 
the land, it often comes in the form of dreams or nightmares that are revealed 
during conversations or chatting in daily life. The majority of them had suffered 
the process of migration and experienced the difficulties of adjusting to life in a 
new land where they were mixed with other tribes. Recollections of homeland 
are fuelled by recent movements for land claims and demands for the return of 
indigenous lands, and the efforts to map and narrate homelands. 
 Here, I use hybridity to indicate a mixture of personal and also ‘collective 
memories’, as well blurred and vivid memories of the land, to describe how this 
category of indigenous people bring representations (including maps) of their 
ancestral lands. 
During the time the national projects on indigenous mapping were being imple-
mented by the township, I found that many activities centred on ideas such as 
‘finding my roots’ or ‘revisiting my homelands’ were still taking place. The case 
study below illuminates how people in a hybrid scenario create representations 
of their homelands.
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4.4.1 A journey to the homeland: Swasal village
Swasal used to be a community made up of many little settlements. The Japanese 
authorities moved Swasal’s residents down from the mountains and dispersed 
them among new mixed settlements in the plains around 1930. On the whole, 
Swasal people were moved far from their original lands, to a county dominated 
by another ethnic indigenous group, the Bunun. In fact, the Bunun have tradi-
tionally been enemies of the Taroko people, in competition for land and terri-
tories. The Swasal people tell many sad stories of suffering in an alien township 
comprising other ethnic groups. In 2007, Swasal descendants living in this alien 
area began a project, sponsored by the Bunun Township, to support a journey 
to their homelands far away in the mountains, in Shoulin Township inside the 
Taroko National Park. The project staff informed the headquarters of the Taroko 
National Park about the project and asked for permission to enter the park and 
for help to visit their homelands. 
 It took a five hour bus trip, plus another five hours of hiking, to be able to ac-
cess the area the Swasal people believed to be their homeland. During the jour-
ney, an elder told me that the migration down to the plains had taken three days 
of walking. About ten per cent of the people on the journey were aged 70 or 
over and many found the hike up to the homeland difficult. The young people 
in the group, who were making the trip ‘home’ for the first time, were watch-
ing over and taking care of these elders who insisted on climbing the path, even 
with sticks in both hands. The march was slow and it took longer than expected. 
Along the way, the elders found animal tracks and hoped that this would lead 
them to paths where traps could be set. Indeed, one elder found a trap that had 
been set by someone else, but said that it was not a good job. He criticised the 
structure of the trap and said that ‘this area should only be hunted by Cilu’s fam-
ily’. In fact, the only representative of the Cilu family on this journey was a young 
boy. He told this young boy, ‘you know, this area belongs to your ancestor, but 
someone else, maybe people from other tribes or the Han, are hunting illegally 
here within the National Park’. ‘Things have changed a lot, but you see, I don’t 
think he will have a nice catch with this bad trap structure’. 
 On the journey, the younger hikers were told (and asked to hear) stories from 
the elders. The stories told were mostly of the journeys that took place when they 
were moved down to the plains some 60 years ago; the suffering involved in car-
rying heavy loads or dropping the only possessions they had. They told of the 
pain of seeing families and friends separated from each other, or they recalled 
the joy of seeing a father coming back with animals he had hunted. 
 Some elders were so tired and had pains in their legs that there were real 
concerns that they might not finish the journey. The party split up into different 
groups of elders accompanied by young men, different groups of hikers of dif-
ferent speeds and groups of relations and neighbours. In fact, the groups auto-
matically formed along the lines of their original settlement. I joined some of the 
groups to chat and listen. At one point, an elder fell down the slope giving fellow 
hikers a scare. They wanted to send him back to the bus, but he refused to go 
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back, saying, ‘I will finish my journey because this is my last journey. I was forced 
to move out here.’ ‘This is my longing and my dream and ambition to come back, 
just don’t bother me.’ Some young men felt so sad that they wept and told the el-
der, ‘Dama, may I carry you on my back and we could go together.’ It was a hard 
job to carry him on the rough trail. Many young men, including me, took a turn 
to carry him. This was made harder by the fact that he regularly wanted to stop 
at certain spots to tell a story, or just to gaze at places. After more than six hours, 
some pioneers arrived and began to hunt. The elders had asked for a big hunt 
so that everybody could have a share of the meat from the homeland. In fact, 
the young leaders and clerks of the team had worried that there would not be 
enough meat to feed the 80 participants, so they had hired and sent out hunters 
prior to the journey in preparation. Consequently, the harvest was so huge that it 
took them quite a few hours to deal with all the prey like wild boars, deer, flying 
squirrels and wild goats. They set up a fire and cooked the dinner as the night 
fog fell and engulfed the big leaves of the tree ferns and we heard the crying of 
wild deer (Formosan Reeve’s muntjac: Muntiacus reevesi). The respected elders 
and pastors prayed and everybody began to eat. They cut some meat and poured 
some wine on the ground stating, ‘our great ancestors of this tribe Swalsal, please 
forgive for visiting you so late’. Then, each elder in turn said their prayers and 
invited everybody to eat as much as possible, because ‘there would be no more 
chance to eat meat from our ancestors’ land’ as one elder said. ‘After the dinner’, 
one elder said, ‘I will tell you stories I remember, and I will reveal every detail of 
every piece of land I know here.’ The wild deer were crying so loudly that they 
seemed to echo the stories being told. Most of the stories began by criticising the 
policy of the Japanese who had moved them down to a place they did not feel 
was home. An old and respected pastor, who was among the oldest in the group, 
recalled how initially the Japanese had sent interpreters to invite the tribal lead-
ers and ancestors to move willingly down the mountain, but that in the end they 
were forced to leave: 
No matter that we were forced to move to the plains in the past, now we think 
that we can maintain our relationship with the land here. Actually, even if we 
were not willing to move down by our own free will, we still have the right 
to claim the land here as our own territory. Or, even if we were willing to go 
down, we still have right to access the land here, since we were so unused to 
the land where we are living now. Actually, one of my relatives had come back 
in secret and died here during the Japanese time. We have rights here, but the 
National Park is a trouble that stops us from coming here. As you can see, deer 
and pigs are plenty, don’t you think it is to our ancestors’ happiness at seeing 
us back that they welcome us back with such a good harvest? (Elder B.C. Yeh 
Aug, 24 2006). 
One young man asked why the Indigenous Council had not invited them to join 
the traditional territorial mapping: 
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Is it just because we are living in another alien county, not in the same county 
in Shoulin? Can you believe the maps they made? And what about us? What 
about our land here though we were moved to another county? This time we 
come back with elders to find our lands, and we should tell our descendants 
to remember this area. 
Everybody was very excited and eager to see the land, now covered by the heavy 
night fog and echoing with the sound of crying deer. The next morning, most of 
the visitors followed elder Yeh to the places that his map indicated as belonging 
to someone’s family. Some happened to find that, here, their families had been 
neighbours, though they now live in different communities without knowing 
each other. Some old men wept or stood silently on the spot. Some young par-
ticipants were laughing to express their astonishment at seeing their ancestors’ 
houses. Many photos were taken of the whole group – of the descendants and 
neighbours. New connections were made. After an easy and quick lunch, every-
body started on the walk back to the bus. On the journey back, I was thanked for 
helping them and asked to report to the Indigenous Council that ‘finding roots’ 
activities such as this were so important. 
 I felt a responsibility and was determined to take their advice, not least be-
cause I was curious about how to discuss such a journey in report for a mapping 
project that only allows for clinical drawings and images. I had the sketch map 
drawn by elder Yeh, but the GIS system could do nothing with it since the map 
contained no coordinates with accurate indicators. Hence, the description of this 
‘My dear elders please tell 
us more about here’, asked a 
young man, ‘and please tell us 
details of where my grandfa-
ther lived and where his land is 
located.’ One elder answered, 
‘Young man, I am sorry, I am 
not familiar with your place 
that is two or three hours away 
from here, and I don’t have 
many memories about it’. ‘But I 
know the place here and I have 
drawn a little map to indicate 
every little house where some 
of your grandparents and par-
ents or relatives lived.’ ‘The 
map [see photo 4] is drawn ac-
cording to my memory, but it is limited only to the area of the proper Swalsal tribe’.  ‘And to-
morrow in the very early morning, I will guide you to see each piece of their land.’
Photo 4.3
Mapping of Sawal Tribe by elder Yeh.
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journey in this thesis; to show that it is a form of mapping that carries people’s 
emotions and ideas.
4.4.2 Journey as mapping
The hike provided participants with opportunities to see how the elders gazed 
on the landscape. Histories and stories were told to connect the hikers with the 
colonial histories that were vividly expressed on the difficult journey. These el-
ders seemed to suffer again as they recalled their memories, visualized on the 
spot and on the trail to the homeland. Young people were also invited to join 
in the experience, to empathize with the sufferings and memories that these el-
ders showed. It was like a ritual. The young people imitated and learned the suf-
ferings of the journey of the forced migration process, which allowed them to 
understand the time or histories and vivid events that happened so many years 
ago. Some memories were vividly recalled by those who had direct experiences; 
other memories were imagined by those who were invited by the elders to go 
back to the past. Some encountered feelings of deja vu, which confused. I would 
describe this journey to the homeland as a pilgrimage, to bring a ‘communitas’ 
that brought every visitor to a time-embedded landscape where their ancestors 
were living. 
 In terms of the standard geo grid maps demanded by the Indigenous Council 
or the scholars of geography, I am sorry to report that the sketch map the elder 
Yeh had drawn was not acceptable to any township office. Eventually, however, 
a ‘spot’ named ‘Tribe Swasal’ was recorded in the GIS databank of indigenous 
mappings in the report to the Indigenous Council. The sketch map drawn by the 
elder was not a cadastre that demarcated clear boundaries agreed among stake-
holders. Thus it was not incorporated into the land registration system. 
 But the journey was centred on visiting the area where the sketch map had 
indicated the home bases of the participants. The visit seemed to reconstruct 
neighbours’ relations and create a new starting point in terms of the area being 
a home and a temporary communitas. This sort of communitas does not actually 
promise anything in terms of grants or recognition of land rights, or owner-
ship, or even rights to access the ‘originally affluent’ natural resources now under 
the rule of the National Park. Mapping is a strategy used to claim actual rights, 
but the journey led by a sketch map only serves as a device for building com-
munities or togetherness (Seiber 2000). The experience of eating and sharing 
the meat ‘provided’ by the homeland ancestors started and reconstructed a new 
connection between the participants and the land and their common ancestors. 
In short, mapping as a process among people in a hybrid scenario can only re-
construct a limited part of the past. This partial past cannot indicate actual land 
tenures and ownerships or rights to access, because these groups of pilgrimages 
were only a small portion of all the possible stakeholders. The sketch map was 
only part of the memories of one elder, and some of the other elders wondered 
whether it could be biased. 
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The journey was devised to bring memory back to the relationships with the 
land, but did not result in an ‘unproblematic map of the homeland, in which each 
group is associated with a physically demarcated area’ (Barendregt 2005:15), as 
the Indigenous Council required. It is a community not so much demarcated 
by physical borders, but rather defined in terms of what Gupta and Ferguson 
(1992:10) would call ‘imagined homelands’ (see Barendregt 2005:15). These 
homelands would actually be what Auge (1995) notes as an emergence of non-
places; spaces without history or vivid personal experiences. In fact, for the hik-
ers on the journey, these spaces were not without history like ‘modern highways, 
airports or malls that are areas of transience and anonymity’ (Auge 1995); rather 
they are places being recognized with histories that would actually be forgot-
ten or erased forever if the elders had not been there. That is the reason why 
these elders ran the risk of climbing and hiking in the mountains to inscribe and 
restore the histories and incidents that resulted in such great changes to their 
lives. These areas were on the edge of being either zero or sum embodiments of 
histories or memories, or local senses. Thus, I call the areas we visited zero-sum 
places. Through such journeys people reconstruct spaces as places full of mean-
ingful landscapes. We must accept these journeys as participations, penetrating 
human-land relations and mapping histories and places. Thus, the reconstructed 
zero-sum-places stand on the edge of either fading away forever or being recon-
structed as renaissances. 
 Ironically, modern devices such as cadastres, and legal doctrines such as terra 
nullius bring about an erasure of the places where land and humans are imbed-
ded with each other. After so many years, the only mapping option open to in-
digenous people was a journey to evoke a zero-sum-place, to bridge or compen-
sate the loss of sense of place, to stop living in a world of non-places. The vivid 
and direct memories of a hybrid scenario facilitate this in a way that a diaspora 
scenario, with its imagined or constructed memories, cannot.
 Swasal is still a space in the regime of the Taroko National Park (Song 1999) 
and it is used as an environmental education center. But it is also a space for 
poachers to hunt or for foreign hikers to find leisure and recreation, a space that 
modernity and hyper-modernity demands for ‘natural conservation’, ‘environ-
mental preservation’ or World Heritage Promotion projects that are far removed 
from the journey made by the indigenous participants in search of their original 
relations with the lands.
 More and more Zero-sum-places are emerging as a result of the journeys, 
camping or hunting trips made by local people and the increasing ‘finding our 
roots’ activities being undertaken. Indeed, the rescue and recovery of places is 
booming in the area where I am doing my field work. 
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Photo 4.4
Finding roots in Ancestral Traditional Territory in Swasal.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter illustrates three topographies between present day indigenous set-
tlements and traditional territories: in situ, hybrid, diaspora. This typology sug-
gests a decline in the closeness with and knowledge of territories being claimed. 
Claimants seem to divert into objective empiricism and subjective reconstruc-
tionism in terms of the ideas and methodologies for mapping traditional terri-
tories. In an in situ scenario, landscapes are demonstrated face to face through 
the checks and balances of locals. In a diaspora scenario, when stakeholders and 
information are lacking and there are few checks and balances on the relation-
ships between people and traditional territories, the politics of representation 
are more controversial. We found that locals adopted a method of large scale 
mapping in order to ensure the inclusion of territory that they hope will be ruled 
again by ancestral gaya, once autonomy passes to the Taroko people. Future per-
spectives are concerned with mapping. In a hybrid scenario, where some direct 
connections remain, in the form of elders who are able to make a journey to 
their homelands, a space of zero-or-sum place emerges and awaits rescue. Alter-
natively, this zero-or-sum space would become an imagined homeland or a lost 
land, a non-place to the indigenous descendants. 
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Photo 5.1
A meeting of indigenous scholars and activitists after the passing of the Indigenous Basic Law. 
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5
Making Laws for Indigenous Tradi-
tional Territory and Land Rights: 
Controversy in a Taiwanese Context 
5.1 The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (Basic Law 2005): 
 A breakthrough? 
The passing and enactment of the Basic Law (2005) was good news that came 
as a surprise to many lawmakers, scholars, and indigenous activists. Its articles 
contained many international standards of indigenous human rights and, un-
expectedly, it passed with relative ease through the Legislative Yuan, in which 
indigenous members occupy less than two per cent of the seats. (Simon 2011: 
731-732; Ku 2008: 401). There has been very little study of the law-making pro-
cesses. Thus, I will begin this chapter by presenting some theories and statements 
from indigenous people in order to trace a line of logic that demonstrates the 
major reasoning and considerations that culminated in the Basic Law incorpo-
rating a number of human rights and, in particular, much needed land rights. 
Out of a total of 35 articles contained in the Basic Law, eleven articles9 explicitly 
and implicitly concern the definitions and boundaries of land territories, as well 
as rights and substantial benefits for indigenous people. Furthermore, the law 
implies that lands are a basis for self-determination and autonomy. The ambi-
tious Basic Law puts indigenous developments at the base of a system to manage 
lands that have been out of indigenous control for a long time. I will illustrate 
this by interpreting some of the articles in the law that relate to indigenous land 
rights and their future implementation. First, however, I will examine some of 
the discourses and actions of indigenous people and activists before the Basic 
Law was passed.
9 In articles: 2, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 32 (11/35) see translations by Council Of Indig-
enous Peoples, Executive Yuan, R.O.C at: www.apc.gov.tw/main/docDetail/detail_official.jsp?isSea
rch=&docid=PA000000001795&linkSelf=231&linkRoot=231&linkParent=231&url= (last accessed 
3 November 2010).
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5.2 Natural sovereignty and various claims for self-determination
 
Over many decades, beginning in the 1980s, Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have 
been asserting their rights and reclaiming their territories. One of the implicit 
theories that is practiced by indigenous land rights movements is the idea of 
‘natural sovereignty’ (Poiconu 2005). The indigenous law scholar, Pu (2005), ar-
gues that natural sovereignty is the direct result of the following process:
First occupation or long term residence → natural sovereignty → current rights
He acknowledges that it is hard to explain why first occupation and long term 
residence could support a natural sovereignty that would prevent any encroach-
ment by the state. What is the status of natural sovereignty in a modern state? 
Who is able to claim natural sovereignty? Could natural sovereignty possibly 
be governed by state laws? All these questions are hard to answer. That said, 
Western or Roman laws, and indeed many civil laws, respect the notion of first 
occupation and long term residence as legal facts to support the rights of the 
people on the land. Why does natural sovereignty only concern land issues, and 
how does natural sovereignty stand in relation to the state? Poiconu believes that 
it should be explained using the histories and processes relating to the situation 
before and after the indigenous people encountered outsiders and the state (Pu 
2005). 
 He believes that ‘natural sovereignty’, based on natural rights, refers to a 
highly autonomous history in which indigenous people have used and protected 
their home areas and the natural resources over a long period. Consequently, in-
digenous people have a political structure based on an unofficial semi-state and 
sovereignty over their living areas. As a semi-state is not equal to a state under 
standards of international law, indigenous people refer to the notion of owning 
the ‘natural sovereignty’. Certainly, the fact that indigenous people have lived in 
an area for a long time according to natural laws that existed before the emer-
gence of nation state would suggest that they deserve ‘natural sovereignty’. ‘Natu-
ral sovereignty’ is a human right that does not need approval from the state. Un-
der this concept, we must adjust the idea of state sovereignty taking precedence 
over all other rights. Based on the idea that different sovereignties are equal and 
independent, the state cannot take any indigenous traditional territory into the 
realm of state territory. Thus, rights connected to indigenous traditional terri-
tory, such as the right to autonomy, rights of access to natural resources and the 
management of natural resources, cannot be disrupted by the state and should 
be kept intact. The state cannot insist on the ‘theory that state has the absolute 
sovereignty’ to rule over indigenous traditional territories. The state has no right 
to ask indigenous people to give up their natural rights to their traditional ter-
ritories. 
 This concept of ‘natural sovereignty’ is an important idea among indigenous 
peoples (see Shi-lin 2002). By this, I do not mean necessarily that the theory is 
consciously used by indigenous people as a call to action; rather, I would say 
that this theory is the convergence of a number of ideas by different indigenous 
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people about first occupations and long term residence. For example, the people 
in the Taroko area use the spirit of gaya (a general term for Taroko people’s tra-
ditional laws) to respect the first comers or cultivators, at least in political and 
religious terms. Many indigenous peoples have similar ideas and experiences 
of being colonized, which bring about a theory of natural sovereignty and lead 
to actions and movements. These histories have led to the fight for indigenous 
land rights. Based on this local theory, indigenous people have created move-
ments at many different levels in order to appeal for their rights. Thus, we see 
a wide spectrum of claims concerning collective or individual rights, based on 
varying degrees of collectivity or individuality. There have been some responses 
and feedback from the authorities providing some solutions to claims from in-
digenous people, such as the granting of some reservation lands to individuals. 
But this did not satisfy many indigenous people who insist on various claims 
of self-determination. While the majority of indigenous activists are eager for 
autonomy and outright sovereignty, other ideas on ‘independence’ have been 
mooted, including shared or co-ownership with the Republic of China (R.O.C) 
in Taiwan (Wu, Rwei-ren 2009). The Basic Law reflects this continuum of in-
dependence. However, if any kind of sovereignty for indigenous people is to be 
achieved, more procedures and further legislation relating to implementation 
and resolving conflicts between different laws are needed. 
 Another study is required in order to explore the continuum that ranges be-
tween the different poles of individuality/collectivity, sovereignty/property and 
self/collective determination. For now, I will focus on the processes involved in 
indigenous people incorporating and implementing these issues in the legisla-
tion relating to the Basic Law. 
   
5.3 Legalizing ‘traditional territories and lands’ 
Legislation alone is rarely enough to resolve land issues. Besides problems of 
definition, the implementation of rights is complicated, as is evident in many 
other countries. That said, law-making is a necessary first step. There are many 
critical considerations to be taken into account when legislating for land rights 
in Taiwan, not least the diversity among indigenous peoples. Despite many dec-
ades of effort, the Basic Law remains problematic and needs additional legisla-
tion. Before discussing some of the pitfalls implied in the Basic Law, I would like 
to describe a formal meeting that took place in the Legislative Yuan in 2006, in 
order to illustrate the process involved in indigenous activists brainstorming on 
the definitions and implementation of indigenous rights. 
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5.3.1 Debates on the definitions of ‘lands’ or ‘traditional territories’ 
On the 7th December 2006, a meeting was held in the Legislative Yuan. This 
meeting had the grand title of ‘The 6th Term of the Legislative Yuan, the 4th 
Congress Conference, the 8th meeting of the Commission on Interior Affairs 
and Ethnic Relations’. I did not attend this meeting personally, but having read 
many legislative records, and following a series of interviews and exchange of 
ideas with indigenous activists over a number of years; I have chosen it as a typi-
cal example of a meeting convened to debate indigenous rights. 
 This meeting was held to discuss the draft of a new law initiated primarily by 
the Legislator Yan, Zen-fu (2006), who belongs to the Amis tribe. The draft law 
draft was titled the Indigenous Traditional Land Restitution Act (draft). Leg-
islator Yan had already served four terms in the Yuan, so he was experienced 
in terms of introducing draft laws to promote indigenous claims. At the same 
time, he was cautious about introducing a draft concerning the restitution of 
indigenous lands, in particular relating to his electoral area. The Amis tribe had 
been deprived of land rights and their territories were designated as free market 
lands, which are quite different from reservation lands. Because the Amis live 
mainly on the east coast and plains, their early encounters were with the Han 
or non-indigenous peoples, rather than with mountain indigenous peoples like 
those in the Taroko area. Consequently, the Amis people were considered to be 
more civilized than other savages deep in the mountains. Indeed, since the Japa-
nese times, the Amis have been considered as rational or sinicized enough to be 
treated as citizens deserving of full land rights, i.e. private land ownership. This 
meant that they could sell lands to non-indigenous people at will. As a result of 
this, and a series of Japanese laws that legislated for the state ownership of terra 
nullius, the Amis sold out and lost most of their lands. As a matter of fact, many 
of the Amis believe that they have suffered more than other indigenous peoples 
who at least had reservation lands. Legislator Yang emphasized the notion of 
‘traditional lands’ when asking for the restitution of lands lost by his people. In 
his draft of the Indigenous Traditional Land Restitution Act, he included a defi-
nition of traditional lands as:
Those taken, confiscated, registered or taken over by forceful means to occupy 
or deprive lands originally owned by indigenous peoples. The lands not yet re-
turned to indigenous people include the following:
1 Lands in indigenous villages or tribes and the adjunct areas where indig-
enous people used to cultivate, herd or hunt.
2 Lands where indigenous ancestors cultivated, settled their houses, rituals, 
ancestors sacred places, herding or hunting.
3 Lands like lakes, rivers, or islands in rivers.
4 Lands confiscated or taken or registered by the authorities or institutions 
like the Ministry of Defense, Council of Veterans, Bureau of Forestry, Bu-
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reau of National Property, Bureau of New Lands Development, Bureau of 
Tourism, Ministry of Education.
5 Lands confiscated or taken over by national corporations like the Taiwan 
Sugar Company and other national corporations.
From his definition, we can see that Yang was mainly focused on lands lost in the 
past, in particular those lands taken by state agencies. At first sight, the defini-
tion is clear; but look closer and the definition is vague because it indicates that 
the lands that should be part of the restitution process are, in fact, lands owned 
mainly by the state. This definition ignores those conflicts over land between in-
digenous peoples and the Han or other non-indigenous peoples. It is aimed only 
at state lands. However, this definition was supported by other indigenous leg-
islators, such as Mr. Tseng, Hua-der, who responded in the meeting saying, ‘the 
draft is very important because it concerns a source of long term pain among in-
digenous peoples. This could be the most important law ever for indigenous peo-
ples because for so many years, we have been trying for the return of those lands 
that were cultivated by our ancestors’ hoes’. Legislator Tseng was from a moun-
tain tribe where, in his experience, the major losses of the land came as a result 
of Japanese colonial rule and the state taking territory. His people were granted 
limited reservation lands; however, they still lost a lot of traditional lands ten-
ured by their ancestors. Consequently, Tseng agreed to the use of the term ‘tra-
ditional lands’. This term was also echoed by another indigenous legislator Mr 
Lin, Tsun-der, who extends the definition by saying, ‘even the area on which the 
Presidential Hall was built in our capital in Taipei is indigenous traditional land’. 
This is an exaggeration, but he apparently believes it to be the truth. Tseng said 
that when he uses the term ‘traditional lands’ he does not mean that the entire 
island of Taiwan should belong to indigenous peoples and that they should be 
granted independence. He stated that he would rather the term ‘indigenous tra-
ditional territory’ was used in place of ‘traditional lands’, for two reasons: firstly, 
indigenous ‘traditional territory’ could be defined by law with a narrower scope 
than the term ‘indigenous territory’, which indicates a historical process or real-
ity. It means that traditional territory could be defined in law through a process 
of investigations. He seemed to say that it is irrational to expect that the whole 
island should be included in the process of restitution. Instead, he believed that 
legal processes should be the rationale for defining traditional territory. Tseng 
emphasized that, according to the General Land Act, lands redistributed and 
appropriated by due processes are not included in the process of restitution. In-
stead, he focused on forest lands as the objects of restitution. The second reason 
for Tseng insisting on the use of the term ‘indigenous traditional territory’ is 
that the term has already been adopted in a number of articles in the Basic Law 
(2005). Tseng’s ideas raised significant questions regarding the title and defini-
tion of the law, and specifically, whether to adopt the term ‘traditional territory’ 
or ‘traditional lands’. The chair of the meeting and the Commission of Interior 
affairs and Ethnicity, Legislator Wu, Tung-shen (a Han), suggested that it was 
better to adopt the terms in use in laws already. However, he did not agree with 
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his colleague, Legislator Lin, who also called for the use of ‘indigenous tradition-
al territories’, saying that it is clear in the Basic Law that the term, ‘indigenous 
traditional territory’ is a sub-category of the term ‘indigenous land’, which also 
includes reservation lands. Reservation lands are lands that are owned by indig-
enous peoples now, whereas the term traditional territory deals with lands lost in 
the past. Chair legislator Wu suggested adopting the general category of ‘indig-
enous land’ in the title of the draft ‘Indigenous Lands Restitution Act’. Legislator 
Wu provided another reason for supporting this strategy to promote the law. He 
thought that the term ‘traditional territory’ was sensitive as it could denote an 
extension of the scope of territory to a state territory, which could conflict with 
state sovereignty in constitutional terms. Chair legislator Wu strongly suggested 
that because in the Basic Law the term ‘indigenous lands’ includes both lands 
in terms of territory and lands now and in the past, it avoids conflict with state 
power. In the end, the majority of indigenous legislators insisted on keeping the 
word ‘traditional’ in the definition in order to maintain their links with the his-
tories, causes and effects of the past. Both Lin and Tseng insisted on keeping the 
term ‘traditional territory’ in order to denote sovereignty. The problem of the 
definition of lands had not been resolved, and many participants in the meeting 
mentioned that in order to clarify which lands should be part of the restitution 
process, an investigation and institution should be established. There was an ex-
plicit recognition among these legislators that those lands taken by the state, and 
specifically those taken by the Bureau of Forestry, should be brought under the 
restitution process. The next step, then, was to establish a law that would support 
a state institution to deal with the investigations and decisions related to indig-
enous lands. 
5.3.2 Debates on the definition of restitution: to return or recover?
The title of the draft law was still to be decided, but another debate was taking 
place regarding the ambiguity of the term ‘restitution’. The English word ‘restitu-
tion’ is a direct translation of the Chinese word ‘回復’ (huei-fu), which was used 
in the title of the draft. In English, ‘restitution’ can mean ‘the act of restoring 
anything to its rightful owner, or of making good, or of giving an equivalent for 
any loss, damage, or injury. Thus the term ‘回復’ (huei-fu) could be ambiguous 
in terms of future actions. There are a number of ways to manage restitutions. 
It can take the form of compensation, or it can be as little as paying lip service 
by offering apologies. There are also situations where it is not possible to restore 
things to an original state. Consequently, all the participants in the meeting in 
the Yuan acknowledged a sense of ambiguity in the term restitution. Legislator 
Tseng, who, as previously mentioned, said, ‘we want those lands cultivated by 
our ancestors’ hoes returned to us’, suggested using the term ‘return’. He even 
indicated that the KMT (Nationalist Party) should return indigenous lands oc-
cupied by the KMT regime in the past. He wanted to adopting this clear term in 
order to ensure that specific lands be included in the draft law. He suggested the 
title of the law should be the ‘Indigenous Peoples Traditional Territory Lands Re-
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covering Act’, substituting the term ‘restitution’ with ‘recovering’ (恢復huei-fu). 
Once again, there was no resolution or agreement surrounding the best meaning 
or actions for the term restitution, and the debate subsequently switched to dis-
cussions about the purposes of restitution. 
5.3.3 Debates about the purpose of restitution
Legislator Lin hoped that the original traditional lands could be returned direct-
ly to his people who were keen to receive autonomy, something that was strongly 
advocated by the then president Chen. Indeed, Chen signed and announced a 
‘nations within a nation’ partnership with Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. In the 
context of this partnership, Lin interpreted autonomy as the ultimate form of 
restitution. Lin originated from a Tgdaya tribe in the mountains of north Tai-
wan, an area infamous for its fighting and resistance to Japanese rule in 1930, 
when Lin’s ancestors fought a war against the Japanese colonial government. This 
war was later considered to be shameful, not least because of the previously men-
tioned ‘Wushe Incident’ in which many Japanese were killed. The war also indi-
cated the failure – after almost 35 years of colonial investment and implementa-
tion – of a policy to control the ‘savages’. The Tgdaya people, and neighboring 
tribes, have a long history of advocating autonomy stemming from their struggle 
against Japanese rule and their experience of being treated as rebels. Autonomy 
was both the theme and the major goal agreed by all participants at the meeting 
in December 2006. Certainly, this theme was a reminder that, as yet, no comple-
mentary laws for setting up indigenous autonomous areas had been designed or 
stipulated, despite the fact that article 4 of the Basic Law states that, ‘The govern-
ment shall guarantee the equal status and development of self-governance of in-
digenous peoples and implement indigenous peoples’ autonomy in accordance 
with the will of indigenous peoples. The relevant issues shall be stipulated by 
laws’. Furthermore, article 5 states that: 
The state shall provide sufficient resources and allocate sufficient annual bud-
get to assist indigenous peoples in developing autonomy. Unless otherwise 
provided under this Law or other laws related to autonomy, the power of au-
tonomy and finance in regions of autonomy shall be subject to the Local In-
stitution Law, the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and 
Expenditures and other statutes governing county (city).
Article 6 also brings empowerment to indigenous peoples at a state level: ‘In 
the event that any dispute concerning the power of autonomy arises between 
the government and indigenous peoples, the Office of the President shall call a 
consultation meeting to resolve such a dispute’. These three articles address the 
rights to be supported by the state and to have autonomy granted according to 
the ‘will’ of indigenous peoples. The meaning of ‘will’ in this context can be both 
explicit and vague and, as such, it merits further discussion later. 
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In the records of the 2006 meeting, we find confusion concerning terms such as 
territory or lands; restitution or recovering or returning; and traditional or status 
quo. Ultimately, there were no decisions and there was no consensus among the 
participants. If there had been consensus, then the draft would be brought by the 
commission to the congress for further negotiation. In fact, as had been the case 
with previous attempts to introduce this draft bill, four indigenous legislators 
belonging to parties other than the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
boycotted the promotion of the law. Moreover, the law encountered another 300 
legislators who insisted on maintaining the land rights status quo.
 A number of legislators explained that the reason for the boycott was purely 
party political. Party identity is not only a label, but also the source of support 
for elections and political power among these indigenous legislators. It can also 
deliver another arena of contingencies in the process of promoting indigenous 
rights.
 It is clear that the effective implementation of the Basic Law in terms of rights 
for indigenous peoples requires further legislation. This is very complicated. In 
fact, the final article of the Basic Law states that any amendments must be made 
within a period of three years: ‘The relevant authority shall amend, make or re-
peal relevant regulations in accordance with the principles of this law within 
three years of its effectiveness (Article 34)’. The deadline for complementary leg-
islation was originally set for February 2008; at the time of writing this paper 
(June 2011) no supplementary laws or amendments to the Basic Law have been 
passed. As a matter of fact, in the aforementioned meeting, the only agreement 
reached by the participants was to urge the Indigenous Council to bring a draft 
of an Indigenous Peoples Lands and Ocean Territory Act to add to the legisla-
tive negotiations taking place in Congress. This ‘mission impossible’ had to be 
completed within a few months. Not surprisingly, the Indigenous Council was 
unable to achieve this draft in such a short space of time, and it took a further 
year for the Council to present its draft Bill to Congress.
 At the time of writing, a few years after this now infamous meeting, the tim-
ing and opportunities to promote any land rights for indigenous people are no 
longer favorable, as the ruling party is now the Nationalist Party (KMT), which 
has little concern for indigenous rights. Indeed, rumor has it that President Ma 
chose an Amis indigenous woman who speaks no Amis language to be the Min-
ister of the Indigenous Council precisely to put a stop to the promotion of crucial 
indigenous rights. It certainly appears to be the case that the Minister has halted 
all the legal processes, though she did add the Indigenous Traditional Lands and 
Sea Territory Act (Draft) to the waiting list to be approved by the Executive Yuan 
and, subsequently, to enter the legislative procedure for first reading. However, 
the draft was swiftly rejected because the Minister believed that the law con-
flicted with the land rights of the non-indigenous or the Han people. Many in-
digenous activists believe it was a cynical move by the ruling KMT party to hire 
an indigenous person to fight against and disempower the indigenous people. It 
was certainly the most convenient way to postpone any indigenous agenda that 
would conflict with the majority interests. Many indigenous people feel that the 
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general environment for law-making is contingent on majority politics, and that 
local and national political arenas are not trustworthy. Consequently, many in-
digenous activists seek alternatives to promote indigenous rights. One method 
used by indigenous people is to move their struggle to small-scale arenas, in the 
hope of a ‘bottom-up’ movement being more successful in terms of putting for-
ward ideas and practices such as river protection or promoting ethnic autonomy 
for the Truku people. Certainly, legal arenas have proved problematic. Almost 
no progress has been made through these channels, which, for the most part, 
focused major efforts and emphasis on matters such as recovery from natural 
disasters resulting from floods brought by typhoons or the large-scale damage 
caused by earthquakes that have hit Taiwan (and in particular indigenous areas) 
heavily in recent years. To summarize, the passing of complementary laws and 
amendments to the Basic Law is crucial to the claims of local indigenous people. 
Many efforts by indigenous officials, intellectuals and activists were aimed at try-
ing to implement a more bottom-up approach in order to stimulate the promo-
tion of relevant laws. However, because of the ambiguity of many terms used in 
the Basic Law, many activists are pessimistic about the promotion of the indig-
enous rights. Some of the issues concerning indigenous land rights that illustrate 
how difficult it is to achieve improvements using legal channels include: (1) the 
vague categories used to define indigenous land; (2) vague definitions of ‘tribes’ 
or autonomous units; and (3) the vagueness of the term ‘autonomy’, which is ac-
tually hard to define. Because of these shortcomings in the Basic Law, many in-
digenous people consider it to be an obsolete piece of legislation, despite the fact 
that it accords with the standards of the UN Declaration of Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples that was officially ratified in September 2007. 
5.4 Vague categories used to define ‘indigenous land’
There is a land category that is seen as crucial to the quest of ‘Return my land’ 
social movements. That is the term ‘indigenous land’. Article 2 of the Basic Law 
‘refers both to the traditional territories and reservation land of indigenous peo-
ples’. Reservation land is relatively clearly defined and administrated in Taiwan 
using the cadastre system; however, questions still remain regarding what tra-
ditional territories are and where they are located. It is interesting to note that 
the Basic Law adopts the term ‘indigenous land (yuan-tsu-ming-tsu-tu-di 原住
民族土地)’, which in Chinese denotes a collective right to land. More recently, 
the word ‘tsu’ (族) (tribe, race, ethnical group) in ‘Yuan-Zu-Min-Tsu-Tu-Di’ (in-
digenous peoples’ land) has been used to refer to both individual and collective 
rights. Taiwan’s reservation land has already gone through a process of privatiza-
tion, though alienable and disposable rights are still limited among indigenous 
people. Rather, rights to reservation lands are usually granted to individuals. In 
the Basic Law, the definition of ‘indigenous land’ includes both ‘reservation land’, 
which indigenous people already have ownership of, together with another cat-
egory of ‘traditional territories’, which so far has not been defined in the Basic 
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Law. In fact, the definition of ‘traditional territories’ will be decided by an institu-
tion that will be set up in the future if the Legislative Yuan issues a law to support 
article 20 of the Basic Law that states:
 
The government recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural re-
sources. The government shall establish indigenous peoples’ land investigation 
and management committee (IPLIMC) to investigate and manage indigenous 
peoples’ land. The organization and other related matters of the committee 
shall be stipulated by law. The restoration, acquisition, disposal, plan, manage-
ment and utilization of the land and sea area owned or occupied by indig-
enous peoples or indigenous persons shall be regulated by laws. 
We may assume that this future indigenous peoples’ land investigation and man-
agement committee (IPLIMC) will be empowered to decide on the definition 
of ‘traditional territories’ and further decide on where, when and whose tradi-
tional territories are implied in article 20. Here, I assume that indigenous land 
and related natural resources are the objects to be investigated and ‘managed’ by 
the (IPLIMC) in the context of land rights. It is not clear, however, whether this 
will result in the granting of indigenous land rights as indigenous peoples have 
always imagined. Moreover, to what extent will the IPLIMC be empowered with 
the authority to make decisions on land rights while further legislation is pend-
ing? 
 As previously mentioned, in order to achieve more legislative progress, the 
Indigenous Council has a produced draft of an Indigenous Peoples Land and 
Ocean Act (IPLOA). Many people remain curious as to how the IPLIMC will 
decide on and deal with the land issues in the draft law. In an interview, Yabu-
sonngu Poiconu, a sub-section chair in charge of the indigenous land policy in 
the Indigenous Council, said, ‘the committee shall be empowered with at least 
the function of a court, to judge on land issues; otherwise they won’t be able 
to decide such complicated things’. As for the investigations into land issues, I 
found many indigenous people have diaspora and hybrid relations with their 
territories, which makes it difficult in terms of determining clear boundaries 
among people and their relations with specific tracts of lands. This raises another 
problem in relation to the definition and recognition of the ‘owner’ of the land 
and any natural resources on it. Furthermore, as discussed below, the use of the 
term ‘tribe’ in the Basic Law is another example of the controversy surrounding 
definitions.
5.5 What is a ‘tribe’? 
In the Basic Law, there are terms that refer to collective actions on lands and ter-
ritories based on solid group foundations. Thus, the term ‘tribe’ appeared for the 
first time in Basic Law in reference to ‘a group of indigenous persons who form a 
community by living together in specific areas of the indigenous peoples’ regions 
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and follow the traditional norms with the approval of the central indigenous au-
thority’ (article 2, definitions 2). The Basic Law provides for certain groups ap-
proved by the Indigenous Council to become action groups. The term ‘approval’ 
is also controversial due to its top-down connotations. According to article 2, 
‘approved tribes’ are tribes recognized by the state. A memorandum signed by 
former President Chen stated the intention to form a ‘New Partnership’ with 
indigenous peoples and to recognize them as nations within a state. However, 
Chen did not explain what a ‘nation’ is in his new partnership declaration. Many 
indigenous activists, and thus indigenous people imagined that an approved 
tribe would equate to a nation. In fact, ‘tribe’ is a term that has been used in co-
lonial constructions. Tribal activities at different levels have formed the second 
wave of indigenous movements. We see ideas or actions conducted on a small 
scale in order to revitalize the health or wealth of a small indigenous community. 
At the same time, it is possible to see a large-scale project by an ethnic group with 
a large area of land to form a ‘nation’, an autonomous area. Such ideas and ac-
tions have been incorporated in the concept of tribal self-determination during 
the last decade. Since 2005, these efforts have been supported by the Basic Law. 
The former Minister of the Indigenous Council, Walis Berlin had been leading 
indigenous movements for many decades and supported the tribal movement 
through his legislative endeavors and policy practices. The scale of subjectivity 
of the indigenous people will be a critical issue in terms of the future implemen-
tation of the Basic Law. Thus, tribes become basic units composed of groups of 
people and communities who have rights. It is interesting to know that ‘tribe’ (部
落) in the Taiwanese context denotes different levels recognized by government; 
from a small-scale village community to a large ethnic group. Many activists 
contest the process to define a tribe in the Basic Law. They believe that there are 
natural processes for defining a tribe as a unit of natural sovereignty. Poiconu, an 
advocate of natural sovereignty says:
Basically speaking, sovereignty starts from a tribe with its habitat areas and 
then its cultivation lands, hunting and gathering areas and distant areas over 
which the tribe has no direct or strong control. But when any of these areas is 
intruded on, the people who own the territories must defend themselves in or-
der to demonstrate the strength of their sovereignty (in Committee of Special 
Chapters for Indigenous People on Constitution, 2005). 
A unit such as a ‘tribe’ actually develops naturally in a local context. Any ‘ap-
proval’ by the authorities will often conflict with local ideas. So far we do not 
have any cases to illustrate the above mentioned problems that many activists 
have predicted.
 However, in order to resolve the definition problem hidden in the Basic Law, 
the Indigenous Council has been encouraging a bottom-up approach. In recent 
years, I have observed that the notion of ‘approval’ has been implemented with 
large amounts of funding, in a bid to support ‘tribes’ who are engaged in collec-
tive actions on tribal ‘revitalizations’. Thus, we can observe the phenomenon of 
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‘making a tribe’ taking place under the sponsorship of government. The Basic 
Law includes the terms and conditions, ‘with the approval of the central indig-
enous authority’. This means that, in future, the scale and scope of a tribal agent 
to act as a legal unit will be determined by the central indigenous authority. The 
land rights of an approved tribe will be recognized in accordance with its due 
tribal agent. A tribe afforded land rights is seen as the ideal status by many in-
digenous activists. Following the announcement of the Basic Law, achieving au-
tonomy for a tribe-nation has been an advocacy priority among activists. Even 
though the Autonomy Act for indigenous peoples has yet to be passed, the Ata-
yal, the Tsou, the Thao, the Troko, the Tao, the Saisiat and the Bunun are all 
engaged in autonomous movements and are demanding the establishment of 
an ethnic parliament in order to create a forum for the setting up of a prepara-
tory ethnic congress and government. These actions to create ethnic autonomy 
are similar to nation-state building activities and movements; however, to what 
extent will the autonomy they achieve mirror that of a nation in a state? The cur-
rent ambiguity in this area can be explained by examining those articles relating 
to autonomy in the Basic Law as well as by recalling a number of historical expe-
riences. 
5.6 Vague autonomy 
As mentioned above, the Basic Law (2005) prescribes that the state must do its 
best to assist indigenous autonomy. The Basic Law states that autonomy should 
be decided in accordance with the ‘will’ of indigenous peoples. If indigenous 
people are thinking in terms of solid sovereignty to claim indigenous traditional 
territories, then, based on articles 4 and 5 of the Basic Law, the aforementioned 
IPLIMC is the first authority that can assist in achieving this goal. However, if 
the IPLIMC is not set up with the full support of legislation, then the will of the 
indigenous peoples will not be approved by the authority. The implication is that, 
according to the Basic Law, the right to autonomy is acknowledged. However, 
without the establishment of the IPLIMC it is not achievable. Put bluntly, the 
articles of the Basic Law only pay lip service to the idea of autonomy. Even if the 
IPLIMC is established, there will still be a direct conflict about the meaning of 
the term ‘will’. A will is a will free of any others’ will, and does not require ap-
proval from any authority. The Basic Law apparently predicts the possibility of 
future conflicts and embeds a device for managing such conflicts by prescribing 
that the Office of the President shall call a consultation meeting to resolve such 
disputes (article 6). This implies that the will of the President is important when 
it comes to issues of scale, power and authorities of autonomy and similar prob-
lems. As a result, any solutions are likely to depend heavily on the future politi-
cal and economic environment and the willingness of the majority population. 
 Thus, we experience a gap between the idea of ‘natural sovereignty’ and ‘au-
tonomy approved by governments’. As some advocates of natural sovereignty 
say: 
117
5 ■ Making Laws for Indigenous Traditional Territory and Land Rights
If indigenous peoples own natural sovereignty, which is different from state 
sovereignty, there is no need to be recognized by any state. If the indigenous 
peoples can bring their own representatives as agents of natural sovereignty, 
then indigenous peoples could be independent from the state and an autono-
mous unit per se. So some activists are in favor of a law or constitutional re-
form to recognize the treaty rights of the indigenous peoples. If the indigenous 
peoples insist on natural sovereignty, it would be quite a paradox to achieve 
that status of natural sovereignty through the approval of the state. Thus, it 
would deem natural sovereignty less legitimate under state sovereignty, and 
then the theory of natural sovereignty loses its base to demonstrate that ‘natu-
ral sovereignty takes precedence over the state (Committee of Special Chap-
ters for Indigenous People on Constitution, 2005; Shih, Chen-fong 2006; Shih, 
Chung-shan 2006).
 
These theoretical debates are important for the future of indigenous autonomy 
since we still have no official implementation of any kind of autonomy for the 
indigenous peoples. How, then, can both sides involved – the indigenous people 
and the majority population – find a compromise in order to achieve a regime of 
indigenous autonomy? As we can see from the aforementioned meeting of legis-
lators, there appeared to be little appetite for compromise and a strong desire to 
avoid conflicts with the state constitution, which insists on strong state sovereign-
ty. Many observers worry about the strategy adopted by indigenous intellectuals, 
like the non-indigenous chief of the committee, who strongly advocated the use 
of more neutral terms like ‘lands’, in order to avoid conflict over the name of the 
law draft. By analyzing the debates, I have found that the indigenous legislators 
were aware of the conditions and limitations that would force them to compro-
mise and to adopt clever strategies or skills to promote indigenous rights. It was 
also clear that if they failed to compromise to some extent, they would lose in the 
end. It is historical fact that many lands were lost because of state claims. Lands 
were not only lands but also territories that hold historical and cultural meaning. 
Autonomy stands on these foundations of sovereignty. Later, we see that, in fact, 
these legislators did not compromise and insisted on drafting the law with the 
basic elements of ‘traditional territories’. As a result of this strategy, legislators 
would be exposed to future confrontations and possible conflicts, at least on the 
terms of the law. However, they could keep their ideas and emphasis regarding 
the title of the draft. As an observer, I would say the emphasis on restitution for 
past injustice over land rights and an autonomy based on natural sovereignty 
were embedded or implied in the contents of the draft law. Thus, there seems no 
need to insist on a certain title for the draft. Despite this, the legislators refused 
to compromise at all on the title of the law, even if there was an agreement about 
the contents. In fact, the contents of the draft law, which in the end required 
three readings in the legislative process, were also a cause of confrontation. This 
kind of insistence reflects that indigenous activists, though constrained in terms 
of power, are determined to adopt a strategy that puts them in direct confronta-
tion with the state. I would like to describe this model of pursuing autonomy for 
118
Part II ■ Mapping as land claims
indigenous peoples as ‘dependent but independent’. According to Wu’s analysis 
on the origins and practices of autonomy advocating activities among indige-
nous initiators during the transition of colonial regimes from the Japanese to the 
Nationalists, indigenous elites have developed ideas and practices of autonomy 
based on a model described as ‘Nation-sponsored Development of Autonomy’ 
(Wu, 2005). Wu found that indigenous elites developed a model of actions to ask 
for autonomy with the help of the state. He found that the indigenous advocates 
had to adopt this strategy in order to achieve some level of autonomy on the con-
dition that indigenous peoples remain minorities. Following Wu’s hypothesis, 
we can understand that many articles in the Basic Law concerning the rights to 
autonomy reflect the ‘Nation-sponsored Development of Autonomy’ in so far as 
the state should assist indigenous people to achieve a degree of autonomy based 
on their own will. As Wu points out, this ‘autonomy but ruled by state’ is a para-
dox. Moreover, it seems to conflict with the term in the Basic Law that advocates 
‘autonomy by will’. It is paradoxical to see indigenous will as being based on the 
notion of natural sovereignty. Theoretically speaking, state sovereignty would 
not be above indigenous autonomy. Thus, an autonomous area ruled by the state 
would be a real compromise on the part of the indigenous peoples in terms of 
theory and practices in the future.
‘Autonomy by will’: the case of the Truku People’s Autonomy Constitution 
Draft
Prior to the Truku presenting a Truku Autonomy Constitution Draft in 2006, 
most of the advocates had fought for recognition of an ethnic label for the Truku 
people that differentiated them from the Atayal. From the Japanese time, the 
people living in the Taroko area were considered as belonging to the Atayal 
people. The Japanese labeled these three peoples as a subgroup of the Atayal, 
something which all three ethnic groups felt to be a miscategorization. From the 
1980s onwards, we see many ideas relating to these groups being recognized as 
different from the Atayal. The largest of these three groups is the Truku. Perhaps 
because the area is called Taroko, and because there had been a well-structured 
Presbyterian branch named Truku, independence from the Atayal in terms of 
ethnic names was established with the new label Truku (Tera 2003).The idea of 
an independent ethnic group such as the Truku people has taken many decades 
to be accepted. Certainly, an ethnic group recognized and re-recognized by its 
ethnic name by successive governments gives a strong position in the political 
economy. An ethnic group that has not yet been recognized by the people them-
selves, but is granted independence as a single tribe is confronted with many 
internal problems. Put simply, many individuals in the Taroko area fight for au-
tonomy and to be recognized as a tribe independent of the Atayal. There are still 
many individuals who disagree with being labeled as Truku, the largest group, 
and would rather be categorized as Toda, Tgdaya or even by the general term 
sediq (used by the Truku, Tgdaya and Toda to indicate human beings) as an in-
dicator of humans on the basis of their language. Thus, we find many internal 
confrontations regarding different ideas on ethnics. That said, these pan-Truku 
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activists want to see autonomy firmly on the agenda of ethnic movements. This 
issue also has an impact on the scoping of autonomy for indigenous territory 
where there are different people insisting on different ethnic names. Despite 
such confrontations, a Truku Ethnic Group Constitution on Autonomy was es-
tablished and expresses the demand for autonomy. 
 The Constitution implies that the indigenous autonomous areas should be 
treated as a state, and be granted every kind of power afforded to a state, includ-
ing diplomatic and military rights (see Box 5-1 from Siyat 2004). The Truku 
Constitution on Autonomy is in line with the theory of natural sovereignty. As 
Poiconu says:
 
The areas where there is natural sovereignty are traditional territories. Territory 
is the arena where ethnic power (natural sovereignty) rules. Territory is a spatial 
used term to differentiate ‘we’ groups from other groups. It means the ‘us’ group 
has exclusive rights to the territory and that other groups cannot interfere. This 
makes an indivisible unit of territory (Committee of Special Chapters For Indig-
enous People on Constitution, 2005). 
In order to protect this natural sovereignty, indigenous people hope to be 
equipped with the rights to law, education, police, military, and foreign diplo-
macy; rights that usually go hand in hand with state sovereignty. Is it a state 
within a state or autonomy under a state? Either way, it is an autonomy that the 
ROC government should, in accordance with the will of the tribal people, pro-
vide with adequate resources and a budget to assist the development of Taroko 
autonomy (see article 3 in Box 5.1).
 Here we have an example of ‘autonomy by will’ that would challenge schol-
ars of politics and advocates of autonomy who have to face explicit theoretical 
confrontations and more implicit obstacles from inside. This constitution was 
drafted by Truku intellectuals who are usually criticized for being elites without 
public support. The pan-Truku movements initiated by these elites are helping to 
empower locals to express and act on the issue of autonomy. However, as I have 
observed, it is largely political elites or intellectuals who join these actions. In 
addition, there are many local villages that are bringing their ideas of autonomy 
via initiatives such as the co-management of river protection, with a view to col-
lectively reviving and improving livelihoods, ecology, and culture. Clearly, local 
people have different ideas about autonomy than elites. This gap requires further 
observation to see how ideas and actions on autonomy will evolve. 
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Box 5-2 ■ Some themes in the Truku Ethnic Group Basic Law (Draft); 
 also called the Truku Ethnic Group Constitution on Autonomy
	 太魯閣族基本法草案	(太魯閣自治憲法):
Based on international trends, ‘the new partnership between indigenous peoples 
and the Taiwanese government’, and the Additional Article 10, Clause 12, of the 
ROC Constitution; in order to support the recognition of indigenous desire for au-
tonomy, and in accordance with the principles of protecting the equal status of 
indigenous peoples and autonomous development; the ten articles of the ‘Taroko 
Nation Autonomy Constitutional Charter’ are explained below. 
 1 In order to respect the natural rights of the Taroko Nation and the Spirit of 
Gaya; and to protect its autonomous development; in accordance with the 
UN Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the ROC Constitu-
tion, and the Basic Law on Indigenous Peoples, the Taroko Nation Autonomy 
Constitutional Charter shall be established. 
 2 The Taroko Nation shall implement tribal autonomy in accordance with its 
traditional territory; establish an autonomous government, tribal council, and 
regional government. 
 3 The ROC Government shall protect the right of the Taroko Autonomous 
Government to exercise autonomy; and the autonomous political, econom-
ic, social, educational and cultural development of the Taroko Autonomous 
Government in accordance with the principle of self-determination. The ROC 
Government shall, in accordance with the will of the tribal people, provide 
adequate resources and a budget to assist the development of Taroko au-
tonomy. 
 4 The sovereignty of the Taroko Nation belongs to all Taroko People. 
 5 The land and resources within the autonomous territory belong to all Tribal 
People. 
 6 The Tribal Council shall be the highest legislative body of Taroko Autonomy. 
 7 The Taroko Autonomous Government shall be the highest executive body of 
the Taroko Nation. 
 8 The Council of Elders shall be the highest judicial body of the Autonomous 
Government. It shall be charged with civil affairs, criminal law, the trial of ex-
ecutive lawsuits, the disciplinary punishment of public officials, and the exer-
cise of rights of impeachment and censure. 
 9 Tribal foreign relations shall, based on the spirit of independence and auton-
omy as well as the principle of equal reciprocal benefit, respect treaties and 
the UN Charter. In order to protect the rights of the tribal people, it shall ad-
vance international cooperation and promote international justice and world 
peace. 
 10 The Taroko Autonomous Government shall actively promote tribal educa-
tion, promote tribal language, develop tribal history and culture, develop its 
pluralistic potential, and elevate its international perspectives.
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5.7 Conclusion 
It appears that Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have benefited little from the Basic 
Law (2005), which still awaits future legislation. A clear response to land issues 
is cleverly avoided in the articles of the Basic Law. The same can also be said of 
the memorandum on ‘A New Partnership Between the Indigenous Peoples and 
the Government of Taiwan’ signed by the then President Chen, which stated an 
intention: 
To restore or recover tribal and ethnic traditional territories for Taiwan indig-
enous peoples, who were originally tribal societies where institutions of com-
munal or individual uses are based on communal ownership of land. In order 
to rebuild an ethno-cultural development subjectivity to process a foundation 
for autonomy, the government of Taiwan should admit or recognize, regard-
less of the private ownership regimes on land, on the tribal and ethnic subjec-
tivities and their ownerships over the traditional territories. 
The first two Chinese words ‘Huei Fu (恢復)’ in the abovementioned memo-
randum denote a common meaning of recovery. But exactly what is to be re-
covered is not clear as words like ‘return’ and ‘giving back’ remain vague. This 
memorandum uses the words ‘recognize or admit’ in terms of indigenous 
sovereignty over their traditional territories but it does not appear to go any fur-
ther and actually grant these rights. This declaration leaves us no clearer about 
the extent to which land rights will be assumed, not to mention that many people 
still think this law is unconstitutional (Huang, Ju-zheng 2009). To quote Pasuya 
Poiconu, the former deputy minister of Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP) 
once more, ‘we (indigenous people) first have to persuade mainstream society 
and to produce consensus in each indigenous group.’ The implementation of the 






Protest for the land that is occupied by Taiwan Power Co. in Fushih village, Taroko, May, 2009. The 
label in the photo says, ‘Return My Indigenous Lands; otherwise I will fight to Death! Shame on the 
township office! You never listen to what the elders say!’
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Reservation Land Property 
Disputes: From a Law-Individualism 
Perspective
6.1 A preliminary review of the study of indigenous land property 
conflicts within the Reservation Land Procedure regime
In 1945, soon after the end of World War Two, the Chinese Nationalist gov-
ernment took over Taiwan and adopted the Japanese regime, which had also 
stopped non-indigenous people from taking indigenous lands. Even today, in-
digenous lands are still state owned. In order to maintain the existing regulations 
and to develop methods of management, the government introduced the ‘Indig-
enous Reservation Land Management Procedure (IRLMP, 原住民保留地管理
辦法)	(Hereafter referred to as the Reservation Land Procedure) in 1948 (Yen 
and Yang 2004; Wu, Shuh-tsrong 2000). 
 The Procedure followed Japanese doctrines and the notion that, basically, in-
digenous lands were terra nullius. As a result, if indigenous people could not 
provide any official Japanese deeds to prove ownership of a piece of land, the 
Nationalist government confiscated the property. The strict implementation of 
the Procedure triggered many conflicts about the principles that make up the law 
and, subsequently, there have been a series of indigenous claims to the disputed 
land. In this chapter, I will focus on those claims arising from the doctrine of 
reservation land in order to illustrate how indigenous people provide reasons to 
suggest where laws are compatible – or incompatible – with their ideas and prac-
tices relating to land issues.
 There has been little research on the legal conflicts concerning reservation 
land by law scholars in Taiwan. Equally, anthropologists in Taiwan tend not to 
be immersed in land tenure problems from a legal anthropological point of view, 
i.e. the relationships between state laws and local lives. Most of the attention for 
indigenous reservation land problems has originated from scholars of land ad-
ministration and politics. However, in my view, these studies lack ethnographic 
immersion on the implementation of processes taking place inside indigenous 
communities. Indeed, much of the research has focused on the process of estab-
lishing the laws concerned (Chen, 2002, 2003; Yang, Chih-Wei, 2005; Wu, Shuh-
Tsong, 2000; Simon, 2002; Mao, 1998). Actual and detailed discussions of the en-
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counters between state laws and local ideas have, thus far, not been highlighted. 
Fu (2001) has written (but not yet published) a short article that discusses how 
certain indigenous peoples have lost their reservation lands. He uses an ethno-
graphic methodology in order to uncover the social and political proceeds of the 
lost land, which was occupied by local indigenous governments or non-indige-
nous people (Fu 1997). A good starting point is an analysis of the legal concerns 
raised by Judge Tang, Wen Chang (2005) in the Huanlien District Court, based 
on the land claims cases he dealt with. This will also provide us with some gen-
eral characteristics of indigenous reservation land conflicts. Judge Tang believes 
there are some typical types of conflicts arising from the implementation of the 
doctrine of Reservation Land Procedure. Firstly, the Procedure was not issued 
as a normal law, but rather as an administrative procedure that conflicts with 
other laws issued by the Legislative Yuan. Thus, the Procedure conflicts with, 
among others, the Forestry Law (2004) and the Animal Law (1989). This makes 
it hard to support indigenous rights in court decisions. Secondly, the restric-
tions on land transactions between non-indigenous peoples have reduced the 
value of reservation land. Consequently, reservation land is less attractive and it 
is harder for indigenous people to get bank loans or raise the capital necessary 
to buy and invest in reservation lands. Thus, the Reservation Land Procedure 
policy limits the chances of indigenous people surviving in normal conditions. 
This certainly accounts for why illegal land transactions of land have become 
such a big issue between indigenous and non-indigenous people (ROC Control 
Yuan 2004). Thirdly, the land transactions of land between indigenous and non-
indigenous people are illegal, and the punishment is confiscation of the lands 
in question. This can be a source of ethnic and economic conflicts. The fourth 
characteristic of land claims conflicts mentioned by Judge Tang is the misun-
derstandings caused by the gap between indigenous tenure ideas and the land 
registration process implied in the Reservation Land Procedure. These observa-
tions are similar to those noted by the Legal Aid Foundation Huanlien Branch, 
who found that indigenous people asked for more legal aid than non-indigenous 
people. In addition, they found that in 2004, the top three per cent of all cases 
brought by indigenous people were about land issues (Tsai, Yun-qing). A lawyer 
for the Foundation, Tsai, found that the majority of 25 reservation land cases he 
examined were conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples (Han 
people), or between indigenous citizens and township governments. In all these 
cases, the conflicts centered on the land registration procedures. I believe it is in 
everybody’s interest to examine these conflicts with Taiwan’s state laws. 
 Based on the above-mentioned observations, and with a view to expanding 
the field of observing land conflicts beyond court cases, I carried out a review of 
the archives of Shoulin Township’s Council of Mediation (秀林鄉調解委員會
檔案). Here I examined 174 cases. In addition, I reviewed 30 cases found in the 
documents of the Shoulin Township Representatives Council (秀林鄉代表會議
事錄); 45 claims documented by the Hualien County Representatives Council 
(花蓮縣議會議事錄); and I examined papers of the Formal Taiwan Province 
Representatives Council of Senates (台灣省議會議事錄及省政公報); docu-
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ments from the Legislative Yuan Documents (立法院議事錄) and many other 
official land claims documents relating to the period 1945 to 2010. I read these 
with the aim of getting to know the people behind the names in these official 
documents and legal archives relating to a number of adjunct villages in the 
Taroko area. This is how I selected my cases studies. This is quite different from 
history, which mainly studies affairs from the past. Instead, I try to find people 
in the documents and archives who are alive today and have ongoing land claims 
or experiences of the aftermath of land confiscation. This provides me with the 
opportunity to follow conflict cases from an ethnographical perspective and to 
examine how land issues are related to people and societies. 
 I will detail some of the cases I have collected in order to demonstrate the 
ethnographical methods used. These methods start from a holistic ambition to 
study each case and illustrate the impact modern state land laws have had on 
indigenous people. In principle, I will arrange my cases in line with the legal 
procedures of land property titling, beginning from the land survey and measur-
ing, the registering of cultivation rights or land surface rights for construction or 
forestation land, and then wait for five years to promote the usufruct right that 
is non-alienable to non-indigenous people according to the Reservation Land 
Procedure (appendix 2). In order to provide a preliminary typology of conflict 
types, I will illustrate cases that are, in accordance with my findings so far, typical 
of each phase of the procedure. 
6.2 Conflicts concerning the Land Survey and Measurement 
 Procedures from the 1950s to the 1970s 
6.2.1 No measurements, no land rights:10 Case of Taiwan-Power vs. 
 original indigenous cultivators
In May 2009, a ‘Fushih Tribe Land Claiming Self-Rescue Association’ along 
with some 50 or more local villagers assembled outside the offices of the Shoulin 
Township government to demonstrate for the return of their indigenous lands. 
Some elders belonging to the association said that prior to 1920 they used to 
cultivate the land that was now the backyard of the Taiwan Power dormitory. 
‘We have lost our land for a long time and that was because there were no ‘white 
paper and black ink’ [contracts or documents] to prove our land rights at that 
time’. The spokesman for the association, Mr Tsing, urged the Township Office to 
10 The land survey and measurement began in 1958 and finished in 1966. The measurements were 
processed with the following purposes: (1) to define land types in order to assess whether they are 
suitable for forest, herding or agriculture and to help indigenous people to use the land efficiently; 
(2) to allocate and appropriate reservation lands in more reasonable ways; (3) to define boundaries 
between reservation land and public land; and (4) to provide legitimacy for the granting of reserva-
tion land to the indigenous people (see Li, Yi-yuan 1983: 113-114). After the measurement phase, 
reservation lands were assigned with a land number, type indications, cadastre for the legitimacy of 
reservation being granted to the indigenous people. Later, the ‘over all registration of lands (土地總
登記)’ procedure went on to clarify all land tenures.
128
Part III ■ Individualization of Land Rights
return the land as soon as possible; otherwise, ‘they would use all kinds of fierce 
measures and protest against the injustice’.
 Actually, this group of indigenous people had been trying for almost a decade, 
using all kinds of possible methods, to get the lands in question returned. They vis-
ited the local Township and also County Government offices to ask them to inves-
tigate possible wrongdoing during the procedures that cancelled their land rights. 
However, the only answers they received stated that according to the relevant laws, 
they have no rights at all to claim the land in question. Having failed to find justice 
at the local level, the group then approached the ‘Big men’ in the Control Yuan and 
a number of indigenous legislators in the Legislative Yuan, only to be told they 
should ask the local township to investigate the process. The spokesman for the 
association is a highly educated man, whose wife has a law degree, and who had 
spent years carrying out ethnographical research on the history of the land using 
documents and oral histories. He provided oral histories, old aerial photos and 
official documents to prove the ‘simple and obvious’ fact that the land was indeed 
cultivated by his elders and ancestors. After more than seven years of efforts to 
have the land returned, there was no sign of a response from the local indigenous 
township government. The next step was to form an association and raise funds 
in order to bring an appeal to the court, despite the possibility of winning justice 
being slim. Initially, the association was unsure about whether to go to a general 
court or an administrative court. In fact, deciding whether reservation land issues 
should be dealt with in the general courts or an administrative court is a source of 
controversy among legal experts, because the procedures concerning the titling 
of indigenous reservation land are the responsibility of the official agents of the 
Township Indigenous Reservation Land Committee (TIRLC). The actions taken 
to give a title to indigenous people are administrative actions and therefore belong 
to the realm of public or administrative law. Others argue that these claims are pri-
vate matters to be resolved between property owners (Tang 2002). Judge Tang con-
firms that many cases suffer from this confusion and this was one of the reasons 
why the members of the association decided to recruit a high profile lawyer to fight 
their cause and win the case to return the lands that were ‘obviously and clearly’ 
theirs. One high profile lawyer they approached responded with the same confu-
sion about which court was suitable for their case. In the end, they chose to go to 
the administrative court in Taipei to accuse the township government of not re-
turning their lands. The judge in the Taipei Higher Administrative Court accepted 
this case (#1668(2008)) as an administrative suit. However, he expressed concern 
about exactly what it was that the elders were asking for. Was it ‘returning the land’ 
(申請返還土地) or ‘asking for a redistribution of land’ (請求分配土地), both of 
which require a different type of hearing and evidence? A case asking for the return 
of land demands that only a legal owner, with title and rights, can claim his prop-
erty back. A request for the redistribution of land requires a claimant to ask the 
township government for the registration of surface rights or cultivation rights ac-
cording to the Reservation Land Procedure (see the decision on case#1668(2009)). 
In the end, the Judge ruled that the primary purpose of the case was to ask for the 
land back. Consequently, he made a decision on the case stating that because it did 
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not conform with the requirements of either of the scenarios mentioned above and 
that he could find no evidence that the elders or claimants had completed any of 
the legal procedures required by the Reservation Land Procedure when applying 
for either the return or the redistribution of the lands. The judge said that he could 
only take cases where there is a dispute over prior administrative decisions. He ac-
knowledged that the plaintiffs had made many and varied attempts to get the land 
back, but said that they had not provided sufficient legal evidence or followed the 
necessary procedures at the township government level. The township representa-
tive explained in court that, ‘these elders lack proof of registration’ (權源證明文
件), which is recorded in the Land Survey Registration Book and details the type 
of land use and a list of land users at different times: the Total Land Survey of the 
1950s; the 1973 Illegal Land Use Survey (濫墾地調查山地保留地使用清冊); the 
Reservation land Use Survey (山地保留地現況調查表) of 1983; and the 1987 Il-
legal Land Use Survey (花蓮縣秀林鄉山胞非法濫墾使用山地保留地宜林地審
查清冊). In other words, during these four surveys by the government, there was 
no record of any of the plaintiffs. They do not qualify, therefore, as candidates for 
land titles, even though there is now plenty of evidence in the form of oral histories 
and communal relations to support their claims of land use. The judge ruled that 
these plaintiffs did not hold any registration records and, therefore, they have been 
unable to make progress in terms of redistributing land titles. The Judge accepted 
the township’s argument and refused to accept the appeal on the grounds of a lack 
of evidence that the lands were lost ‘legally’ before the township leased the land to 
the Taiwan Power Company. The plaintiffs argued that since the indigenous peo-
ple were unable to provide proof of registration, then the township government 
should be able to demonstrate how the lands in question were legally taken by the 
government and the government should have first compensated the original land 
users before then leasing the land to others for ‘national economic’ purposes. In 
fact, the township office did not have to pay any compensation to anybody at all, 
because the township office viewed the land as terra nullius and thus believed it 
owned the territory and could appropriate it at will. The judge also denied this case 
on the grounds that, according to section 7 of the Reservation Land Procedure, the 
‘Council of Indigenous Peoples, together with the relevant authorities concerned 
should assist the aborigines in establishing the indigenous peoples reservation 
land cultivation rights, land surface rights, as well as lease rights and ownership 
rights’. However, there was no ruling that the indigenous people have the right to 
ask for the government to reveal its decision-making process. It is no surprise that 
the elders and claimants could not understand or accept why the Judge failed to see 
that they had actually cultivated the land in question. In fact, they were so outraged 
by the ruling that even the mildest of old ladies and pastors, who were seldom in-
volved in conflict, gathered for the ensuing protests.
 I asked the claimants why their names had not shown up in any of the previ-
ous land use surveys. A number of them told me that they had no idea about the 
land survey at all: 
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For God’s sake, who knew to accompany the surveyors in order to prove our 
land rights?’ ‘We neighbors knew very clearly which line and which inch of 
land to use (pyusi). It’s our gaya (customary law) to obey the lines and borders 
(ayus). We knew this from our ancestors. The government did not inform us 
about joining the survey and we didn’t think it was such a big deal because 
between the mutual recognition among neighbors and the gaya of ancestors 
our lands were safe enough. 
During the early period of the implementation of the Reservation Land Proce-
dure, we find that many indigenous people still supported their land use rights 
with collective norms or rules they call gaya. Perhaps the various surveys were 
designed to create a direct one-to-one relationship between the land and its own-
ers or users. In any case, the notion of land used as common or communal prop-
erty was not permitted under this type of state simplification.
 Local neighbors have always adopted a policy of mutual recognition of land 
tenure and thus the new laws were seen only as additional support for their land 
rights. The procedure to parcel land for individual registration based on the Land 
Survey was not started until 1958. That is to say, indigenous people were still using 
land in collective methods prior to 1958. The Reservation Land Procedure even 
suggested indigenous people should plant trees collectively and share the mutual 
benefits of tree trading. Land tenure was constructed using local customary norms 
and gaya, so the government surveys were somewhat alien to the indigenous peo-
ples. They did not understand that the only way to have your legal title to land 
recognized was for it to be recorded in the Township Survey Book. 
6.2.2 The wrong registration of the wrong people 
Case study: Grandma Sakura’s complaint: dreams and gaya
Many of the elders involved in the protest were also involved in their own land 
conflicts. Grandma Sakura‘s claim – to ask her sister to return her land – was a 
typical example of the wrong registration of land titles that occurred frequently 
under the land survey procedure. About 40 years ago, around the time of the land 
survey in the 1950s, Grandma Sakura’s husband lent a big piece of land to her 
sister’s husband, who had just moved into the village without any land to plant. 
According to Grandma Sakura’s memory and discourse, she believed there had 
been an oral contract between her husband and her sister’s husband (Anay) to 
lend him the land so that the family could survive until their children had grown 
up enough to become independent. The promise was a free loan on the condition 
that one day the land would be returned. However, almost 40 years after her sis-
ter’s husband’s funeral, Grandma Sakura found that the loaned land had already 
been registered in the name of her sister’s husband’s by the township government. 
Grandma Sakura did not understand why her sister’s husband would register the 
land in his name. This would mean that his sons would inherit the land. It seems 
there was no intention of returning the land. Grandma Sakura felt upset for many 
years and did not know what to do. One day, her grandson decided to act on her 
131
6 ■ Reservation Land Property Disputes: From a Law-Individualism Perspective
behalf and approached the Township Mediation Committee with the request that 
the sister return the land. However, the sister’s son said that: 
the land belongs to my father who spent more than 40 years of labor and sweat 
cultivating the waste land and making it fertile. It is legally registered in the 
Township Land Book. I don’t feel worried at all; the law is with us. The law will 
prove that we own the land forever’. 
The son said his piece and left the Township Mediation Committee in a temper. This 
resulted in the mediation process being stopped and Grandma Sakura was told that 
she could bring the case to court. But she did not want to do this and hoped to find 
other ways to bring her prick her sister’s conscience and get her land back. 
 She expressed the belief that the oral contract or promise had been supported 
by gaya: ‘If you break the gaya, you will be punished badly, even worse than what 
the law can deal out’. During these few days, one of Grandma Sakura’s daughters 
kept dreaming about the land issue. In the first dream, she found her aunt’s hus-
band (the man who had borrowed the land) had fallen down into a deep gorge 
and was tangled in heavy wires, too badly hurt to walk. She was shocked by the 
dream because she had just returned from her father’s grave to ask for advice 
about the land. She shared the dream with her family who told her that, in fact, 
her aunt’s husband had indeed died when he fell into a deep gorge. The second 
night she dreamed that she was searching for her father’s money, all over the 
house, but she could not find it anywhere. In her dream, her father told her that 
the money was hidden in a new place. The next day, one of their neighbors said 
that the dream was actually telling her that the land was registered in another’s 
name. It was during the 1970s that the government sent surveyors up to the 
mountains. They called on land users and land owners to witness the land sur-
vey and they carried out measurements according to the procedures laid down 
in law. At that time, Grandma Sakura’s family had moved down to the plains, 
and perhaps this is the reason why they were not informed of the survey. Con-
sequently, the borrower and user of the land participated in the survey and were 
registered as the land user who was entitled to the right to cultivate (so-called 
surface rights). It was argued that her sister’s husband did not mean to cheat her 
family out of the land and that it was outside of their ‘legal awareness’ to find out 
the real meaning of the land survey. However, others argued that her sister’s hus-
band had every intention of taking the land thus did not inform the real owners 
about the survey. They believed that this could be proved by the dream that he 
had fallen to his death. Slipping on stones or wood is taken as a sign or skribut (a 
Truku term) for being symbolically stopped by a utux (ghost), and that is always 
seen as a judgment for breaking a gaya (Xen 1998; 1999): 
 Gaya is so powerful that you can see another relative, who also borrowed 
land from us, has just returned the land to us after 40 years. He had no gaya 
to steal the land and register it in his name. People believe that gaya always re-
members to execute fierce vengeance on its violators or on a corporate group 
(personal contact). 
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The villagers became reluctant to talk too much about this gaya, which had al-
ready been responsible for something bad. People did not dare to talk too much 
about it in public for fear that someday there would be vengeance. During my 
time in the field, I could sense that most of the villagers had an opinion on this 
matter and there was plenty of gossip about the case. Most villagers suggested 
that the land should be returned in order to keep the gaya intact and then a pig 
should be sacrificed and the meat shared among relatives as compensation for 
any damage. What people worried about most was that the son, who had inher-
ited the land and insisted that he had a legal right to the land, would suffer bad 
fortune like so many others who had stolen land or violated the gaya. Indeed, 
one day, the son who had inherited the land was going up the mountain to fix a 
house that he wanted to run as a homestay; his mother warned him to be alert 
and to guard against accidents or falling down. But he ignored her and when he 
was coming back down the steep trail he slipped and could not walk for many 
days. The people’s daily lives seemed to become full of warnings. 
 In this case we found the emergence of a special category of people who are 
seen as controversial by villagers. I would call this category of people ‘law-indi-
vidualistic’. In local people’s terms, they are people who take advantage of their 
knowledge of certain laws and procedures in order to benefit from the support 
of the law. They are usually people who local people believe are violating the 
gaya. One villager commented that the Land Survey was designed to ‘call for 
people concerned to record the ‘facts’ of land tenure in the government book, 
but unfortunately it was ruined by some people who disregard the gaya. They 
could have registered the original facts, i.e. who may actually own, or deserve to 
own, the lands. They are selfish and destroy the collective gaya’. According to this 
thinking, there is no reason why the land survey could not have maintained the 
original indigenous structure of land tenure. The Reservation Land Procedure 
did not force people to be selfish, but it allowed it to happen. People usually call 
these law-individualistic people thieves. Very often, the processes implemented 
by the agents of government were full of administrative mistakes or inconven-
iences. Land thieves are land thieves no matter whether they take advantage of 
the law or not. People often complained that the notification about the survey 
was announced on a bulletin board that few people accessed. In addition, at that 
time, just after the Japanese had left, not many people were able to read Chinese. 
The new procedures were supposed to be publicly announced, but this clearly 
failed. The following case from a nearby village (law suit #6444 (2001)) exempli-
fies a land dispute. 
6.2.3 No land rights without registration 
An Indigenous teacher vs. the township office
Four cases11 were brought by an indigenous teacher who believed that the land 
she inherited from her parents had been stolen or registered ‘illegally’ in other 
11 Cases 90,訴,6444 and 89,訴,155確認土地所有權存在.
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people’s names. She accused the township government of granting the title of 
land ‘owner’ ‘illegally’ to others. She stated in the court that the rights to the land 
in question should be granted to her parents who had first cultivated the land 
and still used it to this day. She had discovered by chance that the land had been 
registered by someone else. She believed that this was, at worst, an illegal action 
and, at best, a mistake made by the township government and the wrong land 
title holder. The judge who heard the case was confused the teacher wanted and 
decided that, first and foremost, she was looking for a ‘correction of the title to 
cultivate’ (更正耕作權) and not ownership of the land. If she wanted to present 
a case for ownership, then, she would have to challenge another governmental 
institution in charge of land registration, the Hualien Branch of the Land Office 
and not the township government. Listening to the testimony from the Town-
ship Office, the judge heard that the teacher’s parents did not present themselves 
at the office between 1961 and 1962, the years when the land survey was con-
ducted in the village. Consequently, the Original Land List did not list her fa-
ther as the land user. In 1980, the new Land User List recorded that the right to 
cultivate (surface rights) was registered by the township government and also, 
strangely, a note was attached to the record stating that the teacher’s father was 
the land user. In 1982, the township government carried out a third land survey 
which apparently recorded double ownership and informed the teacher. At that 
time, the teacher did not bring a claim to correct the title. Before long, the 15 
year period within which a land claim was possible (negative prescription) had 
elapsed. The note attached to the entry in the Reservation Land Use Survey Book 
stated, ‘the registration of the surface right is wrong and needs to be corrected 
to the original user’. However, because land surface rights are different – have 
less status in law – to land use rights, the township government did not feel any 
urgency to correct the mistake. What is not clear is how another person was able 
to register the right to cultivate (surface rights) the land. The Reservation Land 
Procedure declares that the right to cultivate is reserved for someone who ‘has 
opened and cultivated prior to the enactment of said procedure’ – in this case, 
the teacher’s parents. The Reservation Land Use Survey Book also acknowledged 
that her father qualified for surface rights. Crucially, in 1982, the government 
noted that it had been a mistake to register the land to a third party. The mystery 
of the third party continued, but rumor had it that the registration had been 
done intentionally and illegally by township government officers and the land 
title holders. Thus, we see the emergence of a law-individualistic man who may 
have registered illegally, but later had this decision upheld by law. It seemed that 
no one could correct the obvious mistake: 
There is no justice at all in the ROC laws and courts! It is obvious that the 
teacher’s father was most deserving of the land, not a stranger. 
If you didn’t show up in the first land survey, then you were not registered as 
the land owner, even though you had cultivated the land for generations’. 
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If you showed up for the survey, your name will at least be listed in the Survey 
Book and you will automatically have rights, even though you haven’t shed a 
drop of sweat on that land at all. 
These are some commonly-held views about the National Land Law. 
In order to compensate for the numerous omissions from the first land survey, 
the government carried out more editions, listing land users with a view to as-
sisting the registration of land rights. However, the above case illustrates that 
the justice or truth in people’s mind was not reflected in the Land Survey Books. 
The teacher did not claim her rights before negative prescription came into ef-
fect. She said she did not know what the procedures were at that time and had 
assumed her parents had rights because they were still working on the land in 
question. Neighbors were quite clear about the local tenure structure. If consen-
sus on land property issues was achieved at the local level, then why bother to 
care about whether the land had been officially registered or not?. Registration 
was an idea alien to these peoples’ culture. Tenure had already been structured 
by a clear collective consensus. The registration system, on the other hand, cre-
ates a fictive tenure structure based on words and paper, something that was new 
to indigenous people. Inevitably, there were problems resulting from the trans-
formation of the tenure system from a local equilibrium to a national registra-
tion system. Local customary equilibrium was balanced between related neigh-
bors and, thus, was supported by different but related levels of collectiveness, 
such as families, relatives or local adjunct land users. By contrast, the surveyors 
involved in the registration procedures were not familiar with local contexts, and 
it was highly possible for distorted information to be registered in the land book. 
Law-individualistic people emerge as individuals who deal with their property 
without participation in a wider context. That is to say, with the backing of new 
national laws these individuals could ignore traditional or customary ways of 
land tenure that are more relationally embedded in a local context. The new na-
tional laws replace these traditional relations and serve as a kind of objective 
means by which land ownership gradually requires a new form of interdepend-
ence, where one’s own wider recognitions do not function as a primary means of 
obtaining the land. 
 From the above examples emerge a new type of person that adopts individu-
alism and leaves collectiveness behind. At this juncture, however, we see that this 
tendency to individualism has not yet ‘atomized’ as would happen later. Basi-
cally, this was because the land survey was carried out in a collective atmosphere 
that provides less opportunity for selfish individuals to take advantage. Later, I 
will discuss the procedures that were introduced after the land survey, which 
resulted in a structure that fostered increased law-individualism and allowed in-
dividuals to make decisions in more atomized ways. The procedures that encour-
age increased law-individualism can be illustrated by the following cases that 
took place during a time when progress was being made towards land ownership 
on the basis of surface rights, also known as superficies. 
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6.3 Conflicts during the period of limited cultivation and land surface 
rights (Superficies)
Cultivation rights or land surface rights are like superficies; that is to say, a real 
right consisting of a grant by a landed proprietor of a piece of ground, bearing 
a strong resemblance to the long building leases granted by landholders. The 
right of superficies is adopted in the reservation land procedures because the 
indigenous land is legally state-owned. Thus, for indigenous people to have legal 
permission to use or to own land, they must first go through the procedure of 
registering superficies that resemble a permanent rent. Before you could obtain 
ownership of a piece of land for agriculture or housing or forestry, you first had 
to be listed in the survey book and then begin to obtain the surface rights to the 
property. According to section 17 of the Reservation Land Procedure, you have 
to inherit the land, cultivate it, or live on it for private use for a period of (at 
least) five years after registration. However, the promotion to ownership after 
five or ten years is not automatic. Rather, it must be on the ‘condition that the 
personal use has been verified factually’. Only then can the land ‘be converted to 
land ownership registration upon the personal application of the cultivation or 
land surface rights holder in the presence of the authorized clerk of the Council 
of Indigenous Peoples’.
 Thus, the application should be filed at the local land registry office. In my 
fieldwork I found conflicts and mistakes consistently occurred during the pro-
cess of verification and promotion. Below, is such an example, in the form of the 
nationally famous and internationally reported case between the Shoulin town-
ship government, the Asia Cement Company and some 90 indigenous people.
6.3.1 Indigenous Land rights appropriated by the state for use by 
 industry
Indigenous people vs. Asia Cement Co.12 
At a time when Taiwan had just released itself from the constraints of martial 
law, a group of indigenous land owners took advantage of the freedom to dem-
onstrate and lobby for their rights. In fact, since 1995, they had adopted many 
different measures to ask the Asia Cement Company to return their lands13. 
This particular group was among the very first from the indigenous commu-
nity to exercise their right to protest. In fact, they attracted so much publicity 
that many activists and legal experts agreed to help them. For example, a hu-
man rights NGO, largely comprising lawyers, volunteered their services to help 
them bring a series of cases in different courts. In these cases, the indigenous 
plaintiffs stated that in the year of 1973 the township government had faked 
their signatures in order to cancel their rights to cultivation, which had already 
12 I discuss this case based on the records of the court’s decisions re: case #1(1999) and # 2055(2006).
13 Since martial law was lifted in 1987, indigenous peoples have been able to start lobbying for bet-
ter enforcement of their land and labor rights. (Allio 1998).
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been registered after the land survey during the 1960s. They believed that later 
the township government leased the land illegally to the Asia Cement Company, 
according to section 15 of the Reservation Land Procedure: 
Indigenous peoples land grants for cultivation rights, land surface rights, lease 
rights, or gratis land use rights is non-transferable or non-leasable, except to 
the indigenous heir or chosen successor, another indigenous member of the 
original beneficiary household, or indigenous peoples within a three-degree 
kinship. 
The indigenous claimants believed that they still had the rights to cultivate and, 
because a decade had passed since registering their cultivation and surface 
rights, they should be promoted to ownership rights. Their accusations raised 
a lot controversy, even among indigenous communities and among some of the 
previous owners of the land related to Asia Cement. Subject of the most debate 
was the money these previous owners had taken from Asia Cement; money that 
was intended to compensate for the cancellation of the cultivation rights. Ac-
cording to the Reservation Land Procedure, cultivation rights cannot be sold 
or transferred to non-indigenous people. So it seemed that in order for Asia 
Cement to establish itself in the indigenous area, they first needed indigenous 
land owners to give up their cultivation rights. Then, the Township Office, as 
the representative of the ‘real’ land owner – the State – could take back the lands 
and then lease them to corporations for national economic and industrial plans. 
The money that changed hands was meant as private compensation and not as 
‘rent’ or as a ‘price for buying or trading’ between Asia Cement and indigenous 
land owners. This tricky process appears to be an implicit – and perhaps com-
plicit – attempt by Asia Cement and the township to avoid breaking Section 15 
of the Reservation Land Procedure. However, there are many conflicting inter-
pretations among indigenous land owners about this money. This is exacerbated 
by the fact that the process happened almost 30 years ago when these plaintiffs 
were young and the business was conducted by their parents who were illiterate 
or ignorant of legal processes. Many second generation owners believed that the 
money actually meant rent, so the papers they signed, which were sometimes 
fake, were seen by them as proof of a rental contract. As a result, they filed cases 
asking for the return of their land. Here we find that they still adopt natural law 
thinking, and believe that they were in a position to rent out the land with cul-
tivation rights, even though the Reservation Land Procedure did not allow this. 
Other indigenous people accept that the transaction that took place amounted 
to a purchase and consequently, they no longer had any rights to the land. Yet 
others understood that, according to section 15, they could not lease lands that 
they had cultivation rights for but did not actually own. There were some indig-
enous people who accused those who believed they had the right to rent out the 
land of being ignorant of the law and refused to join the land claim case. On the 
other side, there were a number of people who saw an opportunity to piggy back 
on the case and perhaps benefit from a positive result. They certainly saw the 
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involvement of Han intellectuals and lawyers in the case as an advantage. Thus, 
a case was filed, accusing the township government and the cement company 
of faking the paperwork that cancelled their cultivation rights. For its part, the 
township government stated that the money paid was private compensation for 
giving up cultivation rights. This meant that once you took the money you gave 
up any further rights to the land. The township representative admitted, how-
ever, that the problem with this procedure was that when the township received 
the signed permissions, giving up the cultivation rights, the clerk did not take 
the next step and go to the Land Registry Office to officially cancel the cultiva-
tion rights. This oversight on the part of the township government is the major 
reason a number of indigenous land title owners, who had taken the compensa-
tion money and signed to handover their cultivation rights, were able to regain 
ownership of this land ten years later. A second mistake also occurred that en-
couraged a number of indigenous people to file land claims. Rumor had it that 
some of those who had sold out their rights managed to get ownership back as 
a result of bribing the township government or by using underhand methods. 
It was certainly the case that a number of those who were granted land titles 
were employed as clerks in the township governments. These clerks and others 
who had taken compensation but then claimed land back attracted a great deal 
of criticism, from within the indigenous community, but also from township 
representatives. Local people complained that, ‘they are tricky to use legal meth-
ods to get what they don’t deserve’. The judge in this trial made a decision that 
did not resolve the problems at all and, in fact, created more confusion among 
stakeholders. The decision stated that what these indigenous people wanted was 
to ask for their rights to be promoted ion to ownership from cultivation rights 
to ownership rights. It also said that the decision about whether or not to agree 
promotion should be made by the county government, in accordance with sec-
tion 5 of the Reservation Land Procedure (see appendix 2). This decision caused 
a great deal of confusion. 
 In short, we found that vindication by the court does not always equate with 
justice in the peoples’ minds. I would go so far as to say that justice cannot come 
from national laws that are designed with such limitations. We have found that 
many of the people asking for their rights through the courts are not always 
expecting real justice for their community, but rather are looking for profit for 
themselves. Justice or injustice from the courts is not compatible with ideal mor-
al sensibility among people. When there are no other alternatives than to pro-
ceed through the courts, the result is that an individual moves outside of the 
moral circle of the community and, instead, turns to the law for support. At the 
point someone chooses to find support or fortune from the law, he becomes in-
dividualized. 
  Many of the court decisions I have heard or read about share similarities with 
the Asia Cement case. For example, research showed that the township govern-
ment and private companies or national corporations such as Taiwan Power or 
Taiwan Water even took land without providing compensation, either because, 
once again, the township office failed to cancel the cultivation rights at the Land 
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Registry Office, or the township 
turned a blind eye to the fact that 
the lands these corporations wanted 
were already registered or used by 
someone else, only to face claims 
by subsequent generations later. In 
my observation of land claims, truth 
and justice are hard to find, although 
some individuals have been lucky 
enough to get their land back. For 
example, the court decision listed as 
the case of Hua-simple-#508(2007), 
which related to land in my field-
work villages. In this case, the plain-
tiffs asked for the return of land that 
was being used as a water station 
by Taiwan Water, who obtained the 
land for public use from the town-
ship government. However, prior to 
Taiwan Water obtaining this land 
for free, cultivation rights had been 
registered in the name of the plain-
tiff ’s father. The township admitted 
that it failed to cancel these cultiva-
tion rights and, consequently, the 
plaintiffs were awarded ownership. 
The plaintiff refused to acknowledge that his family had previously received any 
compensation for the land, and challenged testimony by an elder in court who 
said that her father had actually donated the land for public use. The representa-
tive from the township government also defended their actions, saying that it 
was obvious that the lands had been a public water station for decades and that 
the plaintiff had not personally cultivated the land for more than ten years. Ac-
cording to section 15 of the Reservation Land Procedure, this meant that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to ownership rights. However, the judge decided to 
award ownership to the plaintiff because, according to article 43 of the Land Act, 
‘Registration duly made according to this Act shall have conclusive validity’. That 
is to say, even though the registration had not followed procedure, it was still 
valid. Thus, the decision was made that the water station should be torn down 
and clear land returned to the plaintiff. I do not intend to examine this decision 
further, but I can imagine that the decision divided opinion. In fact, article 43 
of the Land Act has become something of a standard among indigenous people, 
who are bringing similar cases in the hope of a similar outcome. 
Photo 6.2
Protest for the returning of Cultivation Right against the 
Asia Cement Co. Photo courtesy of Ciwing Masa
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6.3.2 Indigenous land appropriated for Han shelters
Mr Cilu vs. nine Han families: 18 trials in more than 12 years
Mr Cilu is an employee of the controversial Asia Cement Company and earns a 
salary good enough to give his family an above average standard of living. His 
wife has a successful fishing tool shop that provides them with an extra source 
of income. It is quite unusual to find a double income indigenous family. It is 
fair to say that Mr Cilu felt financially secure. Consequently, about 15 years ago, 
he decided to think about asking for his father’s land back. This land been oc-
cupied and nine Han families had built apartments on the property. These Han 
families believed that they had paid compensation money to Cilu’s father and, 
therefore, had the right to build houses on it. Indeed, they had lived there for 
over 30 years, from 1977 and the moment a fierce typhoon called Wenny struck 
their village and swept away their houses. The houses the Han people are now 
living in were planned by the township government, the Nationalist Party (Kuo-
mintang) and the provincial government, who arranged for Cilu’s parents and 
other indigenous cultivation rights owners to receive 10,000 NTD (a good rate 
at that time) as compensation for the loss of their cultivation rights. However, 
as with the previous case, the township did not proceed to cancel the cultivation 
rights at the Land Office. As a result, in 1989, Cilu’s mother received a deed of 
ownership from the township government. He could not understand why they 
had the deed of ownership when the land was being used by Han families. His 
mother said that she had no idea about the 10,000 NTD. He concluded that when 
his father had been alive, the family had been cheated by a powerful triumvirate 
of local Han politicians, the KMT and the township government. Cilu believed 
it was his duty to ask for the land back. He asked other indigenous people who 
had suffered the same problems to join him, but many were hesitant because of 
financial problems and a mistrust of the courts, the laws and lawyers. A number 
of those who hesitated believed their parents had received compensation money, 
so they did not have a right to make any claims. It appears to have been a mistake 
that promoted Cilu’s cultivation rights. And, in fact, many people in the village 
told him that the transfer of the land had been organized by the government 
in order to help the Han people to survive in the aftermath of the typhoon; so 
they suggested that he should not to proceed with legal action, even though he 
possessed the ownership deeds. The township suggested that a solution was for 
him to lease the land to the Han people who had lived there for so many years. 
They warned him that the law may not offer him the solution that he was look-
ing for and also asked him to think about what would happen to the Han fami-
lies without anywhere to live. The Han people in question were very angry that 
their housing rights were being threatened by a mistake by the township many 
years ago. Despite this, Cilu still believed that there had been many injustices 
during the time of the land arrangements and he insisted that his family had not 
received any money, so they had the right to take back a clean property. In fact, 
Cilu started legal action in the civil courts without hiring a lawyer. The case was 
140
Part III ■ Individualization of Land Rights
heard in the court eighteen times14 in thirteen years, but the result he was look-
ing for remained elusive.
 In the first two appeals, Cilu’s claim was denied because the judges believed 
that his parents would have received the money like others had, which demon-
strated an intention to give up the cultivation rights. But Cilu refused to accept 
these court decisions and so he hired a lawyer to fight a third appeal in the high-
est court in Taiwan. Dramatically, the court overturned previous decisions on 
the grounds of article 43 of the Land Act, ‘Registration duly made according to 
this Act shall have conclusive validity’. Thus, Cilu won the case and now waited 
for the land to be cleared and the houses torn down by compulsory enforcement 
(強制執行). Meanwhile, the Han families mustered all their resources and hire 
lawyers to appeal the decision. A staggering fourteen more trials took place in 
a bid to get the Indigenous Council to influence and stop Cilu. They put for-
ward the argument that his ownership had been based on ‘incomplete’ cultiva-
tion rights and that Cilu’s family had not personally cultivated the land for ten 
years without disruption because the land had obviously been used for housing 
and not farming. Most of the Han families involved believed that it was a cynical 
move on the part of Cilu and his mother who waited for fifteen years to pass and 
with that the deadline for bringing any action (negative prescription	時效消滅) 
to claim their surface and housing rights (superficies).
 To summarize the events surrounding these eighteen trials, I would say that 
only article 43 of the Land Act promotes indigenous rights. As a result of these 
trials, Cilu’s family was thought of as selfish by the Han people, while some in-
digenous people thought he was courageous for challenging an unfair system. 
Later, we found another group of Han who were worried that the original indig-
enous owners of the land that they were living on would file a case as Cilu had 
done. To avoid this, they put forward a plea to the Hualien County Parliament to 
protect their housing rights. We also found a number of indigenous people join-
ing with Cilu to form a local association to promote their village development 
and to fight against the dominance of Han people who had obtained land from 
indigenous people and then promoted the land as a valuable commodity. Cilu’s 
victory certainly encouraged many indigenous people to fight for land rights. 
Therefore, we can see that in contrast to previous cases, this law-individualistic 
character had enough charisma to raise support from indigenous people who 
would not have got involved in such a fight a decade or more ago. Cilu’s case be-
came famous in local villages and many people who had suffered because of land 
14 List of the 18 appeals on the same case in a period of 13 years: (1)1997 訴326號拆屋還地之訴, 
(2) 1998上字48號拆屋還地之訴, (3) 1999,台上,2533拆屋還地之訴, (4) 2000,上更(一), 22 返還土
地之訴, (5) 2002 台抗	477 號債務人異議之訴	(6) 2003,訴, 126 債務人異議之訴, (7) 2003,上, 62, 
債務人異議之訴	(8) 2005,台上, 349 債務人異議之訴, (9) 2005,訴, 60 債務人異議之訴, (10) 2006, 
上, 11 債務人異議之訴, (11) 2007,台上, 1050 債務人異議之訴, (12) 2003,訴, 309 請求協同辦理
地上權登記, (13) 93,上, 30 請求協同辦理地上權登記, (14) 2005,台上, 756 請求協同辦理地上權
登記, (15)2005,訴, 981 臺北高等行政法院判決原住民保留地, (16) 2007年度重訴字第	33 號請
求塗銷土地所有權移轉登記, (17) 2008年度重上字第	13 號請求塗銷土地所有權移轉登記, (18) 
2009 年度台上字第三六０號請求塗銷土地所有權移轉登記.	These verdicts can be accessed on-
line at: www.law.gov.tw.
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conflicts sought him out in order to exchange experiences and ideas. It did not 
take long for a theory to develop; that is to say, if you possessed the land right 
deeds, no matter whether they have been obtained legally, in error or illegally, 
you had a strong claim to ownership rights. 
 Mother Leaf ’s case clearly illustrates the theory of ‘registration above all’. This 
case demonstrates the failure of an oral contract, which was less powerful than 
the registration of ownership. In this case, Mother Leaf had found many elders 
in her neighbourhood who were prepared to testify that she had bought land 
from the accused, a second-generation descendant who insisted that his parents 
had forgotten to cancel their right to the land with the township authorities and 
failed to transfer the rights to Mother Leaf. Mother Leaf did not hire a lawyer to 
fight her case, but rather asked an indigenous cousin who had experience of the 
Asian Cement case to assist her. The judge hesitated to believe the neighbors’ 
testimony and the notion that there had been a transaction, even if it had only 
been an oral contract between Mother Leaf and the buyers. The decision was 
very controversial among the indigenous community, not least because there are 
so many similar cases where oral contracts had taken place. This judgment basi-
cally meant they were all invalid, or at least useless in terms of land claims. The 
problem with these oral contracts is that they took place more than a generation 
ago and the memories of and witnesses to the events were gone. At the same 
time, modern law demanded that property trading be dealt with formally, with 
paper deeds. Local gossip suggested that there had indeed been a purchase – oth-
erwise the land could not have been used by the plaintiff for so many years. The 
defendant’s cousin, however, possessed the paper deeds to the land, which had 
more legal weight than an oral contract. Here, then, we find another case where 
one of the parties is supported by law, while the other is relying on local customs 
and hearsay. Ultimately, Mother Leaf lost her case. 
 During my fieldwork I found another important example of a case (Hua sim-
ple 63, 2002 (九十一年度花簡字第六三號) in which the land had been sold 
and the buyer had built a house and lived on the land for more than 40 years. 
Later, however, he was threatened with the house being torn down because the 
land was still registered in the seller’s name. I also found case 109, 2003 (拆屋
還地92,訴,109) where an old man who had migrated from mainland China was 
urged to return the land he was living on because it was still registered in the 
name of the seller’s descendant. A similar case can be found in Up Yi 74, 2003 
(九十二年度上易字第七四號), where the judge ruled that ownership should 
belong to the seller, but that the buyer was eligible to occupy the land that they 
were living on because the trade of the land had happened before 1972 when the 
Reservation Land Procedure decided that land can only be transferred among 
indigenous people. To everybody’s astonishment, the buyer’s oral contract meant 
that his descendants could occupy the land but had no land title. We can see 
that land rights are supported by law and that local recognition does not count. 
One example worth noting here is the devastating case of Up YI 33, 2005 (九十
四年度上易字第三三號). In this case, the seller’s daughter sold the land with 
an oral contract and forgot to transfer the title. The land was then sold on again 
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to a third party. The daughter’s claim to the land was given no credence by the 
indigenous community, but she believed that the legal process would uphold 
her claim. This is yet another example of indigenous people learning legal tech-
niques in order to gain personal profits. But the consequence is the sacrifice of 
local balance. Below, the Brighten case provides a typical illustration. 
6.3.3 Registration is paramount
Brighten vs. his indigenous neighbor 
Based on the theory of ‘registration above all’, one of Cilu’s colleagues at Asia Ce-
ment, nicknamed Brighten, had registered a piece of land that was already occu-
pied and used for many years by one of his neighbors, an old lady who had filed 
a law suit demanding that Brighten return the land she had used and cultivated. 
The case came in front of the judge twice, and twice the judge ruled that the land 
had been legally redistributed to Brighten. Following this decision, the old lady 
still occupied the land, so Brighten countersued in the Hualien civil court and 
demanded that the houses on the land be torn down and the land returned to 
him. Brighten assumed that he had already registered the cultivation rights so 
he would be in a strong position in terms of claiming the full land rights. How-
ever, on this occasion the civil court judge ruled that, on the one hand, Brighten 
could not prove that he had occupied the land earlier than the old lady and, on 
the other hand, the period in which Brighten could enjoy cultivation rights had 
come to an end after five years. This meant he had no right to claim the land, 
which according to procedures should now be returned to the state (in this case 
the township). This decision was quite a shock. Indeed, the majority of people 
expected that ownership would be automatically granted after the five year term. 
The judge ruled that no further appeals would be heard because the total value 
of the land in question was now below the parameters of the law. In fact, many 
people in the community thought that the ruling that nobody was given the land 
title was a good decision in terms of maintaining community relations.
 Brighten was clearly astonished to find that registration is not actually para-
mount. He could not understand why he had not been able to earn the land 
back. If we examine all nine appeals on the Brighten case, 15 there appears to be 
an inconsistency between the decisions of the administrative court and those 
made by the civil court. From the cases highlighted here, we can see that the 
Reservation Land Procedure has been designed to decide the power attributed 
to various rights through a collective process such as a collective land survey and 
the conditions of using land for cultivation or housing. Among the techniques 
and procedures employed in land claims, there is a tendency to reduce the pub-
lic or collective aspects in order to prove the power afforded to a specific type of 
land right. It is certainly possible to gather the signatures of four neighbors who 
15 A list of the nine appeals on the Brighten case in the years 2004 to 2008: (1) 花蓮縣政府訴願決
定書93訴字第8號, (2) 93,訴, 3948行政訴訟, (3) 93,訴, 3948行政訴訟, (4) 花蓮縣政府訴願決定
書94訴字第024號,	(5)	94,訴,	4078, (6) 拆屋還地94,訴,2 96, (7) 96, 裁, 3779 最高行政法院, (8) 拆
屋還地94,訴, 296, (9) 拆屋還地97,上易, 39.
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are willing to testify to your ownership of land you have actually never used. 
You may register your name instead of that of the real cultivators. But there are 
still public processes that need to be completed, even with fake documents. And 
herein lies the problem; it appears that the public processes are so focused on the 
need for registration or the holding of deeds that they miss cases where land is 
being claimed dishonestly. This can cause controversy between individuals and 
in communities. The precedents set by previous rulings and increased knowl-
edge of how to exploit the loopholes in the law have resulted in more indigenous 
land claims cases. 
Later, I will provide examples of other cases concerning the granting of own-
ership rights that occur outside the collective domain and public monitoring. 
These examples show that indigenous people bringing land claims cases tend to 
be those with autonomy and the private means to do so. Moreover, they appear 
to take individual decisions without worrying about how others in their com-
munity may react. All the examples highlighted here suggest an increasing trend 
towards law-individualism among indigenous people. This, in turn, appears to 
reflect the original design principle of the colonial Japanese government and to 
prove that the implementation and practice of the Reservation Land Policy of 
the ROC government seems to correspond with the status of a colonial state. 
6.4 Disputes arising subsequent to obtaining ownership 
There are many checks in the system of public monitoring and administrative 
governance designed to establish whether reservation land is being used by in-
dividuals as intended, i.e. for cultivation, forestry or housing. These processes 
are designed to help protect the basic needs of indigenous people. There is an 
implicit recognition between policy designers that land can be used collectively 
by indigenous communities for agricultural and housing needs. The collective 
processes that take place before ownership rights to a piece of reservation land 
are granted include agreement to the condition that the property is not to be sold 
on to non-indigenous people. As we have seen, this process is still vulnerable to 
mistakes or deliberate rule breaking due to the emergence of law-individualism, 
as previously discussed. Below, I will illustrate how a legal environment encour-
ages an atmosphere of increasing individualism that falls outside of collective 
monitoring or controls. I have found two tendencies in particular that are il-
lustrative of this trend towards individualistic decisions regarding land use. One 
is changes in the law that have increased the opportunities for non-indigenous 
people to use indigenous land, despite the government maintaining a policy of 
not transferring ownership to non-indigenous people. This raises the spectre of 
collaboration between indigenous and non-indigenous people in order to cir-
cumvent these laws. Consequently, there is an atmosphere in which indigenous 
people are forced to deal with their ownership rights in secret, away from moni-
toring by the authorities. The second tendency my research demonstrates is the 
legal idea of private autonomy that goes hand in hand with the registration sys-
144
Part III ■ Individualization of Land Rights
tem. The logic is that once a land title is granted and the paper deeds are in 
your possession, you may use it as an asset to borrow money, and you may sell 
it to others without notifying others, even those who may claim connections to 
the land. Here we see that the law tends to grant land titles to individuals and 
favors private ownership of land. Private autonomy tends to exclude relations, 
other than legal relations, that may be employed in land claims and results in 
land becoming a commodity. Here, I would warn that the extent of privatiza-
tion needs to be differentiated. For example, land can be titled to co-owners of 
a shared property. There are certainly records of the registration of co-owners 
in indigenous areas. These co-owners still tend to deal with the land collectively 
when collective actions favour their survival. Even individual owners, with spe-
cific individual land, may cooperate with local ideas of land use. Therefore, the 
privatization of land titles is not an issue resulting from indigenous land con-
flicts. Rather, and more critically, is the way people deal with land issues from the 
perspective of private autonomy. We see that the Reservation Land Procedure is 
trying hard to help indigenous people deal with land at a local level with public 
monitoring, in order to avoid land rights to being taken out of local contexts and 
thus rendering indigenous land subject to the total control of private autonomy. 
The legal ideal of private autonomy is not totally unsuitable for indigenous peo-
ple, but it does foster an environment in which indigenous people can disregard 
their collective relations. In particular, with regards to the transactions of land, 
private autonomy encourages people to opt out of the collective process. For this 
reason, private autonomy encourages people to become increasingly individual-
istic, even selfish, in terms of winning land rights. 
 Examining the cases relating to the Taroko indigenous area, I have found, 
generally, that Taroko society is facing a transformation; one that encourages 
less collectiveness and more possessive individualism in the form of law-indi-
vidualism. If we follow Macpherson’s idea and view possessive individualism as a 
person who is ‘the sole proprietor of his or her skills and owes nothing to society 
for them’ (Macpherson, 1962), then we can say that possessive individualism in 
the Taroko area is not strong in most of the aspects of daily life. This is because 
we find many indigenous people who still share their resources and production, 
at least among families and relatives or adjunctive neighbors. 
 However, we can argue that possessive individualism has been observed in 
the domain of land conflicts, in cases where there is an individual who is keen 
to occupy land. In this scenario, possessive individualism and law individualism 
work together to bring a sense of selfishness and a disregard for the collective 
atmosphere. My research also suggests that we cannot use Dumont’s argument 
to describe Taroko society; that is to say, that ‘egalitarian individualism is ex-
ceptional, a recent and specialized growth’ (Macfarlane 1978). In fact, I would 
argue that egalitarian individualism and possessive individualism is not new in 
indigenous society; that individualism has not just emerged since ‘land became a 
commodity and markets played an important part in the economic system’ as ex-
pressed by Polanyi (Ibid). I would argue that possessive individualism is, indeed, 
becoming stronger in indigenous society and that we see indigenous communi-
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ties experiencing a ‘great transformation’. It is certainly moving away from a non-
market, peasant society where economics is ‘embedded’ in social relations, but 
it has not yet completed the shift ‘to a modern market, capitalist, system where 
economy and society have been split apart’ (Ibid). It is important to note that, up 
to this point, there was no free market system for Indigenous Reservation Land. 
Law-individualism has become an important medium in terms of progressing 
the great transformation described by Polanyi. The situation in Taroko, however, 
is not shaped by the emergence of individualism; but rather by stronger posses-
sive individualism that is focused on the economic domain. In the Taroko area, 
possessive individualism is progressed by law-individualism, particularly with 
respect to issues of land use, the disposal of land and land transactions. However, 
there is no evidence that the sharing of land and embeddedness of land use in the 
social context have disappeared entirely.
 Private autonomy is a basis for law individualism. Below, I will illustrate a 
number of cases that demonstrate conflicts among family members. Incidents 
where individuals have opted for private autonomy or law supported individual-
ism and disregarded their family relations in pursuit of land claims. These exam-
ples will illustrate how collective decisions are disrupted by law-individualism. 
6.4.1 Typical examples of private autonomy supported by state laws 
Cases of conflict within a family
The case most typical of private autonomy that rejects collectiveness and public 
recognition is case 91, sue, 142 (花蓮91年訴142號). In this case, siblings ac-
cused their eldest brother of selling the land they should have inherited from 
their father to a third party. Previously, they had taken their problem to the me-
diation committee at the township office, and during this process all the siblings 
promised to share the land. Later, however, the eldest brother rescinded and sold 
the land to a third party. The family went to court and the judge found that 
the land had been registered in the eldest brother’s name right from the start 
and officially he had the cultivation rights. Consequently, the judge ruled that 
he should be promoted to land owner, rather than his father who had actually 
started to cultivate the land. From the judge’s point of view, there was no legal 
proof that the land belonged to the family’s father. The upshot was that the sib-
lings had no right to claim the land as inheritors. Inevitably, this decision broke 
up the family, who saw their eldest brother as a law-individualistic man that was 
only interested in profit. The judge ruled that the eldest brother had been free 
to register the land because his brothers and sisters had not. Even though it was 
their father who had begun to cultivate the land, the law could only recognise the 
eldest brother’s rights to the land. 
 Another case Hua sue 306, 2000 (花89年訴306號) also deals with brothers 
and sisters competing for the right to share the house their father left them. One 
particular son demonstrated that he had made much more of an effort than his 
siblings in terms of maintaining the house and insisted on having the full rights 
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to the house. His claim was upheld by the judge. The ruling did not compensate 
the plaintiffs, his siblings, in any way. 
 In another case – Hua Simple 231, 2003(花簡字92年231號), a family reg-
istered the land they had inherited from their father in the names of some of 
the brothers and sisters. Later, however, they each refused to return the share 
that they had. Indeed, some of them were claiming more than the share they 
deserved. Thus, we find a situation where many indigenous people worry that 
if their parents do not make proper arrangements for their land before they die, 
there will be problems regarding the division of the heritage. This is supported 
by the findings of the fieldwork by Xia (2003:48). 
6.4.2 Methods used to circumvent the Reservation Land Procedure 
Cooperation or corruption between indigenous people and the Han
Many policymakers from the Japanese period believed that if there were no 
borders between indigenous and Han peoples, and if the government adopted 
a laissez-faire policy regarding land economy, then eventually the indigenous 
people would lose their land. The Reservation Land Procedure was designed to 
protect against this loss of land. The Reservation Land Procedure was developed 
and accompanied by other policies to help transform indigenous ideas and life-
styles so that they would be more aligned to the situation in Taiwan as a whole, 
and in particular with the lives of the Han people. We have seen that, since its 
introduction, the Reservation Land Procedure has been changed, in particular 
a number of the sections relating to the transfer of land rights between the in-
digenous people and the Han. It appears that the reservation land procedure 
was originally designed to help indigenous people to survive through farming 
and forestry. Equally, the sections relating to land tenure were designed to create 
units of families or individuals with basic life resources. There is provision for 
indigenous people to use land collectively (see appendix 2), although the real-
ity is that this seldom occurs because indigenous reservation lands tend to be in 
areas that are steep and scattered and are not suitable for collective investments 
and developments, especially in the national parks area with so many limitations 
and restrictions.16 The method of land registration encourages people to use land 
in pieces but not in blocks. This makes titled land unsuitable for collective agri-
culture. In addition, there was a need to ensure that indigenous people do not 
profit more than Han farmers (see Chart 6.1: A survey of the annual income of 
indigenous and non-indigenous people). 
16 Many scholars and officers are devoted to providing incentives for indigenous people to plan 
land collectively. To this end, a law, the ‘Statute of Development and Management on Indigenous 
Reserved Land’ was drafted but later rejected by the Legislative Yuan. The draft law intended to set 
up a Reserved Area for indigenous people to ‘preserve the traditional culture, improve the living 
environment, and promote the economic development collectively’. Scholars believed that such a 
law would ‘correct the market failure and government failure caused by ongoing regulation when the 
new design becomes a formal law’ (Yen, A-C; Chen, C-C; Wu S-T et al. 2006).
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Chart 6.1
Annual income of indigenous and non-indigenous people between 1967 and 1996 (NTD)
Groups\ year 1967 1969 1972 1974 1978 1996
Mountain indigenous 19,490 – 31,283 – 98,883 501,264
Plains indigenous – 19,648 – 55,382 101,456 512,438
Non-indigenous 130,298 643,010
Indigenous agriculture tends to be just for daily consumption and survival, and 
it is vulnerable to market fluctuations. From the beginning of industrialization in 
Taiwan, in the 1970s, agriculture has been insufficient for indigenous people to 
make a living. The costs involved outweigh any profit to be gained from agricul-
ture. As a result, there was a significant trend towards indigenous people embrac-
ing urbanization and industrialization and leaving their indigenous homelands.17 
In order to improve the situation, the government has changed the laws and invited 
corporations or Han people with capital to invest in the indigenous areas. The Asia 
Cement Company was a case in point. While the government’s intention had been 
to invite outside capital into the area in order to help indigenous people develop 
careers, research show that indigenous people remain poor and unable to make 
good use of their lands in terms of agriculture. Following a change in the law that 
allowed non-indigenous people to rent indigenous land, those territories that are 
good for commerce are generally leased or occupied by non-indigenous people. 
Even in cases where indigenous people have land that has the potential to be good 
for economic or tourism development, the issue of a lack of capital remains a huge 
obstacle. As a geographer observed, ‘For a few decades, many indigenous people 
left their homes and went to urban areas to find jobs, thus reducing the value of 
indigenous lands and leaving them vulnerable to take over’(Chen, Yi-Fong 2008). 
Thus, we see in Chamin Village that 60 per cent of the land was sold to Han people 
who now use it to run bed-and-breakfast hotels or profit from tourism, something 
that in fact indigenous people more than capable of doing (Chen, Yi-Fong 2008; 
Shoulin Township Historiography, 2008).18 
17 A survey supported by the Indigenous Council found that more than half of the indigenous 
population are now living in urban areas.
18 However as the 1974 amendment to the reservation procedure shows, the government did 
not give up on the idea of considering ‘reservation land’ as national land. But in amendments in-
troduced in 1990 and 1998, there is nto longer any use of the term ‘national land’. Thus, as Fuji 
has argued regarding the granting of lands to indigenous people, the title documents do not carry 
the meaning of reservation land. Section 27 of the original 1948 version of the Reservation Land 
Procedure indicates that reservation land limitations and restrictions will be only cancelled when 
indigenous people have improved their standard of living and are able to live financially indepen-
dently. However, as Fuji has argued, when indigenous young people head off to urban areas to earn 
a living, their financial situation is not based on farming on reservation land, but rather on the urban 
economy. Indeed, the reservation land in the homeland now becomes a real ‘reservation land ’, one 
that is beyond the role it was originally designed to play, i.e. it now has a transition role and can be 
used to introduce capital into indigenous communities. This is because the majority of indigenous 
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In a bid to circumvent the problems of a lack of capital, we can see a great deal of 
corruption between indigenous individuals and Han capitalists. In the Taroko area 
where I conducted my fieldwork, for example, the most famous illegal dealing was 
between indigenous people and a high profile Han who was a chief in the Shoulin 
Township Parliament of Representatives, known as ‘Mr Big’. The case was publi-
cised in the local media who reported that Mr Big had occupied indigenous land. 
The prosecutors of the local court had tried to find evidence to charge him with 
dealing with local ‘mafia’, but nothing came of it and he was free to go about his 
business, albeit surrounded by controversy (Kensheng Diary 2007). He also man-
aged to stay out of the local criminal courts because he understood how to avoid 
breaking the law. Mr Big was also involved in the corruption case 1999 (貪污88,上
更(二)) but this time it was a clerk in the civil engineering department of the Hual-
ien County Government who was accused of accepting bribes from him in return 
for faking a compensation report to the National Railways, which was going to take 
land for railway construction. The clerk was accused of faking records that stated 
that Mr Big had built a KTV (Karaoke and MTV) shop worth 20,050,020 NTD 
(almost 435,870 Euros) and was entitled to compensation. The prosecutor carried 
out an investigation and found that the land was indigenous reservation land and 
did not belong to Mr Big who was not indigenous. The prosecutor also discov-
ered that Mr Big seemed to have had prior knowledge of the railway construction 
because he had many sources in government providing him with policy informa-
tion. In this way, he had tried to obtain indigenous land to build the KTV shop. In 
fact, the prosecutor found that the KTV shop was an illegal building without the 
relevant construction permits. Furthermore, the clerk had faked documents to le-
galize the building in order to ensure the payment of compensation. The clerk was 
found guilty of accepting bribes. However, he appealed the verdict (Tai Up, 1434, 
2001 (90,台上,1434)) in the high criminal court and the ruling was overturned 
because the judge thought the prosecutor could not support his findings with laws 
or articles proving that the building was illegal. The prosecutor had fully intended 
to take the matter back to court, but the clerk died suddenly and all further hear-
ings were stopped. Local people were very unhappy with the outcome as they felt 
that Mr Big had been clever at finding ways to obtain a piece of indigenous land 
and then claiming compensation following its sale. They believed he had become 
rich by employing exactly these kinds methods: ‘These kinds of gangster’s deeds 
should be punished; otherwise there is no justice at all in this world’. At the same 
time, there was a reluctance to be open about these kinds of practices, because that 
would mean admitting that someone from the indigenous community had coop-
erated with him. There was a feeling that these kinds of issues should be dealt with 
in secret; that even family members should not know. Case 50, 2001 (90,	訴, 50) is 
evidence of just this. In this case, Mr Big loaned money to indigenous people who 
needed funding to stand as candidates in an election for the Township Parliament 
Representatives. He did this by taking out a mortgage on the valuable plants on the 
reservation lands became a ‘commodity’ that was used for mortgage, leasing or renting. Seen from 
this perspective, reservation lands can be viewed as ‘private lands’ (see Fu 2001). 
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land. The case was brought by the losing candidate’s mother who said that her son 
had no right to mortgage her plants or take what belonged to her. 
Mr Big regularly used this strategy to control candidates who were running for 
the local Parliament; especially those were in need of a lot of money to run in the 
elections. One indigenous representative in the Parliament told me that, ‘Mr Big 
used a lot of money to obtain the position of Parliament chief and most of the 
members were in debt to him. So, the Indigenous Township Parliament and also 
the Government were virtually controlled by this non-indigenous individual and 
he grew stronger and stronger, winning successive terms as Parliament Chief for 
two decades’. In fact, these actions were no secret at all. The local prosecutors 
in the criminal court were always trying to convict him on corruption charges 
(Kenseng Diary, 2000). But these prosecutions always failed. 
 Returning to the abovementioned bribery case, we can see that the prosecu-
tors were frustrated by the accused clerk’s sudden death, not least because they 
had failed in previous attempts to convict this high profile Han individual for 
corruption. The prosecutors were also frustrated by the judge, who later ruled 
that the transfer of land that took place had not been a matter of land purchase, 
but rather of a land trust, which is legal under the Reservation Land Procedure. 
People were also astonished by the judge’s opinion that despite the transaction 
being deemed a sale, whether or not it should be ruled guilty or not depended 
on the administrative procedure between the township and the accused. Basi-
cally, this meant the possibility of another trial, this time in the administrative 
court. Given the precedents, the chances of the sale being ruled illegal there were 
slim 19(see 89,	易, 895 and 90,	上易, 90). The above case received a great deal of 
attention and became the subject of local murmurings and gossips. The case il-
lustrates how profits were constructed by local indigenous and non-indigenous 
people. Cooperation and corruption went hand in hand. We can find examples 
of a number of non-indigenous investors in indigenous areas seeking profit 
from public infrastructure construction or tourism and cooperating with and 
even corrupting local ethnic people in the process. Establishing a trusteeship is 
a brand new way for non-indigenous people to deal in indigenous land prop-
erty within the law. Other ways, which are perhaps less clear cut in legal terms, 
include lease of ownership, mortgage or the registering of superficies. In recent 
decades there have been discussions among law scholars like Wang, Tay-Sheng 
(2003) and Lin, Jia-ling (2000) on the process of passing indigenous lands to 
non-indigenous people more openly. It has been observed that there are conflict-
ing opinions among judges in decisions related to the protection of indigenous 
land and the extent to which use of indigenous land should be open to non-
indigenous people. After much debate, in 2001, an administrative document 
19 Mr. Big is indeed not a buyer. But the fact he used the name of the accused to register 
the land in question is actually against the reservation land procedure and thus is outlawed. 
But whether it is outlawed needs another administrative court to decide on. Thus, it’s hard 
here to decide whether he is guilty or not. Thus I (the judge) reject what the prosecutor has 
brought as guilty’.(see case 89花易895)
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was published by the Indigenous Administration Bureau in Huanlien County20 
announcing that the central government had decided to allow non-indigenous 
people to register superficies of indigenous land: 
The reasons why the land is marked as ‘Indigenous Reservation Land’ should 
be explained from the background of histories. Indigenous peoples are ruled 
by the Han and are peripheral in remote areas with low population. They are 
not inspired by civilizations and have fewer abilities to compete with the Han 
plains people. It is usually the indigenous people who are inferior to the Han 
when they are dealing with commerce. The marking of indigenous lands could 
prevent indigenous people from making bad decisions lest that the land won’t 
transfer to non-indigenous people easily. It is intended that the Reservation 
Land Procedure, especially article 18, will limit the use and users to indigenous 
people. Despite the Procedure, we still hear of a lot of illegal acts of transferring 
illegal usufruct to non-indigenous people. Now the central government has 
decided allow the transfer of the superficies, since the superficies are usually 
almost as powerful as property rights, and let some profit seekers make use 
of indigenous lands. While this could see indigenous peoples’ rights invaded 
step by step. However, if we look at it from another perspective, if land can be 
used efficiently and developed by economically strong men, then landlords 
can profit from rent. It is a principle of market economy and the government 
and the indigenous people are all members of the wider environment. Thus, 
we could not disobey the principle. It is not easy finding a balance between the 
right to survive and the operation of the market.
(An official document to announce the new rules of the reservation land circu-
lated among indigenous officers check the source)
6.5 Conclusion
The above opinion expressed by an indigenous official, puts forward a strong the-
ory for allowing the market economy to lead the way in mediating the use of res-
ervation land among indigenous and non-indigenous (mainly Han) people. In the 
50 years since the implementation of the Land Reservation Procedure, we have 
seen many original principles changed in a way that benefits the state but does not 
benefit indigenous peoples. For example, section 3 of the Reservation Land Proce-
dures says, ‘The indigenous reservation lands herein refers to the mountain land 
originally reserved for the indigenous people for administration purposes, and 
reservation land should be legally delineated and annexed for indigenous people 
to safeguard their livelihood (appendix 2)’. Reservation land actually belongs to 
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This is demonstrated in the many court cases and in local and national policies. 
Through the court cases studied in this chapter, we see that there are always ways 
for a profit seeker to avoid the law. One method, known as ‘hanging indigenous 
names to buy reservation land for non-indigenous people’ (掛人頭) is so popu-
lar that you can see the results all over Taiwan’s indigenous areas, especially those 
that are good for tourism. This method is well-known, even among government 
officers, and there are many surveys to indicate that many indigenous reservation 
lands are actually used or occupied by non-indigenous people.
 From these surveys (see Chart 6.2), we can see that the county of Hualien has 
a lower percentage (23.95%) of illegal non-indigenous reservation land use than 
other counties. Some scholars think this percentage is low because of poor moni-
toring, and that, in fact, many indigenous areas, especially those with connections 
to tourism, would score as much as 60 per cent illegal land use (Chen, Yi-Fong 
2008). Illegal methods remain popular, but increasingly we see more legal ways to 
use and occupy indigenous reservation lands. The use of trusteeship, as we see in 
the case of Mr. Big, or the permission to lease superficies granted by the govern-
ment provide non-indigenous people with more rights to use reservation lands. 
This is seen as a way of bringing together the indigenous people who have land 
and, in particular, Han people who have capital to invest. We would like to see this 
trend of neo-liberal thinking open up the boundaries between indigenous reser-
vation lands and capital. As the cases above illustrate, there are many scenarios 
in which indigenous people have felt the loss of their lands and have also been 
exploited by the cooperation or corruption surrounding dealings on reservation 
lands. Indigenous landlords earned little rent when the reservation land is valued 
well below the market rate. The mainly Han tenants are able to use and occupy the 
land for long periods precisely because the rents are so cheap. The reality of renting 
out reservation lands has always been the loss of the land. These scenarios have his-
torical origins in the colonial period; a time when the Japanese authorities believed 
that indigenous people were barbarians, incapable of rational thinking and unable 
to manage what they had. This social Darwinism theory was implemented for the 
colonial policy and resulted in the confiscation of indigenous lands and territories. 
Indigenous people were seen as lazy and foolish, incapable of learning the ways 
of civilized people who work hard and understand economics. This evolutionary 
theory was also designed to simplify indigenous land use and categorize their ter-
ritories as waste land, leaving only a few lands for sedentary farming by the indig-
enous people What we have seen, however, is that clearly the Japanese authorities 
were cheating themselves by thinking that indigenous people were too stupid and 
lazy to have land tenure or be capable of land management. My research in the 
Taroko plains area found that indigenous people were smart landlords and even 
able to exploit non-indigenous labor. The theory of terra nullius and the taking of 
lands as state-owned were colonial acts that rendered indigenous people ‘stupid’ 
and with no land. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking still prevails among many 
people, even among indigenous ones. 
 There are so many restrictions on non-indigenous land use that reservation 
lands can only really be used for agriculture. And because indigenous people 
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have no capital to invest in their land, their farming remains at a subsistence 
level. They are forced to go to urban areas to find low paid work. Under these 
kinds of restrictions, reservation lands are rendered useless and worthless and 
are vulnerable to profit seekers. The emergence of legal individualism has seen 
the rejection of original or communal ways of dealing with reservation lands. 
Legal individualism cuts out communal relations or reciprocal responsibility. As 
Herskovits (1965:326) mentioned, if the national land laws are to be implement-
ed in such a way that creates a better local equilibrium, ‘Whatever absolute crite-
ria of property may be set up, the ultimate determinant of what is property and 
what is not is to be sought in the attitude of the group from whose culture a given 
instance of ownership is taken, mistakes or distortions should have chances to be 
corrected’ (see Hann 1998). The cases examined in this chapter show that very 
often court decisions do not offer the justice people want and instead judgments 
are processed with the logic of legal formalism. We find that laws support a legal 
individualism and equip the more controversial elements within communities 
with the skills to violate local customs and moral norms and to ignore alternative 
solutions to property disputes.
Chart 6.2
Indigenous Reservation Lands used by Non-Indigenous People (hectares)
County (1) total area 
of Reserva-
tion area












(5) % of area 
of reservation 
used by non-IP 
illegally (3)/(2)
Total Taiwan 251,080.8427 16,778,4102 11,195.1098 6.68% 66.72%
Taipei 2,080.8138 25.0601 21.3021 1.30% 85.00%
Yilang 14,930.3223 663.2927 494.3447 4.44% 74.53%
Taoyuan 12,195.7230 1,053.1682 976.4175 8.64% 92.71%
Hsinchu 18,653.5395 77.0279 56.2185 0.41% 72.98%
Miaoli 7,614.4480 804.1194 479.8616 10.56% 59.68%
Taichuan 6,680.0149 2,995.5143 2,348.6438 44.84% 78.41%
Nantou 31,589.1758 4,493.5943 3,081.3766 14.23% 68.57%
Chayi 6,606.1261 149.9028 82.8311 2.27% 55.26%
Kaoushiung 16,458.0977 255.1802 150.5387 1.55% 58.99%
Pintung 64,590.7097 1,931.8809 1,063.5890 3.00% 55.05%
Taitung 43,720.7550 3,405.9534 2,218.7205 7.79% 65.14%




Cement Industry comes to the east! “That is the way the eastern politicians welcome Them!” (Eastern 
Coast Critics)
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7
Land is ‘Concrete’ while Money is 
not: ‘Development’ Scenarios in the 
Taroko Area since the 1980s 
Taiwanese people call the eastern part of their island the ‘back mountains’, in-
dicating areas of poor development (Hsia and Yorgason 2008). This idea has 
been widespread among both people and policymakers (Tseng, H.P. 2002: 90). 
Though the east is full of natural resources, and is particularly favorable for min-
ing and forestry industries, poor infrastructure and low levels of development 
mean that the area was not ready for further exploitation. Consequently, many 
parts were left as pristine natural areas and have become famous for their natural 
landscapes and beautiful scenery. But the natural resources in the area remain 
targets for further exploitation. Thus, we see ongoing debates about whether 
these landscapes should be sacrificed for the sake of developing industry in the 
region or whether the natural beauty of the area should be preserved (Tseng, H.P. 
2001; Chi 1999; 2001; 2002; 2003; Chi and Hsiao 2005).
 Many studies have provided detailed analyses of the political and econom-
ic processes relating to conflicts between the environment and the economy, 
like the ones arising from the setting up of cement and power plant industries. 
In this chapter, I will call on these analyses and studies in order to illustrate 
how indigenous people have reacted to these processes. This will help us to un-
derstand various development scenarios and examine how indigenous people 
claim their environmental, human and land rights amid the growing number of 
‘development’ projects being initiated by the State and corporations. 
7.1 Five petitions heard by members of the Control Yuan 
On 22 December 1995, three members of the Control Yuan came to visit Shoulin 
township government to collect data and investigate issues of conflict between 
local people and local authorities. According to the Republic of China’s Consti-
tution and its Additional Articles, the Control Yuan has the power of ‘impeach-
ment, censure and audit. In addition, it may take corrective measures against 
government organizations. Members of the Control Yuan may accept people’s 
petitions, inspect central and local governments, make investigations, and su-
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pervise examinations’. These three members of the Control Yuan were warmly 
welcomed by the locals and received four petitions from the Taroko indigenous 
people. These four cases all concerned indigenous land conflicts. The first peti-
tion accused the Asia Cement Company of taking indigenous land illegally; spe-
cifically, of faking deeds that resulted in indigenous people losing their lands in 
Fushih village. The second petition concerned a request for land title registration 
from the original land users that was later rejected by the township government. 
This petition claimed that people who had never cultivated the land, rather than 
the original land users, were granted land rights. It turned out that most of these 
people were officers or political representatives in positions of power. 
 The third petition concerned an application procedure on land # 664-88-91 
in Hoping village (和平村) where a base for a big cement industry project was 
planned. People complained that the land was only registered in the name of 
privileged individuals and not in the names of the original cultivators or users. 
The fourth petition concerned a piece of land that a cement mining company 
had abandoned in Pratan village (三棧) (Hao yu gong cheng gu wen gong si, 
1991). By law, the land was earmarked for redistribution among indigenous peo-
ple who lacked land for subsistence purposes. 
 These four cases concerned three villages inside the Shoulin Township where 
the cement industry had established itself and, in the process, had stirred up 
land conflicts. In fact, indigenous people had already fought for land more than 
a decade before the three Control Yuan members came to hear the petitions. In-
digenous people were eager to find answers to their land conflicts and grabbed 
every chance to ask for help. However, the investigations by these three members 
did not bring any resolutions. With regard to the first petition, the Control Yuan 
members suggested that the Shoulin Township should carry out an investiga-
tion in order to establish whether any mistakes had been made in the process 
of cancelling the cultivation rights on the land. The indigenous people were dis-
appointed to receive a solution that involved the ‘wrong’ doer investigating the 
‘wrong’ doing. For the second and the third petition, the Control Yuan members 
thought that the procedures relating to land title registration for indigenous res-
ervation lands had not yet been finalized and therefore there was no evidence 
of stolen lands. The land rights in the fourth petition were the subject of a court 
case and so the members could not express any ideas about the hearing. They did 
state, however, that if the judge ruled that the land should be taken back from the 
Asia Cement Company, then the township government could redistribute the 
land fairly and ensure that it did not fall into the hands of privileged elites. 
 In addition to these petitions concerning indigenous affairs, a member of 
the Control Yuan was asked to investigate a project in which the Taiwan Ce-
ment Company in Hualien City had extended its production capacity by adding 
more machines but had failed to carry out the required environmental impact 
assessment. The case was later taken to a local court where a judge would rule 
on whether adding machines in this way had, in fact, been illegal. This case at-
tracted a great deal of attention from the media and local people. There were 
environmental demonstrations and protests to stop the expansion of cement 
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production that would result in greater pollution in Hualien City. These protests 
turned out to be the biggest demonstrations that had ever taken place in eastern 
Taiwan. However, the judge was to deliver a decision that would disappoint lo-
cal people. His ruling stated that even though the Taiwan Cement Company had 
admitted to spending 5 million NTD on ‘negotiations’ with local people in the 
hope of gaining their approval for the adding of cement machines, it appears that 
this money never actually reached the people who were in charge of the decision 
making. For this reason, it could not be seen as a bribe. The cement company 
boss was acquitted. By the time the judge made the decision, a Control Yuan 
member who heard the case also believed the case should be dismissed. 
 All five of the cases examined by Control Yuan members led to demonstrations 
against state institutions and to local people questioning what was ‘legal’ and what 
went against administrative procedures. However, local people remained realistic 
and did not rest all their hopes for justice on the shoulders of these four Control 
Yuan members, even though this institution is constitutionally designed to aid the 
Justice Yuan in delivering administrative justice. Significantly, local people were 
working together to find grassroots solutions to these issues. 
 These five well-publicized cases signaled the start of an era – between the 
1980s and the 1990s – in which the east of Taiwan, including the Taroko area, 
became the stage for development with a backdrop of national industry, natural 
environment and indigenous land rights. By examining these five cases, I hope to 
analyze how different people and institutions conceptualized and implemented 
their ideas of development. 
7.2 Scenario 1: Development from top to bottom
Taiwan Cement Company in Hualien City
The Taiwan Cement Company was established with the support of the Nation-
alist Government in 1946. This was at a time when the Japanese had just left 
Taiwan, leaving behind a number of Japanese initiated cement companies.21 The 
21 After taking over Taiwan following Japanese occupation, in April 1946 the Kuomintang govern-
ment established the cement industry supervisory committee, and took over the control of Kaoh-
siung Plant belonging to Asano Cement Co. Ltd. (formerly the Kaohsiung Cement Plant of Taiwan 
Cement), Taiwan Huacheng Cement Co. Ltd. (Suao Cement Plant of Taiwan Cement), Southern 
Cement Co. Ltd. (formerly the Chutung Plant of Taiwan Cement), and Taiwan Cement Pipes Co. 
Ltd. (Taiwan Cement’s production plant in Taipei). The Taiwan Cement Co. was established on 1 
May of the same year. The company was run, with joint capital, by the former Resource Council of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Taiwan Provincial Government. On the 1st of January 1951, 
the company was converted into a limited company. In 1952, the Resource Council was abolished, 
and the company was run jointly by the Ministry and the provincial government. In 1953, the policy 
of ‘land to the tiller’ was launched. 11 November 1954, the company was privatized and bought the 
three cement plants in Kaohsiung, Suao and Chutung, as well as two cement production plants in 
Taipei and Kushan. In September 1962, in answer to the government’s call for ‘capital securitiza-
tion’, Taiwan Cement became the first company to go public on the stock market. It has been 50 
years since the privatization of Taiwan Cement. Over this half a century, Taiwan Cement has been 
involved in major constructions and development at a time when Taiwan was growing strongly. 
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company was later transferred to private owners, mainly the Koo family who 
had cooperated with the Japanese government in Taiwan in the commercial and 
industrial sectors (Sun and Ho et al. 2007). The Koo family were big landlords 
that owned a lot of real estate. The nationalist government wanted to reduce the 
amount of land they owned and transfer it to other sectors, for example by using 
the ‘37.5% Rent Reduction Contract’ land reform policy to promote industrial 
investment in the agricultural sector (Shieh 2006). The government bought up 
most of the land and leased it for a period time. It then granted rights to real cul-
tivators in order to stimulate agriculture support and to help peasant families. 
However, the government also gave stocks to landlords, which were equal to the 
price of the land taken by government, in exchange for the then nationalized 
cement company. It was a method of transferring agricultural capital in order 
to help industrial sectors. The cement industry was defined by the Nationalist 
government as a national priority, necessary for society and for national military 
defense purposes. Thus, we see the emergence of a principle policy to protect 
and help the industry that continues today. The Taiwan Cement Company grew 
incrementally into a large corporation running cement and related businesses 
both inside and outside Taiwan. It has always been a highly profitable company 
in Taiwan. The leaders of the company are seen as important initiators and de-
cision makers in policymaking and implementation. The Koo family’s corpora-
tions have good relationships with the authorities. 
 By 1980, the supplies of raw materials for cement production were running 
out in the western part of Taiwan, so the mining authorities planned to invite 
cement companies, mainly in the west (see map below), to transfer their pro-
duction capacity to the east. This policy of ‘Going East’ was advocated strongly 
by the then President Li Deng-Hue, who hoped that big industrial companies 
would stay in Taiwan and not cross the Taiwan Strait to mainland China where 
they were offering lower costs for industrial investment (Huang, Min-hui 1991). 
Keeping these companies in Taiwan was a priority for national security, even 
though many companies had already gone ‘illegally’ or ‘secretly’ to China. In 
fact, a number of cement companies had already gone to nearby countries like 
the Philippines and Vietnam. It appears that after many assessments, these ce-
ment companies had felt it was better to move abroad than to move to the east 
of Taiwan. Among these companies, only Taiwan Cement would stay in the east 
and proposed, with the support of the nation, the establishment of the biggest 
cement industrial district with the biggest production in the world. This was at 
a time when cement had been defined as a top polluting industry and the least 
welcome industry in Taiwan. Everybody assumed that Taiwan Cement was sure 
Taiwan Cement was a witness to the ‘Taiwan Experience’ that resulted from the changes in society 
and the rapid development of the economy. The paid-in capital increased from 270 million NTD at 
privatization to more than 32.4 billion NTD (100 times of growth) today. The production grew from 
an initial 500,000 tons to more than 10 million tons (a growth of more than 20 times). Annual sales 
amplified from 24 million NTD to 24.6 billion NTD (a growth of more than 100 times). It is truly an 
example for privatization of government-owned businesses. Electronic document: www.taiwance-
ment.com/english/#About_1_1_3 (last accessed 22 June 2011).
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it could profit from remaining in the country, otherwise it would had followed 
the other companies seeking lower costs and bigger profits abroad.
 The Taiwan Cement Company implemented its ‘going east’ policy in two 
ways: one was to extend the production capacity of the factory already estab-
lished in downtown Hualien; the second way was to propose a project to estab-
lish a world class cement district in the Taroko indigenous area. In this section 
I would like to explore how the extension plan for Hualien City not only raised 
critical environmental issues for the people living downtown, but also issues that 
local people considered to be human rights sensitive and as having an impact on 
the land rights of the rural indigenous people. Through this case, I also gained 
insight into how people in urban areas helped and cooperated with indigenous 
people in the Taroko area to express their environmental and land rights and 
how they were propelled to employ different strategies. While the state and the 
company were set to make profits, the urban civilians were faced with a polluted 
environment and the indigenous people lost their lands. 
 In 1992, the Taiwan Cement Co. hoped to extend its production capacity 
from 200,000 tons to 1.5 million tons a year. Taiwan Cement initially filed the 
project with the Hualien County Government and then sent it to the Provin-
cial Construction Department for preliminary review. Later, the company was 
required to produce Environmental Impact Assessment Reports because the 
Construction Department believed that the project was intended to add more 
factories. However, this plan was soon changed when the project was reviewed 
by the industry’s higher authority in central government, which decided that 
the Taiwan Cement project was only about renewing machinery and, therefore, 
no further environmental impact assessment was necessary. Thus, Taiwan Ce-
ment started the construction of a new kiln factory in 1994 with the approval 
of central government (Chi 1999).This construction soon raised questions and 
doubts from both local government and the citizens of Hualien. Hualien County 
Council ruled that the construction should stop because it believed that Hual-
ien County Government had not followed due process and had cheated the citi-
zens of Hualien in order to create an easy route for the company. Meanwhile, a 
number of local NGOs initiated the ‘Love Hualien Self Rescue Association’ in 
order to protest and demonstrate against the Taiwan Cement Project. ‘It is an 
unbearable fact that we have an extensive cement project in our lovely county’. 
‘Everyone who lives in Hualien should write a letter to the authorities to stop the 
project’. Slogans and actions like these seemed to work and stimulated a collec-
tive campaign expressing people’s opposition to the project. In fact, the series 
of protests organized by the NGOs and local people were so successful that the 
mayor promised to stop any new construction. However, the Taiwan Cement 
Company filed a petition stating that the construction should be continued be-
cause the whole process was supported not only by the law, but also had the ap-
proval of central government. The mayor reversed his decision and allowed the 
company to carry on with the construction on the condition that the company 
provided an environmental impact assessment. This reversal led NGOs to ac-
cuse the mayor of not obeying the law. The conflict came to a climax during the 
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summer of 1995. The media broke the news that the cement company was brib-
ing authorities in order to quiet the noise about stopping the construction. Local 
prosecutors investigated the issue and arrested a number of people in the Taiwan 
Cement Company. Some high profile local officials had taken bribe money. Later 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs called a meeting of a number of government 
authorities to negotiate the Taiwan Cement Company project.22 This meeting 
was a public signal that the highest authority was in charge of the renewal pro-
ject. However, opposition from NGOs and the Love Hualien Self Rescue Asso-
ciation continued unabated. Protests took place not only in Hualien, but also in 
the capital Taipei in order to raise national awareness of the issue. These protests 
gave rise to Alliance Fighting against the Taiwan Cement Company. This alliance 
was joined by a number of members of the Legislative Yuan. The Taiwan Cement 
Company was so depressed by the relentless opposition that the company’s pres-
ident released a statement to say that they would make no further investments 
in the project to bring the world’s largest industrial cement district to Hoping 
village. He made it be known that ceasing construction in Hualien would mean 
a loss of investment amounting to 80 billion NTD. Some leading actors in the 
commercial and industrial sectors established a financial and economic forum 
for supporters of the project in order to lobby the government to implement its 
policy and to stop all the irrational protests. These industrial leaders commented 
that the environmental assessment and related restrictions on industrial devel-
opment were now creating a situation where companies would have no choice 
other than to leave Taiwan. President Li received a petition from these industrial 
representatives asking for government help to ‘go east’. Meanwhile, the head of 
the Taiwan Cement Company admitted in court that he had used a 50 million 
NTD fund to subdue the opposition to their project. On 26 November 1995, 
as many as 5000 people (from the population of 300,000) gathered in Hualien 
City to protest against the project (Taiwan Environment 1993). The local gov-
ernments were unable to respond to any of the claims made by local people, but 
could only obey the central government’s orders. In the Spring of 1996, con-
struction finally restarted on condition that Taiwan Cement provide three re-
ports regarding their plans to protect air quality, prevent water pollution and to 
dispose of waste material. Ultimately, local people had failed to stop the project. 
The court also ruled that the accusation that the Taiwan Cement Company had 
engaged in bribery could not be substantiated. In September 1997, construction 
was completed and the factory started its trial operations. Before long, however, 
the equipment for collecting dust was out of order and pollution and dust in the 
urban area became a serious issue. All the local government could do was to im-
pose fines again and again. 
It is clear that the local government was weak and unable to stop a highly pol-
luting industrial project supported by the central government. Indeed, this is 
the first scenario I would like to highlight as a top to down method used to em-
22 On 14 October 1995, the Ministry of Economics hosted a meeting to ‘Renew the plan for Taiwan 
Cement’ for all the authorities concerned. 
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bed cement and related industries into indigenous areas. In fact, the Taiwanese 
constitution is written in such a way that the counties are weak (Chang, Ji-Wen 
2003).23 Local government has little power in relation to national industrial poli-
cy and pollution control. That said, there were a number of cases at this time in-
volving other counties that show that the local government was able to negotiate 
an outcome on pollution control between national policy and industrial profit 
seekers. For example, a case in Yi-Lan County in the north of Hualien County 
whose mayor, Dr. Chen Ding Nan (陳定南), insisted that the Taiwan Cement 
Company commission an environmental impact assessment and only signed a 
contract with the company on the condition that pollution was controlled and 
profits were shared. Yi-Lan County also stipulated a special rule called ‘Control 
Methods and Rules Concerning New Cement Factories (Chang, Ji-wen 2003)’24 
in order to ensure that cement companies fall under the control of local govern-
ment. This example showed that local county government could have a say on 
environmental matters and profit sharing in the processes involved in setting up 
highly polluting industries. Yi-Lan County acted more forcefully than Hualien 
County, insisting on local benefits. Yi-Lan County had a mayor from the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP), and Hualien County’s mayor was a member of 
the ruling party. Yi-Lan County fought for the indigenous area in its county de-
spite the institutional and legal limitations. Hualien County, however, felt com-
pelled to obey the decisions made by central government, even though many of 
its citizens were pushing for a local perspective on the project. 
 Industrial mining and landscape conservation were issues subject to constant 
debate. In the Yi-Lan case cited above, we see the difficulties the cement giants 
faced in choosing a location for their expansion. Yi-Lan County was now out 
of the question, as were other urban areas. The company decided against relo-
cating to China. The final option was a move to the indigenous area where, in 
theory, there were less people with less loud public voices and, moreover, land 
was much cheaper. The head of the company added pressure to the situation by 
announcing that if the extension planned for Hualien City did not go ahead, the 
23 The Yi-Lan County case highlighted the limits on the autonomy of county government, and the 
fact that a ruling on a county’s desire to control industrial pollution from industries was not sup-
ported by any laws at that time.
24 The concept of a ‘Convention of Environmental Protection’ adopted by the Yi-Lan County origi-
nates from examples in Japan where local governments signed conventions with companies on the 
prevention of pollution. The earliest cases in Japan can be traced to the signing in 1962 of a Memo-
randum on the Convention of Environmental Protection between Shimane county government and 
a number of paper and textiles companies. The signed Memorandum rules that the process to con-
struct the factories should follow administrative procedures and ordinations related to building of 
equipment and dealing with waste water. If pollution occurs, compensation should be paid accord-
ing to the standards the governments have set. However, the case that really showed the effectiveness 
of the Convention of Environmental Protection was the memorandum signed between the Yoko-
hama City Office and a power plant that set out rules on the prevention of pollution. This convention 
was later adopted as a model all over Japan; hence, it is now called the Yokohama Model (see Yi-Lan 
County Office; see also Chang, Ji-wen 2003 ‘On Basic Problems of Administrative Contracts 
relating to Environmental Protection’ in www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=543 2003-
12-18 10:08:10. 
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company would withdraw the 80 billion NTD investments it was making in the 
indigenous village of Hoping and it would seek to shift its operations to main-
land China. This threat was enough to exert pressure on central government, 
which then promoted the project in Hualien City and expressed its hopes that 
the Hoping Cement Industrial District would proceed and bring more profits for 
the company and central government.
 
7.3 Scenario 2: Taking indigenous lands legally for the national project
Cement companies were not confronted by indigenous people’s environmental 
claims until the late 1990s. Prior to that, they had faced land rights issues relat-
ing to indigenous communities where cement production was embedded. The 
most renowned company is the Asia Cement Company, whose board members 
include top officials from central government. As mentioned in Chapter 6, estab-
lishing cement factories resulted in the loss of cultivation and ownership rights 
on indigenous reservation lands. The Asia Cement Company established itself 
in Shoulin Township in the 1970s, at a time when environmental concerns were 
much less of a priority than the drive to develop the economy. The company was 
welcomed by the township and the government created convenient paths for the 
company to rent indigenous lands that were already being cultivated by indig-
enous people. If the deeds handed over by the township government were issued 
in accordance with the Indigenous Reserve Land Procedure, then the expropria-
tion and the cancelling of the cultivation rights would be clear and complete, i.e. 
the indigenous people would understand clearly that they would lose their land 
after taking the expropriation money. It should also be clear that the money tak-
en was not meant as rent for the indigenous people from the company, but rather 
it was a private expropriation relating to the plants and the housing complexes 
built on the land for the companies’ staff and laborers. The cement companies 
should only pay rent to the government, which actually owned the land once the 
indigenous people had given up their cultivation rights. The money the indig-
enous people received was to compensate their superficies and cancel their legal 
rights. It is important to note that the Asia Cement Company was welcomed by 
the township government and given priority because the township government 
understood that it would provide income for the area that would ameliorate the 
township’s problematic financial situation.
7.3.1 Chong-Der Industry District
Renting lands for mining in indigenous areas was much cheaper than renting 
in urban areas. Furthermore, the Indigenous Reserve Land Procedure had actu-
ally created space for non-indigenous people and corporations to mine. In fact, 
the scenario of indigenous people giving up their cultivation rights in return 
for expropriation money, and the land being handed over to the state and then 
rented out to corporations, was a popular way to access cheap land for the min-
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ing industry. This scenario was also adopted by another giant corporation, the 
Wang’s Formosa Plastic Group, which wanted a share of the highly profitable ce-
ment industry market in the early 1980s when the central government planned 
Chong-Der village as a mining district.25 The Wang corporation was so eager 
to start its investment in the east that it began to secretly ‘buy’ land from indig-
enous people. So far, the only explanation for why Wang kept these purchases 
secret is that the corporation was not allowed to buy land from indigenous peo-
ple because it actually belonged to state. The money Wang paid to indigenous 
people was private expropriation for the loss of plants and ownership (Econom-
ics Daily News 1981).26 Consequently, this meant that Wang had not actually 
obtained the land. He had no legal deeds for the land, but rather had only ob-
tained a private contract or a memorandum between the corporation and the 
indigenous people who were only tenants of the township land. It appears that 
at the time of purchase a number of Wang shareholders worried that they would 
not own the real estate even though they had paid the money to the land own-
ers. They suggested that Mr. Wang should not proceed with the purchase. Wang, 
however, was acting under the impression that the Asia Cement Company had 
followed the same processes to obtain their land with explicit permission, so 
there was no reason the Wang Corporation could not do the same. In fact, cen-
25 In 1984, The Executive Yuan passed the East Area Multi-Development Project that would trans-
form the villages of Sinchen, Pratan and Chongder and Hoping into a mining district.
26 A news report described the fights among shareholders and the head of the Formosa Plastic 
Group, Mr Wang. The fights were on the issue of buying lands from indigenous people in order to 
proceed with the construction of a cement factory in Chong-der village. Some shareholders sus-
pected that the buying of indigenous reservation lands was not legal so the money that Mr. Wang 
had paid to the indigenous people could not be returned. These shareholders believed that the loss 
of the money should not be included in the company’s accounts in the balance book-keeping of the 
company. They argued that the loss should be paid for by Mr Wang and not the shareholders. In the 
shareholders meeting, there were serious arguments and Mr Wang insisted that he had purchased 
the indigenous reservation lands for the development of the company and not for his own private 
reasons. Mr Wang insisted that purchase was legal because he thought the reservation lands had 
been granted to the indigenous people for agriculture. Having been granted rights to cultivation 
for 10 years, the indigenous people would automatically be granted ownership of the reservation 
land. Mr Wang mentioned that he believed he was buying lands that had been granted full owner-
ship rights, but that later he discovered that the township office had not granted ownership to those 
sellers who had taken his money. He said he had no idea about whether the land he intended to 
buy would be converted into industry lands, but he thought it would be cheaper to buy at this stage 
because he believed there would be less risk of losing money than if he bought property that had 
already been converted into industrial lands. Mr Wang decided to run the risk of buying in advance, 
even though it was illegal. One of the shareholders in the meeting insisted that Mr Wang’s reasons 
were unacceptable and that the shareholders should refuse to share the loss. One of Mr Wang’s legal 
consultants said that even though the purchase appeared to be illegal, according to article 246 of the 
Civil Code: ‘If the presentation of a contract is impossible, it is void. However, if the impossibility 
can be removed and if the parties, at the time when the contract was constituted, intended to have it 
performed after the removal of the impossibility, the contract is still valid. If the contract is subject 
to a suspenseful condition or to a time of commencement, and if the impossibility has been removed 
prior to the fulfilment of the condition or the deadline, the contract is valid’. So even though the 
purchase was not illegal at that time, Mr Wang’s desire (wishful thinking?) to obtain the legal rights 
to the reservation lands he had bought from the indigenous people in Chong-der village was quite 
clear. (See Economics Daily News 1981-04-03 page: 7). 
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tral government had provided a budget of about 360 million NTD in order to 
take over and cancel cultivation and ownership rights from indigenous people 
and to clear the land for the proposed industrial district so that it could lease it 
to those corporations who wanted to invest. In simple terms, the government 
would buy and take indigenous land for corporations. According to this central 
government policy, Wang did not have to spend his money on accessing land. 
Local rumors suggested that Wang paid the money in a bid to jump the queue 
and gain priority in terms of renting the land from the township. If the govern-
ment really wanted to buy the land to provide an industrial district, the govern-
ment would buy the land from Wang so that Wang’s corporation would profit 
first from selling the land. For this to happen, Wang first had to make sure that 
the town hall would rent the land to his corporation. Local gossip had it that the 
Wang Corporation already had a promising agreement with the township gov-
ernment leaders. The agreement meant there was no need for bribery. Besides, 
the township government had never said ‘no’ to cement companies in the past. 
In fact, Wang had such great expectations regarding the costs and profits for his 
cement factory that he thought his future production costs would only be half 
that of what could normally be expected. This price undercut other players in 
the cement industry. Legislator Huang, Shin-Chieh (黃信介), who had previ-
ously worked in the cement industry, said the price had always been controlled 
by the alliances built in the cement industry that balance the production and 
price (Fan 1993). Wang was accused of being naïve for thinking he could enter 
the market with a liberal spirit and not be confronted with many obstacles. Ulti-
mately, Wang’s deal failed because it was decided to establish the Taroko Nation-
al Park and the indigenous village of Chong-Der was located within this area. 
Wang lost the money he had spent ‘buying’ the land. The central government’s 
decision to set up a national park was an effort to demonstrate that Taiwan was 
willing to conserve its nature, under international pressure for conservation 
and, in particular, the US Pelly Amendment.27 This conjunction between indus-
try and natural conservation left central government with a dilemma because 
large corporations and local rent seekers had made considerable investments 
in the plans for an industrial district. As previously stated, ultimately the gov-
ernment decided to include Chong-der village inside the Taroko National Park. 
27 Since 1971, the US has stipulated the Pelly Amendment as a legal basis for imposing economic 
sanctions on those countries who violate the International Whaling Commission (IWC) or the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). In 1993, 
the US used the Pelly Amendment to impose sanctions on Taiwan, which it accused of trading in 
rhino horns and tiger penises.
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7.3.2 Hydropower plant projects inside Taroko National Park 
With respect to the conflicts between economic development and landscape 
conservation, the Chong-Der Cement Industrial District project was a signifi-
cant case as Tseng’s study has shown (Tseng, 2002). On 22 July 1983, the Inte-
rior Minister , Lin, Yang Kang (林洋港) and the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Chao, Yao-Dung (趙耀東) went together to visit Chong-Der village, the site of 
the planned project to build a cement industrial district. The purpose of their 
visit was to assess the project’s impact on the environment and the landscape 
inside the planned Taroko National Park. There was a debate between these two 
ministers regarding whether the development of the industrial district was more 
important than the conservation of the area. The Interior Minister said he was 
going to support the industrial project for three reasons: 1) Taiwan had limited 
space but a high population density, so resources are always scarce. Therefore, it 
was not possible to set up a national park to the same standards as, say, the US 
where there were plenty of both resources and vacant lands; 2) all the dealings 
with government must take into account the rights of the citizens; thus, the gov-
ernment must also take into account any potential losses for those who had been 
granted mining rights. 3) With the development of modern mining technology, 
mining companies could avoid damage to the landscape and so it is possible to 
follow a policy of both industrial development and conservation (ibid). 
 This idea to meet the needs of both sides was popular with citizens in Hualien 
County, and a poll in 1984 showed that 44.8% of the population was hoping to 
achieve this kind of consensus. In the same poll, only 12.3% of the population 
put more emphasis on the conservation of landscapes than on the mining indus-
try. This opinion was also emphasized by the then Minister of Economic affairs, 
Chao, Yao Dung (趙耀東). Later it turned out that the pro conservation policy 
for Taroko National Park was chosen by the Prime Minister Yu, Koa-Hua (俞國
華), who also determined that the Wang Corporation’s cement industry district 
project should come to an end. 
 Sociologist Michael Hsiao described this dilemma as ‘schizophrenia’ (Hsiao 
2001); whether to emphasize environmental concerns and conservation, or fo-
cus on industry to bring economic growth. The Taiwanese government was also 
faced with a choice between the environment and the economy. A project initi-
ated by the National Taiwan Power Corporation to build dams for generating 
electricity that exceeded the actual need of the local population in the east is 
another example. Surplus electricity was to be sent to the west of Taiwan where 
demand was high. Rumor had it that the extra power was actually to supply 
Wang’s planned development in Chong-Der village. There appears to have been 
cooperation between private companies and government in order to see the con-
struction of a dam for another of Wang corporations, the Formosa Petrochemi-
cal Corporation, in the west of Taiwan.28 A hydro power plant was planned for 
28 The building of these petrochemical factories is considered by many scholars to correlate with 
dam construction by the central government in order to provide water to the Formosa Petro-
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the LiWu (Tatsukili) River inside the planned Taroko National Park. In fact, from 
1974 onwards, the Taiwan Power Company had already invested about one bil-
lion NTD (total investment would be 50 billion) on the construction of roads 
accessing the dam areas because central government had granted permission for 
the power plant project to go ahead.
 At the moment when the government decided to back the plan for a National 
Park (Huang, Yueh-wen, 1999),29 this power plant project was made the subject of 
another review that gave local people and local authorities a chance to put forward 
their arguments for and against the project. Once again there was a dichotomy 
– landscape or industry. While there was debate about these issues, there were 
no strong opinions expressed by indigenous governments or people, probably be-
cause the land included in the project did not legally belong to indigenous people 
but to the Bureau of Forestry or the future National Park administration. Some 
indigenous people still insisted on zoning in order to maintain hunting areas and 
protect the hunting rights of indigenous people inside the park, but this idea was 
quickly rejected by the Prime Minister Wu, Po-shung (吳伯雄), who insisted on 
the enforcement of the Wild Life Act.30 The project to extend the hydro power 
plant was later stopped for conservation reasons. In fact, there were still Japanese 
built water power plants working generating extra power to be sent to the west in 
the same watershed. These old dams and power generators continued to work, so 
they maintained the status quo of the existing power plants in the Taroko National 
Park on condition that no new plants were built (Taroko National Park Headquar-
ters 2007). Thus, the state was establishing national parks but did not eliminate the 
damage or expel the polluters, especially big companies like Asia Cement, from 
mining areas (see the cover picture showing the cement mining landscape at the 
gate of Taroko National Park).
chemical Corp. 
29 Taroko National Park is the National Park in Taiwan. Taroko had been considered a candidate 
by the colonial Japanese government. But the establishment of a formal national park in the area 
was stopped in World War Two. In the 1960s, the Nationalist government also planned to set up 
the national park but there was no legislation to support the plan. In 1972, the National Park Law 
was passed and the Taroko National Park was the first candidate for national park status. In 1979, 
the Executive Yuan accepted a multi-development project for Taiwan (台灣地區綜合開發計畫)	to 
promote the conservation of the area now inside the Taroko National Park regime. In 1982, the area 
was promoted further with a project to develop tourism (觀光資源開發計畫)	and to conserve the 
area’s natural resources. 
30 On 6 November 1994, the commission conference was headed by the Minister of the Interior, Wu 
Po Hshiung. The commission backed the plan to set up plan the Taroko National Park. The principle 
of ‘conservation above all’ was adopted, but the park plan also included 3000 more hectares of ce-
ment mining areas and indigenous reservation lands. As for the request from the local indigenous 
people for exclusive hunting areas, the commission used the Amendments to the Wild Animals Act 
(1994) in order to deny the claim.
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As Tseng (2002) has observed: 
Under the goal of the National Park, the execution of those development 
projects has been restricted. However, the aim of environmental protection 
through the Taroko National Park seemed incomplete, especially when the re-
gional and national policies have collided with each other at the same time. 
Then we may conclude that at this moment, the projects of regional environ-
mental protection have to give priority to the economic policies for national 
development. 
7.4 Scenario 3: Periphery Indigenous Area for Polluting Industry 
7.4.1 Indigenous land rights vs. industrial development
The cement industry was seeking to profit from production on an island-wide 
scale. The plan to establish Taroko National Park appeared to prevent cement 
industries from encroaching into indigenous areas and the Chong-Der project 
and a number of other plans put forward by small-scale cement mining com-
panies were rejected. However, when Wang’s Corporation was ‘buying’ lands in 
the village of Chong-Der, the Koo family’s Taiwan Cement Company was also 
‘buying’ lands in the Hoping area where another industrial district especially 
for cement was being planned (Legislative Yuan 1999:1889). In retrospect, we 
can see this as evidence that there was an implicit recognition among investors 
in these industries to specialize or monopolize in different areas (Taiwan Ce-
ment in Hoping village and Wang in Chong-Der village), with a view to future 
profits. Wang lost his battle in Chong-Der, but Taiwan Cement was still buying 
and renting lands in Hoping village with the aim of creating the world’s largest 
cement company. In fact, before the policy of ‘going east’ was advocated by the 
central government, many investors had smelled the possibility of profits that 
the future cement industry in the east would bring. On 24 May 1986, the central 
government decided on a national project to help prolong the cement industry 
in order to cope with a future shortage of cement resources in the west.31 The na-
tional project clearly intended to transfer the cement industry to the east. From 
this time onwards, many people began to enter villages and a ‘black’ land mar-
ket developed that adopted methods of cancelling the cultivation and ownership 
rights of indigenous reservation lands in order to form a ‘hot’ market that, in 
fact, was not allowed by law. These speculators were actually expecting to receive 
an extra 40% more expropriation or compensation money for land and to com-
pensate surface damage. Those who were able to ‘buy’ indigenous reservation 
lands first would profit first if the land, originally designed for indigenous people 
31 The Executive Yuan passed the ‘Project on the Longitudinal Development of Cement Industry’ (
水泥工業長期發展方案) to cope with the lack of cement sources in the west of Taiwan and promote 
the ‘going east’ policy for cement industry.
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to use for agriculture, was promoted to more valuable industrial land. Thus, we 
see the promotion of an investment strategy to buy indigenous lands in the east 
where cement industrial areas were planned. The trading of indigenous reserva-
tion lands was basically illegal, but local governments turned a blind eye as they 
wanted to invite capital to invest in the exploration of the natural resources in 
indigenous areas. Mining was particularly encouraged. While the law was trying 
to pave the way for indigenous people themselves to invest in mining, the reality 
was that they simply did not have enough capital or knowledge to start a mining 
project. Consequently, it was non-indigenous people and capitalists arriving on 
indigenous land to mine. The government was so eager to promote mining activ-
ities that mining law was even more powerful than the Indigenous Reservation 
Land Procedure. If a mining company obtained the leasehold from the relevant 
authorities, the owners of the land would have no further rights or claim on the 
land.32 This phenomenon was so popular in indigenous areas that many indig-
enous people worried that the Reservation Land Procedure was no longer able 
to protect indigenous people’s land rights and, in fact, helped capitalists to profit 
even more.33 At this time we see many similar issues and land conflicts raised 
by various indigenous peoples and groups and eventually they came together to 
form the ‘Returning My Land Alliances of the Taiwan Indigenous Peoples’ (台灣
原住民族還我土地運動聯盟) in 1988. The movement started primarily in the 
west of the country where land conflicts had already been more serious than in 
the east. The movement started at the time the Chong-Der cement project was 
rejected by the government. The movement was promoted by some Presbyterian 
pastors who began to worry about the loss of indigenous land (Economics Daily 
News 1988).34 But their initiatives relating to the return of land in the east ap-
32 Chapter 3 of the Mining Act, concerning the access to lands for mining, had been amended in 
1959 to say that mining rights grantees could use the lands of other owners under certain conditions. 
Concerning the access to land usufruct, one article stipulates that the right to land usufruct could 
be granted when necessary. As a result of the amendments to these two articles in 1959, we see the 
possibility of land owners or occupiers losing their land rights to miners without any conditions. In 
article 65 of the Mining Act, if the land has been designated as suitable for mining, then the min-
ers can make a contract with the land owners. If contracts are not able to be negotiated, then either 
side can request the authority to judge on the negotiation. This article was further supported by a 
new amendment in 1978 stating that if either the land owners or the miners could not accept the 
negotiation by authority, either side could bring a case in court; meanwhile, the miners could start 
to use the lands for mining provided that they had set aside a budget for compensation in the event 
that the case was accepted.
33 In 1960, the then Mountain Reservation Lands Procedure of Taiwan Province contained an ar-
ticle ruling that legal private or public run mining, agricultural, fishery or herding companies or cor-
porations could be allowed to access reservation lands on the condition that the management plans 
were accepted and acknowledged by the provincial government. When the reservation lands were 
not used by indigenous people, the province office could lease them to non-indigenous investors.
34 On 15 April 1988, many indigenous people joined the ‘Return my lands’ movement. In the east, 
indigenous people focused on the project of Chong-der and Wan-long Industry District to check 
whether investors would actually fulfill their agreement to provide a compensation package. An in-
digenous legislator Mr Li, Tien-Shen expressed that the ‘Return my lands’ movement was being pro-
moted by Presbyterian pastors and representatives from all levels of local and central parliaments. 
The movement focused on the problem of the misuse or misappropriation of reservation lands (see 
Economics Daily News (經濟日報) in 15 April 1988).
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peared to raise little local response. Many speculators from inside and outside 
the indigenous areas were still expecting profits because they had invested in the 
process by obtaining or buying indigenous lands. 
 When Wang’s project was rejected by the government, members of the local 
Shoulin Township Representative Council immediately submitted a petition to the 
central government to find other places to locate the cement industry district in 
Shoulin Township. In fact, these members of Representative Council were from 
Hoping village which was thought to be the best possible location for the cement 
industry in Shoulin Township (Sinotech Engineering Consultants, Ltd. 1984: 
0-2~0-4). A report said that Hoping village scored as the best candidate for the 
cement industry because it would save on transportation costs. The mining area 
could be combined with the industrial areas where land was relatively cheap and 
where population numbers were low. The area required for the cement industry 
was about 400 hectares. Thus, the cement industry would also concentrate itself 
in this village in order to limit the environmental impact. At that time, the cement 
industry in Taiwan was spending about 8.7 billion NTD per year on medical costs; 
however, if it was moved to the east, to Hoping, it would spend only about 2 mil-
lion NTD per year (Liu, Yan-zheng 1995: 75). Locating to Hoping was also seen 
as a way to control the impact of pollution in a concentrated area, resulting in the 
least cost to society (Lee, Chou-han 1998: 93).The project in Hoping was assessed 
to be so profitable that it soon gained support from central government, which 
was coming under pressure on environmental issues as well as economic adjust-
ments at that time. The concentration of the cement industry in Hoping would 
address both of these issues. Thus, even though it was inside the coastal conserva-
tion area and near the Taroko National Park, the project was approved in the Six-
Year Planning for the National Construction Projects in 1991 (Huang, Yue-wen 
1999a; 1999b). Construction began in the industrial district in 1994 but there was 
strong resistance from environmental organizations. The Hoping Industry District 
was set up in an effort to concentrate the national cement industry. The pollution 
would be concentrated only in this small indigenous village which was thought to 
be acceptable by local politicians, who hoped for industrial development. 
7.4.2 Environmental rights versus industrial development
The decision by central government to set up the cement industry in Hoping soon 
caused discontent among environmental NGOs, including the Taiwan Environ-
ment Protection Union (Hualien Branch). These NGOs engaged in a struggle with 
legislators to fight against the cement industry that was encroaching on both the 
urban and the remote indigenous areas of Hualien. The environmental protestors 
were proposing alternative options for industrial development. They disclosed in-
formation to suggest that the cement industry project was just a Trojan horse for 
other projects, including the building of coal-fired power plants which were not 
mentioned in the original project. The special industrial harbor in Hoping was also 
close to important ecological conservation areas. The cement industry also need-
ed other materials like clay that could be excavated in adjunct villages. This, too, 
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would have an environmental impact. The issue that was of the greatest concern 
to the environmental alliance was the planned levels of cement production. The 
targets also included potential exports to Southeast Asian countries. The planned 
profits and production capacity of Taiwan Cement were sacrificing indigenous 
land rights and would have serious environmental consequences. 
 In 1990, a severe typhoon caused a big landslide in the Taroko village of 
Tongmen (銅門), and more than 20 people lost their lives (Ceng 1998). The 
landslide and the damage were taken as a sign of too much destruction in the 
upstream part of the watershed. For the environmentalists, it was a clear example 
of how an industrial-scale taking of natural resources would bring catastrophe. 
The Environment Protection Union Hualien Branch initiated public hearings 
in the villages that were going to be affected by the cement industry. But these 
actions could not change the decisions already made by central government, 
especially since the President was advocating a policy of going east. In August 
1990, officials from the Bureau of Industry and the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
had a meeting with local representatives. They arranged a meeting to discuss the 
environmental impact assessment that had been carried out in order to obtain 
consensus from the local people. However, critics said the meeting had not be 
sufficiently announced and did not give enough people a chance to express their 
concerns about the establishing of the cement industry in Hoping village (see a 
report by the Eastern Taiwan Students Alliance 1990). As with the example of the 
urban cement extension discussed in previous sections, the county government 
and the mayor would not speak out against the central policy. Thus, they failed 
to negotiate the processes of setting up an industrial district with due attention 
to the environmental consequences. Local politicians were so keen on welcom-
ing the industry that opposing opinions were silenced with threats of expropria-
tion or promises of compensation money. The central role played by power and 
policy elites in this situation cannot be neglected. Even public opinion inside the 
village was controlled in order to show a welcoming attitude to the cement com-
panies. The money promised for compensation or for expropriation increased 
and for the local indigenous people it was a huge amount. Indeed, the compen-
sation money that the local indigenous people could obtain for the loss of their 
reservation lands was sufficient to buy a house in the city of Hualien. It is an 
amount that the indigenous people did not dare to imagine, especially since they 
believed their reservation land was far cheaper than the normal price for real 
estate in the liberal land market. Inevitably, the indigenous people were attracted 
by the compensation and this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to receive such a 
large amount of money. They did not care so much about the reallocation plan 
that would, in effect, move them into a polluted area in the cement and power 
plant industrial district. They gave up their support for the environmental NGOs 
fighting against these industrial developments. In fact, the only protests raised 
were those to ask for compensation rights for those locals who had sold their 
lands to profit seekers prior to the whole project. Some profit seekers even took 
land from the indigenous people for very low payments while waiting for com-
pensation money that was thought to be much bigger than the money actually 
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paid for the land. Some locals considered this to be illegal. These land ‘thieves’ 
used the law to obtain lands that originally did not belong to them. 
7.4.3 Indigenous land rights versus money 
Some local people were very concerned about the environmental impact that 
would be brought by the cement industry. But the major focus of the environ-
mental activists was the project to expand Taiwan Cement in the Hualien area. 
Anti-cement voices in local indigenous villages seemed to be silenced. When 
the Taiwan Environment Protection Union Hualien Branch was showing an 
environmental movie to explain the negative impact of the cement industry in 
Hoping to the local indigenous people, they were threatened by an indigenous 
township Representative Council member, who urged the union not to show 
the movie anymore. This Township Representative Council member was later 
accused by local people of buying reservation lands while hoping to get profit-
able expropriation money from the government. In fact, he was not the only 
one who was accused of taking reservation lands. The chief of the township was 
also accused of taking land in the name of his relatives who had no connection 
to the land. What worried local people most was that some indigenous people 
had not completed the registration processes proving ownership of the reserva-
tion lands. Thus, they would not receive expropriation money. As a Presbyterian 
pastor said, at that time what people worried about most was the amount of 
expropriation money on offer because many people had invested a great deal to 
obtain the lands. A former chief of the township has said that the county Rep-
resentative Council member living in Hoping was expecting compensation of 
more than 100 million NTD. It is no surprise that she would give her support to 
the cement industrial district if she was going to be a ‘millionaire’ overnight. It 
seems clear that the governor of the township and a number of local politicians 
promoted the setting up of a cement industrial district because they would profit 
immediately and receive millions. Local officers, on the other hand, welcomed 
the industry because it would apparently provide some 3000-4000 jobs for local 
people. In order to counter the lack of local consensus, the township conducted 
a public poll that showed that there were only a few non-indigenous inhabitants 
– Han people – who were opposing the cement industry. Their prime reason was 
that those Han people could not receive the full expropriation money because 
they were not able to be registered as reservation land owners (United Daily 
News 1993:3). Most of the inhabitants would receive expropriation money that 
amounted to, on average, 4.5 million.35 For most of the families, 4.5 million was 
an overwhelming amount of money that was very attractive to them. This was a 
time when poverty was rife in the area. Young people were leaving for the urban 
areas because agriculture no longer held any promise and things became so dire 
that young women and even children turned to prostitution in the indigenous 
35 The total compensation money was 1,956,757,044 NTD and the average money every family 
could receive was 4.29 million. This equated to 1.15 million per capita.
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areas. Indigenous parents ‘sold’ their children to brothels in cities. If land could 
be transferred into money that could save people’s lives, it was hard to reject 
the seductions and temptations of such large amounts. As pastor Kau said, the 
industry was so welcomed that the protests against the government were con-
cerned only with increasing the expropriation payments and not with pollution 
issues (United Daily News 1993:3). In 1993, the expropriation money was dis-
tributed among the villagers and soon the village was ‘awash with money’. The 
money was so powerful that the environmental concerns being put forward by 
NGOs and some indigenous people based on their experiences with the Asia Ce-
ment Co., were no longer considered relevant. As an indigenous leader who was 
making alliances among various indigenous villages said, ‘See! We were defeat-
ed by money again!’ It was also a time when the protests against the expansion 
of cement factories in the Hualien city were defeated by the national industry 
policy promoted by central government and the big companies. The little group 
of protesters consisting of students and some indigenous intellectuals soon lost 
its energy. In July 1993, the Bureau of Industry issued an order to take the lands 
needed to implement the extension policy. 
 People always tell two stories to show how the village was ‘awash’ with huge 
amounts of money.
Story 1
The people who received the compensation money were so rich that they car-
ried around large packets of cash that they did not know how to put in a bank. 
They used large notes to buy little things. There was one man who used a 1000 
dollar bill to buy a pack of betel nuts worth only 50 dollars. When the sales girl 
was looking for change to give to him, he just said ‘keep the change’ and left.
 
Story 2
The people were so rich that they carried around large packets of cash, which 
attracted many car salesmen to bring their Mercedes or BMWs to the little 
village to sell to these tycoons. These tycoons would pay in cash. But they 
would soon destroy their brand new expensive cars because they would also 
be drinking too much to drive well (Economic Dairy 1988: 7). 
These were the two stories most often told in adjunct villages among indigenous 
people expressing sarcasm about those indigenous people who spent their ex-
propriation money in a matter of days.
 Some indigenous people believed that the reason why the money was used 
up so rapidly was because it was it violated the gaya; the promises made by the 
ancestors not to sell or let go of the lands. The money was seen as ‘dirty’ and so it 
had to be shared or spent as soon as possible. The money was from the land that 
used to support the people, so the money should be shared among the people. 
The money was from the soil that would become concrete and cement. It was 
interesting to see that indigenous people symbolized the money as a loss of gaya, 
but it is sad to see the loss of land and the life it supported. In fact, many indig-
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enous people complained that the job opportunities that the government and the 
company had promised never materialized. Only a small number of indigenous 
people were employed by the company who were looking for more educated 
workers. Indeed, the company only hired around 100 employees in total. This 
fact frustrated many indigenous people greatly. They felt cheated by the govern-
ment and the company. The image of development they brought was like a castle 
in the air. As a villager said to me, ‘money is not concrete at all in indigenous 
people’s pockets. Land became concrete and brings treasure for big companies 
and governments. Indigenous people who lost their lands would be like an egg 
without shell that is without protection at all’.  
With the construction of the Hoping cement district, designed to bring profits for 
the company, we can see that the area was almost completely under the control of 
the companies. A gasoline power plant was soon built and a special harbor was 
constructed for the export of cement. Many profit seekers were eager to rush into 
this area and huge amounts of capital was made available for investment. A power 
plant project developed according to a similar kind of scenario: local land rights 
were sacrificed to make space for profits. A court case (see case 1154, 2001) took 
place in which the accused was charged with avoiding an environmental impact 
assessment that was necessary for setting up a power plant.36 The building of the 
harbor was also accused of providing local politicians with the opportunity to earn 
large amounts of expropriation money and of failing to recognize small stakehold-
ers who were living from ocean resources (Hsieh, M.S, 1997). 
 In Hoping’s case, indigenous reservation land rights were sacrificed for the 
priority given to the industry even though the reservation land procedure had 
been designed to help the indigenous people survive through agriculture. Ul-
timately, however, in the spirit of promoting industry, the government used 
money to acquire the land. The question of whether compensation could really 
substitute the loss the indigenous people have suffered is not easy to answer. Be-
low I will outline the other costs of development that have been shouldered by 
indigenous people. 
 As Chi mentions, indigenous people were forced to bear all the costs of devel-
opment, including the development of the national parks (Chi 2001, 2002). These 
costs manifested in the ban on mining, fishing, hunting and gathering wild flora; 
restrictions on the transformation of land surface; and restrictions on all construc-
tion works. To most indigenous people, the establishment of the national parks 
brought no benefit to their communities. On the contrary, their traditional eco-
nomic and cultural activities have been seriously restricted and their lives have 
been made much more difficult. Chi(2002) and Wang refer to a number of ex-
amples that are often reported from the field: ‘one farmer was cited and fined 1,200 
36 See the case 1154, 2001(90,訴, 1154) by Taipei Local Criminal Court: in his summing up, the 
judge stated that he believed the reason why the Fubow power plant in the Hoping area was not built 
on schedule was that the local government resisted making a decision on the environmental impact 
assessment. So the reason to stop the building was out of the expectation of the buying plan. Ac-
cording to this information, it seems that the industry investors were certain that the environmental 
impact assessment would be approved.
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NDT for trying to remove a big rock from his field with a powerful machine with-
out prior approval. Another farmer complained that he wanted to remove a tree 
that stood in the middle of his field but the park administration did not allow him 
to do so. Many people felt very angry about the fact that they were not allowed 
to do anything about the monkeys and pigs that were constantly destroying their 
crops. We also found that indigenous people’s resentment of national parks was 
amplified by a feeling that the National Park administration discriminated against 
them. Take mining as an example, while many indigenous people have been fined 
for picking up only small quantities of precious stone in the park, many big min-
ing companies still continue to operate inside the park. National park administra-
tors argued that these companies had been mining before the setting up of the 
national park and that they had valid mining concessions from state authorities. 
Indigenous people responded to this by saying that they have been living there and 
undertaking all kinds of activities in the area for hundreds of years, well before 
the mining companies started their operations, and also before the national parks 
were established. Now these activities were forbidden. 
 
7.5 Scenario 4: Local resistance by the township office in Pratan 
 Village
In the cases where the state played a big role, we found that local governments 
and people were suppressed by a central government that insisted on making the 
economy a priority. Thus, environmental and land rights were sacrificed for the 
sake of industry. That said, people were not so frustrated that they lost all their 
energy to fight back and claim their rights. 
 The history of the village of Pratan demonstrates an indigenous social move-
ment that was not just based on land rights, but that also involved the needs of 
a healthy environment. This makes it different from the cases in those indig-
enous areas we have discussed in previous sections. Pratan also suffered from 
the losses of reservation lands and from air, water and noise pollution caused 
by the cement and mining industries for more than 35 years. Pratan was like 
other villages in this township where there was a boom in the encroachment of 
non-indigenous capitalists. These capitalists were able to find ‘legal loopholes’ 
that actually gave the Taiwanese government, as well as Han Chinese individu-
als and corporations, access to indigenous land (Simon 2002). While the people 
in Hoping were still expecting a large amount of money to compensate them for 
their losses, the people of Pratan had already realized that the promises made 
by the cement and mining companies were hollow. The cement industry did not 
bring employment opportunities and development to the community; instead, it 
caused out-migration of young people. As Chang’s study concluded, the cement 
industry’s policy of going east had not brought positive development; it had ac-
tually only brought negative effects to the east (Zhang, Z. Y. et al. 1994: 124). The 
people of Pratan village had realized that the cement and mining industry had 
only delivered pollution and damage to the environment. 
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7.5.1 Indigenous Reservation Land Rights vs. industry in Pratan 
As a man from Pratan said, ‘The land here was indigenous reservation land; the 
leaseholds were in the hands of the township government. It is obvious that the 
leaseholds to the cement and mining companies were illegal deeds’. Like the case 
involving Asia Cement, the land rights for cultivation were just cancelled with 
the payments of small sums of money. This did nothing to resolve the land con-
flicts. Generally speaking, there were four types of land conflict caused by the 
leasing: one was the length of the lease term that both sides forgot to update and 
thus it seemed to be limitless; second was the failure to compensate the rights 
of the people who deserved the expropriation money; third was the occupying 
of extra land that was not included in the original lease; and fourth was that 
the mining authorities and township governments had not dealt adequately with 
the pollution and illegal lease problems. All four were common issues raised by 
local people and politicians during the time when the slogan ‘going east’ was 
strongly advocated. It was also a time when Hualien people were expressing their 
resistance to the extension of the cement industry in their area. In this period, 
1988-89, indigenous people initiated and joined two waves of social movement 
demanding the ‘return of my land’ and organized large-scale demonstrations 
and protests in Taipei. These two waves of social movements had some effect in 
terms of compelling the government to consider giving back some land to indi-
Photo 7.2
Local news pay attention to the Dangers brought by the Mining Co. in Pratan. Kensheng 
Daily 17, February 1998.
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vidual indigenous people (Yang, Lin-Hui 1996; Chang, Dai-Ping 2000; Wang, 
Ming-hui 2003). But to the disappointment of most of the activists, the govern-
ment response paid only lip service and it gave no real attention to the claims of 
the indigenous people. The notion of ‘natural rights’ put forward by indigenous 
people was not understood and accepted by the government. The concept of 
‘natural rights’ – that indigenous rights are based not on substantive or national 
laws, but on natural laws – appears to have been inspired by the international 
indigenous movements of, in particular 1993, when the UN proclaimed the year 
as the Year of Indigenous Peoples. Later, it was transformed into a ‘Decade for 
Indigenous Peoples’ to promote collective human rights. Indigenous activists ar-
gued strongly that indigenous societies had existed long before the state came 
into being, no matter whether it was a Japanese or Nationalist state. Whereas, 
the theory of natural rights seemed to have its origins in local indigenous soci-
ety, especially in the Taroko area. Taroko was originally the place name used by 
outsiders, including the Qing Dynasty and the Japanese colonists, to indicate 
an area where many different communities lived largely devoid of government 
control. People in this area shared the experience of being treated as a special 
area with little direct control. What played a key role was the war between the 
Japanese army and the people inside the area. These war experiences made them 
feel strong as a group, or as a community or ethnic group (although within this 
group they differentiated themselves as sub tribes: Truku, Tgdaya and Tausai). 
An association named the ‘Taroko Development Association’ (太魯閣建設協
會) brought together local people and politicians from different villages in the 
Taroko area to exchange ideas on autonomy and land right issues. They often dis-
cussed the idea of natural rights, especially in relation to land conflicts. The logic 
behind this concept runs as follows: indigenous people have not recognized the 
Han state, which had not asked for consent from the indigenous peoples to form 
the country. Furthermore, the Han state has frequently acted without adhering 
to the principles of justice and peace, especially with regard to the use of force 
to acquire land belonging to indigenous peoples. ‘Indigenous peoples were the 
first masters of this island, so they have a natural sovereignty over this island.’37 
Ideas such as these were regularly exchanged during this period when many in-
digenous people were feeling depressed about land and natural resource issues 
(Xie 1987). In fact, this was a period in Taiwan when all kinds of social move-
ments were established. Many indigenous peoples were inspired and were look-
ing for ways to express their resentment or discontent with the government dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. 
37 On 10 December 1993, demonstrations were held on the streets of Taipei. This was the third 
wave of the ‘Return my land’ movement. The protests demonstrated that: 1) the indigenous people 
were the earliest owners of Taiwan and so deserve natural sovereignty; 2) indigenous peoples have 
the right to not recognize the Han-dominated country, which has consistently put forward unfair 
and unjust procedures rather than enter into peaceful negotiations. Indigenous peoples have the 
right to object to the behaviour of the Han who used excessive force in order to incorporate indig-
enous land into the regime; 3) the problems between the indigenous peoples should be considered 
as problems between the nation and the invaded; and 4) the fact that indigenous peoples are still 
oppressed means that there is no real Republic.
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7.5.2 Resistance using ‘township authority’
Indigenous people’s efforts to express their resistance to government or compa-
nies have always suffered from a lack of support from even the local township 
government. This was particularly true in situations when there were fights over 
money among local people. When conflicts resulted from governmental orders 
or plans, indigenous people could not afford to fight against the state and rent 
seekers, so indigenous governments usually obeyed orders from above rather 
than help indigenous people.
 In 1992, there was a case in which the indigenous Wanlong Township Rep-
resentative Council (萬榮鄉代表會) helped to expel polluting mining compa-
nies that stole land from indigenous people. The issue had already existed for 
more than 35 years, but one day some of the indigenous members of the town-
ship Representative Council asked the township office to start an investigation 
into how the mining companies were able to steal reservation land and bring 
so much noise and pollution to the village. The two companies were owned by 
non-indigenous people and, largely due to low profits from mining operations 
during that time, the mining companies were not obeying the rules for control-
ling the emission of polluting substances. Crucially, these two companies oc-
cupied land belonging to a Representative Council member. This person knew 
that his land had been occupied but he could not do anything about it until he 
had been elected. He found that the township office had the right to reject the 
extension of another term of mining lease. He discovered that the township had 
the right to punish the mining companies for occupying and stealing land from 
indigenous people. He also solicited support from other members in the Rep-
resentative Council and the newly elected chief of the township office. This was 
the first successful case in which indigenous people were able to turn away the 
companies that had brought so much damage and pollution. This experience 
inspired members of the Shoulin Township Representative Council to start to 
fight against mining and cement companies that were causing damage to their 
local environment. Indeed, from 1996 onwards there was a series of protests di-
rected by local Representative Council members in Shoulin Township fighting 
against the four companies located around the small village of Pratan. In fact, 
the protests had been initiated by a number of indigenous land owners whose 
lands were occupied by these mining companies. These land owners were led by 
a Representative Council member who also suffered from the occupation by the 
mining companies that had claimed land in 1996 (Huang, Xian-long 1996). Sub-
sequently, the claim was supported by the township office, which started to in-
vestigate the areas for lease and the non-lease areas that belonged to indigenous 
people. This investigation soon led to the return of some pieces of land to indig-
enous people. It inspired more people to start similar actions. The Representative 
Council members were also connecting with higher level parliament members 
and even legislators and they invited environmental NGOs to help them support 
their case. There were disagreements on the standards and rules for pollution 
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control between the companies and the local people. A newspaper article stated 
that the Representative Council members had walked off the mining premises to 
show their anger to these state or privately owned companies (Keng-Sheng Daily 
1998). This was also the time of the previously mentioned Tongmen landslide, 
which had resulted in many local people worrying that their own environments 
were also suffering from ecological degradation as a result of mining and log-
ging operations by profit seekers. The climax of these protests came when local 
Representative Council members and local people united to expel these com-
panies. The township office immediately rejected the extension of the mining 
concession and said that the factory would only be allowed on condition that it 
strictly adhered to the rules of pollution control. This case showed how the local 
township official used the Indigenous Reservation Land Procedure to support 
his demands. Leaders such as this official gained increasing support from local 
people who wanted their voices heard and to take actions for self-determination 
on many issues such as the co-management of natural resources with institutions 
such as the county government, the national park administration or the Bureau 
of Forestry.
7.6 Conclusion
Taiwan experienced rapid economic development in the 1970s and 1980s and 
it inspired an entire development discourse on the ‘Taiwanese miracle’ (Simon 
2002). As Simon’s article ‘The Underside of a Miracle: Industrialization, Land, 
and Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples’ has pointed out, this view overlooked three 
important facts that should be taken into account when examining the develop-
ment in Taiwan. First: rapid development was made possible largely by an op-
pressive regime of martial law that quelled worker unrest. Second: development 
took place at immense social and environmental costs. And finally, those costs 
have been disproportionately borne by Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. Through 
the cases that I have presented above, it should be clear that many burdens were 
shouldered by the local indigenous people. They suffered from these develop-
ment plans in terms of environmental degradation and lack of recognition of 
human rights. From the perspective of obtaining environmental justice, the 
‘borrowing a golden hen to lay golden eggs’ ( in the words of a Hualien County 
Council member) development scenario invited western companies to come to 
the east to invest for future profits; however, it did not bring a promising future 
for the local people at all. As for the cement industry, it did not bring jobs or a 
great deal of tangible or intangible profits as the companies and governments 
had promised. What it did bring was pollution and the loss of lands. What is 
more, these industries were protected, even when they polluted the environment 
and violated human rights.
 In relation to land conflicts between the local indigenous land owners and 
the Asia Cement Company, I found an official document from the Ministry of 
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Interior defending the corporation and urging the county government consider 
extending the company’s mining lease (Ministry of the Interior 2005):
‘Asia Cement was set up with encouragement from the national policy of going 
east for cement industries. Asia Cement has existed from 1979 until now; a lot 
of investments have been made. The factory has brought much revenue and 
many job opportunities to citizens in the east. And the factory has obeyed all 
the relevant laws and rules. If the land lease contracts on the lands the factory 
are using expire, and if the leases are discontinued this would lead to a disrup-
tion of cement prices and supplements. Moreover, there would be a negative 
impact on the factory and the industry, not to mention that the company 
would require compensation from the government. Thus, the extension of the 
mining lease should be seriously considered (Ministry of Interior, 2005). 
I think it would have been difficult for this case to make a difference to the in-
digenous people because most of the processes had been undertaken legally, al-
though some administrative mistakes had occurred. As a result of these frustrat-
ing cases, many indigenous communities are in devastating situations having 
been flooded with money, capital, pollution, industry and mining. It is argued 
that negotiations not calculations are needed in relation to corporations and de-
velopment in indigenous areas. The spirit of free, prior inform and sharing of 
profit is brought to help indigenous development in the article 21 of the Basic 
Law stipulating that: 
The government or private party shall consult indigenous peoples and obtain 
their consent or participation, and share benefits with indigenous peoples gen-
erated from land development, resource utilization, ecology conservation and 
academic research in indigenous people’s regions. In the event that the gov-
ernment, laws or regulations impose restrictions on indigenous peoples’ uti-
lization of their land and natural resources, the government shall first consult 
with indigenous peoples or indigenous individuals and obtain their consent. A 
fixed proportion of revenues generated in accordance with the preceding two 
paragraphs shall be allocated to the indigenous peoples’ development fund to 
serve as returns or compensation. 
This article is vague in the sense of knowing who exactly should be asked for 
consent and granted the revenues; indeed, in recent times all we have seen is in-






River protection by the Skadang community. The project was sponsored by the Taroko National Park 
Headquarters. The placards they hold say: No fire! No Playing in the Water! No Swimming! No Fishing!  




Taiwanese Scenarios of River 
 Protection in the Taroko Area
8.1 Community visions of river protection
River protection is action taken by local people that includes patrolling, preven-
tion of poaching and the monitoring of certain aspects of the river’s ecology, en-
vironment and its natural resources whether it be on the riparian banks or on 
a watershed level. Here, I use the term that is a direct translation from the Chi-
nese Hu-Shi (護溪) meaning river protection or from fong-shi-hu-yu (封溪護魚) 
meaning closing the river to protect the fish. It is a term that has been widely used 
in Taiwan in the last decade and there have been over 200 similar collective ac-
tions taking place all over the island in both indigenous and non-indigenous areas. 
River protection (Hu-Shi) is a key phrase in the context of Taiwan’s environmental 
issues and it describes in the simplest terms what local people do on the river in 
order, primarily, to bring back the fish and other necessary elements of a biologi-
cal environment to create a ‘natural’ river. Before we start to examine what people 
see as the visions and practices of river protection, we should start with some basic 
information on river ecology in the past from a local perpsective. 
8.1.1 Communities and ecologies in the past 
By the 1980s, as the industrial development reached a climax, nearly all of Tai-
wan’s rivers, streams and creeks were so polluted and overharvested that there 
were no longer any healthy waterways in the country (Tzeng 1986). Many Tai-
wanese call the relatively unspoiled eastern part of Taiwan, where industry was 
not so widely dispersed, the ‘last clean land of the Island’ (最後淨土), a some-
what Buddhist idea. Some less polluted rivers survive, but many still suffer from 
overharvest or illegal poaching of the natural resources. People compare the dif-
ferent ecological and environmental situations of certain rivers by saying that 
there used to be more fish and eels and crabs. ‘Where have all the fish gone?’ 
This desire to bring back fish to the rivers was an almost automatic response 
when people were asked to come up with ideas for river protection. The three 
rivers discussed in this chapter have actually been utilized for hydropower dams 
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and farms. In the upper and middle stream areas they are given over to logging 
or mining. Downstream, or at the mouth of the river, are the indigenous vil-
lages that had formed following the period of forced resettlement instigated by 
the Japanese from 1928 (Zhang, Yong-zhou 2004; Zhang, Jun-yan 2005). These 
villages are a mix of different populations from different tribes and ethnicities; 
thus, they are still in a fuzzy process of inner and outer negotiations regarding 
different governance regimes. The impact of certain ‘development’ programs in 
the upper stream means that river banks and mouths are always dirty and pol-
luted with garbage, especially in the summer when the heat brings many people 
to the rivers in order to cool down. Many local people believe that the reason 
why there are no fish in the rivers is because of the illicit poaching. One inhabit-
ant along the Skadang River told us: 
the more natural the river, the more poachers would come. In the past we have 
different sections of the river looked after by different families who could man-
age and co-manage the river’s resources with different families or tribes. But 
since the government claimed the river as state property, the river was getting 
worse. The river is state owned ‘public’ land, which means many people from 
outside the area would come to take what they wanted from the river.
Rivers and related ecosystems were neither under the control of indigenous vil-
lagers, nor were they under the full control of the authorities, whether that be the 
Bureau of Rivers, the Bureau of Forestry, the National Parks or local government. 
The problems of pollution and garbage in the mouth of the river where the indig-
enous population lives and many outsiders come for summer recreation, has not 
been viewed as an issue requiring management. Poaching, for example, has be-
come so frequent and popular that even locals adopt the attitude that ‘if we don’t 
fish, then outsiders will’. This reflects the tragedy of the commons described by 
Hardin (1968), where traditional management and public administrative regu-
lations were severely limited. ‘It has been a long time that a community is not a 
community at all here (personal contact).’ The river is not as affluent as it was 
before. Indeed, I find that Li’s observation, ‘where nation states have stepped 
in to control natural resources, particularly forests and rangelands, inefficiency 
and short term profit-seeking by the state have caused rapid deterioration’ (Li, 
Tania Murray 2010:503) best describes the situation of the rivers in the Taroko 
area. Poaching and overload from visitors and tourists only scratches the surface 
of this story. The reality is that ecology is not a priority in the minds of locals 
who are busy dealing with human and societal problems. The first time I visited 
the community of Pratan, which I am discussing as one of my examples, was 
fifteen years ago. At that time, it was seen as a heartland for young indigenous 
prostitutes and the cement and mining industries. The human situations were 
so poor that, at that time, the environment and ecological problems were not a 
priority. Indeed, this was a period of radical compartmentalization of ecological 
zones, outside of the monitoring and reflection of the human living environ-
ment. This compartmentalization occurred as a result of the following attitudes: 
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(1) an ecological environment is a zone that you do not have to care about be-
cause the locals are not allowed to take care of it using their traditional methods. 
Furthermore, because it is under state control, the state will take care of it; (2) an 
ecological environment is important for natural resources and for finding food, 
but this is no longer allowed by the authorities. The result is a tragedy of com-
mons where indigenous people have to compete with poachers for access to their 
ecological environment. It is impossible not to see a situation where people are 
living together with the nature but are unable to have a say on its management 
as anything other than a tragedy of commons being inflicted on the community 
from outside. The consequences are devastating. During my fieldwork I saw a lo-
cal logic in action that suggests that indigenous communities now have negative, 
rather than positive, relations with nature. They take from nature, but are unable 
or cannot afford to give positive feedback to it. Nature has become a source and 
not a ‘place’. There is no reciprocity. Simply put, locals are forced to access their 
ecological environment illegally and because they find themselves competing 
with other people or poachers in this space, they no longer care about their envi-
ronment and cannot give anything back, despite a tradition of gaya and ancestral 
rules. This is ecology in moral crisis. Even though local people were fed up with 
the pollution brought mainly by outsiders, especially in the summer months, 
the authorities in charge of tourism or environmental issues did not reflect on 
the overloaded ecology as an issue that must be dealt with. Instead, they focused 
on things like employing lifeguards to prevent the people swimming or having 
fun in the ‘clear and cool’ river from drowning or getting into danger. The river 
environment and the communities around it were never thought of as an eco-
system by any of the authorities concerned. Geertz proposed that as a researcher 
‘one can achieve a more exact specification of the relations between selected hu-
man activities, biological transactions, and physical processes by including them 
within, including them in a singular analytical system, an ecosystem’ (King and 
Wilder 2006; Geertz 1963a: 3). Even though everybody seemed to recognize the 
ecological consequences of reckless use by insiders and outsiders in the water-
shed, right from the very start of the Taroko National Park regime in 1986, we 
find a number of government sponsored civil engineering projects in these areas 
planning and designing places for recreation. 
 Although today these areas are the subject of river protection schemes, for 
many years these public lands were used as free recreation areas (though in the 
past some taxes or entrance fees were charged by local governments). Inevitably, 
it was the local communities that shouldered the burden of huge tourist num-
bers and overcrowding. Yet local communities, who had suffered displacement 
and disempowerment, had no say on access to these areas. As Bates and Lee say, 
nature is none of local communities’ business: ‘the problem occasioned by treat-
ing culture and environment as two separate and independent domains’ (Bates 
and Lees 1996: 3-4). This kind of separation is also reflected in the internal di-
visions among government departments dealing with local indigenous welfare 
and nature conservation.
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Such division was common in Taiwan until some communities began to ask to 
have a say and to get involved in these areas. The Taroko people living in the 
region of these three rivers felt an obvious injustice about the fact that mining 
companies and cement factories were still working in the National Park area, but 
that the indigenous locals could not even do something as simple as picking up 
stones from the rivers. This injustice is embedded deeply in the locals’ minds. 
It was not long before other indigenous areas began to fight for what I would 
describe as ‘autonomy’ on human-nature relations. They encountered many ob-
stacles from both local and provincial and national governments. For example, 
the community in Danayiku in south central Taiwan, where the Tsou people live, 
became famous and attracted large numbers of visitors following a program to 
bring back fish to their tiny creeks. Now, tourists were pouring into this once 
unknown and inaccessible remote small indigenous village. At the same time, in 
the east of Taiwan, some local indigenous people began to return to their home-
lands. As a result, from the 1990s we see a rise in local level social movements 
in indigenous communities, also in the east. These social movements brought a 
lot of local and intra indigenous NGOs to the areas where they exchanged ideas 
and experiences in a bid to make their visions and ambitions come true. To a 
large extent, the models in Danayiku and elsewhere were so ‘successful’ that they 
have inspired a number of the communities that I am discussing in this research. 
What follows is an outline of how local people observe and learn from these 
models or cases elsewhere, which are almost seen as ‘utopia’ in the locals’ minds. 
8.1.2 Visions and models from ‘utopia’: Tanayiku and Smagus 
 
Tanayiku Ecological Park has been run by the local Tsou people since at least 
1989. It is successful to the extent that local indigenous people are managing 
their environment by themselves and they are allowed to make profits from tour-
ism to support the welfare of their communities. Besides providing care for the 
elderly or tuition fee support for students, most important of all is the fact that 
the residents of this community can make their living through tourism in situ. 
In the following section, I will describe how Taroko people from the three case 
study communities are observing and learning from this model. Danayiku is a 
village of around 400 residents and, in the course of a year, they can earn over 
30,000,000 NTD alone from the collecting of entrance fees to the park, not to 
mention other income from villagers supplying tourists with the things that they 
need. While the landscape in the area is much like any other mountain village, 
it is the fish that attract the visitors. Indeed, so much fish has not been seen in 
Taiwan’s rivers for a long time. Thus, the place becomes a hot spot for tourism 
and also a good model for teaching activists and community workers. It has be-
come a ‘pilgrimage’ destination for practitioners of river protection from over 
200 communities in Taiwan (River Protection Association 2006). The vision of 
Danayiku is vivid in the sense that in situ villagers have subjectivity in environ-
mental affairs. Most of the visitors from the villages in the Taroko area mention 
the profitable vision and some local practitioners express respect for the pro-
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cesses that the Danayiku people have gone through. As Hipwell (2007) mentions 
in his paper, 
The Tsou had not, before 1989, been well-organized enough to prevent these 
activities (of poaching), and complained that Taiwanese police and natural 
resources officials had been accepting bribes from poachers. The organizing 
involved in establishing a locally drafted ‘Treaty of Shanmei Tanayiku Stream 
Conservation Self-management or Tanayiku Environment Law, which banned 
all fishing in the creek. The creek remained closed until 1995, during which 
time the Tsou restocked the creek with the fish species that had been nearly 
extirpated. Some locals were trained as guides and conservation officers to en-
force the Tanayiku Environment Law, monitor tourist activity, and ensure the 
ecological health of the creek. In 1999, the Tsou were able to re-open portions 
of the creek to restricted fishing. In order to manage tourists and protect the 
creek from poachers, access to its watershed, already difficult due to steep ter-
rain, has been further restricted by the construction of a wall and gate. 
There are many other successful cases demonstrating the vision of local indig-
enous people, such as the river protection initiatives in North Taiwan where the 
Atayal people live (Lu, D.J 2004; Su 2006). As previously discussed in this re-
search, the Atayal people and cultures are closely related to the Taroko people. 
For example, the Atayal use the word gaga to refer to ancestral disciplines, rules 
or local laws; this is very close to the term used by the Taroko people, gaya. A 
villager in Pratan explained that the people in the Atayal tribe Marikuong in 
the north of Taiwan used the ideas of gaga to formulate rules on river protec-
tion: ‘We had gaya too in the past, but now we have to reintroduce it to have our 
rules’. The need to have gaya was fundamental to many locals’ narrations on river 
protection. As far as they are concerned, gaya is the reason why the cases like 
Marikuong have been successful in terms of returning fish to the rivers. In prag-
matic terms, local Taroko people judged the Marikuong case to be successful in 
terms of collecting entrance fee or ‘tariffs’ for fishing that would support the local 
economy (although it should be noted that the implementation of this scheme 
was met with a series of obstacles) (Yen and Kuan 2003; Kuan 2002). Indigenous 
visitors to these successful indigenous communities were enlightened by what 
they saw and brought these visions back to their own villages. However, many 
overlooked the difficulties that these model villages had encountered, and chose 
to see a simplified idea that could transform their own ideas of river protection: 
We would bring back fish to our rivers, which are embedded in globally beauti-
ful national park scenery that is easily accessible and convenient. Ideas are easy 
in the beginning, but in practice we could sense that the projects local people 
are implementing were vague, albeit full of ambition and vision to first bring 
the fish back and then bring the tourists back to support the local economy. 
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In the next section, I will describe how local people in each of the three research 
villages managed their ecologies and communities using a method that I would 
like to call ‘total social engineering’. 
 
8.1.3 Ecologies and communities in a vision of ‘total social engineering’ 
On the 6th of July 2005, an indigenous Christian pastor, Hayu, said prayers at 
the opening ceremony of the co-management project between the Skadang com-
munity and the Taroko National Park: 
 
Because of our greed, we have broken the Wonders of the Creation. What used 
to be fresh and green in the forest is now damaged; the rivers that used to be 
full of life are now barren and dry, as if there is no water. A place full of bless-
ings is now a place cursed. Today we want to evoke our responsibility for man-
agement of the ecology through the actions of river protection. Here I pray 
to God to give us strength to support our fellows in the village and to devote 
every individual’s efforts to managing the assets our ancestors have left for us; 
the place named the Secret Valley the Skadang River, full of secrets and fresh 
interests. We hope the God Utux Barow of Weaving will help us protect and 
manage the river. In this way, our tribe can cooperate with the National Park 
headquarters to bring about renewed self-confidence and pride and to once 
again find the wisdom of our ancestors. This will allow our community to re-
vive and young people will have jobs to make their livings […].
In order to assist in the implementation of the river protection, the Skadang 
community established an NGO, the ‘Skadang and Hohos Tribes Natural Ecol-
ogy Promotion and Self-Management Association, Shoulin Township, Hual-
ien County’ (花蓮縣秀林鄉同禮部落自然生態自治協會). This organization 
helped with the coordination between two groups of people who used to belong 
to different tribes in the mountains but now are living together in the same re-
settlement location. People from different tribes have conflicts with each oth-
er about things such as church, transportation or on tribal characteristics. This 
NGO tried hard to help the cooperation within the area (and also outside) in 
relation to the river protection co-management project with the Taroko National 
Park. A plan of ‘Finding and Visiting the Homelands’ was also included in the co-
management project. In addition, the association invites people to visit the river 
and buy local products such as the rare, but high quality, arrow bamboo shoots. 
The promotion of agricultural products was intended to prevent brokers from 
taking a cut of the profits, something the indigenous people have put up with for 
many years. In addition, a project to ‘find the roots of the ancestors’ also encour-
aged the community to set up an ecotourism program along the Skadang River, 
where indigenous locals can work as tour guides and earn money to support the 
community economy, especially during periods when agriculture and hunting 
(though illegal) was fallow. The project lasted for three years and was planned 
and supported by the National Park, which hoped to establish a partnership 
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with the local indigenous communities inside the National Park regime. Even 
though ‘conservation explicitly addresses the long-term future, project-type ac-
tivities are generally narrowly instrumental and planned in short-term episodes 
governed by the project rhythm of donor agencies’ (Persoon et al. 2003). Local 
Skadang people were also expecting to cooperate with the park and have op-
portunities to transform the social and environmental situation and resolve eco-
nomic problems. As the professor who is hired to mediate between the National 
Park and the locals says, ‘it’s a project that brings ‘economic’, ‘social-cultural’ and 
‘environmental’ to meet local goals’ (Lee, Kuang-Chung et Al. 2005; see Hierro 
et al. 2005). I would call the co-management of river protection total social en-
gineering within the community. There is a feeling that visions of the river are 
penetrating through lively landscapes and places that are full of memories of 
indigenous cultures. It will be a river that could support people’s livelihoods and 
cultural identity as well as sustain the ecology. Throughout this paper, I describe 
and analyze the processes and provide detailed case studies in order to urge the 
kind of study advocated by Brosius and Russell, i.e. a ‘better quality of social 
research for conservation’. That through ethnography, though time consuming: 
we learn to recognize the hidden agendas of our informants, their unspoken 
disagreements with others that might compel them to provide partial ac-
counts, and we are provided with a plethora of small gems of local knowledge 
that allow us to weigh and compare the statements of our informants (Brosius 
and Russell, 2003: 48-49). 
During my fieldwork, I have been lucky to find a number of local scholars (either 
sponsored by the National Park or Masters’ students) who have also paid a great 
deal of attention to this subject. 
 As King and Wilder (2006: 236) and Vayda (1961; 1974; 1999) have de-
scribed, there is a political ecology of contingency in total social engineering. 
The term ‘contingency’ is used by many scholars to describe the uncertain causes 
and effects of processes. Sometimes I feel the term ‘contingency’ is redundant in 
scholarship because it explains nothing and simply describes a sense of complex-
ity. Vyada, Bradley and Walters (Vyada et al. 1999) urge for: 
an alternative to the present plethora of programmatic statements on behalf 
of political ecology, a proposal called ‘evenemental or event ecology’ is sug-
gested to bring more analysis on the causes and effects between ecology and 
politics. 
Inspired by this as a way of viewing the processes involved in these co-manage-
ment scenarios, I will outline my findings according to Borrini-Feyerabend, i.e. 
beginning from ‘the point of departure, the phases of organizing for the partner-
ship, negotiating plans and agreements in order to find compromises and short 
hands among these implementations that I would agree are processes of ‘learn-
ing by doing’’ (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000). 
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Government funding is one of the incentives to help local people to initiate 
plans, however, some of the successful cases, like the aforementioned project in 
Danayiku, took almost no funding from governments (Hipwell 2007:889). The 
Smagus tribe also rejected governmental funding and supported themselves us-
ing their own property and labor (Horng and Lin 2004). In fact, scholars and 
practitioners considered the act of refusing funding to be a major factor in terms 
of stepping into a more successful stage of community-based natural resources 
management. Among the initiators of co-management projects in the Taroko 
area, we found that the decision about whether or not to take government fund-
ing was an issue prior to implementing co-management. We see a political econ-
omy among authorities, communities and politicians that, as I will reveal later, 
would have considerable impact on the implementation of co-management. 
 The Skadang and Hohos communities are located inside the Taroko National 
Park. The eventual partnership between the Skadang and Hohos communities 
and the National Park headquarters was not initiated directly by these indig-
enous communities and their vision of natural resource management, but rather 
the Chair of the national headquarters had her own ambitions to assist those in-
digenous communities inside her regime. She sponsored a local team of academ-
ics to establish a forum for the local community and the headquarters to meet 
and express their ideas and to find incentives to work together. This forum was 
intended to find common ground that would facilitate the local community and 
the National Park in terms of management of the park. This was at a time when 
partnerships between indigenous peoples and the state were being encouraged 
by the then President Chen, S.B. (新夥伴關係). In fact, my research suggests 
that the local people always hoped to attract projects to the mountain where 
their reservation lands were located. They used the forum to express their hope 
that these projects would improve access to their areas by bringing roads or bet-
ter cable cars. Without this infrastructure local people had to climb the steep and 
dangerous mountain trails. They also hoped their original houses could be regis-
tered as legal, which would give them the rights to renovate them or build hostels 
to host eco-tourists. They hoped to have electricity finally brought to the area. 
However, these demands were rejected or dismissed with very vague answers. 
The inevitable result was the failure of the forum. Ultimately, the communities 
and the National Park wanted different outcomes. The headquarters considered 
the reservation lands in the mountains to be host to hunters and poachers. It was 
never the authorities’ intention to construct roads and provide convenient access 
to the area because there was never any question of allowing indigenous people 
to initiate developments that would result in violations in a zone that was a re-
stricted area. Indeed, the National Park would rather buy reservation lands from 
the indigenous people in order to implement their strategy of isolating the land 
and disrupting the close relationships between the land and the indigenous peo-
ple. Consequently, the National Park headquarters made a budget every finan-
cial year with a view to buying lands back from the indigenous people. Another 
strategy employed by the authorities was to divert indigenous people’s interests 
to other places that they saw as more suitable for development projects, such 
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as the Skadang River, which had been zoned as a recreation area. The project 
to build a partnership between indigenous communities and the National Park 
transformed into a project about river protection co-management, something 
that initially the communities did not see as a priority. However, inspired by 
their visits to the successful projects in Danayiku and Smagus, along with the 
generous budgets on offer from the National Park, there was an undeniable in-
centive for the locals to compromise and participate in a new association of local 
people being established by the academics. 
 A local NGO structured a division of labor in order to run this local associa-
tion. Indigenous people were given positions including head of the association 
and project manager and other locals were elected as members in charge of vari-
ous other tasks. They volunteered their labor for free, believing it to be an honor 
to serve their tribal people. It took two years of organization took get this river 
protection co-management project up and running. 
 With the tricky initiation of the Skadang case in mind, I will discuss how oth-
er communities encountered similar problems in their projects. I will begin by 
examining the initiation process that took place within communities in order to 
illustrate how compromise and cooperation dealt with internal conflicts within 
these heterogeneous communities. 
8.2 Fermentation within communities
8.2.1 Initiatives and initiators 
The implicit intention of the National Park headquarters was to divert the lo-
cals towards river protection instead of developments in the mountains. This 
intention was supported by an idea to facilitate the Skadang and Hohos tribes 
to establish ecotourism in the area around the Skadang River. A civil engineer-
ing planning report sponsored by the headquarters in the 1990s added weight 
to this proposal. The report suggested the establishment of a trail and using the 
riparian banks of the Skadang River as recreation areas. The plan also included 
infrastructure such as toilets and shops. However, the first obstacle was that the 
lands suitable for these facilities were reservation lands belonging to the Skadang 
tribe. At that time, the intention was to use governmental power and authority to 
buy the land. The locals rejected this as they wanted the land to plant vegetables 
and keep chickens and ducks. A place called Fivehouses was a section along the 
beautiful riparian river notorious for being full of garbage and bad smells from 
human waste and the debris resulting from both tourists and a chicken farm 
that had been set up by indigenous locals. As far as the National Park headquar-
ters was concerned, it was an eyesore and an example of bad river management. 
For example, there were no toilets along the more than two kilometers of trail. 
The headquarters blamed the inhabitants of Fivehouses and said they should 
accept responsibility for the tourists. An easy way for the headquarters to elimi-
nate this ‘shame’ would have been to take over the land and build a public toi-
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let. However, disagreements and objections from the inhabitants kept the land 
in their hands and the problems of pollution persisted. Indeed, it remained an 
ongoing problem and National Park officers were continually looking for so-
lutions. Ecological tourism, run by indigenous people in order to support the 
local economy, could provide an answer as it would require the locals to build 
a toilet and a café or a shop. The headquarters took the opportunity to employ 
intermediaries from universities to assist in this project and it provided a bud-
get to lease the land at Fivehouses and carry out the necessary construction. 
The headquarters also offered to provide support for a training program for tour 
guides and to facilitate a project for historical and cultural documentation with 
a view to promoting ecological tourism run by the indigenous locals. This was 
an attractive offer from the headquarters and I would say that the officers came 
up with considerate ideas that would be mutually beneficial. However, the locals 
did not seem to understand the benefits. Indeed, the indigenous association also 
encountered problems. Cooperation on the project required the consent of the 
people of Fivehouses. This proved impossible as inhabitants refused to join the 
association and cooperate because of a number of land disputes that had oc-
curred in the community in the past. For example, there were disputes about 
land that had been registered in the names of the current inhabitants. A number 
of Hohos people saw these residents as latecomers who had registered the land 
without the consent of the Hohos tribe. Even though all those involved used 
the trail every day, the latecomers and land takers were not seen as part of the 
group. The National Park attempted to initiate negotiations within the tribe in 
order to bypass the long history of land disputes and encourage the idea that all 
the people belonged to the same group. However, there was an added complica-
tion: the inhabitants living on the river bank in a place called Threehouses were 
more dependent on the natural resources of the river and the forest. There is no 
direct evidence that the headquarters intended to push communities to stop tra-
ditional activities along the river such as hunting and gathering. However, these 
were obstacles that the new association had little opportunity to overcome, es-
pecially as the majority of the association’s leaders were young people with little 
experience or authority to deal with the affairs of the older generation. Here is 
an example of how the headquarters underestimated the heterogeneity of this 
group of people who, in reality, were still learning how to cooperate and recon-
cile their very different characters, modes of behavior, modes of communica-
tions and definitions of land boundaries. It was also naïve of the headquarters to 
expect so much in terms of the capacity and ability of the new NGO to overcome 
considerable property issues and to come up with an ecotourism package for the 
Skadang river area run by locals who would rather begin a project in the moun-
tains where their land and homes are located. The reality is that a toilet and a café 
were never the real obstacles to this project; rather, as we shall see below, it was 
the unwillingness of a single family in Threehouses to agree about ‘river protec-
tion’ that was a problem. 
 The family in question owned the reservation riparian land in the area 
known as Threehouses. The family rejected the river protection co-management 
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project that they believed would stop them from accessing the river resources. 
They responded with a simple action; they erected a billboard saying, ‘This land 
is private property and you are not allowed to enter without our permission! 
Fierce Dogs inside!’ Attempts on behalf of the indigenous association to com-
promise and find a solution for Threehouses failed. The actions initiated by the 
Threehouses family to stop the Skadang people passing the trail stirred up many 
historical conflicts among the two tribes. In response to the blocking of the trail 
by the Threehouses family, the Skadang people challenged their rights to the 
land, causing a land conflict among the two tribes. The ripples from this con-
flict spread throughout the community. For example, a cable car runner from 
the Hohos tribe was accused of stealing and occupying lands belonging to both 
Skadang and Hohos inhabitants at cable stations and where supporting pillars 
for the cable stood. The claimants blocked the way for the cable transporters, 
which resulted in a fight so furious that it almost broke up the association. In 
fact, the association asked the headquarters for help on the cable car affair. Cable 
cars are crucial infrastructure that supports the basic needs of the two tribes. The 
response of the headquarters was vague insofar as it said that agreement from 
the land owners was needed before the headquarters could help with the build-
ing of a new cable car system. Very few locals trusted this excuse and believed 
that the basic policy was to promote disconnection. During the implementa-
tion of the river protection project, both sides produced a lot of obstacles (big 
and small) but we also found that many of the questions and requests for help 
from the locals were not responded to or supported. This led to the locals feel-
ing frustrated, to the extent that they considered the project a trap and not a 
‘partnership’ at all. They believed it would be a series of trivial and basic support 
that did not meet their expectations of what they believed ‘co-management’ to 
be. Or, they viewed it as patronage; that is to say, the boss getting his servants to 
carry out tasks he does not want to do. Some indigenous people articulated their 
feelings using the Chinese word for partnership, huo ban (夥伴), which could be 
written as 伙伴 (pronounce the same as huo ban) but which denotes a patron-
age situation (patron-client relationship) rather than an equal partnership. Both 
sides of the co-management project were stuck and haunted by a series of prob-
lems that were difficult to overcome. 
 Through the above description of the initiation of the Skadang River protec-
tion project, we can see that co-management was never a real priority in terms of 
local needs.
 It is hard to predict given the many contingencies, but I would say that a de-
tailed survey of property relationships at the beginning of the project would re-
veal relevant histories and present use and prevent problems later on. Failure to 
establish this information leads to questions about who has the right to protect 
or to act will almost certainly block progress. Properties matter, even those on 
the riparian banks of the river that, legally, belonged to the state. The definition 
of private land was vague even in cases where it had been registered in the na-
tional cadastre system. As discussed in chapter 6, the case of Aunt Yeh from the 
Hohos tribe rested on her complaint that the land that belonged to her had been 
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stolen; that the people who said they owned the land had an oral contract but no 
paper deeds. Though the land dispute was finalized by the courts, it continued to 
cause conflict among villagers. The authorities can be accused of diminishing the 
problem and naively hoping that it would be resolved through a program of river 
protection and by providing incentives to make money from a café and a toilet. 
On the face of it, getting land owners to agree to rent the land to the National 
Park for free in exchange for the right to run and manage the toilets and shops 
was an attractive offer. However, the land owners still worried about the security 
of their private property, particularly given their past experience of renting lands 
to the police station but with no return. Furthermore, a number of villagers were 
against the construction of the toilet and café as they believed that it would only 
profit the ‘land thieves’, which is how they viewed the current land owners. What 
is more, the locals simply did not trust that the headquarters would really let the 
management of the café be in the hands of indigenous people, not least because 
many of them had seen that other shops built by the headquarters ended up in 
the hands of Han people, despite a process that purported to be open and even 
give priority to indigenous people. The headquarters hoped to ease locals’ wor-
ries by introducing a monopoly policy38 solely for Skadang inhabitants. How-
ever, this did little to reassure the locals that they would see any profits. Another 
example that led indigenous people to distrust the headquarters was the head-
quarters use of the ‘Internal Consumption Co-operative Society Act’ (員工消費
合作社辦法) to support its employees and officers in establishing a co-operative 
society to run all the shops inside the National Park. In addition, only employ-
ees could share in the profits derived from this monopoly of all the concessions 
inside the park. One indigenous intellectual told me that he viewed it as an im-
moral and ‘colonial’ act for employees of the headquarters to direct that all the 
tourists should come to shops managed by the park and only staffed by low-paid 
indigenous locals. Once again, this act reinforced the negative message with the 
locals that you should never trust the headquarters. 
 What we see is that property matters, even though all the fish in the river le-
gally belonged to the nation. Residents on the riparian banks believed that they 
had the traditional rights to access the resources in the river. Many elders and 
locals emphasize the traditional co-management of different sections of the riv-
er by different families or tribes. They are concerned that the introduction of a 
state-sponsored river protection project would take away their traditional rights 
and deem their traditional access to the river, or even their property, illegal and 
38 Article 19: In order to promote co-management of ecotourism, Skadang indigenous people could 
rent their reservation land for free to the National Park headquarters. The headquarters could invest 
in the planning and construction of the necessary facilities to help ecotourism (like toilets, a tourist 
service center or shops). The headquarters will entrust the Skadang people to manage these facili-
ties. Two thirds of the income will go to the locals and one third will help to maintain these facilities. 
(For proof of this, there should be a contract between the headquarters and the Skadang people).
Article 20: In order to promote the subjectivity of the Skadang indigenous community, Skadang 
indigenous people shall not sell or rent or transfer their reservation lands to non-Skadang people or 
non-indigenous people. They shall not cooperate on the management of Skadang land or the facili-
ties mentioned in the previous article except with the headquarters.
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that they could even face legal action. Through this case we see that both sides of 
the river protection co-management project have simplified issues of ambiguous 
property and of the ‘commons’ that are contingently mixed with private, public 
and communal domains that are hard to define. Besides these properties issues, 
institutional problems, entangled in the context of local politics, also influence 
the implementation of such projects, as will be discussed later. 
8.2.2 Internal conflicts arising from the heterogeneity of the community 
Below (Box 8.1), I have reproduced the conversations that took place between 
some of the participants in the ceremony and announcement of the Skadang 
River protection project. These conversations highlight the problems and dif-
ficulties that troubled both the headquarters and the community. The partici-
pants in these conversations are so significant that they warrant full quotation. 
This provides the reader with a sense of a political ecology or economy in which 
locals are entangled not just with each other but also with outsiders to such an 
extent that it influenced the implementation of the project. Subsequently, I will 
provide an interpretation of these conversations in order to examine how par-
ticipants have tried to understand what actually happened and deal with their 
frustrations and overcome obstacles in order to bring about crucial cooperation. 
I will then connect this to similar problems encountered by other guinea pig 
communities. 
 
Box 8.1 ■ An Informal meeting immediately after the ceremony of the 
 Launching and Announcement of the Project of River 
 Protection on Skadang River on 7 June 2005.
(The participants of this meeting are the chief of the association, the wife of the 
Chief and cashier to the association, Prof. Li the sponsored negotiator, the village 
Elder Tien who was not part of the association, Mr. Chen a township parliament 
representative, Prof. Simon a long term fieldworker and researcher from Canada, 
and the author, then a field research assistant to Prof. Simon).
Elder Tien: I wonder why, after you announce the start of river protection, we can-
not swim there [the river] anymore? Especially the landlords in the Fivehouses 
section of the river have complained about this. If you really want river pro-
tection, you would not have your association doing this alone. We have other 
associations and churches and the township office; why don’t we implement 
the project together? You know the leader in Pratan where they are also carry-
ing out river protection now? Even though she is a parliament member in the 
township office, she has been accused of stealing the association’s money. Be-
cause of this they have fights and internal strife. Now the Skadang River is also 
subject to a river protection project, but I still saw people catching fish when I 
brought some of my customers and visitors there one night last week. The case 
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in Danayiku only succeeded after five years of efforts, so we have to take this 
step by step and not think that you can achieve everything within one year. 
Dear Chief of the association, you have to be able to be good at negotiations, 
otherwise, […]
Chief: ya? That’s what we need, [is to hear] your concerns. We have to start from 
understandings, concerns and devotions then we are gonna make it.
Elder Tien: But you, chief, do not seem to be so good at the art of negotiation, you 
need to prove yourself on this.
Chief: The problem with the inhabitants in Fivehouses is complicated; they hope the 
National Park will help them build a toilet and a shop so that they can make money.
Parliament representative Chen: We have eight NGO associations in this village 
and I hope your association will mediate between these eight associations. I will 
back you up. River protection belongs not just to the Skadang and the Hohos, 
the Skadang River does not belong only to your community. No, you are only a 
small part of the total Fushih village. And all the other associations also belong 
to this village. If the National Park won’t take an entrance fee in the future for 
[access] to the river landscape, then they have to budget for support for river 
protection. These funds should be appropriated and divided equally among all 
of us. Skadang and Hohos do not belong to this village?! Is that true?  If that is 
true, you Skadang and Hohos should go back up to your own mountains where 
you are from. If it is left to me to do the negotiations, I will demand that all the 
eight leaders cooperate on this and I will not divide them like the parliamentary 
representative in the Pratan community. If you do things like her, everybody 
will think you are selfish […]. Concerning the land of the Taiwan Power Dormi-
tory that is now claimed by our fellows, I will ask the Township Office to see 
whether it’s private or public reservation land. You know that the reason why 
the mayor of our Township is delaying the decision is because of the voting on 
her next term. Politicians should participate but cannot go too deep into our 
actions because they just try to grab what they need. It is only us local fellows 
who can take the job to implement these procedures. This time, the Skadang 
and Hohos communities are acting with their own will and ideas, but you have 
got to be alert to the fact that there may be a gap between what the National 
Park wants and what the tribes think.   
Chief of the association: Everybody thinks about his profits! But, you know it takes 
almost one day to patrol the entire river back and forth. But there is not a single 
piece of land [there] belonging to us, the Skadang and Hohos tribes. The reason 
why we devote so much time to this is not because of profits. We won’t expect any 
entrance fees. We hope that one day our efforts will be rewarded by nature and 
a recovered natural ecology. What we want is simply the conservation of nature.
Parliament representative Chen: Ok, no entrance fees; then everybody can do the 
river protection.
Elder Tien: But is it possible that the National Park headquarters will allow us to 
collect entrance fees from tourists to this river, like the case in Danayiku? The 
headquarters could authorize us to manage and take entrance fees! Why not?
197
8 ■ Contingent Ecology: Taiwanese Scenarios of River Protection in the Taroko Area
Chief of the association: Here today we came up with a problem! (Glances shift 
to Prof. Li)
Professor Li: In the short term, collecting entrance fees or any kind of fees from 
tourists seems to be impossible because a system of taking entrance fees was 
cancelled by the National Park at least a decade ago. But we may have alterna-
tive ways to raise money, like working as tour guides. We manage all the needs 
of tour guides through the association, then we […]
Elder Tien (interrupting): From this summer on, I do the same thing and I work as 
a tour guide and I take money from my customers.
Chief: But there are business problems here on the Skadang River! We found many 
tour agencies are bringing a lot of tourists here. We cannot do anything to stop 
them from doing what they want. For example, they just come all the way from 
Taipei to do river tracking; can we stop them doing this?
Elder Tien: It means we don’t have consensus among the communities! There are 
no young people in the communities. And we just have tourists who go to the 
National Park, and what are we gonna show visitors to our communities?
Chief: We don’t have an overall project yet!
Elder Tien: Many people just work and struggle alone but always fail. So the tribe 
and community should work first to come up with an overall project and pro-
cedures. We wanted to do what our community in Kolo was doing, but later I 
found it was only me doing it alone.
Chief: Are activities like river tracking allowed in the National Park?! I asked the 
headquarters once only to find the answer that, ‘It depends on the decision 
from your community’. I think if it really depends on us, then we should have 
the authority or legitimacy! Without this umbrella to empower us, we cannot 
do it […]! So we need to know the rules of the game!
Elder Tien: The National Park is preparing another consortium from Taipei to help 
you negotiate. But it seems there is no further progress.
Chief: If we cannot cooperate, then you elders should help and participate more! 
We protect the river, but you (facing Elder Tien) just make use of the river! You 
don’t cooperate; I want you, my dear elders, to participate!
Elder Tien: The chair of the National Park headquarters just gave you a million to 
build a toilet and a café there on the Skadang River. We, including the parlia-
ment representative, felt unhappy when we heard that the Skadang and Hohos 
got the funds but other communities, like where I am from, got nothing at all. It 
means we are not welcome to participate. So one day I joined a meeting with a 
Legislator, Mr. Kung, and gave him three suggestions: one is to urge the National 
Park to revive the National Park Consulting Council [that had been established 
with local people to consult on the management of the national park]. Second 
is to change the place names in our area into the names of our traditional ter-
ritories. The third suggestion was to allow every association in the village to sell 
their products in the National Park and to take no rent from the National Park.
Chief: The vice chairman of the Bureau of Indigenous Affairs in Hualien County 
Government only promotes the south part of the Hualien County, but not the 
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north where the Taroko are located. The vice chairman says we are not united! 
When I heard that, I was so angry! And he just gets sarcastic, saying that we 
carry out actions on river protection ‘in secret’. What a bad joke from him. How 
come we are doing it in secret? Don’t you see our announcements in the mass 
media!
Parliament representative Chen: (angrily) If I am the representative in the County 
Parliament, I will ask him to stand still for three minutes and not move at all!
Elder Tien: Recently, Hualien County Government Office held an Arrow Shoots 
Festival in Hualien City. That’s bad; they should have it here in Skadang and Ho-
hos where we have the most delicious arrow shoots of all Hualien.
Parliament representative Chen: The Amis people are more loyal to the govern-
ment, so they would hold it in the Amis tribal areas. But we Truku are not 
united and disloyal. And even though we are supported by governmental funds 
we still complain a lot!
Chief of the association: What are the extent and limits of the authorities and 
powers and the rights to protect the river? We should have a clear boundary! If 
swimming is not allowed, tell me which law says so? If activities like river track-
ing are not allowed, what is the law? Otherwise, our responsible patrollers will 
be faced with a lot of fights with the swimmers or people playing in the water! 
We have all kinds of interest groups there! Today the vice mayor of this county 
and the chair of the national park joined the ceremony, but could they back 
us up on these issues. Someone suggested having licenses, like CPR training or 
diving skills. But is that so [important]? We need to have common rules, like a 
tribal constitution? What are we gonna do about the project supported by the 
national park on the investigations of our cultures and histories?
Prof. Li: The auxiliary project of documenting cultures and histories has been taken 
over by another leader in the community, so he will be in charge of the project. 
So it won’t be on your or the association’s executive members’ shoulders to 
take on and do everything.   
Prof. Li: Because this is a new business that the National Park has never done before, 
the headquarters felt ‘away from’ it and did not interfere with you so much! 
Chief of the association: They don’t coordinate much either inside the headquar-
ters! Different branches or departments do not know what the hell is going on 
anyway. Even the Interpretation & Education Section office doesn’t know what 
we are doing and only the Department of Conservation knows I think!
Chief of the association: So swimming should not be allowed! This is our goal! But 
remember river protection doesn’t mean to closing the river!
Wife of the chief: There is a shortage of human resources, so the headquarters 
wants you guys to accept such a difficult deal, to make you suffer!
Prof. Scott: The National Park needs you, but you don’t owe anything to the na-
tional park! You have to remember this!
Prof. Li: you don’t protect the river for the national park but for the tourists, so 
don’t fight against the tourists, instead to find support from them!
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8.2.3 Organizational problems
From my observations of the conversations, the most crucial issue mentioned 
is the capability of the association to handle so many affairs with such limited 
human resources and skills. The association was in no real shape to be taking 
charge of the division of labor and other affairs, despite every branch having 
a head. These heads were usually unfamiliar with administrative matters such 
as finance or auditing or even writing reports. As for auditing, the Chief ’s wife 
was selected to take charge of this on the grounds that she was an assistant audit 
controller in a hospital. She was suitable for the role because of her professional 
skills. But this was a double-edge sword, because having the wife of the Chief 
managing the finances would raise questions. Indeed, Elder Tien used a threat-
ening and sarcastic tone to remind the Chief that mistakes in audits would cause 
trouble for the Chief, or even worse could end up with the Chief going to jail, 
like the cases in Pratan village that were being heard in court. In fact, Elder Tien 
was someone frequently accused of taking money from the government and of 
profiting more than most in the area. He was notorious for making use of local 
culture and community resources to apply for government funding. The asso-
ciation had no choice but to ask for the Chief ‘s wife to help with the financial 
management. These problems are symptomatic of the association’s organization. 
The Chief was actually an employee of the notorious Asia Cement Company, 
which provides some jobs to indigenous workers, in this case for a relatively 
high salary. The Chief ’s job meant that he had a rotating schedule of working 
eight hour days, but every two days he had to sit up all night to keep the cement 
machines working continuously. The reality of this situation was that the Chief 
rarely got enough rest. The moments he did have away from work were taken up 
with working for the association. One of his worries was that the elder in charge 
of the documentation project would just take the money but not to be able to 
submit reports because he could not type or even write. The elder in charge was 
in fact a pastor from the Hohos tribe. The Chief was a member of the Skadang. 
The pastor was a controversial figure who, for example, had raised a number of 
difficult issues that had split the church that used to host the two tribes that had 
come down from the mountains and settled on the plains. The pastor may have 
been controversial, but he was old and experienced with the older traditions. For 
this reason he was respected and had been chosen as the leader of the project 
that was supposed research and document their roots and histories and cultures.
8.2.4 Legitimacy problems 
Besides these troublesome organizational issues, we see from the dialogue in Box 
8.1 that locals from the wider community were challenging the legitimacy of the 
Skadang and Hohos and criticized them for monopolizing the river protection 
scheme and accepting funding from the government. Elder Tien, for instance, 
stated that the money should be divided among all eight associations in the ad-
ministrative village; that way, the tasks of river protection could be coordinated 
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by these eight associations. In my opinion, there was some envy at play here, and 
that basically he was upset that the association had been given funds and his 
association had received nothing. The township representative, Mr. Chen, is an-
other case in point. His style of speech was notorious for making a lot of prom-
ises and coming up with ideas, but few people trusted his logic, largely because 
he always got drunk and talked in an irresponsible and irrational way. Many 
people wondered how he had won three elections as the local representative of 
the township council. Some locals told me that what counts in elections here is 
not a person’s ability, but rather how much money he has. In this informal meet-
ing, Mr Chen claimed to have the interests and welfare of his fellows in the same 
administrative village – Fushih village – where his family was based, at heart. So 
he agreed with Elder Tien to share the funds from the National Park at the ad-
ministrative village level, but objected to it only going to the Skadang and Hohos 
tribes who had just moved down from the remote mountains and occupied only 
a small part of the total village. His tone in the conversation was quite threaten-
ing, saying that the Skadang and Hohos should go back to the mountains. This 
was quite typical of his interactions and it made the locals angry. Little wonder, 
then, that no one would believe that he could negotiate between the eight as-
sociations. Elder Tien could not negotiate between the eight associations either 
because he was not that welcome in other villages. This issue of legitimacy con-
cerning who had the right to take the government funds and implement the river 
protection project was complicated by the threats made by these two ‘big’ men. 
The township representative, Mr. Chen said that if there was no issue about shar-
ing any future profits, then he did not care who carried out the river protection. 
Actually, everyone’s burden will become no one’s burden. Thus, the outcome is 
a tragedy of the commons. Here we see that, in many locals’ minds, the ecology 
was actually secondary to the economy, especially in the minds of politicians. 
In my view, ecology, seen from a perspective of total social engineering, would 
provide support and improve local’s livelihoods. This perspective is very differ-
ent from that of the National Park. The township representative reflected on the 
apparent gap between the headquarters and the community. The chief advocated 
that their association should actually implement the river protection voluntarily, 
out of a devotion to the environment. However, Elder Tien and the township 
representative, Mr. Chen remained curious about the possibility of profiting 
from visitors, as the people of Danayiku had done. This issue of collecting fees 
from tourists was a key concern in most of the communities that were undertak-
ing river protection.
8.2.5 Issues of collecting and distributing fees
Under the rules of the National Park regime, it was impossible for those com-
munities active in conservation to have a fee collecting privilege. In fact, as far 
as I am aware, no study has figured out why the local and private associations 
in Danayiku were able to collect compulsory entrance fees or a fee for cleaning 
garbage. Indeed, collecting fees was illegal because, basically, the river was public 
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land and there was no legal authority for the local community to collect money. 
It was no surprise then that the two elders were curious and quite concerned 
about this issue. Prof. Li responded that it was impossible to have a direct col-
lection but suggested an alternative way of collecting money from by providing 
services to tourists as tour guides.
 The Chief and his fellows were overwhelmed by so many questions and prob-
lems within this short meeting of about twenty minutes. I talked to the Chief 
later and he told me that he had decided not to worry too much about the issues 
raised by Elder Tien and the township representative, Mr. Chen, and instead 
to focus on the co-management project with the headquarters and his associa-
tion. But the troubles brought by these two ambitious elders were not so easy to 
ignore. Indeed, their ideas of sharing the funding spread. A few days after the 
meeting, when I went to other communities, I found that many people were an-
gry about the river protection scheme, saying that the Skadang people could not 
monopolize the river. ‘Come on! The river belongs to Fushih village and I will go 
and swim tomorrow to see what they do to me. Come on! Every citizen in this 
village could go there to swim’. The National Park sent a low-ranking officer to 
help negotiations, which did nothing to appease the locals. The Skadang asso-
ciation was frustrated that politicians could destroy so much and they felt their 
association was isolated and that the National Park could do nothing to help this 
situation. 
8.2.6 Scaling up stakeholders?
Returning to the Skadang river protection case, we can view the worries of the 
Chief of the association as stakeholder problems. Co-management issues con-
cern many visible or invisible stakeholders who hold ‘bundles of rights’ to the 
river. The crucial stakeholders appear to be the residents in the Fivehouses and 
the Threehouses area who did not want to join the association and were not 
willing to accept the river protection because they would lose their rights to ac-
cess the river resources and their traditional methods of stewardship. The most 
troublesome issue was, in fact, an old and complicated land conflict. This issue 
was beyond the association’s original remit and capability. If the property issue 
was not resolved, the river protection scheme would be ineffective because tour-
ists would still pollute the Fivehouses and Threehouses areas and the residents 
would still access the fish there. 
 There were a number of difficulties that could not be solved by either of the 
two sides in the co-management project. This situation was exacerbated by the 
headquarters of the national park not being ready or prepared to deal with this 
new policy of co-management. In terms of the Skadang case, the river protection 
was so troubled that it was unable to survive. It did not take long for the locals to 
lose interest and ambition. The patrolling carried on with only three members of 
the community. These three patrollers were actually the most ‘famous’ and ‘no-
torious’ hunters in the village and it did not take long for people to question the 
notion of having hunters carrying out patrols to catch poachers. People lost faith 
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in the river protection scheme. What’s more, few outsiders trusted the river pro-
tection either. Ultimately, the National Park sent an official letter putting a stop 
to it. The letter gave the reason for cancelling the project that the National Parks 
Council in central government felt that the Taroko National Park should not give 
money to communities outside the realm of National Park boundaries. The Ska-
dang and Hohos were angry with this decision and local people complained that 
it was irresponsible of the headquarters to stop in such a way without negotiating 
with the partnership communities. 
8.3 Conclusion
The Skadang case highlights organizational and institutional problems inside a 
community association. This includes fundamental problems of human resourc-
es and the division of labor. In addition, there were problems of land conflicts. 
Resolving these issues by recruiting and scaling up the crucial Skadang river area 
as a communal property resources management regime was always going to be 
difficult to implement. Though there were traditional communal ways of manag-
ing the river, property conflicts remained a dilemma for the locals.
 Following Ostrom’s principles regarding the design of an institution mecha-
nism, we can see that in the Skadang case there were no ‘clearly defined bounda-
ries of jurisdiction over the resource’ (1990; 2005). Indeed, some locals insisted 
on their customary rights to river resources and they feared that these rights 
would be cancelled by the river protection scheme. Land conflicts that emerged 
from the process of applying for indigenous reservation land harmed the cus-
tomary rules among the locals to ruin what Ostrom suggests that ‘locally ap-
propriate rules must be devised’ (Ostrom 1990). Thus, it is hard to have a ‘clearly 
defined user group or community [to] manage the resource’ because there is no 
‘clear identification of rights to resources and rules about them’(ibid). Those riv-
er land property owners or resource users rejected the idea of being ‘involved to 
take part in decision making about the resources’. Consequently, the local NGO 
that resource users refused to join lost its legitimacy to have ‘decision making 
taking place in public, in arenas to which all resource users have accesses. ‘Con-
flict resolution mechanisms are not clear, accessible and rapid’ (ibid). The Na-
tional Park headquarters also stopped the project that seemed to go astray out-
side of its regime. There was no ‘accountable monitoring and effective authority 
structures’ that could stop illegal poaching or various accesses to the river. Thus, 
‘graduated sanctions’ are not ‘devised for non-compliance with collective rules’ 
(ibid). Not to mention that such sanctions must be applied consistently, rapidly 
and impartially. From the cases in Truku, we find that the only traditional rules 
for river protection were communal and had already been destroyed by national 





Initiation ceremony of the Pratan River Protection in 2004 (Taiwan News). The ceremony held by the 
Hualien County Mayor Mr. Sheh, who also invited stakeholders for different contexts to join the initia-
tion or the declaration of ‘Closing River’ in Pratan. Some vivid stakeholders concerned with the Pratan  
river were invited, like the Township Office, Toroko National Park, Agriculture Water Management 
 Association (花蓮縣農田水利處), Institute of Water Resource (花蓮縣水產培育所), Police Station 
and some local NGOs. Source: web.hl.gov.tw/board/show.asp?idno=4294. 
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9
River Protection Co-management 
in Pratan and Mqeleqi
9.1 External participation and support for local scenarios of river 
 protection
9.1.1 Support from government: trend or paradigm shift?
Conservation areas or national property lands in Taiwan, including forest, river 
and coastal areas, suffered tensions as a result of the rules and restrictions relat-
ing to local ideas and practices. As many studies have pointed out, this is a ‘clas-
sical paradigm of natural resource management and/or conservation character-
ized by the use of scientific knowledge under the strong influence of the national 
government’ (Lu, 2004:1; Huang, Y.W.). In the Taroko area, tensions between 
the state and the local population have a long history and the complex relation-
ship began, at least, in the Japanese colonial time when laws and regulations had 
no respect or regard for local values. Protests and claims by indigenous locals 
about the rights to land, natural resources are increasing and legal procedures 
are becoming more frequent. There are signs that the authorities are increas-
ingly listening to and taking care of indigenous issues. However, scholars who 
have closely and continuously observed these tensions have found a lack of legal 
structure to deal with local concerns. In addition, government policies tend to 
be blind to indigenous issues and individual government departments pay little 
attention to indigenous affairs. My own experience of the situation relating to 
the Taroko National Park is that the attitude of the National Park headquarters 
changed frequently. While the prevailing atmosphere among staff is that indig-
enous affairs were extra work, a burden and an annoyance, getting in the way of 
their regular conservation tasks, there are many officers who do come up with 
ideas and actions to help indigenous locals. The locals’ attitudes to the various 
Chairs of the National Park headquarters were usually along the lines of ‘Mr. 
Shu is a good drinker, he drinks a lot and goes easy on us and he has actually 
done a lot for us indigenous people’. Or, ‘Mrs. Huang is a student of Mr. Shu, 
so is a good drinker and follows the custom of keeping good relations with us!’ 
We found the headquarters tried to ease the many tensions with locals using 
friendships or fictive brother-and-sister-ship, but this approach is something of 
a double-edged sword. The closer relationships are, the more demanding they 
206
Part IV ■ Collectivization of Land Rights
can be. My observations are that it is difficult to be a civil servant in these gov-
ernment departments. The pattern in recent years certainly appears to be that 
central government nominate a Chair to run the headquarters for a short time 
until the locals figure out what kind of character he or she has and use this to 
make further claims. This is usually the moment when a new Chair is appointed. 
In fact, there are no clear guidelines or procedures to support the National Park 
headquarters in the business of co-management, so chairs or senior officers of-
ten find creative ways to manipulate governmental budgets in order to meet their 
promises to locals. 
 In my opinion, establishing legal constructions should be the priority in 
terms of assisting co-management. Take the 2009 proposal to amend the Na-
tional Park Law. These changes would strengthen restrictions and rules relating 
to the National Park regime and also detail plans to establish more conservation 
areas on land belonging to indigenous peoples. The 2009 amendment proposal 
included vague ideas to establish a Consulting Council on Co-management, a 
forum for both locals and the National Park. However, it remains at the dis-
cretion of the Chair of the headquarters whether this council will actually be 
set up and such a body has little authority to devolve decision-making powers 
and management rights to locals. Previous versions of this toothless forum were 
powerless to make decisions based on the participation of locals and to enforce 
the implementation of any sort of co-management. One article in the proposal to 
amend the National Park Law states that the National Park headquarters should 
promote the co-management on the condition that the law establishing auton-
omy for indigenous people is passed and implemented. Critics see this condi-
tion as a strategy for the National Parks to avoid the burden of establishing laws 
and implementing procedures. In fact, it is impossible to pass an autonomy law 
for indigenous people because the ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist) party has 
little desire to promote indigenous affairs and welfare. It appears that they use 
these conditions and articles to prevent indigenous legislators from hijacking 
the proposal and the reality is that the National Park headquarters promotes the 
strengthening of a top-down conservation policy and the extension of their re-
gime. 
 There appears to be a trend not just in Taiwan, but also internationally (Bro-
sius et Al. 2003; Persoon et al. 2006) for conservation officers to be less toler-
ant of indigenous issues. In the following section, I will illustrate the tensions 
between the pros and cons of more conservation for the indigenous locals. One 
day, I attended a meeting hosted by the Taroko National Park to assess a report 
on designing a network of cycle paths inside and around the park. Someone at 
the meeting mentioned the need for a participatory design process. This was 
met with an angry outburst from the Chair of the National Park headquarters 
who said that the ‘Council of Co-management was of no use at all because the 
indigenous representatives just wanted to grab what they wanted and did not 
care about others. That’s the reason why I would stop the Council’. Through her 
anger, I could see that she was fed up with the dysfunctional council and did not 
want to become embroiled with it again (see also a discussion of this council by 
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Chen, S.H. 2003). She was an official who helped manipulate the system to find 
ways to fund local river protection co-management projects; she did this using 
her own methods and without the help of the Co-management Council. Below, 
I will illustrate such a case in Pratan.
9.1.2 Co-management of river protection in Pratan Village
In 2006, the then Chair of the headquarters provided considerable funds to sup-
port Pratan community’s river protection project (Yu, Wan-li 2004), which was 
outside the national park regime. The headquarters also helped with training 
indigenous locals to run ecotourism businesses based on river protection. 
 In addition to expensive infrastructure construction, the headquarters also 
sponsored a survey to monitor the river ecology after the project had been func-
tioning for a while (Yang, Yuen-Po 2005; Chen, Zhen-wen 2004). However, on 
discovering that Pratan was ‘outside’ the national park regime, no further sup-
port came from the headquarters. 
 In fact, the Pratan community’s river protection project survived without the 
headquarters’ help. Pratan village fell partially under the remit of the park re-
gime, but also came under the remit of the ambitious township and county of-
fices that assisted in a number of basic law procedures. Pratan locals also had ac-
cess to other competitive government agencies who were hoping to rack up more 
administrative accomplishments. For example, the Labor Council in Central 
Government financed a basic monthly salary for local people patrolling the river 
for a period of up to three years. The Institute of Fisheries funded preliminary 
research on river ecology and introduced 3000 young Taiwan Shoveljaw carp 
(Onychostoma barbatulum) into the Pratan River in order to increase the group 
of native species. Consequently, Pratan village became a star community that re-
ceived a great deal of both internal and external support. The money provided by 
the Council of Labor was sufficient to sustain twelve locals with a stable income. 
This went a long way to ease the tensions from some locals who were looking for 
something substantial in return for the services they had devoted to the nature. 
A number of villagers in the Pratan community who initially resisted river pro-
tection changed their attitudes and cooperated with the protection agenda hav-
ing found work funded by the Labor Council. There was apparent competition 
among local and central authorities to have their rulings on the locals, especially 
in relation to ecotourism, made a priority on the agenda of governmental proj-
ects. Pratan falls mainly outside of the boundary of the Taroko National Park, so 
the Township and the County were eager to establish co-management with the 
locals, especially because the main leader of the Pratan community was an active 
politician with good connections and access to governmental resources and po-
litical economy. In Pratan, then, we see locals starting to implement their ideas 
on a more voluntary basis and by gathering support from within their commu-
nity. This is in contrast to, for example, Skadang that, as we have seen, received 
much more external support and incentives. However, this meant there was less 
cohesiveness within the community. Tensions between hunters and gatherers in 
208
Part IV ■ Collectivization of Land Rights
Skadang who insisted on accessing the river resources were eased with salaries 
provided from outside authorities. However, internal tensions persisted in the 
form of electoral competition at different levels among political parties or the 
appropriation of funding or profits. Before providing further detail about the 
‘contingencies’ that haunt these villages, I will examine the double-edged sword 
that is governmental support. 
9.1.3 The double-edged sword of governmental support 
Support from different levels of government was always a double-edged sword 
for communities who became too dependent on it. For example, the salaries for 
the patrollers became a burden for local leaders who had initially established 
the patrols on a voluntary basis. Indeed, the salary issue became something of a 
conflict. Those local people who had been against river protection at the start de-
manded that hunters and gatherers be paid for patrolling in order to compensate 
for their loss of rights to access river resources. This fuelled a complex struggle 
inside the community. Many local people felt frustrated by such apparent selfish-
ness and worried that if the government stopped paying salaries there would no 
longer be any will to carry out patrols voluntarily. In addition, the community 
appeared to be divided in regard to the introduction of young fish into the river. 
There were locals who disapproved of artificial methods to sustain the river’s 
ecology and biodiversity. There were others who believed that the introduction 
of fish had more to do with attracting tourists than river protection.
 Pratan had received government support in terms of infrastructure, salaries 
and bio-resources. The outcome of this support was a community that became 
famous nationally and attracted many tourists to see places that had once been 
unknown and isolated. As more tourists came to the village, locals became in-
creasingly inspired to act and prepare for a better future in terms of their income, 
self-esteem and cultural identity. Some locals remodeled their houses, trans-
forming them into hostels or Bed-and-Breakfast accommodation for tourists. 
Others established shops or food stands to make money from the visitors. Lo-
cal leaders, meanwhile, were busy with the question of whether they could take 
entrance or other fees from tourists, as the Danayiku people had done in their 
area. After consulting many experts, the answer appeared to be that it was not 
possible to charge entrance fees. It should also be noted, however, that before the 
fish returned and attracted the tourists, there had been debates about the legiti-
macy of closing the river. In the next section, I will outline the legal arguments 
put forward by both the authorities and some locals for closing the river in order 
to bring the fish back. By examining the laws used for closing or protecting the 
river, we find yet another double-edged sword. 
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9.2 Legal support for generating income for locals 
For the government authorities and officers concerned, co-management of river 
protection was such a new idea that it required a paradigm shift in terms of ad-
ministration. It required designing a structure of devolved power and a division 
of labor for the management of natural resources. Many officers and public ser-
vants were quite ambitious and willing to assist the indigenous people with im-
plementing their visions of co-management that, ultimately, they hoped would 
also support the local economy. 
 Fortunately, there were a number of existing laws that could be used to sup-
port various scenarios of river protection. This required extending the interpre-
tations of some of the sections or articles of laws that were stipulated many de-
cades ago under authoritarian regimes, when ideas of co-management, devolu-
tion and empowering local were impossible to imagine.
 Two laws in particular were extensively interpreted by practitioners of river 
protection. The most commonly used law was the Fishery Act. According to the 
Fishery Act, ‘governments in charge of fishery resources and the management 
of fishery industry structures have the rights to arrange fishery zones, restrictive 
periods or bans’. This article is a strong argument for both the locals and authori-
ties to close a river in order to revive its ecology. Bolstered by this legal support, 
authorities were eager to help the locals close the rivers for a period of time and 
wait for the fish to come back. During the years 2004 to 2005 county govern-
ment, backed up by the Fishery Act, supported the closure of many rivers that 
had some sort of ‘co-management’ with locals. The county government and the 
mayor, Mr. Sheh, invited stakeholders from various contexts to attend ‘Closing 
the River’ ceremonies. In Pratan, for example, stakeholders including the Shou-
lin Township office, the Taroko National Park headquarters, Agriculture Water 
Management Association (花蓮縣農田水利處), Institute of Water Resource (
花蓮縣水產培育所), the local police and some local NGOs were invited (Yu, 
Wan-li, 2004). In fact, these occasions often became celebrations and often there 
were announcements of initiatives that would bring together the locals, the gov-
ernment and stakeholders to launch a vision that indigenous people could use 
to form ideas and practices of ‘co-management’. In particular, these occasions 
provided the locals with opportunities to negotiate with stakeholders for more 
support and solutions to certain issues. 
 I will now describe in more detail the failures of the different stakeholders to 
co-operate before going on to raise an important issue regarding the interpreta-
tion of certain laws relating to river protection. As I have pointed out, river pro-
tection was always intended, in the first instance, as a strategy by both locals and 
concerned authorities to return fish to the rivers as a way of bringing in tourists 
and generating income for the communities. In the short term, this required 
legal support for the locals. With regard to the issue of taking money from tour-
ists in the form of entrance fees, the chief of the township office said she would 
discuss the matter with experts in the county government in the hope of finding 
a legal basis for this practice. But her hope proved to be in vain as there was no 
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direct legal support for private individuals to collect money from tourists com-
ing to visit public land. This would be condemned as illegal or robbery and, in 
fact, there had been complaints from tourists in other communities who were 
charged illegitimate entrance fees, for example, in Smagus. The local township 
authorized the Danayiku community association to collect entrance fees from 
visitors to their village. But the debate continued about whether the local town-
ship had the right to give a license to certain local private NGOs to collect money 
from visitors on public land belonging, for the most part, to central government 
institutions like the Bureau of Forestry or the Bureau of Rivers, or in some cases 
to the county government. It has been argued that the authorities were lenient 
on Daniyiku community and the township because they wanted to help. Only a 
handful of scholars have pointed out this double standard and we can say that 
Danayiku was contingently lucky in terms of avoiding confrontations with visi-
tors or the authorities when collecting entrance fees. Danayiku was lucky be-
cause many other communities experienced problems and challenges when they 
started to collect any sort of fees. The most famous case relates to the Smagus 
tribe and occurred in 2009 when the area was already popular with tourists. The 
Smagus started to collect entrance fees from visitors and saying that the money 
would be used to fund garbage cleaning services. The arrangement was that, if 
you booked an overnight stay in Smagus, then the entrance fee to the Smagus 
Park was waived. The bottom line was that the Smagus people believed they had 
a right to be paid for their services in terms of cleaning and maintaining the 
park, and in terms of compensation for tourists trespassing on private indig-
enous reservation lands. On the face of it, this seemed reasonable and many 
visitors agreed to pay, but this action was soon challenged by different levels of 
government who wanted to stop the ‘illegal’ taking of entrance fees. The major 
argument they used was that the forest lands in Smagus Park were state owned 
property and the right to pass through reservation lands should be protected. 
Some agents of the government said, ‘You cannot just close the road and collect 
money from people passing by the entrance, that’s robbery!’ Consequently, the 
Smagus stopped collecting fees without any support or license from the authori-
ties. The chief of Shoulin Township realized that her township and the Pratan 
locals would face many challenges from higher authorities, so she said she would 
try to obtain the license through the township council who had the right to rule 
on township territory. Her plan was to either help the locals to collect fees di-
rectly, or she would empower her township office to collect the entrance fee and 
redistribute a portion of the revenue to the locals as payment for their river pro-
tection services. This had been the case in north Taiwan where an Atayal tribe 
carrying out river protection had received money collected by the township of-
fice (see Yen and Kuan). However, a number of locals worried that the Chief of 
the Township would just take the money and use it to finance her rule and cam-
paign for re-election. At the same time, even if the township took the entrance 
fee, they could not be sure that another level of government would not challenge 
this. So this scenario was seen as high risk by many locals who feared that their 
efforts would result in frustration and disappointment.
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The Tourism Promotion Act (觀光發展促進條例) that had been enacted in 
1971 was seen as another possible source of legal support for locals collecting 
entrance fees. This act has only recently been interpreted as having certain sec-
tions and articles that can implement special zoning, i.e. that visitors or tourists 
can only enter certain zones if they are accompanied by special tour guides.39 The 
term ‘special tour guide’ can be interpreted as referring to locals with knowledge 
of their cultures, ecology and landscapes. The discovery and re-interpretation of 
this article of the old law provides one solution to the lack of legal support for 
collecting money. However, to achieve this goal, the government and the locals 
must set up a Natural Human Ecological Landscape Zone (自然人文生態景觀
區). This is supported by article 1, section 2, rule 5 of the Promotion of Tourism 
Act, which says: 
Governments concerned can set up this zone when the places in question are 
full of special natural landscapes that would be hard to recover once lost. These 
places could be habitats for natural flora and fauna in indigenous reservation 
lands, mountain areas with limited access, wildlife conservation areas, water 
resources conservations areas, natural reservation areas, historical reservation 
areas inside national parks, special landscape areas or ecological conservation 
areas and so on (Lin, Hung-Kuei 2005). 
9.2.1 Co-management of river protection in the Mqelegi community
The aforementioned law inspired river protection practitioners to establish a 
zone to include both indigenous reservation lands and also national lands. The 
zone featured forest, river and riparian lands. Crucially, the law supported the 
locals in terms of having the right to ask money from tourists directly. This law 
certainly seemed to be a solution. Based on this interpretation, the Shoulin 
Township office felt renewed enthusiasm and sought support from other gov-
ernmental authorities, and local practitioners were encouraged to seek oppor-
tunities to promote the Natural Human Ecological Landscape Zone. Pratan and 
Mqelegi village were both eager to be promoted as the site for this zone, but it 
was Mqelegi that was chosen as the first candidate. The people of Pratan felt frus-
trated because they had devoted a great deal of energy but gained nothing. There 
are many reasons why Pratan community was not chosen, but the official reason 
given was that Pratan was partly inside the Taroko National Park, which was a 
stakeholder that would be in competition with the ruling authorities. Adding an-
other stakeholder to the mix would complicate the process of setting up a special 
zone because the county government and the township offices would feel under 
pressure to bring the National Park under their rule. The reality of the decision, 
however, was that local politicians had already immersed themselves inside the 
management structure of the Mqlegi Association, which was a local NGO. 
39 Section 19 of the 1st article. 
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This plan to make Mqlegi a special zone was approved by the county mayor and 
the township chief. Both county and township budgets were provided to fund a 
high profile academic to draft the zoning plan and to start negotiations with the 
relevant authorities, including the Bureau of Forestry. The fact that the clerk in 
charge of this case in the county branch of the Bureau of Forestry was a post-
graduate student of the professor in charge of the draft seemed like a good sign 
that the process would go without a hitch.
 However, it took almost four years of negotiations with the Bureau of Forest-
ry to reach the point where the special zoning plan was rejected by the Bureau of 
Forestry. Among the answers given for the failure of the plan was the fact that the 
term ‘authority concerned’ in the Tourism Promotion Act was vague. This meant 
that the Bureau of Forestry could interpret this as meaning that the Bureau of 
Forestry and the Department of Transportation should be in charge of tourism 
and were the authorities referred to in the Tourism Promotion Act. When the 
Bureau of Forestry discovered that the zoning plan was designed to include state 
forest lands that were under their administration, they were concerned that the 
local county and township governments would encroach onto state lands that 
had already been set aside as conservation or tourism areas that were run by the 
Bureau of Forestry. From the local government’s perspective they were planning 
only inside the Mqeleqi administrative village, where they believed that they 
had decision-making powers even though the village belonged to the Bureau 
of Forestry and the county. Because there was a great deal of competition about 
the ruling, responsibilities and profits of certain areas, a sense of department-
centralism developed within government and penetrated intergovernmental 
communications. The zoning plan that had been inspired and encouraged by 
so many central and local government officials was finally rejected at the end of 
2009. Understandably, the decision aroused considerable anger and frustration 
among locals. Consequently, we can say that, to date, the law has been unable 
to provide a solution to meet the complicated and embedded needs of different 
stakeholders and, in particular, those at different levels of government. 
The vision of building a synergy between ecology, economy and cultural identity 
through river protection and total social engineering has been frustrated, but 
the patrolling along the river continues in many places, despite the lack of exter-
nal support and the failure of zoning. What has frustrated the locals most is the 
number of invisible or unexpected stakeholders who have apparently brought 
many troubles to the river protection scheme. 
 Based on the Fishery Law, the authorities can close a river to form a protec-
tion zone; however, there are no clear articles ruling that people cannot play or 
swim in the rivers. This troubles the practitioners very much. The Fishery Law 
also supports the authorities re-opening rivers for fishery activities when the fish 
stocks are sufficient. Moreover, the government can charge the fishers a tariff for 
using the river (Lu D. J. 2004, 2008). This money could only be collected by the 
government and there was no clear law or methods of implementation to sup-
port the transfer of money directly to the locals who were providing the services 
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to the environment or to compensate them for the damage caused by mining or 
industrial pollution. Consequently, there was a sense of environmental injustice. 
Environmental injustice was a common experience and river protection practi-
tioners felt frustrated to find that what should have been a simple action to pre-
vent damage became so difficult. Indeed, environmental injustice occurred on a 
daily basis. Pratan, famous for its gorge and creek landscape, was overrun with 
luxury four-wheel drives from all over Taiwan. Many outsiders claimed that it 
was public land, so they had the right to get close to the river and they ignored 
the notices saying that the river was part of a protection project. Ironically, more 
and more tourists arrived in the area precisely because of the famous river pro-
tection project. These small communities became so overcrowded at times that 
many locals joked that there were more tourists than there were fish or stones in 
the river. The question of capacity had been addressed in the zoning plan but this 
made no difference to the situation at all. The burden was always on the locals’ 
shoulders but the profits were always out of local reach. The worst-case scenario 
appeared to be coming true – that the river protection project was actually caus-
ing an ecological crisis. 
 One final contingency is the problem caused by the Hualien County Agricul-
ture Water Management Association (花蓮縣農田水利處) who had a represen-
tative at the aforementioned opening ceremony of the river protection project in 
Pratan. On the day of the opening ceremony, the leaders of Pratan community 
had the opportunity to talk to the representative of the Agriculture Water Man-
agement Association. They believed that the association was one of the most 
crucial stakeholders in terms of the river and the management of dams, canals 
and artificial water channels diverting water from the river for use on a vast area 
of agricultural land. In fact, the Agriculture Water Management Association had 
evolved as a common property resources management device (largely among 
Han farmers) since the Japanese time when the colonial government supported 
farmers’ claims that the water in the river was their common property without 
consensus from the indigenous communities who lived on the land where water 
came from. The practitioners of river protection in Pratan were very worried 
about the Agriculture Water Management Association making decisions, such 
as opening a sluice to direct water to agricultural lands, which would result in 
the river drying up or the fish being killed. The opening ceremony was seen as a 
crucial opportunity to express these concerns. However, the meeting apparently 
had little effect, as in 2006, after the locals had successfully returned fish to the 
river; a drought meant that farmers demanded water from the river to sustain 
their agriculture. The Agriculture Water Management Association diverted all 
the water into artificial channels leading to farm lands and, consequently, the 
river downstream in Pratan dried up and many fish died. The frustrated locals 
who had struggled so hard to build up their livelihoods felt that they had little 
choice other than to start poaching again. Many argued that they would rather 
‘live on the fish than let the fish die because of the failures of governments’. Once 
again we see a tragedy of the commons. 
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9.3 Governance through co-management or autonomy?
As a result of the difficulties I have described, the locals found that it was a risk 
to rely on the government, and the few successful cases in Taiwan were those 
where indigenous people had tried to remain independent and not take support 
from outside. Simply put, the government had very different ideas about pur-
poses, time limits, management terms and administrative limits than the locals. 
Independence and self-empowerment were ways to manage natural resources, 
although it was impossible to be completely isolated from outside interference. 
The cases in Danyiku and Smagus have shown that there is ‘geopolitical resis-
tance to colonization’ (Hipwell 2007:876). Research shows that Danyiku and 
Smagus succeeded in keeping out governmental interference and that self-man-
agement was contingent on the authority’s willingness to keep one eye closed 
and another open. The contingency in these successful communities did not ex-
ist in the Taroko scenario where natural resource governance was embedded in 
stronger regimes. The people of Taroko could not just close an area off or iso-
late themselves from external interference. If we see governance as the complex 
ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
concerns (Borrini-Feyerabend et al.; Agrawal 2005; Sato 2000), then co-man-
agement is a good way for communities and the relevant authorities to manage 
natural resources successfully, meeting the needs of both sides. However, as we 
have seen, many of these co-management projects failed to reach the standard 
Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2000) describe as ‘a situation in which two or more 
social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing 
of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a given terri-
tory, area or set of natural resources’.
 But there is no question of a ‘fair share’,when the National Park just cancelled 
the co-management project without discussion. Furthermore, the township, the 
county and the Bureau of Forestry had different ideas about their roles. The local 
communities were determined to achieve their goal of ‘autonomy’ either through 
‘sovereignty’ or through the management of natural resources. Co-management 
would be a way to avoid the serious problems surrounding ownership and ac-
cess rights. Co-management of natural resources would also bypass the fact that 
property requires clear cut boundaries and the various types of property catego-
ries need clear definition in order to enforce duties and rights. Co-management 
of natural resources also has the purpose of bringing tourists to the area to come 
and see the fish and, hopefully, it will make some money without having to get 
involved in defining properties. Even though the river ecology was not actually a 
priority for local people, the strategy to bring back the fish was seen as a way of 
improving lives and achieving a vision of combining ecology, culture and liveli-
hoods. My research demonstrates the existence of a contingent ecology in the 
realm of ambiguous stakeholders with ambiguous management strategies and 
some vague categories of properties. The locals and a number of indigenous in-
tellectuals critical of government interference had ideas about sovereignty and 
autonomy mixed up with many international, national and regional ideas. This 
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inspired the locals to think of alternative ways to make a living and to bring back 
self-esteem.
 
9.4 Conclusion: uncertain and contingent futures
Natural resource management (NRM) is indeed a political issue. Through the 
cases in Taroko outlined here, we see that ‘governance’ of natural resources is 
embedded in a nexus of conceptions and practices. In the three cases I have 
discussed, we find communities without strong reciprocities and solidarities at 
a river or watershed level. In particular, these communities are deprived of posi-
tive reciprocal relations with the river where ‘colonialists had dismantled com-
munal property regimes and institutions as a prelude to establishing colonial 
economies’ (Gadgil and Guha 1992). A total social engineering perspective is 
vulnerable to difficulties because of the heterogeneity that comes from a com-
munity that is hybrid in terms of character and social structure. Different com-
munity components with different local contexts bring about different visions 
and ideas in terms of practice. Through these cases, we see that indigenous locals 
use moral and emotional reasoning to regain a sense of the participation in the 
governance of the environment. Co-management is way of including govern-
mental resources to help bring about a synergy of livelihoods, nature and culture.
The research shows that legal support is limited. Nonetheless, the state laws sup-
port the state taking indigenous private property to build public infrastructure. 
Indigenous property has actually been recognized to a very limited extent since 
the days of Japanese rule; however, many collectively owned lands that now be-
long to the Bureau of Forestry and the National Park headquarters were seen 
as terra nullius. The Tourism Promotion Act shows some promise in terms of 
co-management, but the government is not so willing to offer up the benefits or 
duties to the locals. Whether the Tourism Promotion Act can deliver a promis-
ing future in terms of the environment and the indigenous people remains to 
be seen and there is a tendency in conservation arenas to advocate stricter rules 
in relation to national lands. Little wonder, then, that many scholars think that 
the new articles concerning the indigenous peoples are only basic directions of 
policy but not basic rights at all. 
 Through the cases outlined in this chapter, I have found that there may be 
more chance of success in terms of implementation if the design of co-manage-
ment is well thought through before the process even starts. This would lead to a 
better division of labor among stakeholders. 
 The cases also illustrate how important property regimes are to the imple-
mentations of co-management. Many scholars found that successful co-manage-
ment must be based on a clear definition of property, such as that in the success-
ful case of Kakadu National Park in Australia where the indigenous peoples were 
granted land rights and sponsorship of co-management. Berkes mentions that 
legal recognition of communal resource-use rights, as in Japanese coastal fisher-
ies, is key to the success of exclusion under communal-property regimes. Even in 
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terms of private property, the legitimacy of state property in the eyes of the local 
community is important for enforcement (Berkes et al. 2001). These interna-
tional cases are inspiring Taiwanese indigenous people, and the implementation 
of co-management of natural resources reflects a greater need for sovereignty 
that comes from a doctrine of communal property. Under communal-property 
regimes, ‘exclusion’ means the ability to exclude people other than the members 
of a defined group (Berkes et al. 2001).
 I found, however, that indigenous locals did not stubbornly insist on ‘total’ 
sovereignty in the way that a nation state demands full control. Instead, they 
were willing to accept ‘soft’ sovereignty in the form of co-management in areas 
of ambiguous properties. In fact, the role the government plays is still based on 
the prerequisite of nation sovereignty. Given the many frustrations experienced 
by indigenous practitioners, it is no wonder that they insist on starting from 
a definition of property. Indigenous locals are looking for adjustments to the 
governance of natural resources and who is entitled to what rights regarding cer-
tain property types. The question of autonomy or co-management is next on the 
agenda. 
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10.1 State of nature/state of the nature
The majority of the Taroko land problems and claims have their roots in the 
Japanese colonial regime. In chapter 2, I described the formation of the area of 
Taroko and the state law frames introduced in the indigenous areas. I found that 
the Japanese authorities viewed the indigenous people’s ways of living and their 
character as being ‘state of nature’. I adopt this term to describe the methods and 
ideologies adopted by the Japanese authorities in order to examine and manage 
the indigenous people. The term ‘state of nature’ has been used by Western po-
litical philosophers to describe the conditions or characters of those ‘others’ that 
were situated in pre-state conditions.
 Japanese ideas of indigenous people demonstrate a ‘state of nature’ that can 
be characterized by a spectrum of different capabilities and rationalities. At one 
end of the spectrum is ‘animals’ with no capacity for rationality; this is followed 
by ‘semi-rational human beings’ with limited capacity for rational thought, i.e. 
people who are not capable of being civilized. Then, at the other end of the spec-
trum are Japanese ‘citizens’, fully capable of rationality and deserving of all the 
rights a state can grant. Thus, we see that the Japanese authorities adopted evolu-
tionary concepts to differentiate the indigenous people and put them into three 
categories: the raw (uncooked), the semi-cooked, and the cooked. The raw peo-
ple like those in the Taroko area were considered animals with no knowledge of 
rationalities and only deserving of war and occupation. The semi-cooked or the 
cooked indigenous people were later treated as Japanese citizens deserving of 
recognition and land titles.
 Despite this categorization, it was in the interests of the Japanese colonial 
government to maintain the savage status of the indigenous peoples who might 
otherwise lay claim to ownership of Taiwan’s richest natural resources. Identi-
fying indigenous people as savages gave the colonial government the right to 
occupy their land. This was a widely shared ideology among the major colonial 
powers at that time. Like the British colonizers’ view of aboriginal land in Aus-
tralia as terra nullius, the Japanese government perceived the savages of Taiwan 
as lacking knowledge of property ownership, and thus claimed their indigenous 
lands as government property. As O’Brien says: 
Accessing indigenous land rights through claims in Taroko Area, Eastern Taiwan
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[…] seventeenth-century English colonists used two devices to dispossess New 
England Indians: they declared lands ‘vacuum domicilium’ (empty of habita-
tion), and (rejecting full Indian sovereignty over their lands) they ‘purchased’ 
Indian land according to English legal principles. Even when they did ‘purchase’ 
Indian lands, they assumed their land rights really emanated from crown grants 
secured through the ‘right of discovery’, and the biblical directive to ‘subdue 
the earth and multiply’. In this equation, ‘Wandering Indians’ failed to ‘subdue 
the earth’ because they did not use the land in European ways (1999: 208).
In a similar way, Taiwan indigenous people actually lost all of their territory 
because it was deemed national land that only the Japanese State owned the ul-
timate right to. 
10.2 Terra Nullius/Sovereignty
During the Japanese encounters with the ‘raw’ Atayal people and also the indig-
enous peoples in the Taroko area, the cruelties were numerous on both sides. But 
the raw Taroko people never had a chance of being promoted to semi-cooked or 
cooked before the Japanese authorities waged war on them in 1914. The Japanese 
started from the premise that the lands in these ‘raw’ areas were terra nullius. 
Of course, the Japanese authorities had to be blind not to admit that there were 
people living on these lands with their own methods of tenure or management. 
Many of the Japanese consultants, like Mochiji Rokusaburou, put policy priority 
on lands that could be used by the state and the indigenous people who occupied 
them were deemed a problem. The doctrine of terra nullius was first suggested 
by the American consultant LeGendre, who signed memorandums with the bar-
barians in the south of Taiwan on behalf of the United States in order to urge 
the indigenous people not to harm any American sailors that drifted ashore. In 
fact, it was the Qing government that was the de jure subject who should have 
signed the memorandums with the US, but LeGendre, in his role as an ambas-
sador in Xiamen in south east China, signed the agreement with the barbarians 
instead. He seemed to think that the southern barbarians were representatives of 
the sovereignty of the southern area. Following this logic, the people who signed 
on behalf of the indigenous people in the south should be considered the hold-
ers of sovereignty. Yet LeGendre still believed that the areas out of China’s direct 
control or administrations were terra nullius and, thus, belonged to no one and 
certainly not to the indigenous people. At a time when many colonial states were 
competing for the land of Taiwan and elsewhere, the theory of terra nullius was 
adopted by the Japanese as a way of approaching the lands and people in indig-
enous areas. In fact, the Japanese approach was a cruel one; they refused to see 
that the indigenous people had their own lands and way of lives. ‘State of nature’ 
was a fictive notion and a legal device adopted by the Japanese colonial authori-
ties to neglect human rights. 
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These theories were different to Western theories such as John Locke’s ‘social 
contract’, which preached that to move from ‘state of nature’ to ‘state’ or ‘civil or 
political society’ requires a social contract, to provide a bridge for people in ‘pre-
state’ conditions to cross into a condition of state. Many Western philosophers 
like Locke and Rousseau had different presumptions or ideas about the condi-
tions of the ‘state of nature’. Locke thought that people in ‘state of nature’ did not 
obey a unitary law or, indeed, any overall rules and they did not recognize me-
diations or punishments. In Leviathan, Hobbes wrote of how people are selfish 
and compete amongst themselves without caring for others. This reiterates the 
point that there are different kinds of ‘state of nature’ and how people in a ‘state of 
nature’ can be so individualized that they are unable to follow any collective rules 
made by a state or, in fact, any other unit (Tully 1993). Even John Locke, who had 
great knowledge of the North American Indian peoples (ibid), still urged the 
state to welcome people in the condition of ‘state of nature’ using the ‘social con-
tract’ theory that the North American Indian people would join the state in their 
own time and of their own free will if they thought doing so would protect their 
original properties. Though colonial history shows us that this idea was ulti-
mately rejected in these American Indian areas, an idea still existed that the state 
should be set up on the condition that the people in a ‘state of nature’ could still 
keep their properties. There is no evidence to suggest that Japanese colonialists 
were influenced by these ideas, but we can see from the Taroko case that there 
was no social contract to bridge the ‘state of nature’ and ‘the state of the nature’. 
On the contrary, Terra nullius was the bridge between the two and the Japanese 
considered the land in these areas as uninhabited or only inhabited by human 
beings who lived like wild animals, who were not civilized. 
 In this period, other colonial powers treated these mini-nations differently. 
For example, when the English went to Canada and New Zealand, they recog-
nized that the indigenous peoples in those territories were nations. They signed 
international treaties with indigenous people. These treaties became the basis 
for later legal claims (Yen and Yang 2004: 241). By contrast, the ‘raw’ indigenous 
people of Taiwan were not treated like those in other colonial situations. As Yen 
and Yang found, the Japanese did not recognize Taiwan’s indigenous peoples as 
a nation. They did not sign treaties with them. They treated them like animals. 
(Yen and Yang 2004: 241; Vickers 2008). Moreover, the Japanese responded to 
the ‘animals’ cruelty in kind. The indigenous people of Taroko were simply ani-
mals that needed to be conquered. 
10.3 War/Peace/Natural Sovereignty
In my fieldwork, I found that Taroko intellectuals have many different reflec-
tions on the history of the Japanese time. In particular, there were many differ-
ent perspectives about indigenous ideals of peace and war, and later the taking 
of lands and properties by the Japanese army and authorities. Indigenous logic is 
one of conquering, being conquered or surrendering under certain conditions, 
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and many rules are based on indigenous customs. For example, with respect to 
the processes of war, indigenous people believed that if the war was started for 
convincing reasons then the outcome could be submission without conditions. 
If, however, the conflict is started without convincing reasons, the indigenous 
people consider it as invasion and submission to the army should only occur 
under certain conditions. Based on these indigenous interpretations, I find that 
indigenous people have an idea of ‘sovereignty’ and that they firmly believed 
their sovereignty was based on the fact that they had occupied the lands, without 
being bothered, prior to any states that came later. In one sense, this so-called 
‘natural sovereignty’ precedes any state sovereignty and, in another sense, it re-
lates to the natural habitats and resources that are occupied by states. Based on 
this idea, indigenous people are claiming their rights to, in particular, land and 
natural resources. Consequently, I find that the Japanese method of ruling the 
indigenous lands has resulted in three topologies that the indigenous people use 
differently as strategies for land claims.
10.4 Gaya as institution: in situ, diaspora and hybridity
In chapters 3 and 4, I illustrated three topographies related to indigenous settle-
ments and traditional territories: in situ, hybrid and diaspora. These typologies 
suggest a decline in the claimants’ closeness to and knowledge of the territories 
they claim. They seem to divert into objective empiricism and subjective re-con-
structionism in terms of the ideas and methodology for mapping traditional ter-
ritories. In an in situ scenario, landscapes are demonstrated through checks and 
balances on the politics of representation and the ‘subjectivity’ of local people or 
‘objectivity’ of land natural resources. But in a diaspora scenario, where stake-
holders lack information to keep a check on the relationships between people 
and traditional territories, the politics of representations are more controversial. 
We find that locals use a method of scoping on a large scale in order to include 
territories governed by ancestral gaya, a regime of autonomy of the Taroko peo-
ple. Future perspectives are concerned with mapping that demands tracing the 
past. In this scenario, where some direct connections are maintained in the form 
of, for example, elders who are tour guides, a space or zero-or-sum emerges and 
awaits rescue. Without rescue, this zero-or-sum space is nothing more than an 
imagined homeland or a lost land or non-place to the indigenous descendants. 
These three ideal types of mapping topology also indicate how levels of com-
munal properties are being constructed. Through these topologies we find that a 
small tribe seems to function in an in situ scenario. In an in situ scenario, people 
maintain gaya rules for land use, though many land conflicts still result from the 
implementation of national laws. In diaspora or hybridity scenarios, the Taroko 
people have lost their connections with the lands or traditional territories; how-
ever, with mapping they can employ an idea of utopian autonomy to try to gain 
back their territories. Gaya is an institution that substitutes national laws; gaya 
is practiced on their lands while national laws conflict with indigenous ways 
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of land use. So gaya is a utopian doctrine used to govern traditional territories 
based on their natural sovereignty. 
10.5 Imagining the autonomy of Gaya in Basic Law
In chapter 5 we found that indigenous peoples have not benefited from the new 
Basic Law that is awaiting further time-consuming amendment. A clear solu-
tion to land issues is deliberately avoided in the text of the relevant articles in the 
Basic Law. There is a similar opaqueness about the two memoranda for ‘A New 
Partnership between the Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Taiwan’ 
signed by President Chen (see appendix 3)’. For example, the 5th article states: 
 
To restore or recover tribal and ethnic traditional territories for Taiwan indig-
enous peoples are originally tribal societies where institutions of communal or 
individual uses are based on communal ownership of land. In order to rebuild 
an ethno-cultural development subjectivity to process a foundation for auton-
omy, the government of Taiwan should acknowledge or recognize, regardless 
of the private ownership regimes on land, the tribal and ethnic subjectivities 
and their ownership of the traditional territories. 
In the above translation, the words ‘restore’ or ‘recover’ have been translated 
from the Chinese idiom ‘Huei Fu’ (恢復), which denotes a common meaning 
of recovery. But exactly what is going to be recovered is not clear from the text. 
Indeed, the indigenous peoples have always asked for the article to be worded 
using terms such as ‘return’ or ‘give back’. The above translation uses the terms 
‘recognize or acknowledge’ in relation to indigenous subjectivity of their tra-
ditional territories, but there is no sign of anything being acknowledged or of 
rights being recognized. A more favourable term would be ‘Indigenous subjec-
tivity’, which recognizes indigenous natural sovereignty. Therefore, many indig-
enous laws and policies must be reconsidered. 
 In the preceding chapters, we have discussed how people reconceptualize 
lands in their collective imagination. Based on natural sovereignty, Taroko peo-
ple have adopted mappings to project autonomy without interference from out-
siders. Through their desire for autonomy, they projected a time when ancestors 
were living in their traditional territories according to their own gaya. Natural 
sovereignty is the ultimate right to protect gaya and the ultimate institution for 
governing the lands that are now occupied by the state. We find that the Taroko 
people have a doctrine in which sovereignty is the basis for re-coordinating land, 
human-units, rights and institutions according to ancestors’ rules. In a Draft 
Taroko Autonomy Constitution, we see that the Taroko people want to be a state 
or a nation within the state. In a Taroko state or with Taroko autonomy, the in-
digenous people would manage land-human relations according to their gaya. 
Natural sovereignty seems to be a solution, but many activists still worry about 
the many different and competing authorities governing their lands, including 
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privatized or reservation lands, or lands taken by industries, national parks or 
the Forestry Bureau. The impact of these de jure regimes on indigenous people’s 
practices related to land and natural resources were discussed.
10.6 Law-individualism 
The theory of terra nullius and taking lands and declaring them as state-owned 
were colonial deeds designed to render indigenous people landless and, ulti-
mately, ‘stupid’ and therefore incapable of dealing with rational matters such as 
economics. This kind of thinking still prevails among many people, even among 
indigenous ones. During my research I found a number of documents circulat-
ing among government officials in the department responsible for indigenous 
affairs that talk of laziness and irrationality. Such themes have informed officials’ 
thinking and policymaking.
 The fact that such views prevail in the 21st century is highlighted by the 
words of a top officer in Hualien County in charge of indigenous affairs: ‘They 
are not inspired by civilization and have fewer abilities to compete with the Han 
and the plains people. It is usually the indigenous people who are inferior to 
the Han when they are dealing with commerce.’ It seems that indigenous people 
are consistently labeled as not so advanced in terms of dealing with matters of 
commerce and economics. The system of land reservation appears to have been 
set up as a bridge to help indigenous people advance, step by step, in terms of 
capability and rationality. It is a fact that indigenous people are not as advanced 
as, say, their Han counterparts, in commercial dealings. However, the reason for 
this has nothing to do with laziness or isolation. In chapter 6, I demonstrate how 
indigenous people act both collectively and as individuals and prove to be just 
as rational or as calculating in matters of economics. They still consider many 
affairs in collective terms, but they also take their own personal interests into ac-
count. In my opinion, indigenous people have not been able to advance because 
they are part of legal and economic structures that limit their ability in the com-
mercial sector. Thus, we see that colonialism has resulted in the reforming of not 
only governance, but also of ownership. 
 There are many restrictions on land use and it appears that the reservation 
land is designed only for agricultural use and cannot be used to provide indig-
enous people with a basic livelihood. This situation is compounded by the fact 
that indigenous people have no capital to invest in small pieces of land. They 
are often forced to move to urban areas in search of low-paid work. Given these 
limitations, reservation lands are rendered useless and worthless, which has the 
effect of inviting profit seekers in to take advantage. During this process, the 
phenomenon of ‘legal individualism’ emerged and threatened, and sometimes 
even violated communal ways of dealing with reservation lands. ‘Legal individu-
alism’ cuts out communal relations and provides a clear cut method of dealing 
with lands at the nexus of relations or reciprocal responsibility. The process of 
granting reservation lands is seen as a way of helping indigenous people to learn 
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the logic of individual autonomy that is supported by laws and administration. 
By this, I do not mean that the Reservation Land Management Procedures are 
suitable in terms of helping indigenous people to define and manage land tenure 
to the extent that it is secure and clear as some economists imagine. In fact, all 
the Reservation Procedures, starting with the survey and demarcation require 
collective and mutual recognition, even though more individualized actions are 
encouraged by later procedures. These procedures are helping indigenous peo-
ple to own lands securely within the modern cadastre system. Problems arise 
around the boundary between capital and value equivalences. If we look at pre-
vious studies of indigenous land rights, we get a sense of déjà vu. Taiwan’s his-
tory shows that from the Dutch time through to the Qing Dynasty indigenous 
lands have been steadily encroached on legally, socially or politically. In his pa-
per ‘State, Proprietary Rights, and Ethnic Relations in Qing Taiwan, 1680-1840’, 
Prof. Chen finds that, ‘Despite the official separation policy, numerous Han im-
migrants (still) encroached on tribal territory in search of new lands and wa-
ter resources.’ Han people and the authorities are using similar methods in the 
Taroko area; in particular, a special contractual system described by Chen (ibid) 
that institutionalizes ‘the separation of title rights and usufruct or cultivate rights 
on the same piece of land. Both the title holder and functional landowner could 
independently sell or sublet their property rights; indeed, a major characteris-
tic of Taiwan’s land development was the early and rapid subdivision of prop-
erty rights among tenant cultivators’. Thus, land rights were separated into two 
independent parts—subsoil rights held by the title holders and topsoil rights 
acquired by those households that actually managed the land. This scenario is 
called ‘fan-chan-han-dieam’ (番產漢佃) by scholars indicating that indigenous 
lands were actually cultivated by Han people (see also Shepherd, 1993; Ke 2001). 
From my study, I also found a new form of indigenous lands being worked by 
Han people ‘fan-chan-han-dieam’ (番產漢佃) emerging in the reservation land 
system and in the modern cadastre system. We see the rise of illegal holders, 
permanent leases and many other regulations on the use of certain pieces of 
reservation land. In theory, the Reservation Land Management Procedures help 
indigenous people to maintain legal rights over reservation land, but in practice 
these rights are being encroached on, even by indigenous people themselves. 
This is a new phenomenon, different from what Li (1982: 104-105、119) called 
‘controlled capitalization among indigenous areas’, a policy to use indigenous 
land for agriculture in order to help indigenous people survive and with the res-
ervation land protected legally by the government. As agriculture was unable to 
produce the necessary profits and provide subsistence for indigenous people, 
the land became vulnerable to capital from outside and prospectors seeking to 
invest in reservation lands for tourism or mining. The government seems to be 
unaware of this trend and rather than coming up with better institutions to help 
the indigenous people survive, in my opinion the Reservation Land Procedure is 
now being used for state land appropriations related to industry and mining and 
conservation or preservation of the nature. Moreover, the value of reservation 
land is now uncontrolled.
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According to the Japanese Counselor Mochiji Rokusaburou, it is impossible for 
indigenous people to have regular land rights until these ‘raw savages’ have been 
cultivated, civilized and are capable of economic rationale. Mochiji Rokusaburou 
put this view of gradual evolution forward during the Qing Dynasty to show that 
raw savages could evolve into cooked barbarians or be ‘Sinicized’ and become 
normal citizens. After more than a century, we are at a point where indigenous 
people have indeed learned the ways of cultivation and are capable of economic 
rationale, but does this mean that the time has come to open Pandora’s Box and 
allow free transactions of reservation lands? No. The reason why a new form of 
‘fan-chan-han-dieam’ (番產漢佃) regarding reservation land tenure is emerging 
is not because indigenous people are incapable of getting to grip with economics, 
but because of the legal limitations and the doctrine of terra nullius.
 In terms of national land laws being implemented in a more balanced way, 
Herskovits (1965:326) mentions that, ‘Whatever absolute criteria of property 
may be set up, the ultimate determinant of what is property and what is not is 
to be sought in the attitude of the group from whose culture a given instance of 
ownership is taken, mistakes or distortions should have chances to be corrected’ 
(see Hann 1998).There are so many regulations and limitations that the indig-
enous people are unable to develop and fall into the trap of conforming to their 
stereotype of being ‘drunkards’ and ‘lazy’.
 Furthermore, the authorities are still apt to deny ‘customary land rights’ or 
‘original titles’ (Huang, Ju-zheng 2009). This has become a significant cause of 
conflict between the state and the indigenous people in many areas and in many 
cases around the world. As Ali observed in Southeast Asia (2004:337), ‘the in-
digenous people are being displaced from their lands, their ancestral traditional 
abodes and surroundings in the name of or as consequence of development ac-
tivities by the government. Therefore, the conflict between public agencies and 
the people has resulted in a conflict of traditional rights versus statutory rights 
or management (ibid: 338).’ 
 ‘Indigenous land rights are conceptualized within the framework of a sepa-
rate legal regime, distinct from the rest of the country’ (ibid: 338). We may think 
that the concept of land rights for the hill people is inextricably linked to collec-
tive customs and traditions with ‘emotional attachment to the land, as well as is-
sues of morality and justice that are always a central component of debates about 
property’ (Hann), but these rules and principles have been attacked and mixed 
with many other ideas resulting in a blurring of land issues within communities. 
We find many cases where land claims are helped by rumors or street conversa-
tions or mediations from elders or even prayers in churches. Communities have 
alternatives to legal methods to resolve land conflicts. 
 Frequently, we see that the law demonstrated in the court decisions men-
tioned in chapter 6 is unable to offer the justice people wanted. Instead, we see 
that the laws are supporting a form of legal individualism that is causing contro-
versy within communities and breaking down the abovementioned alternative 
routes to securing property. As Geertz (1983:289-290) has mentioned, ‘the as/
therefore level of things is as difficult of determination as the if/then level is (in 
225
10 ■ Conclusion
theory, anyway) clear and inescapable.’ It appears that many cases seem to be 
clear in terms of the legal logic of if/then, but unclear in terms of local concepts 
of as/there dimensions. Local knowledge and practices need to be acknowledged 
in the human-land-nature relationship where we can see that customary laws are 
still embedded in strong societal foundations. Many customary rules and ways 
of recognizing ‘property’ still have a strong basis of social support. 
 Taiwan experienced rapid economic development in the 1970s and 1980s 
and this inspired an entire development discourse on the ‘Taiwanese miracle’ 
(Simon 2002). As Simon’s article ‘The Underside of a Miracle: Industrialization, 
Land, and Taiwan's Indigenous Peoples’ has pointed out, this view has over-
looked three important facts that should be taken into account when looking 
closely at development in Taiwan. First, rapid development was made possible 
largely by an oppressive regime of martial law that quelled worker unrest. Sec-
ond: development took place at immense social and environmental costs. And 
finally, these costs have been disproportionately borne by Taiwan’s indigenous 
peoples. Through the cases that I have presented illustrating the encroachment 
of industries into indigenous areas, it should be clear that many burdens were 
shouldered by the local indigenous people. They suffered greatly as a result of 
these development plans in terms of environmental degradation and lack of rec-
ognition of human rights. From the perspective of environmental justice, a sce-
nario of development like ‘borrowing a golden hen to lay golden eggs’ (words 
of a Hualien county parliament member), which invited companies from the 
west to come to the east of Taiwan to invest, did not bring the promised profits 
or bright future for the local people. As for the cement industry, it did not bring 
jobs or other tangible or intangible profits as the companies and governments 
had insinuated. What these industries have brought is pollution and loss of land.
 A report sponsored by the Taroko National Park headquarters states that 
the park generated about 5 billion NTD of profits through the tourism industry 
for the area each year. This news, headlined in a local newspaper raised much 
discussion. Some indigenous people complained that the headquarters had not 
hired some high profile scholars just to calculate how much the indigenous peo-
ple have lost each year because of the park (Lin, Yan-zhou 2006). 
 It would be hard to calculate how much the indigenous people have profited 
from the Taroko National Park, which was supposed to ‘bring more economic 
benefits to the host community (Lin, Y.Z. 2006). The report focuses on the di-
rect income to the National Park, which researchers claim could be income for 
the local indigenous people. But as many indigenous people argue, most of the 
income goes to the headquarters’ employees who set up businesses inside the 
park and who dominate the restaurants and souvenir shops. This is considered 
a serious injustice by the local indigenous people. Capital is not helping the lo-
cal poor, but rather the capital owners and the government elites who have most 
of the opportunities for rent seeking and the instrumentalization of state power 
to secure property. This is evidenced in the case of the land conflict between lo-
cal indigenous land owners and the Asia Cement Company. I found an official 
document from the Ministry of Interior that defended Asia Cement and suggests 
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that the local county government should consider keeping the cement factories 
for a number of reasons. The seventh reason the government lists is:
An official document from the Mining Department in the Ministry of Econo-
my issued as Number 09200253480 on 15th December 2003 says, ‘Asia Cement 
was set up by the encouragement from the national policy of going east for 
cement industries. From the year 1979 on, the Asia Cement was set up till now; 
a lot of investments have been made. The factory has offered many taxes and 
job opportunities to the eastern citizens. And the factory has obeyed the rel-
evant laws and rules. If the land lease contracts on the lands that the factory 
are using have now expired, and if the leases are not continued, this would 
lead to a disruption of the cement prices and supplements. Besides, there will 
be a negative impact on the factory or the industry, not to mention that the 
company would require compensation from the authorities. Thus, it should 
be considered seriously whether to extend the lease for mining (Ministry of 
Interior 2005).
This case does nothing to help the indigenous side because most of the processes 
have been carried out legally, although it is acknowledged that some administra-
tive mistakes occurred. Through these frustrating cases, many indigenous com-
munities find themselves in devastating situations, flooded with money, capital, 
pollution, industry and mining. The government seems to think that the answer 
lies in more negotiations and more corporations getting involved in develop-
ment in indigenous areas. Article 21 of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law, pro-
mulgated on 5th February 2005, stipulates that: 
The government or private party shall consult indigenous peoples and obtain 
their consent or participation, and share with indigenous peoples benefits gen-
erated from land development, resource utilization, ecology conservation and 
academic researchers in indigenous people’s regions. In the event that the gov-
ernment, laws or regulations impose restrictions on indigenous peoples’ utili-
zation of their land and natural resources, the government shall first consult 
with indigenous peoples or indigenous persons and obtain their consent. A 
fixed proportion of revenues generated in accordance with the preceding two 
paragraphs shall be allocated to the indigenous peoples’ development fund to 
serve as returns or compensation. 
This article is vague in the sense of knowing who is the real subject of consent 
and who will be granted the revenues. This is certainly reflected in how disem-
powered indigenous communities have become in recent times. 
 It relates to the reconsideration of the arrangements among human units, 
different characteristics of land, institutions and bundles of rights that are be-
yond the existence of laws and legal devices or governments now. So far we do 
not have cases to show how freely the concept of ‘prior informed consent’ is 
practiced in Taiwan, but my chapters describing the river protection co-manage-
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ment practices illustrate how the local and government authorities concerned 
are experimenting with this new trend of reconsidering human-land manage-
ment. Through these cases, we see that indigenous locals are putting forward 
moral and emotional reasons for regaining governance of the environment. Co-
management is a way to include governmental resources and to help achieve the 
promising vision of combining livelihoods, nature and culture.
 Ultimately, however, the current legal support is so limited that the imple-
mentation has been ineffective. Nonetheless, the state laws support the state tak-
ing indigenous private property for the construction of public infrastructure and 
without the need for reasonable compensation. Indigenous property had actually 
been recognized to very limited extent by the Japanese, but their compensation 
was limited because many collectively owned lands were terra nullius and now 
belong to the Bureau of Forestry and the National Park headquarters, who both 
share the responsibility for implementing co-management with the indigenous 
locals. The Act of Tourism Promotion seems to be promising in terms of co-
management, but actually there are no official procedures laying out how the 
locals can participate in the governance of government properties. I am curious 
to see whether the article in the Act of Tourism Promotion Act will provide a 
promising future for the environment and the indigenous people, particularly as 
there is a tendency among conservation areas to advocate much stricter rules on 
national lands that are now seen as a tragedy of commons, symbolized by land-
slides and floods. No wonder, then, that many scholars think that adding new 
articles to the Constitution concerning the indigenous peoples will only result 
in the direction of basic policy but not basic rights. They view these words in the 
Constitution as weak in terms of the protection and promotion of indigenous 
rights. 
10.7 Property relates to sovereignty
Through these river protection co-management cases, we find that there may 
be more chance of successful implementation when conditions are considered 
and incorporated in the design principles before co-management begins. If this 
occurs, there is a better division of labor between the parties. The cases featured 
here show that locals actually began with no advantages at all. On the contrary, 
the locals started from almost zero and the ‘bundles of rights’ to the river proper-
ties are not generally controlled by the locals. 
 From the cases presented here, we find that property boundaries define the 
‘bundle of rights’ that are really concerned with the implementation of co-man-
agement. Indeed, many scholars found that successful co-management should 
be based on a clear definition of property and they often refer to the successful 
case of Kakadu National Park in Australia, where the indigenous people were 
granted land rights and sponsorship of co-management projects. Berkes men-
tions that legal recognition of communal resource-use rights, as occurred in the 
Japanese coastal fisheries, is key to the success of exclusion under communal-
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property regimes. Or, as with private property, the legitimacy of state proper-
ty in the eyes of the local community is important for enforcement (Berkes et 
al. 2001). These cases are inspiring Taiwanese indigenous people, and the im-
plementation of co-management or governance of natural resources reflects a 
stronger demonstration of the idea of sovereignty that comes from a doctrine of 
communal property. Furthermore, under communal property regimes, ‘exclu-
sion’ means the ability to exclude people other than the members of a defined 
group (Berkes et al. 2001).
 I find that indigenous locals have avoided a perspective that stubbornly in-
sists on ‘sovereignty’ and demands full control and total sovereignty like a na-
tion-state. Instead, they start from the perspective of soft sovereignty and the 
co-management of areas with ambiguous properties. The reality is that the role 
the government play is still based on the idea of hardcore national sovereignty. 
No wonder, then, after so many frustrations and the impact of so many govern-
ment restrictions that many indigenous activists still insist on starting from the 
simple premise of pinning down a definition of property and a vision of who has 
what rights to certain objects or property types. Autonomy or co-management is 
set firmly on the land rights agenda.
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Appendix 1
The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law
Presidential Decree
February 5, 2005
Presidential decree Hua-tsung-yi-tzu-no. 09400017741




This Law is enacted for the purposes of protecting the fundamental rights of 
indigenous peoples, promoting their subsistence and development and building 
inter-ethnic relations based on co-existence and prosperity.
Definitions: 
1 Indigenous peoples: refer to the traditional peoples who have inhibited in 
Taiwan and are subject to the state’s jurisdiction, including Amis tribe, Atayal 
tribe, Paiwan tribe, Bunun tribe, Puyuma tribe, Rukai tribe, Tsou tribe, Saisi-
yat tribe, Yami tribe, Tsao tribe, Kavalan tribe, Taroko tribe and any other 
tribes who regard themselves as indigenous peoples and obtain the approval 
of the central indigenous authority upon application.
2 Indigenous person: refers to any individual who is a member of any of indig-
enous peoples.
3 Indigenous peoples’ regions: refer to areas approved by the Executive Yuan 
upon application made by the central indigenous authority where indigenous 
peoples have traditionally inhabited, featuring indigenous history and cul-
tural characteristics.
4 Tribe: refers to a group of indigenous persons who form a community by liv-
ing together in specific areas of the indigenous peoples’ regions and following 
the traditional norms with the approval of the central indigenous authority.
5 Indigenous land: refers to the traditional territories and reservation land of 
indigenous peoples.
Article 3
For the purpose of reviewing and coordinating matters related to this Law, the 
Executive Yuan shall establish a promotion committee which shall be called by 
the Premier.
Two thirds of the afore-mentioned promotion committee members shall com-
prise members of indigenous tribes in accordance with their respective propor-
tions. The organization bylaws of the committee shall be made by the Executive 
Yuan.
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Article 4 
The government shall guarantee the equal status and development of self-gov-
ernance of indigenous peoples and implement indigenous peoples’ autonomy 
in accordance with the will of indigenous peoples. The relevant issues shall be 
stipulated by laws. 
Article 5 
The state shall provide sufficient resources and allocate abundant annual budget 
to assist indigenous peoples in developing autonomy.
Unless otherwise provided under this Law or other laws related to autonomy, the 
power of autonomy and finance in regions of autonomy shall be subject to the 
Local Institution Law, the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Rev-
enues and Expenditures and other statutes governing county (city).
Article 6 
In the event that any dispute concerning the power of autonomy arises between 
the government and indigenous peoples, the Office of the President shall call a 
consultation meeting to resolve such dispute.
Article 7
The government shall protect indigenous peoples’ rights to education by uphold-
ing the principles of versatility, equality, and reverence in accordance with the 
will of indigenous peoples. The relevant issues shall be stipulated by laws.
Article 8
Governments of municipal cities and counties where indigenous peoples’ re-
gions are located shall establish specialized units in charge of indigenous affairs. 
Other county (city) governments may establish specialized units or have special-
ized personnel in charge of indigenous affairs.
Article 9
The government shall establish special unit responsible for indigenous language 
researches and indigenous language proficiency evaluation system in order to 
actively engage in the promotion of indigenous language development. 
The government shall provide preferential measures for indigenous peoples or 
hold special civil service examinations designed for indigenous peoples where 
under the relevant laws and regulations may require beneficiaries or candidates 
to pass the afore-mentioned evaluation or have proficiency in indigenous lan-
guage.
The development of indigenous language shall be stipulated by law.
Article 10
The government shall keep and maintain indigenous cultures, give guidance to 
the cultural industry and incubate professional talent. 
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Article 11
The government shall restore the traditional names of indigenous tribes, rivers 
and mountains in indigenous peoples’ regions in accordance with the will of in-
digenous peoples.
Article 12
The government shall protect indigenous peoples’ rights and access to broadcast 
and media, establish indigenous peoples’ cultural affairs foundation and formu-
late plans to establish indigenous-language broadcast media and institutions ex-
clusively for indigenous peoples. 
Issues related to the establishment of the afore-mentioned foundation shall be 
stipulated by laws.
Article 13
The government shall protect indigenous peoples’ traditional biological diversity 
knowledge and intellectual creations, and promote the development thereof. The 
related issues shall be provided for by the laws.
Article 14
The government shall formulate economic policies for indigenous peoples and 
give guidance on conservation and utilization of natural resources for the pur-
pose of developing indigenous economy in accordance with the will of indig-
enous peoples and characteristics of environmental resources. 
Article 15
The government shall generously allocate budget for indigenous peoples and su-
pervise utilities providers to actively improve transportation, post, telecommu-
nication, irrigation works, tourism and other public construction in indigenous 
peoples’ region.
For the purpose of implementing the affairs as set out in the preceding para-
graph, the government may establish construction funds of indigenous peoples’ 
regions. The fund’s utilization procedure shall be stipulated by laws.
Article 16
The government shall formulate indigenous housing policies, give guidance to 
indigenous persons to construct, purchase or lease dwellings, and actively pro-
mote the tribal renewal project.
Article 17
The government shall protect indigenous peoples’ employment rights, provide 
vocational trainings which are suitable for the conditions and characteristics of 
indigenous society, give guidance to indigenous persons to obtain professional 
qualifications and technician certificates, build complete indigenous employ-
ment service network to protect their employment opportunities and fair remu-
neration and promotion.
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The protection of indigenous peoples’ employment rights shall be provided for 
bylaws.
Article 18
The government shall establish indigenous peoples’ development fund for de-
veloping indigenous peoples’ economy and assisting indigenous businesses. The 
sources of the fund shall include budget allocated by the central government 
in accordance with the budget procedure, compensations made to indigenous 
peoples’ land, reparation, revenues, funds distributed in accordance with other 
relevant laws and regulations as well as other revenues.
Article 19
Indigenous persons may undertake the following non-profit seeking activities in 
indigenous peoples’ regions:
1 Hunting wild animals.
2 Collecting wild plants and fungus.
3 Collecting minerals, rocks and soils.
4 Utilizing water resources.
The above activities can only be conducted for traditional culture, ritual or self-
consumption. 
Article 20
The government recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural re-
sources.
The government shall establish indigenous peoples’ land investigation and man-
agement committee to investigate and manage indigenous peoples’ land. The or-
ganization and other related matters of the committee shall be stipulated by law. 
The restoration, acquisition, disposal, plan, management and utilization of the 
land and sea area owned or occupied by indigenous peoples or indigenous per-
sons shall be regulated by laws.
Article 21
The government or private party shall consult indigenous peoples and obtain 
their consent or participation, and share with indigenous peoples benefits gen-
erated from land development, resource utilization, ecology conservation and 
academic researches in indigenous people’s regions.
In the event that the government, laws or regulations impose restrictions on in-
digenous peoples’ utilization of their land and natural resources, the govern-
ment shall first consult with indigenous peoples or indigenous persons and ob-
tain their consent. 
A fixed proportion of revenues generated in accordance with the preceding two 
paragraphs shall be allocated to the indigenous peoples’ development fund to 
serve as returns or compensations.
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Article 22
The government shall obtain consent from the locally affected indigenous peo-
ples and formulate a common management mechanism before establishing na-
tional parks, national scenery, forest district, ecological protection zone, recrea-
tion zone and other resource management institutions. The regulations shall be 
made by the central relevant authority jointly with the central indigenous affairs 
authority.
Article 23
The government shall respect indigenous peoples’ rights to choose their life 
style, customs, clothing, modes of social and economic institutions, methods of 
resource utilization and types of land ownership and management.
Article 24 
The government shall formulate public health and medical policies for indig-
enous peoples in accordance with the characteristics of indigenous peoples, in-
corporate indigenous peoples’ regions into the national medical network, imple-
ment indigenous peoples’ health care, establish comprehensive and long-term 
health care, emergency care and evacuation system, and protect indigenous peo-
ples’ health and physical safety.
The government shall respect the traditional medicine and health methods of 
indigenous peoples and undertake researches and promotions.
Article 25
The government shall establish a natural disaster prevention and relief system 
in indigenous peoples’ regions and natural disaster prevention priority zones to 
protect physical and property safety of indigenous peoples.
Article 26
The government shall actively implement social welfare for indigenous peoples, 
undertake planning to establish indigenous peoples’ social security system and 
give special protection to the rights of indigenous children as well as women and 
mentally or physically disabled indigenous persons. 
The government may provide subsidies for those indigenous persons who lack 
resources to participate in the social insurance scheme or use medical and wel-
fare resources. 
Article 27
The government shall actively promote savings and cooperative businesses by 
indigenous peoples, give guidance to the management thereof, and grant them 
with preferential tax measures.
Article 28
The government shall provide protection and assistance for indigenous persons 
living outside indigenous peoples’ regions in respect of their health, accommo-
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dation, finance, education, caring, employment, medical care and adaptation to 
the society. 
Article 29
In order to protect the dignity and fundamental human rights of indigenous 
peoples, the government shall provide for a separate chapter devoted to indig-
enous peoples’ human rights in the national human rights legislations.
Article 30
The government shall respect tribal languages, traditional customs, cultures and 
values of indigenous peoples in dealing with indigenous affairs, making laws or 
implementing judicial and administration remedial procedures, notarization, 
mediation, arbitration or any other similar procedure for the purpose of pro-
tecting the lawful rights of indigenous peoples. In the event that an indigenous 
person does not understand the Chinese language, an interpreter who speaks the 
tribal language shall be provided.
For the purpose of protecting indigenous peoples’ rights and access to the judici-
ary, indigenous peoples’ court or tribunal may be established.
Article 31
The government may not store toxic materials in indigenous peoples’ regions in 
contrary to the will of indigenous peoples.
Article 32 
The government may not forcefully evict indigenous persons from their land, 
except in the case of imminent and obvious danger.
Indigenous persons shall be properly accommodated and compensated for loss-
es suffered as a result of forced eviction as set out in the preceding paragraph.
Article 33
The government shall actively promote exchanges and cooperation between in-
digenous peoples and international indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in 
economical, social, political, cultural, religious, academic and ecological issues.
Article 34 
The relevant authority shall amend, make or repeal relevant regulations in ac-
cordance with the principles of this law within three years from its effectiveness.
Article 35
This law takes effect upon promulgation. 
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Indigenous Peoples Reservation Land 
Development Management Procedure
Executive Yuan March 26, 1990 Ordinance no. Tai-(79)-nei-tzu-ti-05901 Execu-
tive Yuan March 18, 1998 Amendment ordinance Tai-(87)-nei-tzu-ti-11303 
Article I ■ General Provisions
Section 1
 Said procedure is promulgated pursuant to Section 37 of the Mountain Slope 
Conservation & Utilization Law and Section 17 paragraph 2 of the Agrarian 
Development Law. 
Section 2
 The term indigenous peoples central authority refers to the Ministry of In-
teriors; provincial (municipality) authority, the provincial (municipality) 
government; county (city) authority, the local county (city) government. 
The Council of Agriculture of Executive Yuan and the central authority con-
cerned will administer jointly all agrarian matters. 
 The executing authority of said procedure is the village (town/city/ district) 
administration office. 
Section 3
 The indigenous people’s reservation land herein refers to the mountain land 
originally reserved by the indigenous peoples administration office and res-
ervation land legally delineated and annexed for indigenous peoples to safe-
guard their livelihood. 
Section 4
 The indigenous peoples herein refer to mountain indigenous peoples and 
plain-land indigenous peoples. The status recognition of the indigenous peo-
ples stated in the foregoing paragraph is as determined by the Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, Executive Yuan. 
Section 5
 The general registration of indigenous people’s reservation land is conducted 
by local registration authorities as per assignment of the provincial (munici-
pality) Indigenous affairs department. Said land is under the ownership of 
the Republic of China and its administration authority is Council of Indig-
enous Peoples, Executive Yuan. Said land should be properly identified as 
indigenous people’s reservation land in the “remarks” column of the land 
registration book. 
 The provincial (municipality) Indigenous affairs department together with 
the original land administration authority should assign the local registra-
tion office to transfer the administration authority for public land duly reg-
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istered and delineated or annexed as indigenous peoples reservation land to 
Council of Indigenous Peoples , as well as identify said land as indigenous 
peoples reservation land under the same procedure as aforementioned. 
Section 6
 The village (town/city/district) administration office of the locality where 
reservation land is located should organize a reservation land rights evalua-
tion committee to handle the following matters: 
■ Investigation and mediation of indigenous people’s reservation land right 
disputes. 
■ Evaluation of indigenous peoples reservation land allocation, reposses-
sion, deed title transfer, compensation-free usage, or public school utili-
zation applications. 
■ Negotiation of indigenous people’s reservation land reallocation compen-
sation. 
■ Evaluation of indigenous people’s reservation land lease applications. 
 The aforementioned reservation land rights evaluation committee should be 
composed of four-fifths indigenous peoples. Organization guidelines are as 
determined by Council of Indigenous Peoples. 
 The indigenous people’s reservation land applications should be submitted to 
the Indigenous Peoples Reservation Land Rights Evaluation Committee for 
evaluation. Village (town/city/district) administration offices should submit 
applications to the committee for evaluation within one month after accept-
ance; and the committee should complete evaluation within a month and 
present an evaluation report. In case report is late, then the village (town/
city/district) administration office concerned should submit application to 
the higher government authority concerned for approbation. 
 The village (town/city/district) administration office should submit the in-
digenous Peoples Reservation Land Rights Evaluation Committee findings, 
other than those provided in clause 1 of paragraph 1, to the higher govern-
ment authority concerned for approbation. 
Article II ■ Land Administration
Section 7
 Council of Indigenous Peoples together with the relevant authorities con-
cerned should assist the aborigines in establishing the indigenous people’s 
reservation land cultivation rights, land surface rights, as well as lease rights 
and ownership rights. 
Section 8
 The indigenous peoples should request the services of Council of Indigenous 
Peoples in applying for the cultivation rights registration with the land ad-
ministration authority for the following indigenous people’s reservation land: 
■ Land that the indigenous peoples has opened and cultivated prior to the 
enactment of said procedure. 
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■ Land that the government zoning plan designated as pastoral land and 
breeding land, or the Urban Planning Act has designated as agricultural 
zone, conservation zone farm, and arid land. 
Section 9
 Indigenous peoples should request the services of Council of Indigenous 
Peoples in applying for the land surface rights registration with the land 
administration authority for the following indigenous people’s reservation 
land: 
■ Land that the indigenous peoples has leased for forestation and complet-
ed forestation work prior to the enactment of said procedure. 
■ Indigenous peoples have forestation skills and the government allocated 
a forestation land, designated by the zoning plan or urban planning pro-
gram as the forest land of conservation zone. 
Article II ■ School Education
Section 10
 Size of cultivation rights or land surface rights grants for applications accord-
ing to the preceding two provisions should be based on the number of indig-
enous peoples in a household and should not exceed the following standards: 
■ For land designated as pastoral land or breeding land in the zoning plan, 
land grant per person is 0.6 hectare for farmland or 1 hectare for other 
purposes; combination of farm and other purposes land, the average ratio 
of the two standards; for forest land, 1.5 hectare. 
■ For land designated as agricultural zone, conservation zone farm, and 
arid land in the Urban Planning Act, land grant per person is 0.6 hectare 
for farmland or 1 hectare for arid land; combination of farm and arid 
land, the average ratio of the two standards; for conservation zone forest 
land, 1.5 hectare. 
■ Land grant established on the foregoing provisions is not subject to 
change with household population increase or decrease. Maximum land 
grant area per household is 20 hectares; however, land terrain limitations 
will allow an additional area of 10% (maximum). 
Section 11
 The village (town/city/district) should recover, within the prescribed dead-
line, the land area exceeding the foregoing measurement standards in the 
indigenous peoples reservation land cultivation right or land surface rights 
granted to aborigines. If land was used for farming, recovery should be af-
fected after the harvest season and before the commencement of the next 
planting season. 
Section 12
 The indigenous peoples should limit land surface rights establishment within 
the base of his/her existing house of residence in the reservation land; area of 
said land shall be based on the area of the building and its appertaining facili-
ties. 
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 In adaptation to living requirements, indigenous peoples should apply for a 
land surface right on reservation land needed for the legally permitted build-
ing construction. 
 Maximum area of the land stated in foregoing two paragraphs is 0.1 hectare 
per household. 
 Indigenous peoples together with Council of Indigenous Peoples should reg-
ister the land surface rights mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 with the local 
registry office concerned. 
Section 13
 Indigenous peoples intending to engage in industrial/commercial business 
should submit a business plan to the village (town/city/district) adminis-
tration office for the evaluation of the Indigenous Peoples Reservation land 
Evaluation Committee and approval of the municipality or county (city) 
government authorities concerned. Land lease should comply with the le-
gal provisions concerning building construction on indigenous peoples land; 
maximum lease period is nine years, upon its expiration, contract should be 
renewed for continued lease. 
 The aforementioned business plan should not obstruct environmental re-
source conservation, national land preservation, or cause pollution. 
Section 14
 Indigenous people’s religious building or facility construction should have the 
approval of the religious authorities concerned. A construction plan should 
be submitted to the village (town/city/district) administration office for the 
evaluation of the Indigenous Peoples Reservation land Evaluation Commit-
tee and approval of municipality or county (city) authorities. Upon approval, 
free usage of land is granted and said building/facility may be constructed on 
indigenous peoples land in accordance with legal provisions. Maximum lease 
period is nine years, upon its expiration; contract should be renewed for con-
tinued lease. Land area used for said purpose should not exceed 0.3 hectares. 
Section 15
 Indigenous peoples land grants for cultivation rights, land surface rights, 
lease rights, or gratis land use rights is non-transferable or non-leasable, ex-
cept to Indigenous heir or chosen successor, another indigenous member of 
the original beneficiary household, or indigenous peoples within three-de-
gree kinship. 
 Indigenous peoples intending to expand business area or facilitate farming 
operations in the aforementioned aborigine reservation land should apply 
for land usage conversion with the municipality or county (city) authorities 
concerned. Right amendment registration follows approval. 
Section 16
 Indigenous peoples violating the provisions in paragraph 1 of the preceding 
section is subject to land repossession by village (town/city/district) admin-
istration office and the following penalties: 
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■ Court petition for the cancellation of cultivation right or land surface 
right registration or 
■ Termination of lease or gratis usage grant 
Section 17
 Cultivation or land surface rights obtained through said procedure inher-
ited and personally operation or employed for private use for a period of five 
years after registration, and condition has been verified factual, may be con-
verted to land ownership registration upon the personal application of the 
cultivation or land surface rights holder with the presence of the authorized 
clerk of Council of Indigenous Peoples. Application should be filed at the lo-
cal land registry office. 
 Purpose and usage of said land has been converted pursuant to the urban 
planning or non urban land zoning conversion plan prior to the land owner-
ship transfer application shall not affect the cultivation or land surface rights 
holder’s entitlement for land ownership transfer. 
Section 18
 Upon acquiring ownership of a reservation land, said ownership may only be 
transferred to another aborigine, except for land legally defined for a particu-
lar purpose. The aforementioned legally defined purpose refers to the land 
the government requires pursuant to national economic policies or public 
enterprise endeavors. 
Section 19
 In the event of the demise of the cultivation, land surface, lease or gratis us-
age rights holder, and upon the absence of an heir, or inability to personally 
cultivate, relocation or career transfer of the heir making him/her incapable 
of inheriting, then upon the resolution of the Indigenous Peoples Reserva-
tion Land Rights Evaluation Committee, the village (town/city/district) ad-
ministration office execute repossession proceedings. 
 A court appeal should be filed for the cancellation of the aforementioned cul-
tivation or land surface right registration. However, if right has expired, then 
the municipality or county (city) government authority concerned is author-
ized to cancel said right registration. 
Section 20
 A repossessed aborigine reservation land should be reallocated to another lo-
cal aborigine within thirty days after the official announcement of the village 
(town/city/district) administration office under the following order of prior-
ity: 
■ Indigenous peoples whose land allocation area is insufficient and has tra-
ditional relation with the particular land concerned. 
■ Individuals who have not received any land allocation. 
■ Individuals allocated with smaller land allocation. Indigenous peoples 
who transferred or subleased aborigine reservation land illegally are not 
eligible for allocation application. 
 The village (town/city/district) administration office should require the 
owner of the improvements on the repossessed aborigine reservation land, 
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as stated in paragraph 1, to harvest or remove said improvements within a 
given deadline; failure to harvest or remove improvements after said deadline 
shall place said matters under the discretion of the village (town/city/district) 
administration office. 
 Should the aforementioned improvement be legitimate crop or building, 
then upon the valuation of the village (town/city/district) administration of-
fice, the new land grant holder should compensate the previous holder for 
said improvements and assume ownership. 
Article III ■ Land Development, Usage and Conservation
Section 21
 Council of Indigenous Peoples, provincial (municipal) Indigenous affairs de-
partment, or county (city) government should plan the development, usage, 
and conservation of the indigenous peoples reservation land located with-
in its area of jurisdiction, based on development conditions and land usage 
characteristics. The aforementioned development, usage, and conservation 
plans should be implemented under a cooperative, common, or assigned ar-
rangement. 
Section 22
 Government authorities concerned should implement aborigine reservation 
land rezoning or community reintegration as provided by law. 
Section 23
 In the event that special government purposes shall require the use of public 
aborigine reservation land, the authorities concerned (which requires the use 
of land) should prepare a land use plan and submit plan for the evaluation 
and opinion of the Indigenous Peoples Reservation Land Rights Evaluation 
Committee and approval of the higher authorities concerned. Legitimate us-
age, lease, or acquisition should follow. However public production land us-
age is limited to the village (town/city/district) administration office require-
ments; land for agricultural experimental practice is limited to agricultural 
labs or schools. 
Section 24
 Indigenous peoples development or construction endeavors should be pro-
vided priority assistance to foster indigenous peoples reservation land min-
ing, sand & gravel, tourism & amusement, as well as industrial resource or 
social welfare institution establishment, providing said pursuits should not 
obstruct national land preservation, environmental resource conservation, 
indigenous peoples livelihood, and indigenous peoples administration mat-
ters. 
 Indigenous peoples reservation land lease applications pursuant to the above 
development and construction should be accompanied by a development or 
construction plan, submitted to the respective village (town/city/ district) 
administration office for the evaluation of the Indigenous Peoples Reser-
vation Land Rights Evaluation Committee and approval for the provincial 
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(municipal) authorities concerned. Then upon the approval of the industry 
authorities concerned and issuance of the relevant development or construc-
tion documents, lease right is granted to aborigine applicant. Maximum lease 
period is nine years; lease may be renewed upon expiration according to the 
original regulations and procedure. 
 The aforementioned development of construction plan should include the 
following documents: 
■ Progressive annual development or construction plan. 
■ Land use application layout; should be expressed in a 1/5000 scale relief 
map and cadastre. 
■ Land registration title. 
■ Indigenous peoples employment or retraining guidance plan. 
 A thirty-day announcement period from the village (town/city/district) ad-
ministration office is required in the case of lease applications from state and 
private enterprises or enterprises without aborigine status (hereafter referred 
as non-aborigine) for development and construction. Upon the absence of an 
aborigine contender application during said period, the provisions in para-
graph 2 apply. 
 Council of Indigenous Peoples should formulate guidance measures provid-
ing the indigenous peoples employment and retraining plans as provided in 
paragraph 3 of item 4. 
Section 25
 Lease renewal applied pursuant to the foregoing provision should be made 
with the original development or construction approving authorities and ac-
cording to the development or construction application procedures. In the 
event the supporting documents for the renewal is the same as those submit-
ted during the initial application should be attached to the application, then 
reference to the initial application documents should be stated on the appli-
cation thus making it unnecessary to attach related documents. Application 
is exempted from the paragraph 4 requirement of the preceding provision. 
Section 26
 In the case of a land ownership right granted to an aborigine based on a de-
velopment or construction application filed pursuant to Section 24, negoti-
ated price should be submitted to the provincial (municipal) authorities for 
consent and investment participation. Investment rights transfers are limited 
to aborigines only. 
 A compensation price negotiation should be conducted with indigenous 
peoples possessing cultivation rights, land surface rights, or lease rights; 
upon compensation payment, the land management authority should notify 
the local land registry office for the cancellation of said cultivation right or 
land surface right registration. 
Section 27
 Under one of the following circumstances, indigenous peoples reservation 
land lease granted pursuant to the provisions stated in Sections 23 to 25 
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should be revoked and land repossessed; no compensation should be paid to 
facility investments made: 
■ Development or construction is not consistent with the development or 
construction plan and any plan amendment approval or development/ 
construction deadline extension has been processed. 
■ User violated plan. 
■ Subletting or surrendering right to another 
■ Other conditions for lease termination provided in the lease agreement. 
Section 28
 A non- indigenous peoples already leasing indigenous peoples reservation 
land and continuing to engage in cultivation or to use said property prior to 
the enactment of said procedure could continue with said lease. 
 Lease renewal of land leased for cultivation, forestation but later converted 
for building land through a new urban plan, revised urban plan or non-ur-
ban land usage conversion, shall be limited to 0.03 hectares per household. 
 Non-indigenous people whose domicile is within a mountain village (town/ 
city/district) should legally lease, for his/her housing base, aborigine reser-
vation land for building purposes. Area of land should not exceed 0.03 hec-
tares. 
Section 29
 The foregoing leased aborigine reservation land could not be sublet or trans-
ferred to another person. Violation of the foregoing provisions shall result in 
lease revocation and land repossession. 
Section 30
 Rental of indigenous people’s reservation land is paid to the municipality or 
village (town/city/ district) treasury authority; and said funds are used for 
the management and economic development of the aborigine reservation 
land. Rental management and utilization plan is prepared by Council of In-
digenous. 
Article IV ■ Forest Produce Management
Section 31
 Unless otherwise provided in said procedure, the natural forest produce mat-
ters of indigenous people’s reservation land are determined by the forest pro-
duce settlement regulations. 
Section 32
 In an effort to foster indigenous people’s reservation land development or 
business development budget preparation, aborigine reservation land log-
ging plan proposals should be prepared by the village (town/city/district) 
and submitted the central forestry authorities for approval. Public bidding 
through the municipality or county (city) authorities concerned follows ap-
probation. 
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Section 33
 The foregoing logging plan should ensure continued productivity and should 
not obstruct national land preservation as a rule, as well as be consistent with 
the indigenous people’s administration policies and land utilization plan. 
Section 34
 Under one of the following circumstances, application for indigenous peo-
ple’s reservation land nature forest produce acquisition may be submitted to 
the village (town/city/district) administration office for the approval of the 
municipality or county (city) authorities concerned: 
■ Construction materials required for the urgent rescue/restoration of dis-
aster situation or reconstruction of mountain public facility. 
■ Gratis acquisition of byproducts or other materials for personal use with-
in the area designated by the municipality or county (city) government 
granted to indigenous peoples. 
■ Bamboo materials needed for the fungus cultivation or handicraft pro-
duction of indigenous peoples. 
■ Removal of wood obstructing forestation, land clearing, or operations at 
the average of 30 cubic meters per hectare of lumber or less. 
Section 35
 Loggers violating the foregoing provisions are subject to legal prosecution 
and confiscation of illegal lumber or logs; if confiscation is impossible then 
violators are liable to compensation. 
Section 36
 Cutting inspection documents for bamboo and wood inside the indigenous 
people’s reservation land forestation area should comply with the forest prod-
uct logging/acquisition inspection regulations. 
Section 37
 Bamboo and trees the village (town/city/district) administration office plant-
ed in the indigenous peoples reservation land belongs to the ownership of the 
village (town/city/district) administration office. 
Section 38
 Under one the following circumstances, the respective government authori-
ties concerned should restrict logging operations for ecological resource 
preservation and national land preservation purposes: 
■ Sloping land or thin soil stratum where reforestation is difficult. 
■ Logging could result in soil erosion or affect public welfare. 
■ Site inspection revealed need for enhanced conservation efforts. 
■ Site is located in a catchment area, river source belt, coastal wash terrain, 
coastal windbreaker terrain, or sand dune region. 
■ Trees used as stool or culture plant.
■ Trees under logging ban due to ecology, scenery, national monument, or 
relic preservation or other prohibition reasons. 
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Section 39
 Indigenous peoples should be employed for the labor, except for technical 
manpower, needed in aborigine reservation land or public forest logging op-
erations. 
Section 40
 The provincial (municipal) and county (city) government authorities should 
meet with the authorities concerned for indigenous peoples reservation land 
forestation for forestation guidance and incentive policy promulgation, how-
ever said guidance and incentive policymaking is under the jurisdiction of 
Council of Indigenous Peoples. 
Article V ■ Addenda 
Section 41
 In the event indigenous peoples reservation land and land improvements 
which indigenous peoples may rightfully use is placed under use or logging 
(on reservation land) restriction due to government public construction re-
quirements, then damages said aborigine incurred are due for compensation. 
Section 42
 An indigenous peoples legally acquiring ownership of indigenous peoples 
reservation land may apply for a mortgage loan in said land. 
Section 43
 Said procedure takes effect on date of enactment. 
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A New Partnership between the Indigenous 
Peoples and the Government of Taiwan 
(Chinese: 原住民族和台灣政府新的夥伴關係) is a treaty-like document 
signed in Ponso no Tao on 1999-09-10 by the representatives of the indigenous 
peoples of Taiwan and the then-presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian (who 
went on to win the 2000 presidential election for the Democratic Progressive 
Party).
1 The seven articles in the documents include:
2 Recognizing the inherent sovereignty of Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples
3 Promoting autonomy for Indigenous Peoples
4 Concluding a land treaty with Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples
5 Reinstating traditional names of Indigenous communities and natural land-
marks
6 Recovering traditional territories of Indigenous communities and Peoples
7 Recovering use of traditional natural resources and furthering the develop-
ment of self-determination
8 Providing legislative (parliamentary) representation for each Indigenous 
People
The document later became the official indigenous policy for the DPP Govern-
ment. However, as the document was signed before Shui-bian Chen became 
the President; the efficacy of the document has been contested. On 2002-10-19, 
Chen, as the head of state and government, reaffirmed the new partnership be-
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Taiwan is also facing a problematic moment on a lot of land claims from indig-
enous communities. Claims are various and express a lot on human-land rela-
tions. I expand the realm of claims into murmurings, complains, explanations, 
requests, discourses, actions of resistances, expressions and representations of 
feelings, guesses, pleas, petitions, suits, accusations, charges or assertions or even 
joking and indirect criticism from an ethnographical curiosity to see how indig-
enous peoples concept land rights or resource appropriations that happen in the 
situation of the encounters between two or more sets of “people”, “land”, “govern-
ment” and “sovereignty” regimes. 
 I ask what are the characteristics of land rights that indigenous people feel 
misunderstood, ignored, distorted or intruded by others they have encountered 
in Taroko area for the passing century till now to see what evidences and proofs 
or discourses they offer to claim and legitimate over their rights of land in differ-
ent historical, economic, political and legal situations. I will also investigate on 
how they initiate, mobilize, organize or just act to express their claims and dic-
tate how the societies and the states at referencing scales respond to these claims 
and see what kind of rights and to what extents do indigenous people have ac-
cessed or distorted or created on land till now.
 Through the five research questions raised above, and as a result of being ac-
quainted with Taroko contexts, I began to investigate and answer the following:
1 How do indigenous peoples conceive or construct discourses as evidence and 
proof to support their land rights claims? As Appell suggests, ‘we should be-
gin with a single productive resource and work back to the individual(s) who 
have interests of various kinds in that resource’. I will ‘discriminate among the 
types of interest held by an individual in any single piece of claim I encounter 
in the field, and among the kinds of social relationships obtaining between 
individual and any referencing scales of members’ (Appell 1976). 
2 The next step is to ascertain whether or not such interests are recognized as 
emic categories by the wider social group, and only protected through mutual 
recognitions or codification in rules and laws (rights) that may intercom-
municate with the etic ones (Appell1976, 1984; Wiber 1991: 471-472). I will 
examine dispassionately, yet critically, the claims made for land rights in the 
ideologies and practices of different agents at different times and in different 
political situations. 
3 I am particularly concerned with the transfer of ideas between different 
groups and contexts that occurs when claims are made in the Taroko area. 
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Claims are useful for expressing ideas in particular contexts, but seek to go 
beyond such demonstrations and statements of the obvious in order to ask 
how they come into play in the accessing of land rights and ideological and 
political discourse more generally. 
4 The examination of institutions – formal, tangible organizations, legislation 
and regulations, and the unwritten social and cultural norms – will enable a 
more thorough understanding of exactly where and why conflicts, claims and 
perverse outcomes occur; and, more positively, how programs and policies 
can be developed based on seeking out and creating compatibilities between 
sets of rules (Gerritsen and Straton 2006: 181). 
5 This, in turn, may further enable all participants to restructure their sets of 
rules to better serve their shared purposes (Ostrom 2005). Taiwan is also 
‘poised within a problematic moment in the charting of global and regional, 
legal and developmental policy pertaining to land environmental resource 
management, governance, and the rights of indigenous peoples’ (Roseman 
2003: 138). Thus, the country is in need of such an area analysis in order to 
shed light on future policy implementation. Moreover, an ethnography of the 
human-land relationships in the Taroko area is needed in order to under-
stand the reasons why conflicts are happening now and also for future policy 
suggestions supported by the Indigenous Basic Law (2005) and further law 
constructions that indicate the importance of ‘respecting and recognition of 
indigenous ways of conceptualizing and management of properties’ (Indig-
enous Basic Law 2005: Article 20; Yang, Chih-wei 2005). 
During the time of doctoral research, I found the history part is the most dif-
ficult part to study that needs mature ability on Japanese to find material scat-
tered in many different places that I still found troubles to deal with. But based 
on some basic study and oral histories, I had chance to reconstruct the forma-
tion of a special area as Taroko to find the legal and administrative structures 
there. Based on this foundation, I have clues to find the reasons of land claims 
last from the Japanese time till now. Besides interpretations on histories, I found 
land claims are developed in two dimensions: invididualization and collectiviza-
tion of land rights. I consider that reservation land right conflicts raise issues of 
individualization thus destroy collective monitor and bridge to capitalism that 
indigenous people are not so helped much. I found the governments and capi-
talists still appropriated indigenous land rights through individualization of in-
digenous land right in mining and industry projects. To get rid of bad effects of 
individualization, indigenous people think about collective rights. The practices 
of territory mapping and river protection and autonomy illustrated the way in-
digenous people hoped to find their sovereignty and land rights back in collec-
tive control. My thesis thus consists of the following chapters. 
 In chapter 2, I describe the formation of the area of Taroko and the state law 
frames introduced in the indigenous areas. The way in which the Japanese au-
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thorities viewed the indigenous people’s ways of lives, personalities or characters 
can be encompassed by what I call perspectives of ‘state of nature’. The term ‘state 
of nature’ has been used by Western political philosophers to describe the con-
ditions or characters of those ‘others’ that are situated in pre-state conditions. I 
have adopted this term to discuss how the Japanese authorities started from this 
premise in order to develop policies on the rule of indigenous peoples and natu-
ral resources with the aim of accomplishing a ‘state of the nature’ that translated 
into control of these people and resources. 
 As for land tenures, most of the lands in Taiwan were owned by Japanese 
authorities. In respect of the indigenous area, I have adopted the frame used by 
a Japanese officer, Iwaki Kamehiko, who was in charge of indigenous land man-
agement during the final years of Japanese rule. He separated indigenous lands 
into three categories: (1) In 1934, some 51% of the total indigenous population 
(84,000) lived in indigenous villages and were allowed to remain at this original 
location; (2) some 24% of the indigenous population would be ‘mixed up’ and 
recombined into new living groups; and (3) some 25% would be moved to new 
areas. In other words, generally speaking, at least half of the indigenous areas of 
Taiwan would experience some level of migration. In my field area in Taroko, 
almost all the indigenous people have experience of these policies. Based on his-
torical analyses, I focus on how the Taroko people claim land rights through 
mapping activities in different contexts.
 My explorations in chapters 3 and 4 echo Iwaki Kamehiko’s categories and 
find that indigenous people in Taroko have diverse experiences of migration that 
can be differentiated into a further three categories: (1) diaspora: people almost 
entirely removed from their relations with their original lands almost because of 
forced or semi-forced migration; (2) hybrid: mixed communities formed from 
people of different origins, from different tribes or villages with different cus-
toms or gaya (customary rules); and (3) in situ communities: people still living on 
their original lands but subject to control by new political regimes.
 Recent mapping activities related to the Taroko people reflect these three 
contexts of land and people relations. Above, I introduced some of the mapping 
projects and processes that I have participated in or observed both inside and 
around the Taroko area. These mapping projects take place at different levels and 
have various sponsors, initiators and practitioners. The largest mapping project I 
participated in was the Indigenous Traditional Territorial and Land Survey (IT-
TLS) sponsored by the Council of Indigenous Peoples in central government. 
This project dealt with all the mapping initiatives and implementations in all of 
the 55 indigenous townships in Taiwan over a period of five years (2001-2006). 
The Taroko area hosts three townships: Shoulin (秀林鄉), Wanlong (萬榮鄉) 
and Choushi (卓溪鄉) and is also involved in this national mapping project. 
Over the decades, I have observed that indigenous people have always viewed 
(and therefore participate in) mappings as a tool for expressing their land claims.
 In chapter 5, I discuss some of the legal or legislative processes undertaken by 
legislators and officers or indigenous activists in order to see how they concep-
tualize lands or territories, something that is necessary for the revitalization of 
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indigenous rights. I will illustrate some processes both before and after a break-
through regarding the stipulation of the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (IPBL 
2005) with a view to understanding how activists use ideas about lands and ter-
ritories as legal devices to help in their claims to indigenous land rights. I will 
present a case study from the Taroko area to show how the Truku people are 
advocating and acting to achieve autonomy and to illustrate trends in the legal 
sphere, in discourse and in indigenous movements. I specifically focus on how 
the Truku build on the matrix between lands, sovereignty, people and rights in 
order to bring an image of autonomy that they think would avoid many of the 
problems that they are suffering now (and have suffered in the past). I conclude 
that legislating is another way of mapping an ideal Utopia of lands and territo-
ries. 
 Aside from these mappings of the Utopia of indigenous territory, many land 
claims also occur in the legal and institutional spheres. Indeed, reservation lands 
are a common and frequent arena for claims. Reservation lands mean lands pre-
viously reserved for indigenous future use and titling.
 Indigenous peoples in Taiwan have been titled or granted limited reservation 
land rights since Japanese colonial rule. However, this land tenure still conflicts 
with indigenous ideas and practices in a number of ways. In chapter 6, I ex-
plore some of the major types of conflicts and land claims that result from the 
encounters between etic state substantive laws and the customary laws or gaya 
(indigenous term for customary rules). Based on approximately 400 land claims 
cases, collected from different levels of legal and governmental institutions, from 
interviews and interaction with local indigenous claimants in the Taroko area, 
I reveal that state laws, such as the Indigenous Reservation Land Management 
Procedure (IRLMP) (原住民保留地管理辦法), which processes indigenous 
reservation land titling using four fundamental procedures, are the major bat-
tlefields for land conflicts. My research suggests that, as a result of these four 
procedures, which proceed from: (1) land measurement and survey; (2) registra-
tion of superficies (3) duration of actual usufructs; to (4) the granting of titles, 
ever stronger individualistic ideas are being suggested and built among indig-
enous individuals and communities. Gradually emerging from these procedures 
is the possibility of a person who is supported by individualistic ideas based on a 
Roman-Japan-Chinese civil law system. Emerging from these four procedures is 
a law-individualism that moves towards what McPherson (1962) defines as ‘pos-
sessive individualism’, which equips people to be ‘[…] the sole proprietor of his 
or her skills and owes nothing to society for them.’ From this perspective, this 
chapter uses case studies to show how reservation land is increasingly linked by 
this law-individualism to capitalism, which is not well embedded in indigenous 
communities in the Taroko area.
 Many studies have detailed analyses of the political and economic processes 
involved in the setting up of cement and power plant industrial districts, but they 
lack an ethnographic perspective on the processes of indigenous movements and 
on the processes of being embedded in cement industrial districts and other spe-
cial national projects such as hydropower plants and national parks. In chapter 
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7, I illustrate how indigenous people have played a role (from minor to major) 
in all these processes. This is necessary to understand all of these ‘development’ 
scenarios. Among these scenarios I have found a neo-liberalism hegemony in 
the Taroko area that constructed itself through what Davey Harvey described as 
‘accumulation by dispossession’. I will focus on the metaphor of ‘money’ in in-
digenous communities in order to discuss the encroaching of this hegemony on 
development scenarios.
 In chapters 8 and 9, I will describe how the indigenous locals and some gov-
ernment institutions constructed new governances on ‘ambiguous commons’ 
through ‘uncertain co-managements’ of river protection in three communities 
inside the Tarako area: Skadang, Pratan and Meqreq in the period 2000-2010. I 
found indigenous locals were expecting to achieve co-management regimes that 
would support livelihoods, ecology and cultural identity. However, the govern-
ments concerned could only devote limited efforts because of the constraints of 
insufficient law infrastructure. 
 Contingency is a term I use to describe results coming from unknown or 
unpredictable causes and effects in the process of co-management implementa-
tions of river protection. I use the methodology advocated by Vyada et al. (1999) 
– ‘evenemental or event ecology’ – to express the visible line of causes and effects 
that threads through my observations. For those results that did not trace any 
clear evenemental lines, I try to contextualize the situation with other indirect 
information, such as rumours, gossip or my own experiences. Though it may 
seem that I use the term ‘contingency’ to express frustration about the failures 
of the three cases presented, possible lines of cause and effect are still illustrated 
in order to make some suggestions about further implementation of co-man-
agement of river protection. Ambiguity about properties, local management ca-
pacity, legal infrastructure and the interpretation and implementation of laws, 
along with ideas of self-determination are the main issues that are contextual-
ized in order to reach the conclusion that indigenous locals are claiming land 
rights through these collective actions. Local ideas on ‘sovereignty’ will illustrate 
these land claims, which are initiating a new contextualization of the land, hu-
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源珍貴必須被開發的驅力(沙金含量可抵國家預算)，日本人終於發動大軍征伐太魯
閣區域，以行遂其成為掌控全島自然資源之現代國家(state of the nature)。從自然狀









































































































Taiwan gaat door een moeilijke fase ten aanzien van landclaims door inheemse 
gemeenschappen. Claims zijn divers en vormen de uitdrukking van een scala 
aan mens-land relaties. Ik onderzoek deze variëteit aan claims vanuit een et-
nografische nieuwsgierigheid in termen van gemopper, klachten, verklaringen, 
verzoeken, discussies, daden van verzet, uitdrukking van gevoelens, vermoe-
dens, pleidooien, rechtszaken, beschuldigingen, aanklachten of zelfs grappen en 
indirecte kritiek. Ik doe dit om te achterhalen hoe inheemse volken denken over 
landrechten en vervreemding van hulpbronnen dat plaats vindt in de confronta-
tie tussen twee of meer groepen mensen en overheden. Het is ook een confron-
tatie tussen verschillende regiems van soevereiniteit. 
Ik onderzoek wat de kenmerken zijn van de landrechten waardoor inheemse 
mensen zich onbegrepen voelen, genegeerd, en bedreigd door anderen die in 
de afgelopen eeuw het Taroko-gebied zijn ingetrokken en wat het bewijs is of de 
discussies op basis waarvan zij hun rechten op het land claimen in verschillende 
historische, economische, politieke en wettelijke situaties. Ik heb ook onderzocht 
wat zij ondernemen en hoe ze zich organiseren om hun claims tot uitdrukking 
te brengen. 
Op basis van mijn bekendheid met het Taroko-gebied ben ik onderzoek gaan 
doen en heb me hierbij gericht op de volgende onderzoeksvragen: 
1 Hoe construeren inheemse volken de discussies over het bewijs om hun 
claims op landrechten te ondersteunen? Zoals Appell suggereert: ‘We should 
begin with a single productive resource and work back to the individual(s) 
who have interests of various kinds in that resource.’ Ik heb onderscheid ge-
maakt tussen de verschillende typen belangen zoals een individu die heeft 
bij een losse claim die ik in het veld ben tegengekomen. Ik let daarbij ook op 
de verschillende typen sociale relaties tussen individuen en het schaalniveau 
waarop zij opereren (Appell 1976). 
2 De volgende stap is na te gaan of zulke belangen wel of niet erkend worden als 
emic categorieën binnen de grotere sociale groep, en of ze beschermd worden 
door wederzijdse erkenning of codificatie in wetten (rechten) en regels die 
zich op een bepaalde manier verhouden met de etic categorieën (Appell 1976, 
1984; Wiber 1991). Ik heb kritisch de claims onderzocht die gemaakt worden 
voor landrechten in de ideologieën en praktijken van de verschillende instan-
ties op verschillende tijden en in verschillende politieke situaties. 
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3 In het bijzonder ben ik ingegaan op de manier waarop ideeën tussen verschil-
lende groepen en contexten zijn overgedragen wanneer claims worden ge-
maakt in het Taroko-gebied. Claims zijn nuttig bij het tot uitdrukking bren-
gen van ideeën in bijzondere contexten, maar zij zijn vaak ook meer dan de-
monstraties of verklaringen van hetgeen eigenlijk al duidelijk is en zij spelen 
ook een rol in de ideologische en politieke discussies bij het verwerven van 
landrechten. 
4 Het onderzoeken van instellingen – formele concrete organisaties, wetgeving 
en regulering, en de ongeschreven sociale en culturele normen – levert een 
beter begrip op van waar en waarom conflicten zich voordoen, waar claimen 
worden ingediend en waarom die soms leiden tot perverse resultaten. Of 
meer positief geformuleerd: hoe kunnen programma’s en beleidsmaatregelen 
worden geformuleerd op basis van het zoeken en scheppen van overeenstem-
mingen tussen regels (Gerritsen and Straton 2006: 181). 
5 Dit stelt alle participanten in staat hun clusters van regels te herstructureren 
teneinde beter hun gedeelde doeleinden te dienen (Ostrom 2005). Taiwan is 
ook ‘vergiftigd op een problematisch moment bij het toepassen van mondi-
ale en regionale, juridische en ontwikkelingsbeleid met betrekking tot het 
beheer van het milieu en de natuurlijke hulpbronnen, en de rechten van in-
heemse volken (Roseman 2003: 138). Daarom is er dringend behoefte aan 
een analyse op dit gebied ten einde licht te werpen op beleidsimplementatie 
in de toekomst. Bovendien is een etnografie van de mens-land relaties in het 
Taroko-gebied nodig om de redenen te begrijpen waarom conflicten zich nu 
voordoen en ook vanwege suggesties voor toekomstig beleid dat wordt on-
dersteund door de Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (2005) en verdere juridi-
sche constructies die het belang aangeven van ‘het respecteren en erkennen 
van inheemse opvattingen en manieren van beheer van eigendom’ (Indige-
nous Peoples Basic Law 2005, Article 20; Yang, Chih-wei 2005). 
Tijdens de periode van het doctoraal onderzoek, is me gebleken dat het histo-
risch gedeelte het moeilijkst te bestuderen is omdat het een goede beheersing van 
de Japanse taal vereist om het verspreide materiaal te vinden in zeer verschillen-
de plaatsen en dit vervolgens te analyseren. Maar gebaseerd op voldoende kennis 
en orale geschiedenissen, kreeg ik de kans de formatie te reconstrueren van een 
speciaal gebied als Taroko om de juridische en overheidsstructuren daar te vin-
den. Op basis hiervan kreeg ik een beter besef van de redenen waarom vanaf de 
Japanse tijd tot nu toe landclaims werden gemaakt. Naast de interpretaties van 
de geschiedenis vond ik dat landclaims worden ontwikkeld in twee dimensies: 
individualisering en collectivisering van landrechten. Ik ga er van uit dat conflic-
ten over landrechten over reservaten leiden tot lastige kwesties ten aanzien van 
individualisering die het collectieve karakter vernietigen en een brug slaan naar 
kapitalisme waarmee inheemse mensen niet geholpen zijn. Ik heb gevonden dat 
de overheden en de kapitalisten zich in mijnbouw- en industriële projecten nog 
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steeds inheems land toe-eigenen via individualisering van inheemse landrech-
ten. Ten einde de slechte effecten van individualisering te vermijden, denken in-
heemse mensen na over collectieve rechten. De praktijk van het in kaart brengen 
van het territorium, van het beschermen van de rivieren en van lokale autono-
mie illustreren de manieren waarop inheemse mensen hun soevereiniteit en hun 
landrechten onder collectieve controle hopen terug te krijgen. 
Mijn dissertatie bestaat uit de volgende hoofdstukken: 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik het gebied van Taroko en de juridische rechtsorde 
die de staat heeft geïntroduceerd in de inheemse gebieden. De wijze waarop de 
Japanse autoriteiten aankeken tegen de manieren van leven van de inheemse be-
volking, hun persoonlijkheidskenmerken en karakteristieken vormen tezamen 
het perspectief van wat ik noem ‘de natuurstaat’. De term ‘de natuurstaat’ is ge-
bruikt door westerse politieke filosofen om de condities en karakteristieken van 
‘de ander’ te beschrijven die (nog) leven in omstandigheden van voor de staats-
formatie. Ik heb deze term gebruikt om de bespreken hoe de Japanse autoriteiten 
op basis van deze premisse zijn begonnen met het ontwikkelen van beleid om 
over de inheemse volken te heersen en hun natuurlijke hulpbronnen te beheren 
met het doel het bereiken van een ‘staat van de natuur’ die leidde tot controle 
over deze mensen en de aanwezige hulpbronnen. 
Met betrekking tot het eigendom van het land, was het meeste land in Taiwan in 
handen van de Japanse autoriteiten. Ten aanzien van het inheemse gebied heb 
ik de classificatie gebruikt van een Japanse officier, Iwaki Kamehiko, die belast 
was met het beheer van het inheemse land tijdens de laatste jaren van de Japan-
se heerschappij. Hij maakte een onderscheid tussen drie categorieën inheems 
land: 1. In 1934 leefde ongeveer 51% van de totale inheemse bevolking (84.000) 
in inheemse dorpen en was het hen toegestaan op deze oorspronkelijke plaats 
te blijven wonen; 2. ongeveer 24% van de inheemse bevolking werd vermengd 
met andere groepen; en 3. ongeveer 25% werd verplaatst naar nieuwe gebieden. 
Met andere woorden tenminste de helft van de inheemse bevolking werd gecon-
fronteerd met een bepaalde vorm van migratie. In mijn onderzoeksgebied in 
Taroko heeft bijna de hele inheemse bevolking te maken gehad met dit beleid. 
Gebaseerd op historische analyses heb ik me gericht op hoe de Taroko bevolking 
in verschillende contexten landrechten hebben geclaimd met behulp van karte-
ringsactiviteiten. 
In mijn beschrijvingen in de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 weerklinken de categorieën 
van Iwaki Kamehiko. Zij geven aan wat de ervaringen zijn van de inheemse be-
volking in Taroko met de verschillende vormen van migratie die verder kun-
nen worden onderscheiden als drie typen: 1. diaspora: mensen worden volle-
dig gescheiden van hun oorspronkelijke woongebied door gedwongen of half-
gedwongen migratie; 2. hydribe: gemengde gemeenschappen samengesteld met 
mensen van verschillende herkomst, van verschillende stammen of dorpen met 
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verschillende gebruiken of gaya; en 3. in situ gemeenschappen: mensen die nog 
steeds in hun oorspronkelijke gebied wonen maar die onder controle van nieuwe 
politieke regimes. 
Recente karteringsactiviteiten met betrekking tot het gebied van de Taroko be-
volking reflecteren deze drie vormen van mens-land relaties. Eerder heb ik de 
karteringsprojecten en –activiteiten geïntroduceerd waaraan ik heb deelgeno-
men zowel in het Taroko-gebied als daarbuiten. Deze karteringsprojecten had-
den plaats op verschillende niveaus en hadden verschillende sponsoren en uit-
voerders. Het grootste karteringsproject waarbij ik betrokken ben geweest was 
de Indigenous Traditional Territorial and Land Survey (ITTLS) in opdracht van 
de Council of Indigenous Peoples van de centrale overheid. Dit project omvatte 
alle karteringsactiviteiten in alle 55 inheemse gemeentes (townships) in Taiwan 
gedurende een periode van vijf jaar (2001-2006). Het Taroko-gebied kent drie 
gemeentes: Shoulin, Wanlong en Chousi en was daarom ook betrokken bij dit 
nationale karteringsproject. Tijdens deze jaren werd mij duidelijk dat de in-
heemse bevolking deze karteringsactiviteiten beschouwd heeft als een instru-
ment om hun claims op het land tot uitdrukking te brengen. 
In hoofdstuk 5 bespreek ik enkele van de wettelijke en juridische processen die 
door wetgevers, ambtenaren en inheemse activisten ondernomen zijn, om te on-
derzoeken hoe zij denken over land en gebieden, iets dat heel direct verbonden is 
met de opleving van inheemse rechten. Ik illustreer enkele processen zowel voor 
als na de doorbraak met betrekking tot de Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (IPBL 
2005) ten einde een beter begrip te krijgen van de manier waarop activisten idee-
en over land en territorium gebruiken als wettelijke hulpmiddelen in hun strijd 
voor het verkrijgen van inheemse landrechten. Aan de hand van een case studie 
uit het Taroko-gebied heb ik aangetoond hoe de Truku bevolking strijdt en han-
delt om autonomie verwerven en om trends in de juridische strijd en discussies, 
en in de inheemse beweging aan te geven. Ik bespreek in het bijzonder hoe de 
Truku bevolking omgaat met de onderlinge verbondenheid van land, soevereini-
teit, mensen en rechten om hiermee een toekomstbeeld van autonomie te schep-
pen waarvan zij denken dat het veel van de problemen waarmee zij nu kampen 
(en waardoor ze in het verleden veel geleden hebben) voorkomen kan worden. 
Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat wetgeving een andere manier is om een ideaal uto-
pia van land en territorium in kaart te brengen. 
Naast dit in kaart brengen van een utopia van inheems territorium, worden deze 
landclaims ook in de formeel juridische en institutionele kaders gebracht. Land-
reservaten vormen een gebruikelijke en vaak voorkomende arena voor claims. 
Landreservaten hebben betrekking op land dat in het verleden gereserveerd is 
voor toekomstig gebruik door de inheemse bevolking en waarover zij eigen-
domsrechten hebben verkregen. 
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Inheemse volken in Taiwan hebben deze rechten op landreservaten gekregen 
sinds de Japanse koloniale overheersing. Echter deze vorm van landbezit conflic-
teert in sommige opzichten nog met inheemse ideeën en gebruiken. In Hoofd-
stuk 6 onderzoek ik de belangrijkste typen conflicten en land die het resultaat 
zijn van het conflict tussen de etic substantieve wetten van de staat en de lokale 
regels of gaya (inheemse term voor gebruiksregels en –rechten). Op basis van 
ongeveer 400 gevallen van landclaims, verzameld op verschillende niveaus van 
juridische overheidsinstellingen, maar ook op basis van interviews en interactie 
met lokale inheemse activisten in het Taroko-gebied, is mij duidelijk geworden 
dat wetten uitgevaardigd door de staat, zoals de Indigenous Reservation Land 
Management Procedure (IRLMP), die de processen behandelt voor uitgifte van 
inheemse landreservaten, de voornaamste strijdpunten opleveren voor conflic-
ten over land. Deze IRLMP volgt vier procedures: 1. landmeting en -survey; 2. 
registratie van oppervlaktes; 3. duur van feitelijke gebruiksrechten; en 4. het 
toekennen van eigendomsrechten. Het zijn vooral deze procedures die leiden 
tot steeds sterkere individualistische ideeën onder de inheemse mensen en ge-
meenschappen. Op basis van deze procedures komt steeds sterker naar voren 
de mogelijkheid van een individuele rechtspersoon die ondersteund wordt door 
de individualistische ideeën gebaseerd op een Romeins-Japan-Chinees burger-
lijk wetsysteem. Vanuit deze vier procedures komt een juridisch-individualis-
me naar boven dat McPherson (1962) definieerde als ‘possessive individualism’, 
which equips people to be […] the sole proprietor of his or her skills and owes 
nothing to society for them.’ Vanuit dit perspectief behandelt dit hoofdstuk case 
studies om aan te tonen hoe landreservaten door dit rechtsindividualisme ver-
bonden worden met kapitalisme, dat niet goed is ingebed in inheemse gemeen-
schappen in het Taroko-gebied. 
Veel studies richten zich op gedetailleerde analyses van de politieke en economi-
sche processen die gevolgd worden bij het opzetten van industriële complexen 
voor cementfabrieken en elektriciteitscentrales, maar het ontbreekt daarin aan 
een etnografisch perspectief over de inheemse bewegingen en over de processen 
van inbedding in de industriële cementcomplexen en andere nationale projecten 
zoals de elektriciteitscentrales en nationale parken. 
In hoofdstuk 7 illustreer ik hoe de inheemse bevolking een rol gespeeld heeft 
(van een kleine rol tot een hoofdrol) in al deze processen. Dit is noodzakelijk 
om al deze ‘ontwikkelings’-processen te begrijpen. In deze scenario’s heb ik een 
hegemonie gevonden van het neoliberalisme in het Taroko-gebied dat zichzelf 
gevestigd heeft via wat Davey Harvey beschreef als ‘verrijking door onteigening’. 
Ik heb dat gedaan aan de hand van de metafoor van ‘geld’ in de inheemse ge-
meenschappen om zodoende het oprukken van deze hegemonie in de ontwik-
kelingsscenario’s te bespreken. 
In hoofdstuk 8 en 9 is beschreven hoe inheemse mensen en enkele overheidsin-
stellingen nieuwe vormen van bestuur hebben geconstrueerd voor ‘ambigu ge-
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meenschappelijk bezit’ via ‘onzeker co-management’ van bescherming van rivie-
ren in drie gemeenschappen in de Taroko-gebied: Skadang, Pratan en Meqreq 
in de periode 2000-2010. Gebleken is dat inheemse lokale mensen verwachtten 
dat ze beheerssystemen konden krijgen gebaseerd op co-management waardoor 
hun bestaan en identiteit verbeterd zouden worden. Echter de betrokken over-
heden hebben weinig inspanningen geleverd op dit gebied vanwege de beperkin-
gen van een ontoereikende wettelijke infrastructuur. 
‘Toeval’ is een term die ik gebruik om de resultaten te beschrijven die voortko-
men uit onbekende of onvoorspelbare oorzaken en gevolgen in het proces van 
implementatie van co-management van rivierbescherming. Ik heb hiervoor de 
methodologie gebruikt van Vayda & Walters (1999) – evenemental or event eco-
logy – om de zichtbare lijn van oorzaken en effecten uit te drukken die door mijn 
observaties liep. Voor de resultaten die niet duidelijke lijnen van oorzaak-en-ge-
volg vertoonden heb ik geprobeerd de situatie te contextualiseren met andere in-
directe bronnen van informatie zoals geruchten, geroddel of mijn eigen ervarin-
gen. Hoewel het misschien lijkt dat ik de term ‘toeval’ gebruik om frustratie uit 
de drukken over het falen van de drie gepresenteerde cases, worden mogelijke 
lijnen van oorzaak-en-gevolg wel aangegeven teneinde enkele suggesties te doen 
voor toekomstige implementatie van co-management van rivierbescherming. 
Dubbelzinnigheid over eigendom, lokale managementcapaciteit, juridische in-
frastructuur en de interpretatie en implementatie van wetten, samen met ideeën 
van zelfbeschikking zijn de belangrijkste onderwerpen die gecontextualiseerd 
worden om tot de conclusie te komen dat de inheemse bevolking landrechten 
claimt door middel van deze collectieve acties. Lokale ideeën over soevereiniteit 
illustreren deze landclaims die een nieuwe contextualisering inzetten van land, 
mensen, gemeenschappen, instituties en rechten. 
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